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CONFIDENTIAL.

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS OF TURKEY.

(MEDIATION.)

1877-78.

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SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL.

Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Turkey.
(Mediation.)

No. 1.

The Earl of Derby to Count Schouvaloff.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Foreign Office, May* 6, 1877.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 6th instant, in which you inform me that you are about to proceed to Russia on a short leave of absence.

As your Excellency will then doubtless have an opportunity of personally conferring with your Government, I take this occasion of placing before them some considerations of importance to the future good understanding between Great Britain and Russia.

Her Majesty's Government do not propose again to enter on the question of the justice or necessity of the present war; they have already expressed their views with regard to it, and further discussion would be unavailing. They have accepted the obligations which a state of war imposed upon them, and have lost no time in issuing a Proclamation of Neutrality. They, from the first, warned the Porte that it must not look to them for assistance, and they are determined to carry impartially into effect the policy thus announced, so long as Turkish interests alone are involved.

At the same time they think it right that there should be no misunderstanding as to their position and intentions. Should the war now in progress unfortunately spread, interests may be imperilled which they are equally bound and determined to defend, and it is desirable that they should make it clear, so far as at the outset of the war can be done, what the most prominent of those interests are.

Foremost among them is the necessity of keeping open, uninjured and uninterrupted, the communication between Europe and the East by the Suez Canal. An attempt to blockade or otherwise to interfere with the Canal or its approaches would be regarded by them as a menace to India, and as a grave injury to the commerce of the world. On both these grounds any such step—which they hope and fully believe there is no intention on the part of either belligerent to take—would be inconsistent with the maintenance by them of an attitude of passive neutrality.

The mercantile and financial interests of European nations are also so largely involved in Egypt that an attack on that country, or its occupation, even temporary, for purposes of war, could scarcely be regarded with unconcern by the neutral Powers, certainly not by England.

The vast importance of Constantinople, whether in a military, a political, or a commercial point of view, is too well understood to require explanation. It is, therefore, scarcely necessary to point out that Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to witness with indifference the passing into other hands than those of its present possessors, of a capital holding so peculiar and commanding a position.

The existing arrangements made under European sanction which regulate the navigation of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles appear to them wise and salutary, and there would be, in their judgment, serious objections to their alteration in any material particular.

Her Majesty's Government have thought it right thus frankly to indicate their views. The course of events might show that there were still other interests, as, for instance, on the Persian Gulf, which it would be their duty to protect; but they do not doubt that they will have sufficiently pointed out to your Excellency the limits within which they

hope that the war may be confined, or at all events those within which they themselves would be prepared, so far as present circumstances allow of an opinion being formed, to maintain a policy of abstention and neutrality.

They feel confident that the Emperor of Russia will appreciate their desire to make their policy understood at the outset of the war, and thus to respond to the assurances given by His Imperial Majesty at Livadia, and published at your Excellency's request, when he pledged his word of honour that he had no intention of acquiring Constantinople, and that, if necessity should oblige him to occupy a portion of Bulgaria, it would only be provisionally, and until the peace and safety of the Christian population were secured.

Her Majesty's Government cannot better show their confidence in these declarations of His Imperial Majesty than by requesting your Excellency to be so good as to convey to the Emperor and the Russian Government the frank explanations of British policy which I have had the honour of thus offering to you.

I have, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 2.

The Earl of Derby to Count Beust.

(Confidential.)
Foreign Office, May 19, 1877.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

IT appears to Her Majesty's Government that the time has arrived when, in the interest alike of Great Britain and of Austria-Hungary, it is desirable that a frank and full understanding should be arrived at between them as to the policy which they shall adopt in certain contingencies.

Her Majesty's Government have taken the earliest opportunity since the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war, of announcing their determination to maintain a neutral policy as between the two countries engaged in hostilities. Declarations to this effect have been made by them publicly in Parliament, and in an even more formal manner by the Proclamation of Neutrality lately issued. But while avowing and defending the policy above stated, they have from the first made it known that this attitude of quiescence would not be maintained by them if, as a result of the military operations now in progress, danger to British interests should ensue, and that in such case they reserved their full freedom of action.

One of the events which, in making this reserve, they have had in view, is the possible seizure of Constantinople by a Russian force. The issue of the present campaign cannot be foreseen; but, from what is known of the numerical superiority of the Russian armies in Europe, and of the weakness and disorganization of the Turkish troops, it would seem not improbable that the Russian advance may be rapid, and that the Russian Commanders may at no very distant date find the capital within their reach. It is equally probable that, once in possession of Constantinople, the feeling of the Russian people, excited by a successful campaign, would make it difficult for the Emperor, however well-disposed to fulfil the promises which he has given, to abandon a conquest the acquisition of which has notoriously been for generations past an object of Russian ambition.

Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt but that the independence of Constantinople and the freedom of the Straits are objects not less important to Austria than to England, and which Austria, like England, will not be prepared to forego without an effort. If such be the case it ought not to be difficult to come to an understanding, according to which common interests shall be defended by previously concerted action.

I had the honour of lately making known to your Excellency, confidentially, the contents of a note which I have addressed to Count Schouvaloff on this among other subjects. The purpose of the present communication is to invite the Government which your Excellency represents to consider and discuss a plan of joint action in the event above referred to, namely, that of a Russian march on Constantinople. It may be hoped that the contingency in question is not likely to occur, but in matters of such gravity nothing which admits of calculation should be left to chance.

It seems to Her Majesty's Government that the naval force of which they can dispose is adequate for the emergency, so far as maritime operations are concerned; but the distance of England from the scene of action, and the smallness of

the land force available at short notice, give peculiar value to the co-operation of a great military Power such as that which your Excellency represents.

I postpone all questions of detail until I learn from your Excellency whether the Austro-Hungarian Government is prepared to enter into confidential negotiations on the basis above stated.

It must not be forgotten that if the action taken is to be effectual, definitive arrangements cannot be long delayed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 3.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 182. Secret.)
Foreign Office, May 23, 1877.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT herewith, for your Excellency's confidential information, copy of a note which I addressed to Count Beust on the 19th instant,* explaining that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the time has arrived when Great Britain and Austria-Hungary should come to a frank and full understanding as to the policy which they should adopt in common in certain contingencies.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 4.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 204. Confidential.)
Foreign Office, May 23, 1877.

My Lord,

THE Russian Chargé d'Affaires called upon me to-day at my request, and I informed him that in view of the condition of public opinion in this country it was very desirable that Her Majesty's Government should receive with as little delay as possible an answer to the note which I had addressed to Count Schouvaloff before his departure from England as to the limits within which this country would be able to maintain a passive attitude during the present war. I said that in the present state of affairs it seemed not unlikely that the Russian forces might have shortly some considerable military success, and that the prospect or possibility of an advance upon Constantinople would cause excitement and apprehension here which it would be in the interest both of this Government and his own to allay. I wished him, therefore, to impress upon Prince Gortchakow the expediency of our receiving assurances from the Cabinet St. Petersburgh of a nature to satisfy public feeling in England.

M. de Bartholomei said that he expected Count Schouvaloff to be back in England by the 6th or 7th June, and he asked whether it would not be sufficient if his Excellency were the bearer of these assurances.

I said that I did not wish to fix any particular date; but I thought it was a matter of great importance that the answer should be received as soon as possible.

M. de Bartholomei promised to forward the substance of my observations to St. Petersburgh by telegraph.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 5.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received May 29.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Confidential.)
Vienna, May 29, 1877, 6 P.M.

A MESSENGER with Count Andrassy's answer to your Lordship's letter to the Austrian Ambassador will leave to-night. His Excellency objected to giving me

* No. 2.

details of its contents, as he wishes you to receive it *in extenso* without an imperfect impression of his views being conveyed to you by telegraph. He says that though the Powers have not opposed the war from a conviction that the *status quo* in Turkey cannot be maintained, Russia can only be permitted to make peace on terms to which they can assent. He has frequently stated at St. Petersburgh what he cannot permit, and your Lordship has now expressed more formally the view of England. It would, in his opinion, however, have been better if England and Austria had first come to a clear understanding between themselves before stating their views to Russia. Your Lordship will now learn in detail those of Austria, and if you accept his programme he feels confident that it can be carried out without a resort to joint measures. He said that the Russian forces are still a long way from Constantinople, but, in his opinion, it is a matter of indifference whether they get there or not, as they cannot possibly remain against the will of Europe. He expressed entire confidence in the Emperor's declarations, and on my objecting that His Majesty might not have the power to fulfil them he said that His Majesty may have proved himself to be weak in other cases, but we can, if necessary, strengthen his desire to act up to his engagement. He has submitted his views to Her Majesty's Government without reserve, trusting to his communication being considered strictly confidential, and he has not hitherto taken them (the public) here into his confidence, because he believes that if the two Governments wish to obtain their objects without war they are most likely to do so by keeping their plans secret, and by avoiding premature action.

He proposes sending some further explanations by my messenger on Thursday, but he has lost no time in meeting your Lordship's overtures by his present communication.

I asked whether M. Novikoff was bearer of any communication from him to Russia, and he assured me in the most positive manner that he was not.

No. 6.

Count Andrassy to Count Beust.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Count Beust, June 1.*)

(Translation.)

Vienna, May 29, 1877.

M. le Comte,

THE English messenger has brought me your Excellency's Report, with the Earl of Derby's note dated May 19. I do not delay to transmit to you at once a reply thereto.

I am very grateful to Lord Derby for the suggestion of an exchange of ideas. We can only expect advantage to arise therefrom.

If I comprehend rightly the action of the British Government up to the outbreak of the present war, as well as the communications which they have made to us, there is no question in the present exchange of opinions of a departure from the course hitherto adopted by them, but of the protection of the interests of both parties.

Had it been thought fit ("sollte") to stop Russia in the war which she had undertaken, England, like us, was in possession of the means. The Treaty of April 15, 1856, entitled us to protest against the invasion of Turkish territory. Article VIII of the Treaty of March 30 of the same year provided for a mediation between the Porte and Russia.

Neither England, nor France, nor we ourselves, have had recourse to this. The reason, on the one hand, lay in the fact that no one of the Powers wished to intervene to preserve the *status quo*, as they were not convinced of the possibility of maintaining it; on the other hand, in the knowledge that the fact ("faktum") of the war involved no such danger to themselves as not even the dread of an European war should have withheld them from averting; and, lastly, that such a danger might first be created by the results of the war, the limitation of which, however, would lie in the power of Europe.

The position which we have now to take up appears to me to follow naturally from the attitude which we observed in tacit agreement with England before the outbreak of the war.

Since, in spite of our having offered the means thereto, we have not kept Russia from war; since we have declared, directly or indirectly, that we were not willing to interfere on behalf of Turkey; since we have made no *casus belli* of the invasion by Russia, the honesty and candour which we wish to observe in all our relations require that we should not restrain Russia from deciding her quarrel by arms, and eventually overcoming the Porte.

Since, however, on the other hand, the consequences of such a war might produce a state of things affecting our interests as well as those of Europe, we must reserve our whole influence for the final settlement of events.

The object of an understanding cannot therefore be that the action of Russia, so far as it is directed to the settlement by arms of the struggle with the Porte, should be opposed; the basis of an understanding lies rather in the answer to the question, What are the consequences of the present war which we can accept, and what are those which we cannot allow?

With this view it is impossible to settle beforehand a programme which shall be equally applicable in all conceivable eventualities of the war.

It must be framed in one way if the Porte, as is possible, is not overcome by force of arms, and retains her European domains; in another way, if the course of events secures for Russia the satisfaction of a victorious campaign, but at the same time gives evidence that the elements of continued existence are still inherent in the Ottoman Empire; in another way, again, necessarily, if the war leads not only to a military overthrow of Turkey, but also gives a shock to her stability and discloses signs of her inevitable dissolution.

Convinced that a programme which would be useful and practicable in one of these eventualities could not possibly be applied to the others, we consider that under present circumstances it is best to settle only upon the general outlines of a programme, and to specify those issues of the war which, as affecting our interests, we could not accept.

This course is pursued in Lord Derby's letter to Count Schouvaloff, and although that document mostly refers to eventualities which appear to us but little likely to arise, yet we do not hesitate hereinafter to specify those of our interests which we are determined to defend against all eventualities of the war.

Although we consider the Treaty of Paris as capable of modification, and would not insist upon its full maintenance, yet we adhere to the fundamental ideas of that Treaty. Consequently we could not accept:—

1. That the exclusive protectorate over the Christian populations of the Balkan Peninsula should be conceded to any one Christian Power.

2. That the definitive settlement of the results of the war should take place without the participation of the Guaranteeing Powers, and that the creation into a State ("Constituirung") of the Christian populations of the Balkan Peninsula should be granted ("oktroyirt") through the action of a single Power.

Furthermore we cannot consent to—

3. An acquisition of territory by Russia on the right bank of the Danube.

4. The incorporation of Roumania with Russia, or the dependence of that Principality on the Russian Empire.

5. The erection in the above-named countries of a *secundogeniture*, whether Russian or Austro-Hungarian.

6. The occupation by Russia of Constantinople.

7. Finally, no large Slave State should be established at the expense of the non-Slave elements of the Balkan Peninsula, and in any case the reconstitution should be limited at most to the autonomy of the present provinces under a native Chief.

This is the position we have taken up. It was our view before the war and will unchangeably remain so.

We have not, on the other hand, avoided pointing out to the Russian Government the essence of the points in which our interests might be affected. Her Britannic Majesty's Government is aware that, at the time of the Sumarokoff mission, we rejected the idea of a Russian occupation of Bulgaria as a guarantee for the reforms.

We did this for reasons which, having regard to the private nature of the correspondence between Sovereign and Sovereign, we did not make public, but which, nevertheless, left no doubt as to the view we took of our interests. We expressed the fear that after an occupation of Bulgaria it would be hardly possible for the Russian Government to withdraw their troops, and to hand over the Christians to the Porte, after they had once been emancipated. Neither could we assent to a permanent Russian supremacy over Bulgaria, or, in fact, on the right bank of the Danube.

We have likewise declared that an invasion of Servia by Russian troops, even if only as a temporary military measure, would be incompatible with our interests.

In both these cases we have received from the Russian Government assurances

in substance satisfactory, and we have also observed nothing in the attitude of Russia to give us reason to suspect that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh contemplates acting without regard to our interests.

For the continuance of this disposition on the part of Russia we possess a double security: firstly, in our confidence in the Emperor Alexander's intentions; secondly, in the circumstance that Russia has in fact entered into action with a full knowledge of our interests and of our serious intention to protect them, and has, at the same time, placed herself in a military position which she would certainly have avoided if she had not intended to abstain from injuring the interests of Austria-Hungary.

In presence of this double guarantee it would be acting on our part contrary to all the laws of loyalty, and to all good faith, to enter upon any hostile action towards Russia so long as she by her attitude gives no occasion for it. Should, however—which we cannot suppose—a change occur in the course of events which would make these securities ineffectual; should the Russian Government, under the pressure of an internal movement (*lit.* "current"), or through other unforeseen circumstances, cease to be master of its decisions, the question presents itself to us—which must under any circumstances be answered—whether we are determined and ready to stand up for what we have stated to be our interests with the whole strength of the Monarchy, and, if necessary, by force of arms.

Our answer on this point is decidedly, Yes.

This is the unreserved statement of our position. Nor do we delay at once communicating as frankly our views with regard to those points which England has declared that she must protect.

Of the interests which the letter to Count Schouvaloff sets forth, we can, in regard to two—namely, the freedom of the passage through the Suez Canal, and the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Persian Gulf—express the assurance, without awaiting any knowledge of the Russian reply, that Russia, under present circumstances, does not, and cannot, contemplate any alteration in this respect.

The precautious ("cautelen") respecting the possession of Constantinople and the passage of the Dardanelles come, therefore, alone under consideration.

We have taken up a position towards Russia in regard to the first question, and had no occasion to touch upon the latter. As, however, the free passage of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus for Russian shipping is identical with the surrender of Constantinople, the two questions appear to us to be but one.

We are, in fact, of the opinion to which Lord Derby gives expression in his note of the 19th of May, that these points interest us also in a high degree. We cannot, however, refrain from making a special remark as to the view which we take of this interest.

That Russia should neither command Constantinople or the Dardanelles is to us of great importance, but we can only contemplate this question in connection with all the important interests which we have defined above. If we should be obliged to concede that the principle of the Treaty of 1856, by which no single Power should exercise a Protectorate over the Balkan Peninsula, must be given up in favour of Russia; if we allow the creation into a State ("Constituirung") of these populations to take place through Russian influence, without our co-operation; if we should permit Russia to incorporate Roumania, to take Bulgaria, or any district on the right bank of the Danube, under its direct rule or *secundogeniture*, the question whether Constantinople were actually in the possession of Russia or not would be a matter of very secondary importance to Austria-Hungary. If we pointed out to Russia that a Russian occupation of Constantinople could not be permitted, it was because of the conviction that the Power in possession of Constantinople must, in the natural course of events, command Bulgaria and other districts of the Balkans, just as the State which holds Bulgaria and the districts beyond must inevitably obtain possession of Constantinople.

We accordingly consider all the interests which require protection in the East as bound up together, and are of opinion that no one of them can be given up without sacrificing the other.

This conviction determines the exchange of ideas to which the communication of the Earl of Derby has given rise. If his Lordship shares the views of the Imperial and Royal Government the natural solidarity of our interests stands out prominently of itself, and there remains for a further exchange of ideas the question of coming to an understanding as to the means by which these interests can be most surely protected, if possible without endangering the peace of Europe.

Your Excellency is authorized to communicate these remarks to Lord Derby upon the understanding that he agrees to keep our overtures secret, and should he desire it you may leave a copy with him.

Receive, &c.
(Signed) ANDRASSY.

No. 7.

The Earl of Derby to Count Beust.

(Confidential.)
M. l'Ambassadeur, *Foreign Office, June 2, 1877.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I have laid before my colleagues in Cabinet the note from Count Andrassy which you were good enough to communicate to me yesterday, and that my colleagues agree with me in thinking that it contains a frank, clear, and satisfactory statement of the views of the Austro-Hungarian Government as to their position with regard to the possible effects upon the interests of the Empire, as well as upon those of Europe, of the consequences of the war between Russia and Turkey.

Her Majesty's Government concur with Count Andrassy that the natural harmony of the interests of Great Britain and Austria-Hungary is self-evident, and they are prepared for the further exchange of ideas which his Excellency invites us to the means by which those common interests can be most securely protected.

I have, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 8.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 192. Most Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 2, 1877.*

I INCLOSE herewith, for your Excellency's confidential information, the accompanying translation of Count Andrassy's answer to my note of the 19th ultimo,* respecting the possible effect of the war upon the interests of Great Britain. The answer was communicated to me yesterday by Count Beust.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 9.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 193. Most Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 4, 1877.*

AT an interview which I had on the 2nd instant with the Austrian Ambassador I informed his Excellency that I had communicated to the Cabinet Count Andrassy's reply to my note of the 14th ultimo, and that my colleagues agreed with me in regarding that answer as a frank, clear, and satisfactory statement of the views of the Austrian Government.

Referring to a passage in the last paragraph but one of Count Andrassy's despatch, I said that Her Majesty's Government were prepared for the further exchange of ideas which his Excellency considered to be desirable on the subject of the means by which the common interests of the two countries should be protected.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

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* No. 6.

No. 10.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 477. Confidential.)
Vienna, May 27, 1877.

My Lord,

COUNT ANDRASSY received yesterday the note which your Lordship addressed to Count Beust on the 19th instant, on the subject of the common policy to be adopted by England and Austria in certain contingencies, and I have learnt from Baron Calice that he is already preparing an answer to it, which would contain a confidential statement of Austrian views as to future eventualities.

As Baron Calice was, however, very cautious and reserved in speaking upon the subject, and as I said it appeared to me from his language that he did not expect your Lordship's overture to be accepted, he explained that he by no means intended to convey such an impression.

He then mentioned that a report had just been received from St. Petersburgh, stating that an answer to your Lordship's letter to Count Schouvaloff of the 6th instant will thank Her Majesty's Government for the frankness with which they have expressed their views, and give an assurance that there is no intention of advancing on Constantinople.

Such an assurance, however, Baron Calice admitted, is contrary to public opinion in Russia, and is, therefore, not to be relied on.

I propose to-morrow or next day to seek an interview with Count Andrassy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 11.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 480. Very Confidential.)
Vienna, May 29, 1877.

My Lord,

AT an interview which I had with Count Andrassy to-day, he informed me that he had just completed an answer to the letter which your Lordship addressed to Count Beust on the 19th instant, and that it will be forwarded by a messenger to London to-night. He said he would rather not communicate to me the details of its contents, as he considers it important that you should form your first impression of them from its perusal *in extenso*, and without having received such an imperfect idea of his views as could be conveyed by telegraph.

He said there were three considerations which it was necessary to bear in mind:—

1. That the Powers have not opposed the war undertaken by Russia, in consequence of their conviction that the *status quo* in Turkey cannot be maintained.

2. That peace ought not to take place except in concert with the Powers and on terms to which they can assent, and—

3. That there is the possible eventuality of a direct peace between the belligerents to be guarded against.

As to the terms of peace, he said that he had frequently acquainted the Russian Government with the changes to which Austria would object, and that your Lordship has now in a more formal manner expressed the views of Her Majesty's Government on the subject. It might, in his opinion, have been better if England and Austria had first come to a clear understanding between themselves before communicating their views to Russia, but your Lordship will now learn fully those of Austria, and if you accept the programme which will be submitted to you, he feels confident that it can be carried out, and he trusts without the necessity of resorting to material measures.

With respect to your Lordship's suggestion as to the expediency of preventing the advance of the Russian forces to Constantinople, he said they were still a long way from the Bosphorus, but that, in his opinion, it is a matter of indifference whether they get there or not, as they could not possibly remain against the will of Europe.

He said he had entire confidence in the sincerity of the Emperor Alexander's declarations, and, as I observed that it might not be in His Majesty's power to fulfil them, he said the Emperor may have proved himself to be weak in other cases, but that, if necessary, means may be taken to strengthen his desire to act up to his engagements.

His Excellency added that he had submitted his views to Her Majesty's Government without reserve, trusting that his communication would be considered strictly confidential, and that he has not hitherto taken the public here into his confidence, because he believes that the best way to obtain the objects without war which the two Governments desire is to keep their plans secret and to avoid premature action.

He said he had lost no time in meeting your Lordship's overture by his present communication, but he will probably send some further explanations of his views by my messenger on Thursday.

In answer to an inquiry on my part, he assured me, in the most positive manner, that the Russian Ambassador, who had gone to St. Petersburgh, was not charged by him with any communication to his Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 12.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 275. Confidential.)
St. Petersburgh, May 27, 1877.

My Lord,

I HAD a visit from Count Schouvaloff this morning. His Excellency informed me that M. Novikow, the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, was expected to arrive this evening.

I believe that the Imperial Cabinet are awaiting his presence here in order to take a final decision in regard to the answer to be given to your Lordship's note to Count Schouvaloff before his departure from London.

Count Schouvaloff stated that he should leave for England on Sunday next, the 3rd June, and that he hopes that the explanations with which he will be charged will be satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government.

In the course of conversation he expressed an opinion that the question relating to the Dardanelles could not be treated by Russia and Turkey alone, but in concert with Europe.

He stated that the terms of a future peace would be concerted with the European Powers.

In referring to the declaration of Roumanian independence, Count Schouvaloff stated that it was disapproved by the Imperial Government, and that Russia would take no step in regard to it without the European concert.

In the course of our conversation (which was purely of a private and not of an official character) I could perceive that doubts are entertained here of ultimately obtaining the concert of Austria to granting autonomy to the Christian provinces in Turkey, and that it is feared that England will be influenced by the counsels of Austria. On the other hand, the assurances given to Count Schouvaloff by Prince Bismarck, on his late visit to Friederichsruhe, appeared to be so favourable to Russia, that his Excellency's only doubt was as to how far they would be fulfilled.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 13.

Prince Gortchakow to Count Schouvaloff.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Count Schouvaloff, June 8.)

M. le Comte,
St. Pétersbourg, le $\frac{18}{30}$ Mai, 1877.

VOTRE Excellence a été chargée par Lord Derby d'une lettre qui expose les vues du Cabinet Anglais quant aux questions qui pourraient être impliquées dans la guerre actuelle et toucheraient à des intérêts que l'Angleterre doit défendre.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur en a pris connaissance avec un vif intérêt et apprécie la franchise d'explications dont le but est d'écarter des malentendus entre les deux Gouvernements.

Notre auguste Maître m'ordonne d'y répondre par une entière réciprocité, en vous mettant en mesure d'exposer avec la même franchise et la même clarté nos vues, tant

sur les points mentionnés par Lord Derby que sur ceux qui touchent à des intérêts que, de son côté, Sa Majesté Impériale a le devoir de sauvegarder.

Le Cabinet Impérial ne veut ni bloquer, ni interrompre, ni menacer en rien, la navigation du Canal de Suez. Il le considère comme une œuvre internationale, intéressant le commerce du monde, et qui doit rester hors de toute atteinte.

L'Egypte fait partie de l'Empire Ottoman, et ses contingents figurent dans l'armée Turque. La Russie pourrait donc se considérer comme en guerre avec elle. Toutefois, le Cabinet Impérial ne méconnaît ni les intérêts Européens engagés dans ce pays, ni ceux de l'Angleterre en particulier. Il ne fera pas entrer l'Egypte dans le rayon de ses opérations militaires.

Pour ce qui concerne Constantinople, sans pouvoir préjuger la marche ni l'issue de la guerre, le Cabinet Impérial répète qu'une acquisition de cette capitale est exclue des vues de Sa Majesté l'Empereur. Il reconnaît qu'en tous cas le sort de Constantinople est une question d'intérêt commun, qui ne peut être réglée que par une entente générale, et que si la possession de cette ville devait être mise en question elle ne saurait appartenir à aucune des Puissances de l'Europe.

Quant aux Détroits, quoique les deux rives appartiennent au même Souverain, ils forment le débouché exclusif de deux vastes mers où tout le monde a des intérêts. Il importe donc à la paix et à l'équilibre général que cette question soit réglée d'un commun accord sur des bases équitables et efficacement garanties.

Lord Derby a fait allusion à d'autres intérêts Britanniques pouvant être affectés par l'extension éventuelle de la guerre, comme le Golfe Persique et la route des Indes. Le Cabinet Impérial déclare qu'il n'étendra pas la guerre au delà de ce qu'exige le but hautement et clairement proclamé pour lequel Sa Majesté l'Empereur a été obligé de prendre les armes. Il aura égard aux intérêts Britanniques mentionnés par Lord Derby, tant que l'Angleterre restera dans la neutralité.

Il a le droit d'attendre que, de son côté, le Gouvernement Anglais prendra également en juste considération les intérêts particuliers qui pour la Russie sont engagés dans cette guerre et en vue desquels elle s'est imposée de si grands sacrifices.

Ces intérêts résident dans la nécessité absolue de mettre un terme à la déplorable situation des Chrétiens sous la domination des Turcs aux crises permanentes qu'elle provoque.

Cet état de choses et les violences qui l'accompagnent excitent en Russie une agitation motivée par le sentiment Chrétien, très profond dans le peuple Russe, et par les liens de foi et de race qui l'unissent à une grande partie des populations Chrétiennes de la Turquie. Le Gouvernement Impérial est d'autant plus obligé d'en tenir compte, qu'elle réagit à la fois sur la situation intérieure et extérieure de l'Empire. A chacune de ces crises sa politique est suspectée et incriminée, ses relations internationales, son commerce, ses finances, son crédit en sont affectés.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur ne peut pas laisser la Russie exposée indéfiniment à ces chances désastreuses qui entravent son développement pacifique, et lui causent un préjudice incalculable.

C'est pour en tarir la source que Sa Majesté Impériale s'est décidée à imposer à son pays les charges de la guerre.

Ce but ne peut être atteint que si les populations Chrétiennes de la Turquie sont placées dans une situation où leur existence et leur sécurité seraient efficacement garanties contre les intolérables abus de l'administration Turque. Cet intérêt vital pour la Russie n'est en contradiction avec aucun des intérêts de l'Europe, qui souffre, de son côté, de l'état précaire de l'Orient.

Le Cabinet Impérial s'est efforcé de le réaliser avec le concours des Puissances amies et alliées.

Obligé de le poursuivre seul, notre auguste Maître est résolu à ne pas poser les armes avant de l'avoir complétement, sûrement, efficacement garantie.

Veuillez exposer ces considérations à Lord Derby, en lui disant que le Cabinet Impérial est en droit d'espérer que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique les appréciera avec le même sentiment d'équité qui nous porte à respecter les intérêts de l'Angleterre, et qu'il y puisera la même conviction que nous, c'est-à-dire, qu'il n'y a rien dans les vues échangées entre les deux Gouvernements avec une franchise réciproque qui ne puisse se concilier pour le maintien de leurs bons rapports et la paix de l'Orient et de l'Europe.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) GORTCHAKOW.

No. 14.

Memorandum of a Confidential Conversation of Count Schouvaloff with Lord Derby, June 8, 1877.

SA Majesté l'Empereur attache le plus grand prix au maintien des bons rapports entre les deux pays. Il y fera tous ses efforts, mais il faut que le Cabinet Anglais s'y prête de sa part.

Il n'y a rien à ajouter à la lettre du Chancelier Prince Gortchacow en ce qui concerne le Canal de Suez et l'Egypte. La Russie ne touchera pas à ces deux points.

Pour ce qui est de Constantinople, nos assurances ne peuvent porter que sur une prise de possession ou une occupation permanente. Cela serait un fait singulier et sans précédent, si au début d'une guerre, l'un des belligérants s'engageait d'avance à ne pas poursuivre ses opérations militaires jusque sous les murs de la capitale. Il n'est pas impossible que l'obstination des Turcs, surtout s'ils se savent garantis contre une pareille éventualité, ne prolonge la guerre au lieu de l'abréger.

Une fois les Ministres Anglais pleinement assurés que nous ne resterons en aucun cas à Constantinople, il dépend de l'Angleterre et des autres Puissances, de nous dispenser même d'en approcher. Il leur suffira d'agir sur les Turcs afin de rendre la paix possible avant d'en venir à cette extrémité. C'est à quoi, pour notre part, nous nous prêterons volontiers.

Pour ce qui concerne les Détroits, les arrangements en vertu desquels la Mer Noire, fermée en temps de paix, est ouverte en temps de guerre à toutes les flottes ennemies de la Russie, ont été conçus dans un sentiment de défiance et d'hostilité à son égard. C'est une question qui ne peut être révisée que d'un commun accord, de manière à garantir la Mer Noire contre les conséquences de la position anormale et exceptionnelle des Détroits. Serait-il possible pour la Russie de s'engager, au début d'une guerre qui peut être heureuse pour elle, à ne pas faire valoir devant l'Europe la nécessité d'une révision d'un ordre de choses qui a été établi contre elle?

L'Angleterre semble craindre que l'extension ou les conséquences de la guerre ne nous amènent à menacer Bassorah et le Golfe Persique. Nous n'avons aucun intérêt à troubler l'Angleterre dans ses possessions des Indes, et, par conséquent, dans ses communications. La guerre actuelle ne l'exige pas, car le but en est clairement défini, et il serait plutôt compliqué que facilité par une extension aussi vaste de la lutte.

Le Comte Schouvaloff est autorisé à donner à ce sujet les assurances les plus catégoriques, mais en ce cas la Russie est en droit de s'attendre à son tour que l'Angleterre n'entreprendra aucune action hostile contre elle.

Il faut en venir au but essentiel de la guerre, c'est là le plus important. Si une entente pouvait se faire sur ce point, si l'objectif à atteindre était bien défini et le champ des opérations nettement délimité, toutes les questions accessoires tomberaient d'elles-mêmes, et le résultat serait d'autant plus facilement réalisé qu'il rencontrerait le concours de la bonne volonté de toutes les Puissances, au lieu des obstacles qui l'éloignent et le compliquent.

C'est sur quoi le Comte Schouvaloff attire toute l'attention de Lord Derby en précisant aussi clairement et pratiquement que possible les vues du Cabinet Impérial à ce sujet.

Ce qu'il faut absolument à la Russie, c'est de mettre fin aux crises permanentes de l'Orient, d'un côté en affirmant la supériorité de ses armes, de manière à ce qu'à l'avenir, les Turcs ne soient pas tentés de la défier à la légère; de l'autre côté, en mettant les Chrétiens, et surtout ceux de la Bulgarie, dans une situation efficacement garantie contre les abus de l'administration Turque.

Ce qu'il faut à l'Angleterre, c'est le maintien en principe de l'Empire Ottoman et l'inviolabilité de Constantinople et des Détroits.

Ces vues ne sont pas inconciliables.

Une fois la guerre engagée, nous ne pouvons accepter de restriction à nos opérations éventuelles. Elles restent subordonnées exclusivement aux nécessités militaires, mais les conséquences de cette guerre peuvent être renfermées d'avance dans certaines limites convenues.

Nous pourrions donner dès-à-présent l'assurance que si la neutralité des Puissances est maintenue et si la Porte nous demande la paix avant que nos armées n'aient franchi les Balkans, l'Empereur consentirait à ne pas dépasser cette ligne.

La paix en ce cas devrait être conclue aux conditions suivantes:

La Bulgarie jusqu'aux Balkans serait érigée en province vassale autonome sous la garantie de l'Europe.

Les troupes et les fonctionnaires Turcs en seraient éloignés, les forteresses désarmées et rasées.

Le "self-government" y serait établi avec l'appui d'une milice nationale à organiser le plus tôt possible.

Les Puissances s'accorderaient pour assurer à la partie de la Bulgarie au sud des Balkans, ainsi qu'aux autres provinces Chrétiennes de la Turquie, les meilleures garanties possibles d'une administration régulière.

Le Monténégro et la Serbie recevraient une augmentation de territoire qui sera déterminée en commun.

La Bosnie et l'Herzégovine seraient dotées des institutions jugées d'un commun accord compatible avec leur état intérieur et propres à y assurer une bonne administration indigène.

La situation limitrophe de ces deux provinces avec l'Autriche-Hongrie, donne à cette dernière une voix prépondérante dans leur organisation future.

La Serbie, comme la Bulgarie, resteraient placées sous la suzeraineté du Sultan; les rapports du suzerain et des vassaux seront définis de manière à prévenir les conflits.

Pour ce qui est de la Roumanie, qui vient de proclamer son indépendance, l'Empereur est d'avis que c'est une question qui ne peut être réglée que par une entente générale.

Si ces conditions sont acceptées, les Cabinets pourraient exercer une pression collective sur la Porte, en l'avertissant, qu'en cas de refus, elle serait abandonnée aux conséquences de la guerre.

Si la Porte demandait la paix et acceptait les conditions énumérées plus haut avant que nos armées n'aient franchi la ligne des Balkans, la Russie accepterait la paix, mais se réserve le droit de stipuler quelques avantages particuliers comme compensation des charges de la guerre.

Ces avantages ne dépasseraient pas la restitution de la partie de la Bessarabie cédée en 1856 jusqu'au bras septentrional du Danube (c'est-à-dire, le delta des bouches de ce fleuve reste exclu), et la cession de Batoum avec un territoire adjacent.

En pareil cas, la Roumanie pourrait d'un commun accord être dédommagée, soit par la proclamation de son indépendance, soit si elle restait vassale par une partie de la Dobroudja.

Si l'Autriche-Hongrie réclamait de son côté une compensation, soit pour les acquisitions faites par la Russie, soit comme gage de sécurité contre les remaniements ci-dessus mentionnés au profit des Principautés Chrétiennes de la presqu'île des Balkans, la Russie ne s'opposerait pas à ce qu'elle cherche ces compensations en Bosnie et en partie en Herzégovine.

Telles sont les bases auxquelles Sa Majesté l'Empereur donnerait son assentiment en vue d'établir l'entente avec l'Angleterre et l'Europe et d'arriver à une prompte paix.

Le Comte Schouvaloff est autorisé à pressentir l'opinion de Lord Derby quant à ces conditions de paix, sans lui cacher le prix que le Cabinet Impérial attache à une bonne entente avec le Cabinet de Londres.

Pour résumer, si la Porte demandait la paix, et acceptait les conditions ci-dessus, avant que les armes Russes n'aient franchi les Balkans, l'Empereur consentirait à ne pas pousser plus loin les opérations de guerre.

Si le Gouvernement Turc s'y refusait, la Russie devrait poursuivre la guerre jusqu'à ce que la Porte soit forcée de souscrire à la paix. En ce cas, les conditions du Cabinet Impérial pourraient être autres.

En exposant ainsi, avec une entière franchise, le but que se propose l'Empereur et qu'il ne dépassera pas autant que la guerre se maintiendra de ce côté-ci des Balkans, Sa Majesté offre le moyen de localiser la guerre et d'empêcher la dissolution de l'Empire Ottoman; mais il importe à l'Empereur de savoir si dans les limites indiquées, il peut être assuré de la neutralité de l'Angleterre, neutralité qui exclurait une occupation même temporaire de Constantinople et des Détroits par cette Puissance.

Lord Derby a dit que le Comte Schouvaloff ne pouvait s'attendre à recevoir de lui une réponse à des propositions aussi sérieuses et qu'il en conférerait avec ses collègues.

No. 15.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 226. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 8, 1877.*

THE Russian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon on his return from St. Petersburgh, and placed in my hands a reply from his Government to the note which I had addressed to him on his departure from England. Of this reply I have forwarded to your Excellency a copy in my despatch No. 223 of this day's date.

Count Schouvaloff said that in addition, and as a separate matter, he was authorized to offer an exchange of ideas on the question of the possible conditions of peace, supposing the Porte to be willing to come to terms before the Russian forces have crossed the Balkans.

His Excellency said that the discussion must be made subject to two conditions:—

Firstly, that these confidential proposals should not be made public without his first having an opportunity of verifying the accuracy of any statements attributed to him; and, secondly, that in the event of Her Majesty's Government declining to enter on such an exchange of ideas, the terms proposed should not be communicated to the Porte.

To these conditions I agreed.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 16.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 228. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 9, 1877.*

I INFORMED your Excellency in my despatch No. 226, Confidential, of yesterday's date, of the proposal made by the Russian Ambassador for an exchange of ideas as to the possible terms of peace between Russia and Turkey.

Having obtained my consent to the conditions on which that proposal was made Count Schouvaloff went on to relate to me the substance of the instructions which he had received on this subject.

As the communication was important and of considerable length, his Excellency promised to furnish me with a written statement of what had passed, and he has accordingly placed in my hands this afternoon a Confidential Memorandum, of which I inclose a copy for your Excellency's information.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 17.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 287.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May 31, 1877.*

I CALLED to-day at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to take leave of Prince Gortchakow previous to his departure with the Emperor to the head-quarters of the southern army.

His Highness informed me that Count Schouvaloff would return immediately to London, and was the bearer of the reply of the Imperial Government to the note which your Lordship had addressed to him on the 6th instant.

Prince Gortchakow observed that he could not allow his answer to be made known until it had been communicated to your Lordship, tartly observing that your Lordship's note had reached the Cabinet of Rome before it had been placed in his hands.

Consequently his Highness said that he could not impart to me, even confidentially, the nature or substance of his reply, but that he had instructed M. de Giers, in

* No. 14.

his absence, to communicate it to me as soon as he had information of its having been communicated to your Lordship. At the same time his Highness expressed his conviction that the interests of the two countries in the East ought not to clash ("se heurter"), and his hope and expectation that the note of which Count Schouvaloff was the bearer, as also the verbal explanation with which it would be accompanied, would be satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government.

I inquired of his Highness in what light the Imperial Government regarded the declaration of independence by Roumania.

Prince Gortchakow replied that he regarded it as a "fait accompli," *de facto*, but not *de jure*. It was a question which could only be treated later in conjunction with the European Powers.

His Highness believed that the Austrian Cabinet took a similar view of it.

In regard to Servia, Prince Gortchakow stated that Prince Milan and the Servian Government had expressed their readiness, in the present conjuncture, to act according to the ("volonté") wish of the Emperor, and that it had been signified to them in very decided terms that the Emperor's wish was that Servia should remain perfectly passive.

Prince Gortchakow was unable to say what would be the probable duration of the Emperor's absence, but I am told that, in the official and Court circles, it is expected that his absence will not exceed six weeks.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 18.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June* 11.)

(Telegraphic.) *Therapia, June* 11, 1877, 6 P.M.
(Very Confidential.)

TURKISH Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that Austrian Ambassador has sounded him as to whether, if an opportunity offered to propose peace, Austrian mediation would be accepted by Turkey. His Excellency further says that German Ambassador spoke to him generally with reference to the possibility of peace, but expressed his opinion that the Emperor of Russia would not make peace until he had achieved some signal success which would justify in the eyes of his people the sacrifices he had made in going to war, and that Turkey must be prepared to accept the conditions that may be proposed to her.

From what the German Ambassador has said to me I am led to believe that some of those conditions, supported by Germany, might be the surrender to Russia of Batoum, the right of passage through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles of Russian ships of war, and some kind of right of interference of Russia for protection of Slav Christian populations of Turkey. I only gather this from his language and arguments.

No. 19.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 295. Confidential.) *Foreign Office, June* 11, 1877.
My Lord,

IN the course of a confidential conversation which I had to-day with the Russian Ambassador on the subject of his recent communication respecting possible terms of peace between Russia and Turkey, I thought it right to point out to his Excellency that even assuming that Her Majesty's Government were prepared to assent to the terms proposed, as to which I must for the present abstain from expressing any opinion, it did not follow that those terms would be accepted at Constantinople. I pointed out that so long as it had been supposed by the advisers of the Porte that England was ready to take arms in defence of Turkey, English influence at Constantinople was naturally very great; but the attitude of neutrality which we had thought it right to assume in regard to the present war had necessarily affected our position in that respect. We might be advisers, but we could no longer speak with the authority which belonged to protectors.

Count Schouvaloff answered that the object of his Government in the communi-

cation which they had made was not so much that Her Majesty's Government should use their endeavours to press upon Turkey the conditions of peace referred to, but rather to insure the neutrality of England by the evidence thus afforded of the moderation of their intended demands. As regarded the Porte, he had no expectation that the conditions proposed, moderate as they might be, would be accepted, until the Turkish Government had learned by a painful experience how inadequate their means of resistance were.

After some further remarks, I asked his Excellency whether he thought it likely that Austria would assent to that part of the Russian scheme which involved the creation of an autonomic State in Bulgaria, north of the Balkans.

Count Schouvaloff answered that he had no doubt whatever of the assent of Austria, inasmuch as she would be well paid for giving it; and he remarked that the Austrian Government, without incurring any risks or making any sacrifices, would gain territorial advantages greater than those which Russia reserved to herself as the prize of a successful war. He further observed that, with a view to obviate the ill effects which might be produced by any casual and partial publication of the proposal, Prince Gortchakow had furnished it, in the strictest confidence, both to Count Andrassy and to Prince Bismarck. His Excellency expressed more than once his conviction that nothing was to be apprehended from the opposition of any Continental Power.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 20.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June* 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June* 11, 1877.
(Secret.)

I HAVE had an interview to-day with Count Andrassy. He is gratified by the opinion expressed by Her Majesty's Government on the statement of his views as to the consequences of the war, but he did not seem quite confident that they concur in his opinion as to solidarity of the territorial question in the Balkan Peninsula with that of Constantinople, and he will ask for further explanations from Count Beust on this point previous to expressing his views as to the eventual means which may be necessary for protecting the common interests of the two countries.

He had received Prince Gortchakow's answer to your Lordship's letter to Russian Ambassador, and agreed with you as to gravity of threatened difficulty respecting navigation of the Dardanelles.

He considers that Russian answer admits that passage of ships of war through the Straits must be treated as an European one, but he is alarmed at Count Schouvaloff maintaining, as reported by Count Beust, that as Russia was deprived of a right to send her vessels through the Straits after an unsuccessful war, she will be justified in demanding its restoration after a successful one.

His Excellency is not aware of Russia ever having had such a right, but he will cause an inquiry to be instituted into the grounds on which it may be held to have existed.

It may be presumed, however, he said, that if this pretension of Russia is insisted on it will be supported by France and probably by Italy, but he seemed surprised when I added that I feared it would also meet with the support of Germany. The Emperor is at Ischl, and he will probably express no opinion on the subject until His Majesty's return, but I believe his decision on it will be guided by the importance which Great Britain may attach to it. He said, however, that if all the European Powers have equal interest in Constantinople, as admitted by Russia, it cannot be for the advantage of the others that the town should be placed at the mercy of a Russian fleet within twenty-four hours' sail of it. He also is fully alive to the inconvenience of Russia becoming a great Mediterranean Power.

No. 21.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 12, 1877.*
(Very Confidential.)

THE Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following terms on which Russia would be ready to make peace before crossing the Balkans :—

"Bulgaria, as far as the Balkans, to be constituted a vassal autonomous province under the guarantee of Europe. The Turkish troops and functionaries to be withdrawn, the fortresses to be disarmed and razed. Self-government to be established, with the support of a national militia, to be organized as soon as possible.

"The Powers to come to an agreement for securing to the part of Bulgaria south of the Balkans, as well as to the other Christian provinces of Turkey, the best possible guarantees for regular administration.

"Montenegro and Servia to receive an augmentation of territory, to be determined upon in common.

"Bosnia and Herzegovina to be endowed with institutions judged by common consent to be suitable to their internal condition and proper to secure to them a good native administration. The situation of these two provinces on the frontier of Austria-Hungary would give this latter Power a preponderating voice in their future organization.

"Servia as well as Bulgaria would remain under the suzerainty of the Sultan; the relations of the Suzerain and his vassals to be defined in such manner as to prevent conflicts.

"The question of the independence of Roumania to be decided by common agreement.

"If the Porte were to sue for peace, and accept the above conditions before the Russian troops have crossed the Balkans, Russia would accept peace, but would demand in return, as private advantages, in compensation for the expenses of the war :—

"The restoration to Russia of the portion of Bessarabia ceded in 1856, as far as the northern arm of the Danube (that is, excluding the delta), and the cession of Batoum with an adjacent territory.

"In the same case, Roumania to be compensated by common agreement, either by the proclamation of her independence, or, if she remained vassal, by a part of the Dobrudsha.

"If Austria-Hungary should demand compensation either for the acquisitions made by Russia, or as a pledge of security against the above-mentioned advantages to be given to the Christian Principalities in the Balkan peninsula, Russia would not object to her seeking those compensations in Bosnia and part of Herzegovina.

"If the Porte were to ask for peace and accept the above conditions before the Russian armies have crossed the Balkans, the Emperor of Russia would consent not to push military operations any further. If the Turkish Government should refuse, Russia will pursue the war until the Porte is forced to subscribe to terms of peace. In that case, the conditions of the Imperial Cabinet might be different."

Ask Count Andrassy if he has received any similar intimation from the Russian Government, and what view he takes of the terms.

No. 22.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 202A. Confidential.) *Foreign Office, June 12, 1877.*

Sir,

I INCLOSE herewith copy of a Memorandum of a confidential conversation which I had on the 8th instant with Count Schouvaloff,* in the course of which he communicated to me the terms upon which it was the intention of Russia to make peace, if overtures should be made to her by the Porte before her troops have passed the Balkans.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

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* No. 14.

No. 23.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 203. Confidential.) *Foreign Office, June 12, 1877.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 202 of this day's date, inclosing copy of a Memorandum of a confidential conversation which I had on the 8th instant with Count Schouvaloff, in which he informed me of the terms upon which Russia would be prepared to conclude peace if the Porte were to make overtures to her before the passage of the Balkans by her troops, I should wish your Excellency to communicate these terms to Count Andrassy, and to inquire what view he takes of them; it would also be desirable that you should ascertain whether any similar intimation as to the pretensions of Russia has been made to him by the Russian Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 24.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 12, 1877.*
(Most Confidential.)

THE Russian Ambassador has stated to me in confidence the terms which Russia would accept if peace is made before crossing the Balkans.

They are as follows :—

"Bulgaria, as far as the Balkans, to be constituted a vassal autonomous province, under the guarantee of Europe. The Turkish troops and functionaries to be withdrawn, the fortresses to be disarmed and razed; self-government to be established, with the support of a national militia, to be organized as soon as possible.

"The Powers to come to an agreement for securing to the part of Bulgaria south of the Balkans, as well as to the other Christian Provinces of Turkey, the best possible guarantees for regular administration.

"Montenegro and Servia to receive an augmentation of territory, to be determined upon in common.

"Bosnia and Herzegovina to be endowed with institutions judged by common consent to be suitable to their internal condition and proper to secure to them a good native administration. The situation of these two provinces on the frontiers of Austria-Hungary would give this latter Power a preponderating voice in their future organization.

"Servia, as well as Bulgaria, would remain under the suzerainty of the Sultan; the relations of the Suzerain and his vassals to be defined in such manner as to prevent conflicts.

"The question of the independence of Roumania to be decided by common agreement.

"If the Porte were to sue for peace and accept the above conditions before the Russian troops had crossed the Balkans, Russia would accept peace, but would demand in return, as private advantages in compensation for the expenses of the war :—

"The restoration to Russia of the portion of Bessarabia ceded in 1856, as far as the northern arm of the Danube (that is, excluding the delta), and the cession of Batoum with an adjacent territory.

"In the same case Roumania to be compensated, by common agreement, either by the proclamation of her independence, or, if she remained vassal, by a part of the Dobrudja.

"If Austria-Hungary should demand compensation either for the acquisitions made by Russia, or as a pledge of security against the above-mentioned advantages to be given to the Christian Principalities in the Balkan peninsula, Russia would not object to her seeking those compensations in Bosnia and part of Herzegovina.

"If the Porte were to ask for peace and accept the above conditions before the Russian armies have crossed the Balkans, the Emperor of Russia would consent not to push military operations any further. If the Turkish Government should refuse,

Russia will pursue the war until the Porte is forced to subscribe to terms of peace. In that case the conditions of the Imperial Cabinet might be different."

Is there in your judgment any probability of the Porte consenting to these terms? If not, any attempt at mediation in the present state of affairs seems useless.

No. 25.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 13.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June 13, 1877.*
(Very Confidential.)

I HAVE read to Count Andrassy at Schönbrunn a paraphrase of your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, reporting Count Schouvaloff's statement of the conditions on which peace may be made. He had received no intimation of the kind from the Russian Government, but he expected a cyphered despatch from Count Beust by to-morrow's post, which may possibly refer to the subject. The impression my communication made on him was favourable; he was, however, unwilling to express an opinion on its details until he has seen the Emperor, who has already arranged to meet him in Vienna to-morrow, and for whose information he begged me to leave with him the substance of your telegram, so that he may be prepared to give me an answer to it to-morrow, or at latest the next day. He is of opinion that if the Powers agree to support the terms proposed, some form or transaction should be devised to prevent concessions to the Christians appearing to come from Russia alone.

I gathered from his observations that he fears the rasing of fortresses in Bulgaria and the withdrawal of the Turkish troops and functionaries from the province, which would cause indirectly the emigration or expulsion of the Mussulman population, will not be conceded by the Porte while she has any means of resistance at her disposal.

No. 26.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 204. Most Confidential.) *Foreign Office, June 13, 1877.*

Sir,

IN a conversation which I held this day with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, I thought it right to point out to his Excellency that the reply of Count Andrassy to my note of the 14th ultimo, though abundantly frank and explicit as regarded its general tenour, nevertheless left untouched one point as to which it would be very desirable that a clear understanding should exist between our two Governments. I pointed out that Prince Gortchakow, in the explanation which he had addressed to Her Majesty's Government as to the intentions of Russia, had disclaimed in the strongest terms any design of permanently holding Constantinople. He had, however, declined to give any pledge as to the temporary occupation of that capital, and while I fully admitted that his reserve upon the subject might be justified by circumstances, the question remained whether it was wise, in the interests of Austria and of England, to offer no objection to a Russian occupation of the Turkish capital. However sincere might be the promises given by the Emperor, it might be difficult for him to keep them. Military feeling and national enthusiasm might conceivably make it very difficult for an Emperor of Russia to retire from Constantinople when that city was once in his possession, unless he were able to give to his army and to his people reasons for such a sacrifice which would be considered by them satisfactory and sufficient. I therefore thought it advisable to ask him to put to his Government, as from me, the following question which, for greater accuracy, I wrote down and gave to him in the form of a Memorandum:—

"Are the Austrian Government willing to accept the fact of a Russian occupation of Constantinople, or would they in case of need join with that of England to prevent such occupation taking place?

"Russia has given no promise that she will not occupy Constantinople—she declines to do so. Do the Austrian Government think it safe that she should go there, relying on her assurance that she will not stay?"

Count Beust promised to forward this inquiry without delay.

In the course of our conversation I thought it advisable to inform his Excellency

that the Russian Government openly professed to entertain no apprehension of opposition on the part of Austria, affirming that a complete understanding existed between the two countries as to the conditions to be imposed upon Turkey. I had reason also to know that German diplomatists were in the habit of expressing themselves in the same sense. I could not, I said, assume that they had any reason for doing so, after the explanations which Count Andrassy had been so good enough to give, but the mere fact that such an impression was allowed to go abroad would tend to neutralize the influence of Austria in the course of events, and the risk of any future collision would be greatly diminished if it were clearly understood beforehand what acts on the part of Russia his Government would or would not be prepared to oppose. I did not doubt but that if England and Austria could come to a thorough understanding they were masters of the situation, since Russia would assuredly not risk a quarrel with two European Powers, having already a Turkish war on her hands.

Count Beust promised to report, without delay, to Count Andrassy what I had said.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 27.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 13.)

(Telegraphic.) *Therapia, June 13, 1877, 1·10 P.M.*
(Most Confidential.)

WITH reference to your telegram of yesterday, in my judgment the Porte would not consent to the terms of peace suggested to your Lordship by the Russian Ambassador. It could only see in them the dismemberment and annihilation of the Turkish Empire, and I am convinced that no Turkish Minister would dare to listen to them unless Turkey were utterly prostrate, and Russian armies at the gates of Constantinople. It would moreover, I think, be very dangerous at this moment even to suggest them to the Porte or to the Sultan. The secret would not be kept, and there is a party in the Palace which would at once make use of the information to drive the country into measures of despair which might have the most fatal consequences, and might result in very gravely compromising the interests of England. Of course, if Her Majesty's Government desire, I will sound the Sultan or his Ministers upon the subject, but I venture earnestly to advise that this should not be done, at any rate at the present time.

No. 28.

*The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.**

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 14, 1877, 5·45 P.M.*
(Most Confidential.)

WITH reference to previous communications as to proposed Russian terms of peace Prince Gortchakow has now telegraphed to Russian Ambassador here that information on the spot shows that Bulgaria cannot be divided into two provinces, as such an arrangement would exclude from the autonomous institutions the most industrious and intelligent part of the population, and that which had most suffered from Turkish misrule.

I have told Count Schouvaloff as my personal opinion that, in my judgment, the Turkish Government were not likely to have accepted the terms as first proposed, except under pressure of absolute necessity, and that this important modification made acceptance still more improbable.

You may inform Count Andrassy privately of the above.

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* Similar telegram to Mr. Layard.

No. 29.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)
(Confidential.) *Foreign Office, June 14, 1877, 6·45 P.M.*

IN conversation with Count Beust yesterday I pointed out that Prince Gortchakow, in his recent explanations to Her Majesty's Government, while positively disclaiming any design of permanently holding Constantinople, had declined to give any pledge as to the temporary occupation of that capital. I pointed out the difficulty the Emperor of Russia might possibly have in retiring from the Turkish capital when once in his possession, unless he could give reasons for such a sacrifice which would satisfy his army and his people; and I asked his Excellency to put the following question to his Government from me.

Are the Austrian Government willing to accept the fact of a Russian occupation of Constantinople, or would they, in case of need, join with that of England to prevent such occupation taking place? Russia has given no promise that she will not occupy Constantinople—she declines to do so. Do the Austrian Government think it safe that she should go there, relying on her assurances that she will not stay?

I also told Count Beust that the Russian Government professed to have no fear of opposition on the part of Austria, affirming that a complete understanding existed between the two countries as to the conditions to be imposed upon Turkey. The prevalence of such an impression, though I could not suppose it to be otherwise than unfounded must, I said, tend to neutralize the influence of Austria. If England and Austria could come to a thorough understanding as to what acts on the part of Russia should or should not be opposed, they would be masters of the situation; since Russia, with a Turkish war on her hands, would certainly not risk a quarrel with two European Powers.

The above is for your personal information only in case Count Andrassy should speak to you on the subject.

No. 30.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)
(Confidential.) *Foreign Office, June 14, 1877.*

IN reference to your telegram of yesterday you had better explain to Count Andrassy that Her Majesty's Government have expressed no opinion upon the Russian terms of peace, which, indeed, they think it very unlikely that the Turks would accept unless reduced to extremity. Her Majesty's Government were anxious to know whether they had been communicated to Count Andrassy, as was stated by the Russian Ambassador here.

No. 31.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 205A.) *Foreign Office, June 14, 1877.*

Sir,

THE report of my conversation with Count Beust, contained in my despatch No. 204 of yesterday, is sent for your Excellency's personal information only, in order that if Count Andrassy should speak to you respecting it, he may not find you ignorant of what passed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 32.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 208.) *Foreign Office, June 14, 1877.*

Sir,

WITH reference to your Excellency's telegram of yesterday, in which you report the observations made by Count Andrassy upon your communicating to him the

Russian conditions of peace as they were represented to me by Count Schouvaloff, I think it will be advisable that you should explain that Her Majesty's Government have expressed no opinion upon these terms. They think it extremely improbable that the Porte would accept such conditions unless actually reduced to extremities.

Her Majesty's Government were anxious to ascertain whether Count Schouvaloff had been correct in stating that they had been communicated to Count Andrassy.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 33.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 246. Confidential.) *Foreign Office, June 14, 1877.*

My Lord,

THE Russian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon and communicated to me the substance of a telegram which he had received from Prince Gortchakow to the following effect:—

After a mature examination of the situation on the spot, Prince Gortchakow had come to the conclusion that the separation of Bulgaria into two provinces would be impracticable. Local information proved that Bulgaria must remain a single province, otherwise the most laborious and intelligent part of the Bulgarian population, and notably that which had most suffered from Turkish maladministration, would remain excluded from the autonomous institutions.

Some conversation ensued, in the course of which I told Count Schouvaloff—but as a personal opinion only—that in my judgment the Turkish Government were not likely to have accepted the terms proposed in the first instance, except under absolute pressure of necessity, and that the very important modification now introduced rendered their acceptance still more improbable.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 34.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 14, at night.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Most Confidential.) *Vienna, June 14, 1877.*

I HAVE been told at the Foreign Office that the letter expected from Count Beust has not arrived, and that Count Andrassy, who was out, wished to wait for it before expressing an opinion on my communication of yesterday. He had seen the Emperor. I left a message requesting his Excellency to appoint an hour to see me to-morrow.

As the Russian Ambassador here has made no communication on the subject, I said to Baron Orczy that I thought it improbable that Count Beust's letter could refer to it, and that it seemed to me more likely that Russia had hoped to succeed in rendering her proposals acceptable to Her Majesty's Government before communicating them to Austria. I found that Baron Orczy shared a suspicion which had occurred to me that by the alternatives suggested as a compensation to Roumania for the loss of her Bessarabian territory it is intended that no territory of an independent State shall intervene between frontiers of Russia and Turkey.

No. 35.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 15.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Confidential.) *Vienna, June 14, 1877.*

I MAY mention, in reply to the first telegram of to-day, that M. Orczy, whom I met this evening, told me that Count Beust's letter has been received, and that though it principally refers to previous correspondence between the two Governments, his

Excellency was acquainted with the Russian proposals communicated by me to Count Andrassy. He did not, however, say whether the information came from your Lordship or Count Schouvaloff.

No. 36.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 15.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Most Confidential.) *Therapia, June 15, 1877, 10·30 A.M.*

YOU may be quite sure that not a word will be said by me about the Russian conditions; it would be, in my opinion, most dangerous even to hint them to the Porte. I have written with reference to this by last messenger. I will write again.

No. 37.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 15, 1877, 5·30 P.M.*

WITH reference to your telegram of the 11th instant, in my conversation with Count Beust on the 13th instant, of which I sent you a summary by telegraph yesterday, his Excellency did not ask for any further explanations on the point mentioned by Count Andrassy, namely, the connection of the question of exclusive Russian influence in the Balkan Peninsula with that of the occupation or possession of Constantinople by Russia.

Should Count Andrassy revert to the subject, you may state that Her Majesty's Government agree in the general principles laid down in his Excellency's despatch.

No. 38.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 211.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 15, 1877.*

WITH reference to the interview which your Excellency held with Count Andrassy on the 11th instant, when his Excellency mentioned the connection considered by the Austrian Government to exist between the question of exclusive Russian influence in the Balkan Peninsula and that of a Russian occupation of Constantinople, I have to observe that during my conversation with Count Beust on the 13th instant, the substance of which has been communicated to your Excellency by my despatch No. 204 of that date, no further explanations were requested by his Excellency as to the view taken by Her Majesty's Government of the point in question.

In the event of Count Andrassy's again referring to this subject, your Excellency is authorized to inform him that Her Majesty's Government concur in the general principles set forth in his Excellency's despatch to Count Beust of the 20th of May last.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 39.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 15, at night.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Most Confidential.) *Vienna, June 15, 1877, 5·30 P.M.*

IN consequence of Count Andrassy having been unable to fix an hour to receive me at the Foreign Office, he has just called at the Embassy. He said that the Russian Ambassador acquainted him yesterday with the Russian terms of peace, which were the same as those I had communicated to him, with the exception that Roumania is to receive a compensation for Bessarabia in the Dobrutscha, whether she becomes independent or remains a vassal of the Porte. He is of opinion that the terms would

not be accepted by the Porte, except under extreme pressure, but he thinks they might be made the basis of a transaction, and he hopes, therefore, that Her Majesty's Government will not express a decided opinion against them until they receive a statement, which he is preparing, of his views in writing, and in which an answer will be given to a question he said your Lordship had addressed to Count Beust as to whether Austria considered that Russia should be trusted to occupy Constantinople provisionally.

I then said that, personally, I doubted more than ever the power of the Russian Government to maintain a promise on that subject, as Sclavonic pressure appeared already to have led the proposed terms of peace to be modified by a declaration that the whole of Bulgaria—doubtless with the limits proposed by General Ignatiew at Constantinople—must be included in autonomous state to be created, and I recited to him your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, acquainting me with this change in the Russian proposals. He said that the Russian Ambassador here had not as yet made any allusion to such a change which would, of course, increase the difficulty of an eventual arrangement. He would, however, express his opinion on it in the despatch he is preparing, as, with a view to England and Austria coming to a satisfactory understanding with each other, he thinks it unadvisable to state their views imperfectly by telegraph on so important and complicated a subject, whereas his opinions on each point which has been raised will be given clearly in his despatch, which he will communicate to me when it is ready for transmission to London. He could not, however, say how soon he would be able to do so.

He does not understand why there is no reference to the Dardanelles in the Russian proposals.

No. 40.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 15, at night.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Secret.) *Vienna, June 15, 1877, 6·15 P.M.*

I DID not allude in my conversation with Count Andrassy to-day to the subject of the personal information communicated to me in a telegram from your Lordship yesterday, as he merely mentioned the question put to him through Count Beust about Constantinople. It appeared to me, however, that he felt conscious that there were some grounds for your Lordship's observations to Count Beust respecting relations of Austria and Russia, and that he might be suspected of not having been entirely ignorant of the nature of the Russian proposals before I communicated them to him.

No. 41.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 212. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June 15, 1877.*

THE Austrian Ambassador told me to-day that he had received from Count Andrassy a telegram stating that M. de Novikoff had communicated to the Austrian Government on the 14th instant the Russian proposals as regards possible conditions of peace, of which you had informed Count Andrassy on the previous day. M. de Novikoff seems to have inquired whether Count Andrassy had already heard of these proposals from Her Majesty's Government, and upon the latter replying in the affirmative expressed himself surprised, as he was under the impression that I had promised secrecy on the subject to Count Schouvaloff.

I explained to Count Beust that I had kept the communication secret, and had not felt myself at liberty to mention it to him. Count Schouvaloff, however, having subsequently informed me that it had been communicated by his own Government to that of Austria, I had then telegraphed to your Excellency to ask whether the communication had been made, and what view the Austrian Government took of the

proposed terms. The instructions to M. de Novikoff had apparently not reached him till twenty-four hours later.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 42.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 16.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, June 16, 1877.*
(Confidential.)

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has not come to town to-day, but in consequence of some observations he made yesterday I have thought it expedient to mention to Baron Orczy that your Lordship had stated in reply to my telegram of the 11th instant that Her Majesty's Government agree in the general principles on the subject of the connection between the question of excluding the influence of Russia in the Balkan Peninsula with that of her occupying or possessing Constantinople.

I said at the same time that Count Andrassy seemed to consider yesterday that there was some foundation for an observation of M. de Novikoff that if Russia engaged not to occupy Constantinople she might be unable to force the Porte to make peace, but it appeared to me on the other hand that the power of England and Austria to prevent occupation of Constantinople offered the most effective means by which those Powers could exercise their influence on the conditions of peace.

No. 43.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 213. Most Confidential.) *Foreign Office, June 16, 1877.*
Sir,

THE Austrian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon and communicated to me, in strict confidence, the substance of a telegram which he had received from Count Andrassy in answer to the questions I had requested him on the 13th instant to put to his Excellency, as stated in my despatch to you No. 204 of that date.

Count Andrassy states that the confidence of the Austrian Government in the promises of Russia is not absolute. He promises to communicate with perfect clearness to Her Majesty's Government the means by which the reciprocal interests of England and Austria can, in his opinion, be protected under all circumstances; but he observes that it is difficult to give a positive assurance in reply to a special question. For the moment, his Excellency adds, he can only repeat what he had said to you yesterday, namely, that in his opinion England ought in each phase of the question to avoid rejecting the proposals of Russia, and to make them the basis of fresh negotiations.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 44.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 504. Secret.) *Vienna, June 11, 1877.*
My Lord,

I HAD some conversation to-day with Count Andrassy on the subject of your Lordship's despatch No. 192 of the 2nd instant, marked Most Confidential, and his Excellency appeared to be much gratified by the opinion which Her Majesty's Government have expressed on the statement of his views, conveyed to them through Count Beust, as to the consequences of the war at present existing between Russia and Turkey.

His Excellency did not, however, seem quite confident that Her Majesty's Government concurred in his opinion as to the solidarity of the questions respecting Constantinople, and the territorial and administrative arrangements which may be adopted in the Balkan Peninsula. He will probably, therefore, instruct Count Beust to ask for further explanations on this point, previously to expressing his views upon the means which it may be eventually expedient to adopt for protecting the common interests of Great Britain and Austria-Hungary.

He had received a copy of the Russian answer to your Lordship's letter to Count Schouvaloff of the 6th ultimo, and he said he agreed in an opinion, which you appear to have expressed to Count Beust, as to the gravity of the difficulty which is likely to arise respecting the navigation of the Dardanelles, for though it is stated in the Russian answer that the question must be treated as a European one, Russia evidently intends to claim a free passage through the Straits for her ships of war. It appears also that Count Beust has reported to him that Count Schouvaloff speaks of Russia having been deprived of a right to do so after an unsuccessful war, and of her consequently being justified in demanding its restoration after a successful one.

Having His Excellency naturally expressed some surprise at the Russian Ambassador holding such language, and he said he would cause an inquiry to be instituted as to the grounds on which it may be held that Russia ever exercised a right of sending armed vessels through the Straits. But, however this may be, he thinks it may be presumed that, if she insists on her pretension to do so, she will be supported by France, and possibly by Italy. He seemed surprised at my adding that I feared Germany would also give Russia her support in the question.

He then said it appeared to him that Russia's own arguments and admissions might be turned against herself, and that if all the Powers of Europe, as she admits, have equal interests in Constantinople, they will have a right to insist on its being protected against the supremacy of any one of them, and it cannot be for the advantage of the others that the town should be placed at the mercy of a Russian fleet stationed within twenty-four hours' sail of the Bosphorus.

He appeared also to be fully alive to the inconvenience of Russia becoming a great naval Mediterranean Power, by obtaining a free passage for her Black Sea fleet into that sea.

The Emperor is at Ischl, and his Excellency will probably defer expressing an opinion on this subject till His Majesty's return, and I believe his eventual decision upon it will greatly depend on the importance which may be attached to it by Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 45.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 507. Very Confidential.) *Vienna, June 13, 1877.*
My Lord,

HAVING learnt that Count Andrassy, who is residing at Schönbrunn, was not expected in town to-day, I proceeded thither and sought an interview with his Excellency, at which I read to him a paraphrase of your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, acquainting me with the conditions on which Count Schouvaloff has informed you Russia would be ready to make peace before her armies have crossed the Balkans.

In answer to the inquiries which I was instructed to address to his Excellency on the subject, he said that he had received no intimation of the kind from the Russian Government, but that, as Count Beust had telegraphed to him that he might expect by to-morrow's post an important despatch in cypher, he thought it might possibly refer to this subject. He said the question would require mature consideration, and that he could not venture to express an opinion on its details until they had been submitted to the Emperor, whom he had fortunately already requested to meet him in Vienna to-morrow, and for whose information he begged me to leave with him the memorandum of the substance of your Lordship's telegram. He authorized me, however, meanwhile, to state that the impression it produced upon him was favourable; and it was arranged that I should call to-morrow at the Foreign Office, when he hoped he might be able to express his views more fully, but should he be unable to do so, he trusted that, by the day after, he would have received the Emperor's orders on the subject.

He said it did not appear from your Lordship's telegram whether Russia was to act independently in obtaining from the Porte the concessions to be granted to the Christians, and he is of opinion that if the Powers agree to support the terms proposed, some form or transaction should be devised, by which they will appear to be the result of an arrangement between the Powers, and not to emanate from Russia alone.

I gathered also from his observations that he fears the Porte, as long as she has any means of resistance at her disposal, will refuse to raze the fortresses in Bulgaria, and to withdraw the Turkish troops and functionaries from the province, as she would consider such measures might indirectly cause the emigration or expulsion of the Mussulman population.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 46.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 510. Most Confidential.)
Vienna, June 14, 1877.
My Lord,

ON my calling to-day at the Foreign Office, as arranged yesterday with Count Andrassy, I was told that the letter which his Excellency expected from Count Beust had not arrived, and that he wished to wait for it before expressing an opinion on my communication of yesterday. He had seen the Emperor in the morning, and as he was not at the Ministry, I left a message requesting him to appoint an hour at which I can call upon him to-morrow.

During a conversation which I had with Baron Orczy, I said it appeared to me improbable, as no communication has been made to Count Andrassy by M. de Novikow respecting the terms of peace, that Count Beust's letter could refer to them, and that it seemed to me more likely that Russia had hoped she might succeed in rendering her views acceptable to Her Majesty's Government before they were communicated to Austria-Hungary.

With reference to the alternatives suggested in Count Schouvaloff's communication for compensating Roumania for the loss of her Bessarabian territory, I found that a suspicion was shared by Baron Orczy, which had occurred to me, that it is intended that no territory of an independent State should intervene between the frontiers of Russia and Turkey in the arrangement which may be made for that purpose.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 47.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 250. Most Confidential.)
Foreign Office, June 18, 1877.
My Lord,

IN a confidential conversation which I held this day with the Russian Ambassador, his Excellency reverted to the subject of the terms of peace put forward by his Government as being those which they intended to propose in the event of the war ending without the Russian armies having crossed the Balkans. He asked me whether I was prepared, or whether I wished to express any opinion in regard to them on behalf of Her Majesty's Government.

I said that I did not understand them to have been put before us with a view to any present expression of opinion, and before I could give one it would be necessary that I should consult my colleagues, which I was ready to do if he thought it desirable. I added, however, that in my personal judgment it seemed impossible to expect that the Porte should consent to these proposals until reduced to the last extremity. The difficulty, as it seemed to me, did not lie so much in the proposed cession of Batoum, or of a portion of Roumania, as in the erection of Bulgaria into an autonomous State which would practically become a dependency of Russia, and which it was now proposed to carry far to the south of the Balkans.

Count Schouvaloff, speaking also in a purely personal and confidential manner,

said that he was not surprised at the reply I had given, adding that he had frequently warned his Government that England would never accept the extension which he had lately communicated to me of the original proposal as regards Bulgaria.

I thereupon observed that it would be better under the circumstances mentioned that he should not, unless expressly instructed to do so, ask for an official reply to his communication.

To this his Excellency agreed.

In the course of this same conversation Count Schouvaloff dwelt at some length and with much earnestness on the impossibility of the Austrian Government placing itself in opposition to that of Russia. It appeared to me that he was more anxious to impress this opinion on Her Majesty's Government than personally convinced of its accuracy.

I remarked on the strong objection which Count Andrassy had always shown to the idea of Bulgarian autonomy, and observed that the last development of that idea was not of a nature to conciliate Austrian sympathy.

Count Schouvaloff replied that if Bosnia instead of Bulgaria had been in question he should have agreed with me. He did not deny that Austria would regard with extreme aversion the idea of a semi-independent Bulgaria, but he said that Count Andrassy well understood that opposition to the Russian plans would be fruitless, and would therefore accept the compensation which it had been arranged that Austria should receive.

It was understood on both sides that this conversation was of a purely personal and unofficial character.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 48.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 215A. Most Confidential.)
Foreign Office, June 19, 1877.
Sir,

IN a confidential conversation which I held this day with the Austrian Ambassador I pressed earnestly upon his Excellency the importance of some action being taken by his Government with a view of preventing terms of peace being imposed on the Porte which would be permanently injurious to Austrian interests. I reminded Count Beust that, according to the latest version of the Russian scheme, a semi-independent Bulgarian State—which, as a matter of fact, would be a Russian dependency—was meant to extend for a considerable distance south of the Balkans; that that line of defence would in consequence cease to exist; that all the Turkish fortresses within the territory thus set apart were to be destroyed or made over; and, therefore, that the road to Constantinople would lie open and unguarded whenever a Russian army was ordered to march there.

It was impossible, I said, that such a proposal could be favourably viewed by Austria. It might be that Count Andrassy relied on the opposition of other Powers; but, without in any way committing the Government of which I was a member, I did not hesitate to express it as my personal opinion that England would be reluctant to enter into a second Crimean war without an ally.

An Austrian refusal to co-operate might, therefore, very probably lead to, and justify, inaction on our part; whereas, if the two countries acted together, there was not only no doubt of success, but no danger of war, since Russia would not provoke the hostility of two leading Powers while already engaged in hostilities.

Count Beust appeared to acquiesce in this view, and promised to report what I had said to his Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 49.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 509. Very Confidential.)

Therapia, June 11, 1877.

My Lord,

SAFVET PASHA asked me this morning whether the rumours that Russia was not indisposed to make peace had, in my opinion, any foundation. I replied that I had received no information which led me to believe that they were well founded. Had overtures, I said, been made to him from any quarter on the subject of peace? His Excellency answered that he could not say that overtures had been made, but Count Zichy had once or twice sounded him as to whether Turkey would be disposed to come to terms with Russia, and whether, if a favourable opportunity offered for bringing the war to an end, she would be willing to accept the mediation of Austria. He had expressed to Count Zichy his thanks for this proof of the friendly disposition of Austria, but had refrained from committing himself to any kind of pledge in the matter.

As Prince Reuss had just left Safvet Pasha, after a very long interview with him, I asked his Excellency whether the subject of peace or mediation had been referred to by the German Ambassador. His Excellency replied that Prince Reuss had spoken in general terms about the war, which, he said, his Government greatly deplored, and had done their utmost to prevent.

The Emperor of Russia, Prince Reuss had observed, could not be expected to listen to proposals for peace from any quarter until his armies had achieved some signal success, which would enable him to justify to his people the vast sacrifices that they had been called upon to make in going to war. The German Ambassador, his Excellency added, had warned him that when the time for settling the terms of peace came, Turkey must be prepared to resign herself to the conditions which might be offered to her.

I inquired of Safvet Pasha whether Prince Reuss had in any way hinted what those conditions might be. His Excellency replied in the negative, adding that the Prince was "très-boutonné," and had confined himself to speaking in very general terms on the subject. All that could be gathered from his language was the impression that Germany intended, sooner or later, to step in, and to arrange, if not to dictate, the terms of a peace with Russia, which, his Excellency observed, he feared would be little favourable to Turkey.

In conversing with Prince Reuss I have endeavoured to ascertain what his views were as to the conditions to be imposed upon Turkey should Russia, after obtaining a decisive success, be disposed to make peace. He appears to me to think that Russia has a kind of right to Batoum, which, he said, was the natural port for the possessions of Russia in the Caucasus and Georgia. He did not seem to consider that Turkey might also have a natural right to a port which gave access to Armenia, and that Russia had other means of reaching her Caucasian provinces. The Prince argued that Russia has a further right to the freedom of navigation of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles for her Black Sea fleet, which is now cut off from the Mediterranean, and that the interests of England could in no way be affected by the enforcement of this right.

As regards the occupation of Bulgaria, or any other part of Turkey in Europe, the Prince seems to think that Russia will not insist upon it, except for a limited period, unless unforeseen circumstances render it absolutely necessary, but that she will naturally require some satisfactory guarantee for the better government of the Christian Slav populations, as she had gone to war for that purpose.

These may be but Prince Reuss' personal opinions and views, but I have considered them worth mentioning to your Lordship, as they seem, as far as I can judge, to be in accordance with the information which Her Majesty's Government have received from Berlin.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 50.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 512. Most Confidential.)

Therapia, June 13, 1877.

My Lord,

I RECEIVED this morning your Lordship's telegram of yesterday's date, referring to the terms which Russia would accept if peace is made before her armies cross the Balkans, and asking me whether, in my judgment, there is any probability of the Porte consenting to those terms. I have telegraphed in reply that in my opinion it would not; and that it would be even dangerous to suggest them to the Sultan or to his Ministers at the present moment. As the messenger is leaving this afternoon I have scarcely time to enter fully into my reasons for coming to this conclusion in this despatch, but I desire to point out some of them, at least, to your Lordship.

The Turkish Government would feel that to form Bulgaria as far as the Balkans into a vassal autonomous province under the guarantee of Europe, the Turkish troops and functionaries to be withdrawn, and the Turkish fortresses on the Danube to be disarmed and razed, would not only be to lay the foundation for the speedy and complete independence of the new province, but of its union with Servia and the other Slav provinces, and the inevitable extension of Russian influence and rule over the whole Slav Christian populations of Turkey in Europe; that to consent to the destruction of the Turkish fortresses on the Danube and the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the new province, would be to give up the main line of defence of Turkey in Europe, and to place the rest of that part of the Empire and Constantinople itself at the mercy of Russia, and that to establish self-government in this province with the support of a national militia would infallibly bring about these results.

The Turkish Government would be convinced that Greece, foreseeing that to create a semi-independent Bulgarian Principality (for such the new province would be) must, sooner or later, lead to the annexation to it of the provinces south of the Balkans, in which there is a Bulgarian population, would take measures at once to invade Thessaly and Epirus and to raise the Greek population in Macedonia, with a view to securing them from ultimate absorption with Bulgaria; that the Hellenes would be supported by Europe, and that a fresh dismemberment of the Empire would then inevitably take place.

The Sultan and his Ministers would further fear the effect upon all the Mussulman populations of the Turkish Empire of handing over to Christian government and influence a large Mahommedan population. Such would inevitably be the result of forming Bulgaria, north of the Balkans, into an autonomous State. If the Sultan were to consent to this under present circumstances, it would most probably cost him his throne, if not his life.

Such is the present exasperation of the Porte against Servia and Montenegro, and such its conviction that it is about to subdue the latter Principality, that no proposals at the present moment for any augmentation of territory to either of them would, I am convinced, be listened to, except it were some trifling cession to Montenegro, such as that mentioned in my despatch of the 24th ultimo.

With the augmentation of territory to Montenegro and Servia, Bosnia and Herzegovina would probably be cut off from the rest of Turkey in Europe, and with the new institutions to be given to those provinces, the Porte would consider them as practically lost to the Turkish Empire.

To the independence of Roumania, and the restoration to Russia of the portion of Bessarabia ceded in 1856, the Porte would not probably make any very serious objection, but would appeal to the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris. She would not, I believe, listen at this moment to any proposal for the cession of part of the Dobrudcha to Roumania.

The cession of Batoum, with adjacent territory, to Russia would be considered by the Porte as handing over to her the key of Armenia and of all Asia Minor; and moreover Batoum is still held by the Turkish arms.

To add to all the concessions mentioned above, the Porte might, as suggested by Russia, be called upon to give compensation to Austria in Bosnia and part of Herzegovina.

No one who is in the least acquainted with the present temper of the Turkish Government and people, with the exasperation which is slowly gaining ground amongst the Mussulmans of this Empire, and with the means that they still have of

inflicting incalculable injuries upon the Christian population, would, I feel sure, hesitate to declare that nothing but the direst necessity would induce the Porte even to listen to these conditions. There is not a Turk who would not see in them the dismemberment and destruction of the Ottoman Empire. No Sultan, no Minister, would dare even to entertain them. I believe it would be highly dangerous for England, or any other Power, to suggest such conditions to the Turkish Government, much more to propose them. It may be stated with confidence that, however secretly they were placed before the Sultan, or his Ministers, they would soon become known. There is a powerful party in the Palace, supported by the old fanatical Mussulman party outside, averse to peace, and determined to carry on the war to the very end. They are desperate men, and would shrink from no measure should they believe that terms were about to be imposed upon Turkey which would lead to the fall of the Empire, a general persecution of the Mahommedan religion, and to the ultimate extermination of those who profess it in the European dominions of the Sultan. Whether these fears be well-founded or not, they would prevail; and although I am very far from being an alarmist, I can scarcely doubt that they would end in frightful massacres. Up to the present time the Turkish Government has managed to keep the spirit of fanaticism under control, and has succeeded in maintaining a friendly feeling between Mussulmans and Christians, and in restoring the confidence of the latter, especially in Europe. But it could not continue to do so if the Mussulmans were once induced to believe that their property, their faith, and their very lives were in jeopardy.

I think that it would be highly undesirable, if not actually dangerous to our interests, for England to suggest to the Porte the acceptance of such terms as those proposed by Russia. Any influence we may still possess here, and which may hereafter be usefully and powerfully employed in the interests of peace, would, in my opinion, be utterly destroyed if we were to do so. We should be looked upon as greater enemies to Turkey, and to Islamism, than Russia herself, as false friends and traitors. Whether Turkey could revenge herself by inciting our Indian Mussulman populations against us, Her Majesty's Government have better means of knowing than I have, but it seems to me that there is a danger in that quarter. At any rate, when Turkey is compelled to yield to such conditions as Russia now demands, and which she threatens to make still more harsh and extensive if she is victorious, the whole Mussulman world will be stirred, and the possible consequences of such a state of things must be taken into very grave consideration.

I must apologize to your Lordship for the very hasty and imperfect manner in which I have placed before you these considerations; but I could not allow the messenger to leave without at least submitting them, even in their present form, to Her Majesty's Government.

As to the result of the acceptance by Turkey of the conditions proposed by Russia upon the interests of England, I do not feel myself authorized to write. Her Majesty's Government will, no doubt, take them into their fullest consideration.

I may add, that the observations I have ventured to make apply to the present state of affairs. Were Russia over the Danube and at the Balkan Passes, and were she in possession of Armenia, there might be grounds for forming a different opinion to that which I have now expressed; but, it must be remembered, that up to the present time the Russians have gained no very signal victories, and the Porte is still under the impression (however ill-founded) that it can resist the Russian advance with fair prospects of success.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 51.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 23.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, June 21, 1877.
(Confidential.)

I HAVE reason to believe that the answer to the inquiries addressed by your Lordship to Minister for Foreign Affairs will be ready in two days.

No. 52.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 221. Secret.) Foreign Office, June 23, 1877.
Sir,

THE Austrian Ambassador called upon me to-day, and said that a messenger left Vienna yesterday with a detailed despatch from Count Andrassy in reply to the inquiry which I addressed to Count Beust respecting the course which would be followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government in the event of an occupation of Constantinople by the Russian forces, and of which I informed your Excellency in my despatch No. 201 of the 13th instant.

Count Beust informed me, in the strictest confidence, that the following was the summary of the despatch:—

That the Austrian Government do not think that it is the intention of Russia to occupy Constantinople, even temporarily. (The reasons for this opinion will be found in Count Andrassy's despatch.)

On the other hand, they can readily understand the reasons of Russia for declining to give a promise beforehand to that effect.

The Austro-Hungarian Government have confidence in the Russian promises. If, however, Russia were in opposition to her promises, to manifest the intention of keeping Constantinople, they would be obliged to look upon such an act as a *casus belli*, and to act in consequence.

That in such a case it would, however, only be loyal to give, together with the Cabinet of St. James's, due notice of their intention to Russia at the moment when the entry of her armies into Constantinople should have become probable.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 53.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 233. Confidential.) Foreign Office, June 23, 1877.
Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 312, Most Confidential, of the 13th instant, referring to the terms of peace which his Excellency Count Schouvaloff has stated that Russia would be ready to accept if peace is concluded before her armies cross the Balkan, and which I communicated to you by telegraph on the 12th instant; and I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government had no intention of instructing you either to propose those conditions of peace to the Porte or to support them. They were communicated to you for your confidential information only, and in order that you might report your observations on them to Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 54.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 329. Most Confidential.) St. Petersburgh, June 20, 1877.
My Lord,

I HAVE read with great interest, and not without some surprise, the Memorandum of a confidential conversation with your Lordship by Count Schouvaloff, recording the substance of his instructions on the possible terms of peace between Russia and Turkey.

In that document is indorsed forth, for the first time, the possibility of the Russian forces being constrained to advance to Constantinople, although with assurances that, under no circumstances would the Russians remain there.

But in conversation on another occasion, which is recorded in your Lordship's despatch No. 229 of June 11, Count Schouvaloff admitted that he had no expectation that the conditions of peace to which he referred would be accepted by the Porte until the Turkish Government had learned by a painful experience (probably the occupation

of the capital) how inadequate their means of resistance were; stating also that "the object of his Government was not so much that Her Majesty's Government should use their endeavours to press the conditions of peace upon Turkey, but rather to ensure the neutrality of England."

Count Schouvaloff refers to the essential object of the war, which he defines for Russia as consisting in the complete subjugation of Turkey, on the one hand, and in protecting the Christians, especially those in Bulgaria, against the abuses of Turkish administration, on the other.

But, in the conditions of peace submitted by Count Schouvaloff, it is stated that, should the Porte sue for peace before the Russians cross the Balkans, Russia reserved to herself the right of stipulating for certain other advantages for herself as compensation for the expenses of the war.

In the face of the most positive assurances given by the Emperor that he sought no aggrandizement or extension of territory, the restoration of the ceded portion of Bessarabia and the cession of Batoum are mentioned as compensation to be claimed by Russia.

Roumania is also to be rewarded for her services to Russia by the acquisition of the Dobrudscha, and an indefinite compensation is suggested for Austria-Hungary in Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

Anything more vague, more insidious, or in greater contradiction to the object of the war and the assurances of the Emperor, cannot be imagined, nor is their real object concealed with the usual skill of Russian diplomacy, for it is avowed "qu'il importe à l'Empereur de savoir si dans ces limites indiquées il peut être assuré de la neutralité de l'Angleterre, neutralité qui exclurait une occupation même temporaire de Constantinople et des Détroits par cette Puissance."

The object of Prince Gortchakow has been for some time directed to a complete obliteration of the Treaty of Paris, and to wipe out the humiliation under which Russia was placed.

Nothing could more effectually carry out this object than the proposals which Count Schouvaloff has submitted to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 55.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 390. Very Confidential.)
St. Petersburgh, June 20, 1877.

My Lord,

SINCE the departure of the Emperor and Prince Gortchakow for the seat of war, there is a complete stagnation here in regard to any political or diplomatic action.

Little is known as to events passing on the Danube, or of the military operations in Asia, except the meagre intelligence conveyed to the public by the official telegrams from the Commander-in-chief.

The passage of the Danube has been delayed in consequence of the late floods, and it is reported that it cannot take place earlier than the 25th instant.

The opinion entertained here of the hope and intention of signing a peace at Constantinople is daily gaining ground, and is openly discussed by the Russian press.

The temporary occupation of that capital is represented as the deserved fruits of a victorious campaign, and as a necessary evidence to the Mussulman population of Turkish defeat.

Nor will it have escaped your Lordship's observation that, in the late communication from the Imperial Government, not only is there no assurance given that the Russian forces will not advance to Constantinople, but evidence is not wanting to prove that such is their ultimate intention.

The chief object of the Russian explanations, as lately communicated to your Lordship by Count Schouvaloff, appears to me to be solely directed to calm and pacify the fears of England, and to occupy public attention with pacific assurances until it should be too late for any preventive military action on the part of Great Britain.

It is my firm belief that, if England maintains a passive attitude until the Russian armies pass the Balkans, and that Russia is thereby secured from a previous occupation of Constantinople by an English force, the diplomatic language of Russia will assume a very different tone, and the conditions of peace will be of a far more onerous nature.

I am disposed to believe that the Russian Government are not unprepared for a possible occupation of Constantinople by England, not for Turkish but for British interests, and that such a measure, if represented as bearing no act of hostility to Russia, will not be considered as a *casus belli*, although it will naturally produce a feeling of bitter disappointment.

The question is whether England or Russia shall first occupy Constantinople? If we do not occupy Constantinople and the Dardanelles they will be inevitably occupied by the Russians, and who can forsee what may be the duration or consequences of such an occupation.

Take, for instance, the position of the Dardanelles. I am told that it could be rendered impregnable at a very small expense, and form a second Gibraltar. Should it fall into Russian hands can any assurance by Russia be relied on that she will not retain it permanently? It is yet time to prevent the possibility of Russia acquiring this important position. Her armies under the most favourable circumstances could, after crossing the Danube, scarcely reach the Dardanelles or Constantinople under two or probably three months, nor could they, in view of military exigencies for the maintenance of their communications and for masking the Turkish fortresses, do so with any considerable force.

I rather believe that the knowledge by Russia of an occupation of Constantinople and the Dardanelles by England would lead them at once to abandon any intention of proceeding further than Adrianople, and that negotiations for peace would then be opened.

The position of England under such circumstances would be most favourable, and we could more readily come to an understanding with Russia as to the future of Turkey than if we had abstained from all military action.

I venture to submit these views to your Lordship, and crave your indulgence for doing so. The gravity of the moment, and the serious importance of the British interests at stake, must plead my excuse.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 56.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 25.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Confidential.)
Vienna, June 25, 1877, 4·15 P.M.

FROM Baron Orczy's answer to a question which I put to him to-day, Count Andrassy does not appear to have received as yet a report from Count Beust of your Lordship's confidential conversation with his Excellency of the 10th instant; and from the wish expressed by your Lordship as to the use to be made of previous information furnished to me of your communications with Count Beust, I have not felt authorized to acquaint Count Andrassy with the language which you held on that occasion to the Austrian Ambassador.

Count Andrassy has been confined to his room for some days, but came to town to-day to see the Emperor. He has not yet authorized M. Orczy to show me his despatch to Count Beust, which was probably communicated to your Lordship to-day.

No. 57.

Count Andrassy to Count Beust.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Count Beust, June 25.)

Vienna, June 23, 1877.

(Secret.)

OUR point of view has been fixed in principle in my despatch of May 29. I gather from your Excellency's report that a twofold exception is likely to be taken against it. In the first place the British Cabinet does not seem inclined to place confidence in the Russian assurances; in the second place it believes that it would be very difficult to interpose by anything more substantial than words, if we once were confronted by accomplished facts, or if a Treaty of peace were concluded, or were in course of negotiation; and that, consequently, in order to prevent this, it would be necessary to check Russia at the Balkans.

Now in regard to the first of these exceptions, our confidence also in the assurances we have received is not unlimited. We firmly believe in the sincerity of these assurances; we have the fullest confidence in the word of the Emperor Alexander; but we cannot leave out of account the influence of the internal currents of a national agitation in Russia, excited by success. We have, however, unlimited confidence in regard to one point: that is, that Austria-Hungary and England united possess at any time sufficient material force to refuse to admit those consequences of the war that are contrary to their interests.

The second of the above-mentioned exceptions requires a closer examination. It seems that English Statesmen perceive the greatest difficulty in the fact that, although Russia denies any intention of acquiring Constantinople, she does not at the same time undertake not to occupy that city in any case. It is thought in London that there would in consequence be imminent danger of Russia's taking possession of Constantinople so soon as the Russian army has crossed the Balkans.

On this material point I am of a different opinion.

The question about the possession of Constantinople is amongst those on which we also have stated our views very clearly to Russia. Not only have we expressly declared a Russian seizure of Constantinople to be inadmissible, but we have never said even that we would allow a temporary occupation of that city. I have myself asked for explanation from M. de Novikoff on this very point. The Russian Ambassador has repeatedly assured me that the Emperor Alexander does not think of occupying Constantinople even temporarily. But he has stated to me two reasons which render it impossible for his Sovereign to give a binding promise to that effect.

The first was, that a declaration tending to limit not only the consequences of the war, but even the very course of the war, would be highly offensive to the national feeling in Russia. The second reason adduced by M. de Novikoff was, that if the Porte were to become aware of this reservation, she would make peace neither on this nor on the other side of the Balkans, and would act so as to make Russia violate her pledge. Thus the very promise given would compel the Russian Government to do what it is otherwise in a position to avoid.

I cannot deny that there is force in this latter argument. Moreover, I am convinced that the Emperor Alexander and his Government earnestly wish to avoid being under the necessity of occupying Constantinople, and that for this very reason they would be glad to come to an understanding with Austria-Hungary and England, which would enable them to close the campaign while yet on this side of the Balkans. As a voucher for the sincerity of this wish, I adduce my own conviction that, in the present state of Turkey and the existing circumstances of Europe, it must appear to Russia a far easier task to get into Constantinople than to leave it again. English statesmen have rightly felt how difficult it would be for the Russian Government to relinquish Stamboul when once taken. Russia must feel this still more clearly. It seems to be thought in London that, had the Russian army once crossed the Balkans, it would be difficult to protest against an occupation of Constantinople except by words. I, on the contrary, cannot imagine any period at which a joint mediation of Austria-Hungary and England could not compel Russia to evacuate Constantinople in the very shortest time. The appearance of the English fleet in the Straits, a few days' march of our army against the Russian line of retreat, would necessitate the immediate retreat of the Russian army. This conviction is founded on a mathematical basis. Every mile the Russian army advances from its base of operations, contracted as it is, increases the difficulties of Russia.

On the other hand, the Russian Government knows besides that an occupation of Constantinople must cause a commotion of all elements in the East to an extent and with a vehemence far beyond the aims and the calculations of Russian policy. She knows that she would either have to hold the Turkish capital against the will of England and Austria-Hungary, certainly against that of Europe also, or to evacuate it. She knows that the first is impossible, and that the second would draw upon her from the whole of the Slavonic world the reproach of indecision and impotence, and deprive her of all the moral results of the struggle.

This is our appreciation of the position in which Russia would find herself after having crossed the Balkans, and your Excellency was, therefore, perfectly right when you pointed out in your reports that to stop before the Balkans would be more advantageous to victorious Russia than if she were obliged to cross them in order to obtain a peace. The important question is not when and where, but how and upon what conditions, the peace is to be concluded.

These are the reasons why we think it neither expedient nor necessary to check Russian action at the Balkans.

On the other hand, we could not absolutely dissent from an opinion that it might behove the British Cabinet to take certain steps for the safety of its own interests if the Russian army were to cross the Balkan. Such a step as the occupation of Gallipoli, if England did not give it the character of a declaration of war, but that of a measure for the protection of her interests in the East, might, in our opinion, be taken without implying war between England and Russia. We, for our part, could not raise any objection against it. Russia might certainly wish so to interpret the idea of neutrality as to exclude every ostensible step for the security of English interests. But whatever Russia may think about the matter, she would not be in a position, in consequence of the occupation of Gallipoli, to propose other conditions than those upon which she was previously disposed to make peace; for the consideration of general European interests as well as ours would prevent her from making more extensive demands.

As for us, we believe that, as regards Russia, we may rest satisfied with the double security afforded by the promises of the St. Petersburgh Cabinet and by our military and geographical position. But we, too, may have to claim material guarantees for our political purposes. The immediate interest of Austria-Hungary is that no such formation of new States shall take place on our frontiers as might, directly or indirectly, endanger the possession or the tranquillity of our border lands. To guard against such an eventuality, we must reserve to ourselves the adoption of such measures as may be suitable for this special purpose.

An occupation of Servia would not answer this end.

We look upon this Principality as under the protection of the Treaties of the year 1856. Acting on this, we have protested against Russia's extending her operations to Servia, and, therefore, irrespective of the consideration that the existence of Servia in no way imperils our interests, we cannot now do that which we have prohibited to Russia on account of the Treaties.

If an occupation of Roumania were suggested, that would be still less in accordance with the course we are pursuing. Such a step as this could in nowise be compared, for instance, with an occupation of Gallipoli. Gallipoli is not and never can be held by Russian ships. In Roumania, on the contrary, there are Russian troops, and in order to occupy that country we should have to attack and expel the Russian army. This would not be merely a step for the protection of our interests, but it would be warfare, and that not in the ordinary sense; inasmuch as we as well as England have allowed the march of the Russian army into that Principality, it would be war from an ambush—war in form of a *guet-apens*.

England, as a maritime Power, is no doubt in a position to regulate her proceedings without caring whether Russia regards them as of a hostile tendency or not. A war between these two Powers may easily be restricted to a line to be drawn beforehand. I must admit the justice of the saying which compares the enmity of Great Britain and Russia to a contest between wolf and shark. They can show each other their teeth and even do each other passing mischief, but in the end each of them retires again to its own native element, and the fight is at an end. War between England and Russia is naturally circumscribed by the geographical conditions of the two States.

It is otherwise with our relation to Russia. We are immediate neighbours, and must live with one another, either on terms of peace or on terms of war. A war between these two Empires would not be decided by one campaign. Generations must inherit it one from another, and it could hardly end otherwise than with the destruction of one of the two States. Before embarking in such a struggle, there must be causes, not of a transient nature, but of imperative necessity, rendering the collision really inevitable. Only in such a case can a conscientious Government appeal to the force of the Monarchy, and stake all upon the hazard.

We have clearly stated in our despatch of the 29th May, the precision of which Lord Derby has acknowledged, the cases in which we would consider ourselves placed in this situation. We do not reckon the crossing of the Balkans by the Russian army among those cases.

I sum up, as follows:—

We maintain the principles expressed in our despatch of May 29.

We are not afraid that accomplished facts can forestall the vindication of our interests.

We think it neither expedient nor necessary to concentrate our action on preventing the Russians from crossing the Balkans.

On the other hand, we also lay the greatest stress on the principle that peace shall not be concluded without our participation.

We maintain that the results of the war must be subjected to European approval.

In case peace were not to be concluded on this side of the Balkans, Russia has reserved to herself freedom of action in her demands. We are of opinion that hence follows equal freedom for us and England to protect our interests by an ostensible act.

It remains for the Royal British Cabinet to decide whether it would take such a step before or after the Russian army has crossed the Balkans.

We also reserve to ourselves to protect the most direct interest of the Monarchy by an appropriate act.

It is of the highest importance to us that Lord Derby acknowledges the solidarity of our interests and English interests.

We also are prepared to accept—as more particularly stated in our despatch of the 29th of May—the English reservations, and to adopt them as our own.

This solidarity seems to us to offer the basis for co-operation in case one of the interests mentioned should be actually endangered.

As regards the Russian propositions, I reserve it to myself to revert to them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDRASSY.

No. 58.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 631. Confidential.)

Therapia, June 10, 1877.

My Lord,

IN my despatch No. 612, Most Confidential, of the 13th instant I stated, in answer to your Lordship's telegram of the previous day, some of the grounds upon which, in my opinion, the Porte would not consent to the terms of peace which Russia was prepared to offer before her armies had crossed the Balkans. I have since received your Lordship's telegram of the 11th instant, in which your Lordship informs me that Prince Gortchakow had telegraphed to Count Schouvaloff that Bulgaria could not be divided into two provinces, as such an arrangement would exclude from autonomous institutions the most industrious and intelligent part of the population, and that which had suffered most from Turkish misrule. The Russian Chancellor thus appears to demand the formation into one vassal autonomous province of the whole of Turkey in Europe inhabited by Bulgarians. The limits to be assigned to this province can only be at present a matter of conjecture, but they might be made to include the vilayet of Adrianople and that of Salonica down to the Ægean Sea.

If there are good reasons for believing that Turkey would not accept the terms of peace as first proposed by Prince Gortchakow, except after defeats and disasters which would leave her at the absolute mercy of her enemy, there are still stronger grounds for the conviction that nothing but the extremest necessity would induce her to listen to the further condition now suggested.

The formation of the provinces north and south of the Balkans into one vassal autonomous province, with the withdrawal from them of the Turkish troops and functionaries, and the abandonment and destruction of the Turkish fortresses on the Danube, would be, in fact, the end of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. It would take but a little time to convert this so-called "vassal autonomous province" into a semi-independent Principality or State. Its complete severance from Turkey would then be but a question of a few years. Like Servia and Roumania, it would become a mere dependency of Russia, to be annexed when necessary or convenient.

With the creation of this vassal autonomous province, the remainder of the territories of Turkey in Europe must be lost to her. Bosnia and Herzegovina would be completely cut off from Constantinople both by sea and by land, unless, which is altogether improbable, a right of way would be left for Turkish troops through the new Bulgaria. These two provinces would either be formed into another vassal autonomous State, or would be divided between Austria, Servia, and Montenegro, as Prince Gortchakow evidently foreshadows.

Greece will be compelled to demand the annexation of Thessaly and Epirus, and will, no doubt, make a desperate struggle to obtain at least such part of Macedonia

as would prevent her being altogether cut off from Constantinople, to the ultimate acquisition of which the hopes of the whole Hellenic race are directed. It may be presumed that she would have the support of Europe in her claim to Thessaly and Epirus. But Russia has been working for many years to bring the whole of Macedonia, and especially Mount Athos, within the boundaries of Slavism. She would probably, therefore, resist all attempts on the part of Greece to acquire territory so necessary to the development of the Slav race to the south, and without which the new Russo-Bulgarian Principality would be deprived of access to the Mediterranean.

The policy of Russia with regard to Greece has, of late years, been altogether changed, and the Greeks know full well that they have been abandoned by her for the more abject and useful Slavs. The Encyclical recently issued by the Greek Patriarch, of which I have sent your Lordship a copy, is a sufficient proof of the present feelings of the Greeks towards Russia.

To complete the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, Italy would probably lose no time in putting in a claim to Albania as a counterpoise to the increase of territory given to Austria out of Bosnia. She is already mediating and preparing for this step.

What would remain to the Sultan but Constantinople and a part of ancient Thrace? How long could he hope to retain even this fragment of his European Empire with the Danube, the Balkans, Varna, and every port in the Black and Ægean Seas in the hands of his irresistible enemy?

Could Turkey believe that any conditions or Treaties, however solemn or stringent, imposed by Europe upon the new vassal autonomous provinces would be observed. She has learnt by experience how far such engagements, whatever may be their character or their guarantees, are respected by such semi-independent States themselves, and by Russia and by Europe, whenever it is to the interest of either to override them. Whilst she has been held to the strict observance of her Treaty obligations to her vassal States, they have been allowed to violate theirs with impunity. She has been made to feel that Christendom in dealing with her knows no equity nor law. Servia, treated by her with rare moderation and generosity after a disastrous defeat, takes the first opportunity to throw over a Treaty entered into a few months before, and sends her Prince to the Emperor of Russia, at war with her Suzerain, to ask leave to join in it, and to visit Prince Charles, who is in open rebellion to the Sultan. Roumania, after having secretly entered into a Convention with Russia against Turkey, with cynical audacity accuses her of aggressive designs on the Principality, and declares her independence in the teeth of European Treaties, and of her Conventions with the Porte.

With the experience of the past, could Turkey agree, except when utterly prostrate at the feet of Russia, to such terms as are now proposed by Prince Gortchakow?

We should entertain no illusion on this, to us, vital subject. If Turkey were to accept even such conditions as are proposed by Russia before she has gained any decisive or signal success, the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire would have begun and the European territories of the Sultan would be partitioned, as were those of Poland. It is scarcely to be believed that under such circumstances Egypt would long continue to recognize the Sultan's suzerainty. Tunis and Tripoli would be unable to maintain even a nominal independence. There are Powers looking to them also for increase of territory, and of influence in the Mediterranean. Means would soon be found to detach Syria from what was left of the Ottoman Empire, and the Pashalic of Bagdad, with the valleys of the Euphrates and Tigris, would virtually belong to Russia, the mistress of Armenia.

All that would remain to the Sultan would be the western provinces of Asia Minor, and with Russia as his neighbour, it may be foreseen that even this fragment would not be long left to him.

This great disruption of the Ottoman Empire, with the vast changes that it must inevitably bring about in the condition and relative strength of the Great European Powers, may be, as some think, of advantage to the cause of Christianity and civilization, notwithstanding the wars, desolation, and misery to which it must give rise; but it must be looked in the face. If England is prepared to renounce her imperial position and interests, she has only to allow Russia to have her way and to dictate her own terms to the Porte. This new English policy will then be successfully inaugurated; but there can be no retreat from it hereafter. The objects and ends of Russia in the present war against Turkey are no longer a matter of doubt or speculation.

I.

They are avowed in Prince Gortchakow's conditions of peace, offered when it is almost a moral certainty that the Porte would not, and could not, accept them, and with the threat that more will be asked should they be rejected before the Russian armies cross the Balkans. What that more would be it is not difficult to conjecture. There remains but the command of the Bosphorous and Dardanelles and the annexation of Armenia. Russia would then have the control of the alternative routes to India through Asia and by the Suez Canal. We could only keep open the latter by annexing Egypt, or by permanently maintaining a large naval force in the eastern corner of the Mediterranean.

In my reply to your Lordship's telegram informing me that it was desirable that nothing should be said to the Porte as to the Russian conditions of peace, I stated that in my opinion it would be even dangerous to hint at them to the Turkish Government. In my hastily written despatch of the 13th instant I gave some of the reasons why I apprehended danger, should the Porte suspect that Russia, with the support of Europe, and especially of England, was determined to impose such terms upon Turkey. I need scarcely repeat them here, although they were not, perhaps, placed before your Lordship with all the clearness and fullness that the vast importance of the subject demands. What we have to fear is the effect upon the Sultan, his Ministers, his Government, and his people, of telling them, or even of leading them to believe, that they were about to be driven out of Europe,—for in such, and in no other light, would they view Prince Gortchakow's terms. They would, in all probability, be thrown into a state of reckless despair. At any rate, it would be more prudent on every account to wait, before attempting to impose such conditions of peace upon Turkey, until the Russian armies are in possession of, at least, the Bulgarian provinces north of the Balkans, and able to afford some protection to the lives and property of some of those Christians for whose sake Russia alleges that she has entered upon this most calamitous war.

But I would venture to urge most earnestly upon Her Majesty's Government not to be the medium of communicating, or of suggesting, any such terms as those proposed by Prince Gortchakow to the Sultan or to the Porte. It would, no doubt, suit the purpose of Russia to make use of England to impose them upon Turkey. The Russian Chancellor's language does not admit the possibility of a mediation in which England could play a useful or honourable part. It is simply that of dictation. The terms offered are to be accepted at once, or the consequences will be a further dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. England, if she fell into the trap laid for her, would appear as the abettor of Russia in her designs—not as the mediator between her and her victim. Let some other Power, Germany or Austria, accept this task. It is vital to our gravest interests, to interests the importance of which no words can adequately describe, much less exaggerate, that we should be ready to interpose to save the Turkish Empire from complete dissolution. If we have even determined to abandon it to its fate, we have not determined to abandon to the same fate the highest interests of the British Empire. Surely the policy which has hitherto made us support Turkey for our own purposes and safety, and for no abstract love of Turks or their faith, a policy approved and adopted by the greatest statesmen that England has produced, is not one which the events of the last few months, having no relation whatever to it, are sufficient to reverse. That policy was partly based upon the belief that Turkey is a barrier to the ambitious designs of Russia in the East, and that the Sultan, the acknowledged head of the Mahomedan faith, is a useful, if not necessary, ally to England, who has millions of Mussulmans amongst her subjects. He may be deprived of his Empire, and may be reduced to the condition of a fifth-rate Asiatic Potentate; but he will still be the Caliph of Islam, and the Mussulman world, in a struggle for very existence, may turn upon England as the principal cause of the danger that threatens it. Some persons, not without authority, are, I am aware, disposed to treat this consideration lightly; but I am persuaded from what I see passing around me, and from what I have learnt, that it is one which we ought seriously to bear in mind.

It is scarcely necessary to dwell, in this place, upon the result of the breaking up and partition of the Ottoman Empire on the balance of power, or upon the great danger to liberty and civilization of the establishment of a vast military Slav Empire in the east of Europe.

If Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that there is nothing to be done to oppose the designs of Russia, we should, at least, be prepared to mediate when the time comes. In order to be in a position to do so, we should make Turkey feel that although, as we have warned her, she cannot expect any help from us in her struggle

with Russia, we shall be ready, at a favourable moment, to do our best to see that she is treated with justice and moderation, and her Mahomedan and Christian subjects alike with impartiality and equal humanity. It has been my object to raise such hopes, as I have none others to give, without committing in any way Her Majesty's Government, whose views and policy it is my duty to consider and carry out. It is the only course left to us if we are not prepared to give Turkey even such indirect aid as the preservation and maintenance of our own national and imperial interests may render necessary. By following it we may recover and maintain a part of that great and preponderating influence—I hesitate to use a word which has been so indignantly denounced as "prestige"—which England once enjoyed amongst the Mussulman, and even Christian nations and communities of the East, and which she was able to use most effectively for their good and her own.

I have considered it my duty to place these considerations thus frankly before Her Majesty's Government. It appears to me that England has one of three courses to pursue: either to prevent the accomplishment of the designs of Russia by decisive measures, or by holding, at once, such language to her as will make her understand that we are prepared to prevent, if possible, the destruction and partition of the Ottoman Empire; or to let matters take their course until a favourable moment comes for stepping in as an impartial mediator prepared to save Turkey from too onerous and fatal terms, or to fold our arms and do nothing, leaving everything to chance. I will not add the other alternative; that of proposing terms to Turkey which would cause her the utmost indignation, resentment, and despair, and which would only confirm the distrust and suspicion she has already been led by the successful intrigues of Russia to feel of England.

There is a party in Turkey favourable to peace. I believe that the Sultan might be induced to make considerable sacrifices to put an end to a destructive and cruel war. But when I wrote my despatch of May 30 to your Lordship, suggesting that the present relative position of the belligerents might afford an occasion for mediation, I could scarcely have foreseen, after all the assurances of moderation and disinterestedness which Russia had given, that she would insist, even before she had achieved a single success, except the capture of a small Turkish town (Ardahan), upon such terms as those proposed by Prince Gortchakow as the *sine qua non*, terms which, when impartially examined by the light of past history and events, can only be intended to lead to the partition of Turkey in Europe, and the speedy dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

In the foregoing remarks I have not touched upon the enormous difficulties of forming one vassal autonomous province out of the districts inhabited by Bulgarians to the north and south of the Balkans, of finding a Governor for it, who, it is to be presumed, is to be a Christian, and not necessarily a Turkish subject, of dealing with the Mussulman populations that are to be placed under him, and of devising a scheme of administration that will provide for the security of the property and for the religious freedom of Mahomedans. In these questions alone there are the seeds of inevitable discord, wars, and, may be, massacres. They alone may afford pretexts for future interference, total independence, and ultimate annexation.

It must be remembered that the new Bulgarian vassal province, with its large Mussulman population, will be very different from Roumania and Servia when they received their semi-independence. The former had no Mahomedans to embarrass her; the latter soon disposed of the few she had to deal with.

I have referred in this despatch to that branch of the subject which is more immediately connected with larger matters and with the imperial interests of England. The other branch is, however, scarcely of less importance, and I may venture to trouble your Lordship with some observations upon it hereafter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 59.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received June 28.*)

(No. 644. Confidential.)
Therapia, June 20, 1877.

My Lord,

A PERSON entirely in the confidence of Safvet Pasha has asked him whether the German Ambassador has made any offer on the part of his Government to mediate

between Turkey and Russia, or whether any overtures to that effect have been made secretly at Berlin. His Excellency replied that Prince Reuss had not as yet spoken to him on the subject, but that if Germany were to offer her mediation, and the terms she proposed were acceptable, the Porte would not reject such offer in order to apply by way of preference for the mediation of the British Government.

I am inclined to suspect that, although Prince Reuss may not have made any positive offer of mediation on the part of Germany to the Porte, he is preparing the way for doing so in his communications with Safvet Pasha and the Grand Vizier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 60.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)
(Confidential.) *Foreign Office, June 30, 1877.*

I HAVE proposed to Count Beust that a Protocol should be signed placing on record the understanding arrived at between the two Governments.

No. 61.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 226. Confidential.) *Foreign Office, June 30, 1877.*

Sir,

THE Austrian Ambassador called upon me to-day by appointment, and I told him that Her Majesty's Government had duly considered in Cabinet the last despatch from Count Andrassy, which his Excellency had been good enough to communicate to me on the 25th instant.

Her Majesty's Government were glad to find that the Austro-Hungarian Government were agreed with them on the main features of the policy which the two countries should pursue.

Events were, however, passing with great rapidity. Since Count Andrassy's despatch had been written the Russian army had crossed the Danube, and established a footing with little or no opposition in the Turkish territory south of that river. It might be expected that this successful movement would be followed up, and that in a short time some, at all events, of the contingencies contemplated in the recent communications between the two Governments would become imminent.

There was one point in which I could not agree with the views so frankly expressed by Count Andrassy. His Excellency seemed to believe that the Russian occupation of Constantinople might be viewed with indifference, since it would at any time be in the power of Great Britain and Austria-Hungary to compel the Russian forces to relinquish the position. Her Majesty's Government could not be blind to the fact that, however willing the Emperor might be to withdraw his troops, the public feeling in Russia might overpower His Majesty's personal intentions, while on the other hand Her Majesty's Government could not answer for it that public feeling in England might not be so aroused at the sight of the Russian army in possession of Constantinople and the Straits as to lead to war.

Under all the circumstances the cordial understanding between Great Britain and Austria-Hungary seemed to afford the best hope of the preservation of peace.

Already such an understanding had been arrived at, so far as the communications which had been exchanged between us could carry it, and Her Majesty's Government now thought that the time had arrived for placing that understanding in some more definite and distinct form.

I was accordingly authorized to propose to his Excellency that it should be placed on record by the signature of a Protocol. I refrained from entering into details as to the precise nature of the Protocol until I learned from his Excellency that his Government were prepared in principle to adopt the suggestion.

Count Beust said that he did not feel in a position to give an answer until he had received instructions from his Government, but that he would lose no time in telegraphing the proposal to Count Andrassy.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 62.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 228. Secret and Confidential.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 30, 1877.*

I INCLOSE herewith, for your Excellency's confidential information, the accompanying translation of the note from Count Andrassy, explaining his views as to the extent to which Austro-Hungarian interests would be affected by the passage of the Balkans by the Russian troops, which was communicated to me on the 25th instant by Count Beust."

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 63.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 513. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Vienna, June 14, 1877.*

IN reply to the first of the telegrams which your Lordship has forwarded to me to-day, and which I have just received, I may mention that, on my meeting Baron Orczy this evening he told me that the letter expected from Count Beust had been received, and that it principally refers to the correspondence which had taken place between the two Governments before my communication to Count Andrassy yesterday. He said Count Beust was, however, aware of the Russian proposals of peace which had been submitted to you, but he did not say whether the information he had received came from Count Schouvaloff or your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 64.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 515. Most Confidential.)
My Lord, *Vienna, June 15, 1877.*

COUNT ANDRASSY has just called upon me, having been unable to fix an hour to receive me at the Foreign Office. He said that since I had seen him the day before yesterday the Russian Ambassador had communicated to him the terms on which Russia would be ready to make peace before her army crossed the Balkans; and that they were the same as those stated by Count Schouvaloff to your Lordship, except that the compensation in the Dobrudscha, to be granted to Roumania for the loss of Bessarabia, is to be received by her, whether she becomes independent or remains a vassal of the Porte. Count Andrassy is of opinion that the Porte would not accept these terms unless under extreme pressure, but he thinks that they might be made the basis of a transaction with Russia, and he asked me therefore to request Her Majesty's Government not to express a decided opinion against them until he can forward to London a statement in writing, which he is preparing, of his views upon the subject; observing that he would answer at the same time a question which had been addressed to him by your Lordship through Count Beust as to whether Austria considered that it would be prudent to permit an occupation of Constantinople by Russia on a promise that it would only be temporary. I said with respect to that point that personally I doubted more than ever the power of the Russian Government to fulfil any promise which they might give upon it, as the terms of peace which we had been discussing appear to have been already modified, under Slav pressure, by a declaration that the whole of Bulgaria, which doubtless meant a Bulgaria of the extent proposed by General Ignatiew at the Conference, must be included in the autonomous State which it is proposed to establish; and I recited to him your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, acquainting me with the change which has been made by Prince Gortchakow in the Russian terms.

His Excellency answered that M. de Novikow did not appear to be aware of this modification of the terms proposed, as he made no allusion to it; and independently of its diminishing the chance of their being accepted, it will be impossible to come to any preliminary understanding with Russia, if new claims are to be daily brought forward. He would, however, he said, express his opinion on this point in the despatch which he intends to send to London with a view to England and Austria coming to a satisfactory understanding with each other, observing that it appeared to him inadvisible to state their views imperfectly by telegraph on so important and complicated a subject, and that he preferred explaining clearly in a despatch his opinions with respect to each point which has been raised.

He could not say how soon this despatch would be ready for transmission to London, but he promised to communicate it to me when it was so.

He does not understand why in the Russian terms of peace no reference had been made to the question of the Dardanelles.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 65.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 517. Secret.) *Vienna, June 17, 1877.*

My Lord,

IN the conversation which I had with Count Andrassy to-day, as reported in a previous despatch of this date, I did not allude to the subject of the telegram which your Lordship forwarded to me yesterday for my personal information, as his Excellency merely mentioned to me that your Lordship had requested Count Beust to ascertain whether he considered Russia might be trusted to occupy Constantinople as a temporary measure.

His Excellency appeared, however, to feel that there were some grounds for the observations which your Lordship had made to Count Beust as to the relations of Austria with Russia, as, from his manner in explaining to me when M. de Novikow had communicated to him the Russian terms of peace, he seemed to fear that he might be suspected of not having been entirely ignorant of their nature when I acquainted him with them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 66.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 520. Confidential.) *Vienna, June 16, 1877.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of yesterday on the subject of my telegram of the 11th instant, I have thought it expedient to mention to Baron Orczy, as Count Andrassy has not come to town to-day, in consequence of some observations which his Excellency made when he called on me yesterday, that Her Majesty's Government agree in the general principles laid down in his despatch of the 20th May on the subject of the connection between the question of excluding the influence of Russia in the Balkan peninsula with that of the occupation or possession of Constantinople by Russia.

I stated at the same time that Count Andrassy, on speaking to me yesterday, seemed to consider an observation of M. de Novikow's was not altogether unfounded, that Russia might be unable to oblige the Porte to accept such terms of peace as she might be entitled to propose if she had entered into an engagement not to occupy Constantinople. It appeared to me, however, I said, on the other hand, that England and Austria could have no more effective means of exercising their influence on the conditions of peace than the power which they possess of preventing a Russian occupation of Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 67.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 532. Confidential.) *Vienna, June 21, 1877.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 515 of the 15th instant, marked Most Confidential, respecting the terms of peace which Russia will be prepared to accept before her armies have crossed the Balkans, and the inquiries which your Lordship has addressed personally to Count Beust, I have reason to believe that an answer from Count Andrassy will be forwarded to London to-morrow or next day.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 68.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 544. Confidential.) *Vienna, June 25, 1877.*

My Lord,

IT may be doubted from an answer which Baron Orczy gave to an inquiry I addressed to him to-day, whether Count Andrassy has yet received a report from Count Beust of his confidential conversation with your Lordship on the 19th instant, unless he wished it to appear that Count Andrassy's despatch, forwarded to London on Friday last, had been sent off before his Excellency was acquainted with your Lordship's observations to the Austrian Ambassador.

However this may be, in consequence of your instructions as to the use to be made by me of previous information which I had received respecting your Lordship's communications with Count Beust, I have not felt authorized to acquaint Count Andrassy with the substance of your despatch of the 19th instant.

After having been confined to his room for a few days, his Excellency came to town to-day to see the Emperor, but he has not yet authorized Baron Orczy to communicate to me his despatch to Count Beust.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 69.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 553. Secret.) *Vienna, June 25, 1877.*

My Lord,

I HAD some confidential conversation to-day with Baron Orczy on the subject of the despatch lately forwarded by Count Andrassy to Count Beust relative to the understanding which Her Majesty's Government are prepared to come to with Austria, with a view to the protection of their mutual interests in the arrangements which may be made on the conclusion of peace between Russia and Turkey.

In communicating the substance of that despatch to me, Baron Orczy was of course not authorized to enter into any discussion on its contents; but from his answers to questions which I put to him it appears to me that Count Andrassy does not consider the Russian terms of peace, which have been communicated to your Lordship and to himself, as incompatible with the five conditions on which he stated, in his despatch of the 20th ultimo to Count Beust, the acquiescence of Austria in new territorial and administrative changes in Bulgaria would depend.

From what he said I concluded that the Austrian Government will even accept, if necessary, such a Bulgarian autonomous State, extending far to the south of the Balkans, as has been latterly proposed by Russia, together with the destruction of Shumla and the other defences of the Balkans—an eventuality which I said would render the Sultan's possession of Constantinople entirely dependent in future on the will of Russia, and that His Majesty might possibly therefore prefer his entire expulsion from Europe. I may have misunderstood Baron Orczy's observations, but I never-

theless consider it my duty to acquaint your Lordship, in strict confidence, with the impression which they made upon me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 70.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 2, 1877.*
(Confidential.)

ON my mentioning to Baron Orczy the substance of your Lordship's Confidential telegram of Saturday, and expressing my satisfaction at the two Governments having come to an understanding, his Excellency said that Count Andrassy can express no opinion on the subject until he receives a report from Count Beust, which he expects to-morrow.

No. 71.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 4.)

Vienna, July 4, 1877.

(Telegraphic.)

COUNT ANDRASSY, who came to town to-day to see the Emperor, excused himself on my asking him to see me, and M. Orczy's language was very reserved when I expressed a hope that Count Beust's report of his communications with your Lordship had given satisfaction.

No. 72.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 6.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 6, 1877, 3 P.M.*
(Confidential.)

AN act is being prepared at Schönbrunn to record understanding between the two Governments, but the Under-Secretary cannot inform me whether it will be a Protocol or in what form the Minister for Foreign Affairs wishes the object to be effected.

No. 73.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 681. Confidential.) *Therapia, June 27, 1877.*

My Lord,

I HEAR from a trustworthy source that Prince Gortchakow's answer to your Lordship's letter has made a profound impression at the Porte, and has caused great alarm, especially that paragraph in it which refers to the future possession of Constantinople. The Porte sees in the declarations of Russia not an intention to lop off a limb of the Empire, but to destroy it altogether. I understand that, although the text of the letter has been in the hands of the Ministers for several days, no translation has yet been made of it for the Sultan, as is usually the case with such documents, nor have the newspapers been allowed to publish it.

When the determination of Russia to destroy the Turkish Empire is publicly known, it may not only lead to a resolve on the part of the Mohammedans to fight to the death, but, some persons believe, to great dangers to the Christian populations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 74.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 8.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 7, 1877, 2·15 P.M.*
(Secret.)

IN a private and confidential conversation with well-informed Austrian gentleman, he said that if Count Andrassy had changed the policy he wished to pursue five years ago with respect to Turkey, it is because he could not look to Her Majesty's Government for support to it, and he had, therefore, to make the best arrangements he could for the protection of Austrian interests, whilst obliged to make large concessions to Russian ambition.

My informant said that the Emperor, with whom he had had a recent interview, regretted the inevitable advantages which Russia must gain from the course which the Eastern question is taking; but that His Majesty seemed to find consolation in the hope that as the arrangements which may be made in consequence of the war will have a permanent character, they may be more advantageous to Austria than uncertainty with respect to the future of a merely patching-up (*replatrage*) of the relations between the Porte and its Christian subjects.

No. 75.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 8.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 7, 1877, 4·30 P.M.*
(Very Confidential.)

I HAVE seen Count Andrassy, who had just obtained the approval of the Emperor of a telegram to be sent to-night to Count Beust.

It declines, for reasons given, the signature of a Protocol, but I believe states again clearly and distinctly the views and intentions of Austria.

His Excellency stated to me that as he has hitherto in his communications with Russia acted separately, a (joint?) action between England and Austria is now impossible until Russia is false to her promises, for as it would be unbecoming in a gentleman to threaten another with the interference of a third party if he should after all keep his word, it would be equally so in Austria to threaten Russia, with support expected from England, to induce her to maintain her engagements.

He said also that, as he has stated clearly to Her Majesty's Government what he cannot assent to as injurious to Austrian interests, and has declared that he is prepared, if necessary, to defend them by war, he cannot understand why your Lordship should wish for a Protocol.

No. 76.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 8.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 7, 1877.*
(Secret.)

COUNT ANDRASSY'S language at my interview with him, reported in a previous telegram to-day, was so rambling that I found it difficult to understand whether, in his objections to a Protocol, he merely referred to his understanding with Russia or not also to that with Her Majesty's Government, as in representing a Protocol as far as the latter is concerned to be unnecessary, he said that he had never deceived any one. He appeared to be dissatisfied with Count Beust, as he said that he had been instructed to communicate his telegram to-day, in original, to your Lordship that there may be no misunderstanding as to his views, but that he neither knows how Count Beust has translated his previous despatches, nor has he told him what the English Government intends to do. I suspect also that he thinks that there is a disposition in London to put Austria forward as the leader in any action which may be taken against Russia, a suspicion the existence of which has been confirmed to me from another source. Under these circumstances, I venture to suggest that if Her Majesty's Government are satisfied with the declaration or assurances in the telegram Count Andrassy forwards to-day, the best way to arrive at a satisfactory arrangement might be to recapitulate them, and express satisfaction with them in a despatch to myself, with instructions, if Count Andrassy wishes it, to leave a copy with him, and to state

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that, in consequence of Her Majesty's Government trusting to being supported in certain eventualities by action of Austria, as explained in Count Andrassy's despatch to Count Beust, they had decided to carry out the measures (whatever they may be) which they consider most expedient for preventing the occupation of, or securing the evacuation of, Constantinople and the exclusion of ships of war from the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, for which I think that Count [Andrassy?] considers the present regulations should be maintained.

He reminded me of his proposal to England through Lord Lytton in 1871, and though he has apparently entered into an understanding with Russia, which he intends loyally to keep until he believes she is deceiving him, he said that "we are not asleep, and we are ready for every contingency," a statement which, I may add, was made to me some days ago by the Minister of War. He evidently considered passage of the Balkan as not likely to be immediate.

No. 77.

Count Andrássy to Count Beust.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Count Beust, July 9.)

(Télégraphique.)
(Secrète et Confidentielle.)

J'AI reçu l'expédition du courrier. Votre tâche n'était pas délicate, elle vous a été au contraire tracée d'une manière claire et précise. Notre intention n'était pas de faire patienter le Cabinet Anglais mais de préciser les intérêts communs et de déterminer les conséquences que les deux Puissances ne sauraient accepter. Ce résultat a été obtenu par l'échange d'idées qui a eu lieu et nous maintenons mot pour mot tout ce que nous avons dit. Nous sommes également prêts à ajouter aux points que nous avons articulés les réserves Anglaises relatives au passage des Dardanelles. Nous nous contentons d'une simple déclaration du Cabinet Anglais portant que tels sont les points sur lesquels il est décidé à ne pas céder. Nous sommes de notre côté prêts à faire la même déclaration et comme nous n'aimerions pas de doute dans la sincérité de nos paroles nous n'irons pas au-délà. En même temps nous constaterions que nous n'avons aucune raison de supposer que la Russie ne respecterait pas nos intérêts, mais que si à la suite de l'imprévu et de la force majeure nos intérêts se trouvaient cependant menacés nous les défendrions au besoin les armes à la main soit seuls, soit conjointement avec l'Angleterre. Dans le premier cas notre action se règlerait selon les exigences de notre situation; dans la dernière éventualité nous pourrions nous concerter le moment donné sur une action commune.

Nous ne pourrions consentir à la rédaction d'un Protocole tel qu'il a été proposé par Lord Derby pour les raisons suivantes:—Comme votre Excellence a vu par ma dépêche du 29 Mai la mission Soumarokoff a servi à éclaircir notre point de vue vis-à-vis de la Russie, nous avons décliné la proposition d'une action combinée contre la Turquie, mais en même temps il fallait encore prévenir une collision avec la Russie et sauvegarder chacun de nos intérêts. C'est pour cela que nous avons fait connaître au Gouvernement Russe celles des conséquences de la guerre que nous ne pourrions pas accepter et en même temps nous avons déclaré que nous ne prendrions pas une attitude hostile en présence de la Russie allant en avant, si celle-ci nous promettait de respecter nos intérêts. Cette promesse a été donnée et jusqu'à présent nous n'avons aucune raison de mettre en doute sa sincérité.

Dans cet état de choses nous pouvons bien déclarer nos intérêts solidaires avec ceux d'une Puissance tierce et que nous les défendrions les armes à la main dans le cas où ils seraient compromis. Par contre, tant que la Russie ne nous a fourni aucune raison d'en agir ainsi un engagement pour une action guerrière constituerait aujourd'hui une acte d'hostilité que Sa Majesté l'Empereur ne saurait concilier avec ses sentiments de loyauté lors même que la Russie n'en apprenait jamais rien.

Enfin nous ne pouvons pas nous exposer à devoir répondre par un mensonge à une interpellation du Gouvernement Russe ou de notre Parlement, nous demandant si nous sommes engagés dans une alliance offensive et défensive. Ce sont là les raisons qui nous obligent à décliner la rédaction d'un Protocole.

Si le Cabinet Anglais apprécie les raisons qui nous font agir, voici quel serait le modus procedendi. Les deux Puissances ayant constaté quelles sont les conséquences de la guerre qu'elles regardent toutes les deux comme inadmissibles, s'engageraient chacune pour elle seule, et sans se réclamer de l'autre, de faire valoir de cas en cas par voie diplomatique les intérêts reconnus solidaires. Si dans le courant des événements

des intérêts reconnus solidaires allaient être exposés de fait à être compromis alors le moment serait venu de se concerter selon les exigences de la situation sur une action matérielle combinée à l'effet de prévenir ce danger.

Voilà notre point de vue qui se trouve en parfaite conformité avec toutes les ouvertures que nous avons faites jusqu'à présent. Nous ne pouvons pas aller plus loin, et nous ne rétractons pas un mot de ce que nous avons dit.

Votre Excellence voudra communiquer à Lord Derby la substance de ce télégramme.

No. 78.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 293. Secret.)
Foreign Office, July 11, 1877.

Sir,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's own information, copies of a correspondence which Her Majesty's Government have entered into with the Government of Austro-Hungary respecting the policy to be observed in certain contingencies of the war between Russia and Turkey.

Your Excellency will be good enough to treat this correspondence as most strictly confidential, and will take care not to refer to it in any communication with your diplomatic colleagues or with the Porte.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 79.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 242. Confidential.)
Foreign Office, July 11, 1877.

Sir,

THE Austrian Ambassador having called upon me to-day, I stated to his Excellency that before proceeding further in regard to the record of the understanding arrived at between Her Majesty's Government and the Austro-Hungarian Government as to the policy to be observed in certain contingencies of the war in Turkey, it seemed to me highly desirable that we should leave no possibility of misapprehension as to the precise nature of the points on which we were agreed.

I then read to his Excellency the paragraph from Count Andrassy's despatch of the 29th of May, in which it is stated that the Government of Austria-Hungary cannot consent to certain measures, and among these, "No large Slav State should be established at the expense of the non-Slav elements of the Balkan Peninsula, and in any case the reconstruction should be limited at most to the autonomy of the present provinces under a native Chief." And I asked whether his Excellency's Government still held this view after having learned the proposed Russian terms of peace, which included the establishment of a vassal autonomous province extending south of the Balkans, the destruction of the Turkish fortresses, and the creation of a local military force.

It seemed to me, I said, that this would evidently be the creation of a large Slav State at the expense of the other populations inhabiting the districts which it would comprise, and I thought it would be well that his Excellency should ascertain from his Government whether this proposal of the Russian Government contained in Count Schouvaloff's Memorandum of the 8th of June was deemed by them to be compatible with the declaration made by Count Andrassy in his despatch of the 29th of May.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 80.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 244. Confidential.) *Foreign Office, July* 12, 1877.

Sir,

THE Austrian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon and read to me a telegram which he had received from Count Andrassy, commenting on some remarks made by your Excellency in conversation with Baron Orczy.

Count Andrassy understood your Excellency to have said that the reason why Her Majesty's Government were anxious to place on record in a Protocol, or in some other written form, the agreement between England and Austria as to their mutual interests, was because Parliament would not be likely to vote the supplies necessary for any active measures unless previously assured of the co-operation of some other Power. That, on the other hand, Her Majesty's Government were convinced that a joint caution addressed to Russia by England and Austria-Hungary would always be sufficient to check Russia without the necessity of having recourse to war.

In reply to these observations, Count Beust is instructed to state that, according to the view taken by the Austrian Government, any direct reference by one Power to the other, or any mention in the British Parliament of an understanding hostile to Russia having been arrived at between Austria and England is absolutely precluded.

Your Excellency is further said to have observed that in case our wish for a written agreement were not acceded to, or were only acceded to in vague phrases, Her Majesty's Government would feel themselves compelled to abandon the idea of an eventual appeal to arms, and would then confine themselves to taking precautionary measures.

In reply to which Count Andrassy states that the Austrian Government would certainly prefer that England should confine herself to taking measures of precaution rather than that Austria should run the risk of being used for the purpose of intimidating Russia before the latter Power had given her any serious reason for hostile action.

I told Count Beust that I thought there must be some misunderstanding as to the language you were said to have held. You had received no instructions to speak in that sense, nor had you reported any conversation of the tenor he had described. And in regard especially to what was reported to have been said of a possible declaration in Parliament, it had been quite understood on the part of Her Majesty's Government that the negotiations were secret and they had been carefully kept so so far as we were concerned.

I have, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 81.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 245. Most Confidential.) *Foreign Office, July* 14, 1877.

Sir,

THE Austrian Ambassador called upon me to-day and left confidentially in my hands the translation of a telegram which he had received from his Government, and which is to the following effect:—

The Russian conditions of peace, Count Andrassy says, as originally presented by Count Schouvaloff, are not inconsistent with the seventh of the points laid down in his Excellency's despatch of May 29. Some sort of autonomy, he argues, must be conceded to Bulgaria in case the Porte is definitively worsted, although he thinks it would be difficult to grant it in the way foreshadowed in the Russian proposals. In any case, however, the Austrian Government adhere to the second point mentioned in the despatch above referred to, stipulating that no definitive settlement shall be arrived at without the concurrence of all the Powers. With regard to the pretension which has since been advanced to constitute an autonomous Bulgaria extending across the Balkans, Count Andrassy says that he has already stated to M. de Novikoff that the Austrian Government would require explanations on this point, as they considered the creation of so large a Slavonic State in the Balkan Peninsula, absorbing as it would do large non-Slavonic populations, to be inadmissible. He had added that Austria reserved to herself the right to an authoritative voice on the subject at the close of the war.

As regards the manner of procedure, Count Andrassy suggests that England might declare from her own point of view, as Austria has already done and will do again from hers, her objections to the creation of a too extended Bulgaria, or Her Majesty's Government might lay down the principle that nothing can be definitively settled in regard to such matters without the participation of the Powers generally.

Count Andrassy further states that the Austrian Government have not the slightest intention of inducing England to abstain from action. Their only desire, his Excellency says, has been to define those eventualities in which England could also count upon the co-operation of Austria, but they in no way wish to prevent Her Majesty's Government from taking any step which might be thought expedient for the protection of British interests, the less so as they had reserved to themselves the same freedom of action if the necessity should arise.

Some conversation took place between Count Beust and myself, in the course of which I expressed, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, the satisfaction which we felt at Count Andrassy's distinct statement that the creation of an autonomous Bulgaria extending south of the Balkans would be regarded by Austria as inadmissible. I added that from the communications which we had received from the Russian Government there would appear to be no doubt that the Emperor of Russia contemplated the creation of such a State, and it would probably be necessary to leave no doubt as to the objection entertained by Austria to such a proposal.

With regard to the latter part of the telegram referring to the mode of procedure proposed by the Austrian Government, I said that there was no wish on our part to make difficulties as to matters of form and procedure if we were substantially agreed as to what was to be done. I did not clearly understand what was the form of declaration which Count Andrassy had proposed in the telegram communicated to me on the 8th instant, and I therefore threw out the suggestion that it might be well if Count Andrassy would send me, through Count Beust, a draft of the declaration which he was prepared to sign. His Excellency and I could then examine it together, and if we agreed on the question of form a similar declaration might be signed on the part of Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 82.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 14.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July* 14, 1877.
(Most Confidential.)

BARON OROZY having told me yesterday that Count Andrassy seems to consider seventh point in his despatch of the 29th May, respecting which your Lordship has asked for explanations sufficiently clear, and that his Excellency is very decided as to the correctness of his policy as explained in his despatches to Count Beust, I urged that where a *casus belli* is in question, Her Majesty's Government may fairly expect it to be so clearly defined as to leave no doubt how far they can reckon on Austrian co-operation, and that no point should be susceptible of two interpretations. I said I fully appreciated Count Andrassy's unwillingness to show distrust in the promises of the Emperor of Russia, or as an honest man himself to doubt honesty of others; but so many cases had occurred in Central Asia of the Emperor's orders having been set aside by his agents, or as Lord Cardwell once observed, "by satraps more powerful than himself," that it might be doubted whether His Majesty could successfully resist will of the revolutionary party whose influence has been so great in promoting the present war. I asked him whether Count Andrassy considered the Proclamation to the Bulgarians consistent with the promises of Russia, or that Prince Gortchakow had kept faith with him when he supported the insurgents in refusing to accept provisions of Count Andrassy's note. I asked also how many examples there were in which a knowledge that certain eventualities would be resisted by war would have prevented the occurrence, but which, having been allowed to occur, could not be remedied without war, Governments being able to abstain doing what national honour and feeling would prevent their undoing.

An old and intimate friend of mine, who is a confidential secretary to Count Andrassy, having dined with me afterwards, I acquainted him with what I had said to M. Orczy, and advised him to show (and) point out to Count Andrassy that, though he may feel entire confidence in the success of his own policy and his optimist way of

looking at question, that he should not be surprised at Her Majesty's Government thinking that it is too serious a matter for him to embark in without certainty that they understand clearly under what circumstances they will be entitled to claim co-operation of Austria.

I said also that if Count Andrassy was well enough to see me, I was ready to give personally my reasons for (these) opinions.

As far as I can ascertain, military men here consider passage of Balkans before the winter improbable, unless a turning force from the Upper Danube can reach Sophia or the Turks risk a great battle in the plain.

No. 83.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received July* 16.)

(No. 568. Confidential.) *Vienna, July 6, 1877.*

My Lord,

I WAS informed to-day by the Under-Secretary of State that an Act is being prepared at Schönbrunn with reference to your Lordship's wishes that the understanding between the two Governments respecting eventualities in Turkey should be recorded in a Protocol, but his Excellency could not inform me whether Count Andrassy is prepared to sign a Protocol, or whether he may not wish the object to be effected in some other form.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 84.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received July* 16.)

(No. 575. Most Confidential.) *Vienna, July 7, 1877.*

My Lord,

HAVING called to-day on Count Andrassy, I had some confidential conversation with him on the subject of your Lordship's proposal to Count Beust that the understanding come to between the two Governments respecting the consequences of the war in Turkey should be recorded in a Protocol.

His Excellency said that he had just obtained the Emperor's approval to a telegram, which would be sent this evening to Count Beust, conveying the answer of the Imperial Government, stating their reasons for considering a Protocol inexpedient, and at the same time repeating clearly and distinctly, as far as it could be done in a telegram, the explanations which they had already given as to the course which they proposed to pursue, and the interests which they are prepared to defend with reference to the war, and the arrangements which may result from it.

His Excellency said that in his opinion Governments should be guided in their intercourse by the same principles as gentlemen in their dealings with each other, and that as Austria has stated to Russia how her interests may be affected by the war, and Russia has promised to respect them, it would now be unbecoming in her to threaten Russia with the interference of a third party to induce her to fulfil her promises, and as she has hitherto acted alone, it would be now impossible for her to enter upon any common action with England until Russia has proved false to her engagements. Besides, he said, he could not see what object Her Majesty's Government expected to obtain by the signature of a Protocol, after the explicit statements which he has already made as to what Austria could assent to with respect to future eventualities, and those interests which she is prepared to defend by war.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 85.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received July* 16.)

(No. 578. Secret.) *Vienna, July 7, 1877.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to a previous despatch which I addressed to your Lordship to-day, reporting what passed at an interview with Count Andrassy on the subject of your proposal to Count Beust that the understanding come to between Great Britain and Austria, with reference to eventualities in Turkey, should be recorded in a Protocol, I have the honour further to state that his Excellency's language in discussing the question was so rambling that it was difficult to understand whether his objections to your Lordship's proposal merely referred to his understanding with Russia or likewise to that with Her Majesty's Government, as, when he spoke of a Protocol, as far as the latter is concerned, being unnecessary, he said he had never deceived anyone, from which I concluded that he thinks Her Majesty's Government do not consider the explanations which he has already given them to be sufficiently trustworthy. He seemed to be dissatisfied with Count Beust, and appearing to doubt his having correctly translated the previous despatches which he had addressed to him for communication to your Lordship, he stated that he had instructed him to deliver in original the telegram to be forwarded to-day, in order that there might be no misunderstanding with respect to its contents. He complained also of Count Beust's reports of his communications with Her Majesty's Government as not being sufficiently clear, and as neither enabling him to feel certain that your Lordship had understood his views and intentions, nor conveying to him a distinct statement of those of Her Majesty's Government.

I suspect also that he thinks there is a disposition in London to put Austria forward as the leader in any action which may be taken against Russia, a suspicion which I have also had reason to believe is entertained here, from observations made to me by another person.

Under these circumstances, I venture to suggest that, if Her Majesty's Government are satisfied with the assurances and declarations in the telegram, which has been forwarded to-day to Count Beust, the best way to arrive at a satisfactory arrangement might be to recapitulate them and to express satisfaction with them in a despatch addressed to myself, of which I should be instructed to give a copy to Count Andrassy if his Excellency should wish it, and in which it should be stated that Her Majesty's Government, trusting to the support which they would receive from the course which Austria proposes to adopt in certain eventualities, as explained in Count Andrassy's despatches to Count Beust, have decided, should those eventualities occur, to carry out the measures, whatever they may be, which they may consider most expedient for preventing the occupation of Constantinople, or securing the eventual evacuation of that capital, if it should be occupied, and also the exclusion of foreign ships of war from the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, to effect which object I think Count Andrassy is of opinion that the present regulations should be maintained.

When speaking of the inexpediency of a common action at the present moment by England and Austria, he reminded me of the proposal he made to Her Majesty's Government through Lord Lytton in 1871, and though he has apparently now come to an understanding with Russia respecting several questions arising out of the war, on which he intends loyally to act, as long as he believes that the Russian Government will not evade their engagements—he said we are not asleep, we have made our preparations and we are ready for every contingency—a statement, I may add, which the Minister of War had made to me some days previously, on my speaking to him of the reported mobilization of the army.

Count Andrassy, however, evidently considers that he will not be immediately obliged to take measures for the protection of the interests of the monarchy, in consequence of the Russian army having crossed the Balkans.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 86.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received July* 16.)

(No. 285. Secret.)
Berlin, July 14, 1877.

My Lord,

SINCE writing my despatch No. 283, Secret, of the 9th instant, respecting Prince Bismarck's remarks on the newspaper reports of an Anglo-Austrian Alliance (which the Berlin papers believe to be unfounded), I have learnt on good authority that he had been made generally acquainted with the communications which had passed between London and Vienna through the Russian and Austrian Governments, but not through Count Münster.

My informant tells me that Count Schouvaloff was not unfavourable to Anglo-Austrian interference, if it could be made to lead to a more speedy termination of the war, but this opinion was not shared by his Government.

Count Andrassy, I was told, privately consulted Prince Bismarck on the subject, who urged him to encourage the overtures of England and ascertain the exact terms to which Her Majesty's Government would consent when peace negotiations commenced, but he advised him at the same time not to let the agreement interfere with the progress of the war, until it came to a natural termination by the defeat of Turkey. He thought the united action of Austria and England might be beneficially exercised in the interest of a lasting settlement.

Now this information does not quite agree with my impression of Prince Bismarck's language to me on the subject, but he probably thought it necessary to conceal from me that he knew what had passed.

I am also assured on good authority that the understanding between Count Andrassy, Prince Bismarck, and Prince Gortchakow, has become more intimate since the Russian army has crossed the Danube, and that they are now determined to insist on a "lasting solution" of the Oriental question, which I take to mean the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire in Europe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 87.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 240. Confidential.)
Foreign Office, July 16, 1877.

Sir,

COUNT BEUST has this day stated that he is authorized to inform me officially that no engagement exists between Austria and Russia other than that which results from the despatches and telegrams already communicated to Her Majesty's Government.

I asked his Excellency what was meant by this phrase.

Count Beust replied that it amounted to this—that the Austrian Government have accepted certain assurances given by Russia, and consider themselves pledged to treat those assurances as sincere unless evidence should appear to the contrary. No secret understanding or engagement of any kind, his Excellency said, exists between the two Governments.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 88.

Memorandum communicated to Count Schouvaloff, July 17, 1877.

(Secret and Confidential.)

THE Cabinet are deeply impressed with the gravity of the present crisis and the danger to the general peace which may ensue unless some understanding is arrived at. They have received with sincere satisfaction the assurance given by the Emperor of Russia that, as far as concerns Constantinople, the acquisition of that capital is excluded from His Majesty's views. But the assurance does not wholly meet the exigencies of the moment, and they have therefore instructed Lord Derby to tell the Russian Ambassador, confidentially and secretly, that they regard the occupation of Constantinople by Russian troops, even though temporary in duration and dictated by military requirements, as most inexpedient in the interest of the good relations between the two countries. They therefore express their earnest hope that this step is not contemplated by the Russian Government. Should it unfortunately appear that the occupation is likely to take place, they hold themselves free to adopt any measure which in their judgment may be required for the protection of British interests.

The Cabinet wish it at the same time to understood that they will gladly avail themselves of any opportunity that may offer to assist in the restoration of peace on such conditions as may be consistent with the general interests of Europe and with the honour of the Russian Government.

This communication is strictly confidential, and the Cabinet are convinced that it will be received by the Russian Government in the spirit in which it is intended—not as a menace, but as a friendly warning of danger threatening both Governments, which it is most desirable they should avoid.

No. 89.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 285. Secret and Confidential.)
Foreign Office, July 17, 1877.

My Lord,

AT an interview which I had with the Russian Ambassador to-day I informed his Excellency that the Cabinet are deeply impressed with the gravity of the present crisis and the danger to the general peace which may ensue unless some understanding is arrived at. They had received with sincere satisfaction the assurance given by the Emperor of Russia that, as far as concerns Constantinople, the acquisition of that capital is excluded from His Majesty's views. But this assurance does not wholly meet the exigencies of the moment, and they had therefore instructed me to tell him, confidentially and secretly, that they regard the occupation of Constantinople by Russian troops, even though temporary in duration and dictated by military requirements, as most inexpedient in the interest of the good relations between the two countries.

They accordingly express their earnest hope that this step is not contemplated by the Russian Government. Should it unfortunately appear that the occupation is likely to take place, they hold themselves free to adopt any measures which in their judgment may be required for the protection of British interests.

The Cabinet wish it at the same time to be understood that they will gladly avail themselves of any opportunity that may offer to assist in the restoration of peace, on such conditions as may be consistent with the general interests of Europe and with the honour of the Russian Government.

This communication, I said, was strictly confidential, and the Cabinet were convinced that it would be received by the Russian Government in the spirit in which it was intended—not as a menace, but as a friendly warning of danger threatening both Governments, which it is most desirable they should avoid.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 90.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received July* 18.)

(No. 750. Secret.)
Therapia, July 10, 1877.

My Lord,

WHEN Said Pasha called upon me this morning to communicate to me, by command of the Sultan, the contents of a telegram which His Majesty had received from Adrianople (referred to in my despatch of this day), he spoke to me with reference to the possibility of peace being concluded with Russia. He hinted to me that suggestions had been made to the Sultan that if he chose to come to a secret and separate arrangement with Russia, she would consent to peace on three conditions: first, that Batoum and the surrounding territory should be surrendered to her; second,

that the free passage of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles should be secured to her fleets; and, thirdly, that Bulgaria should be formed into an autonomous province.

I endeavoured to ascertain from Said Pasha from whence these suggestions came, but he would not tell me more. I then asked him whether, in his opinion, the Sultan would be disposed to accept them. He replied that he thought not at the present moment, but he could not say that he would not be compelled to do so if the Russians succeeded in crossing the Balkans, which he feared might be the case if Abdul Kerim Pasha remained inactive at Shumla, and made no effort to check the Russian advance.

I further asked Said Pasha whether, from the communication that had reached the Sultan, it was absolutely positive that the terms he had mentioned would satisfy the Russians, and what was meant by "Bulgaria," whether it included Macedonia down to the Gulf of Salonica. He answered that he could give me no information on these points.

Said Pasha added that the Sultan wished to consult me before taking any step whatever in the direction of peace, and that he would keep me acquainted with all that passed, sending me any intelligence of importance that he might receive from the seat of war. His Majesty was anxious, he said, that I should keep Her Majesty's Government fully informed, and especially that I should impress upon them the urgent necessity of preventing the Russians from committing outrages upon the Mussulmans, which would infallibly lead to terrible acts of revenge.

I have every reason to suspect that the suggestion to the Sultan to make peace with Russia without consulting any other Power, and as to the terms which would be accepted by Russia, comes, either directly or indirectly, from the German Ambassador.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 91.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 254. Secret.)
Foreign Office, July 18, 1877.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT herewith, for your Excellency's confidential information, copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin, reporting the views of Prince Bismarck on the subject of Anglo-Austrian intervention in the East.

I have, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 92.

Colonel Wellesley to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Secret and Confidential.)
Bjela, Bulgaria, July 20, 1877.

I AM authorized by the Emperor to state that, notwithstanding recent successes, and though of course His Majesty cannot suspend military operations, he is of the same opinions, and ready to treat for peace if the Sultan will make suitable propositions.

I cannot too strongly express my conviction that an attack on Constantinople can only be avoided by immediate overtures on the part of the Porte.

No. 93.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 291. Very Confidential.)
Foreign Office, July 21, 1877.

My Lord,

THE Russian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon and informed me that considering the importance of the communication which I had been authorized by the Cabinet to make to him at our last meeting on the 17th instant, he had thought it

right to telegraph the substance of it without delay to his Government. In the absence of instructions he could only express a personal opinion on some of the questions involved.

His Excellency dwelt on the difficulty of giving any pledge not to march on Constantinople, since it was possible that the Turks, though defeated, might refuse to come to terms, and in that case the war could only be concluded in one of two ways, either by a march on the capital or by a prolonged occupation of the territory actually held, which would be equally exhausting to both countries. He had, he said, referred on a former occasion to the possibility of mediation, but it was his opinion that the moment was not come for such a step to be successful. The military situation was not clearly defined. The Turkish army to the north of the Balkans remained unbroken, and until some more decided result had been obtained he thought it would be difficult to come to terms.

From this view I did not dissent.

Count Schouvaloff said further that, speaking his own personal opinion only, he thought the idea of mediation would be very unwelcome to the Russian army and people. They would resent the check in a campaign which was apparently successful, and would prefer to settle their differences with Turkey without European interference. Nevertheless, he thought that the time might not be far distant when mediation might be successfully interposed, and, again expressing a personal opinion only, he looked to Austria as the Power by which that step might be most conveniently taken. Germany would not mediate unless expressly asked to do so; and, moreover, Austria had a stronger interest than any other Power in putting an end to a contest which affected a large part of her own population.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 94.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 255. Confidential.)
Foreign Office, July 21, 1877.

Sir,

THE Austrian Ambassador having called upon me to-day, I took the opportunity of requesting him to put to his Government a question as to which it seemed to me desirable that there should be a clear understanding between us. I observed that both the Austrian and British Governments had pledged themselves to resist, if necessary, the permanent acquisition of Constantinople by the Government of Russia. They had abstained from holding language equally explicit as to the case of a temporary Russian occupation of Constantinople, which might, it is alleged, though not by me admitted, be dictated by military requirements. It was obvious, however, that on this plea an occupation might take place which would be described as temporary in character, but which nevertheless might be protracted for an indefinite time. I instanced the case of the French occupation of Rome, observing that the late Emperor of the French might at any time have disclaimed with perfect sincerity the intention of acquiring or of permanently occupying that capital. Nevertheless the French troops had remained in Rome for more than twenty years. It ought to be our business to guard against anything of the same kind happening in the present instance.

I requested his Excellency, therefore, to ask Count Andrassy in what manner he proposed to distinguish between that permanent occupation which he had declared that Austria was prepared to resist, and a merely temporary occupation, with regard to which he had given no similar assurance.

Count Beust promised to put this question to Count Andrassy.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 95.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 23.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 23, 1877.*

COUNT ANDRASSY stated to-day that he had received a telegram from Count Beust reporting that your Lordship has informed him that Her Majesty's Government do not object to the temporary occupation of Constantinople by Russia.

No. 96.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 23.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Most Confidential.) *Vienna, July 23, 1877.*

I READ to-day confidentially to Count Andrassy your Lordship's despatch No. 215 of the 14th instant. He explained that he had not said it would be difficult to grant autonomy to Bulgaria in the way foreshadowed by Russia, but that it would be difficult to induce the Porte to do so. He also observed that his opinion that a large Sclavonic State in the Balkan Peninsula is inadmissible would require explanation, for though he will object to other nationalities being absorbed in the proposed Bulgarian State, he said that the extent of Bulgaria is not yet clearly defined, and he does not think a mile or two of territory claimed for that Province, on the south of the Balkan, a term also open to different interpretations, should be made a *casus belli*. He is, however, about to state his views on this point to Count Beust. He also told me that the draft Declaration will be immediately forwarded to London. It has already received the Emperor's approval.

No. 97.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 25, 1877.*

I HAVE seen Count Beust. He positively denies having telegraphed to Count Andrassy in the sense of your telegram of the 23rd. He says, on the contrary, that he reported my opinion as altogether opposite to that ascribed to me by Count Andrassy in his remarks to your Excellency.

No. 98.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 25, 1877.*

WITH reference to your telegram of the 23rd instant, I cannot understand how Count Beust could have reported that I had informed him that Her Majesty's Government do not object to the temporary occupation of Constantinople by Russia. I never said anything of the sort.

Tell Count Andrassy that I have begged you to contradict at once the statement, which I can only ascribe to some misunderstanding at Vienna. I will also beg Count Beust to contradict it.

No. 99.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Confidential.) *Vienna, July 25, 1877, midnight.*

WITH reference to your telegram of to-day I was as much surprised as your Lordship at Count Andrassy's statement to me on the 23rd instant, and in answer to his Excellency I said that I had always understood that your Lordship's objection to temporary occupation of Constantinople was the principal point on which you differed from him,—an opinion in which he concurred; and he looked for the telegram

to satisfy me that he had accurately reported its contents, but recollected that it had been sent to the Emperor.

I cannot, therefore, believe that I misunderstood Count Andrassy, and presume that there must have been an error in the cypher.

No. 100.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, July 26, 1877.*

I HAVE had an interview with Barons Orczy and Calice, Count Andrassy not having come to town, and I have seen Count Beust's original telegram and another reporting his interview with your Lordship yesterday.

As you have read the former and found it to report correctly your language to his Excellency, which it is quite understood here cannot bear the signification attributed to it in my telegram of 23rd instant, there can be now no misunderstanding on the subject. Count Andrassy's words to me, however, were: "Her Majesty's Government ne fera pas d'objection;" and thinking there might be some misapprehension I addressed to your Lordship my telegram of 23rd.

No. 101.

Colonel Wellesley to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Secret and Confidential.) *Bjela, Bulgaria, July 20, 1877.*

I AM authorized by the Emperor to state that, notwithstanding recent successes, and though, of course, His Majesty cannot suspend military operations, he is of the same opinions and ready to treat for peace if the Sultan will make suitable propositions.

I cannot too strongly express my conviction that an attack on Constantinople can only be avoided by immediate overtures on the part of the Porte.

No. 102.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 304.)
(Telegraphic.) *Therapia, July 27, 1877.*

THE Russians are making serious progress on this side of the Balkans, and may be soon at Adrianople, from whence a few short marches would take them to the Gallipoli Peninsula.

I venture once more to urge upon Her Majesty's Government to take into their most earnest consideration the occupation of this most important position, not as a threat to Russia or as a step towards war, but in the interests of peace and humanity, and as a guarantee for the interests of England. If we told Russia clearly and decidedly that we will not consent to her taking possession of Constantinople, she might, through our mediation and that of the other Powers, make peace at Adrianople. If Russia be once in the possession of the Dardanelles all action on our part would be paralysed. She could dictate such terms of peace as she might think fit. Should the Russians advance upon Constantinople the Sultan will go to Brussa, where I understand preparations are already being secretly made for his reception. His departure and that of the Government would leave the capital at the mercy of a mob and of a defeated and demoralised army. It might be set on fire and the Christians and Europeans massacred. The presence of many thousands of refugees from all sides, in the utmost misery, with stories of Russian atrocities, which may be true or false, is causing already great excitement among the Mussulman population. The warning as to this imminent danger comes to me from so many high and trustworthy sources that I cannot altogether neglect it. In the event of it proving true, our fleet could do nothing to prevent a massacre, for it would be the height of rashness to bring it to Constantinople if the Dardanelles were in possession of Russia.

German Ambassador suggests that we might land part of the crews of the small foreign gun-boats stationed here; but this measure could be of little avail, except

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perhaps, for the protection of the houses and property belonging to Legations. As regards a guarantee for our own interests, if Her Majesty's Government have decided upon allowing Russia to occupy Constantinople, the possession of Dardanelles would always prevent her from remaining there.

This matter is of such vital and urgent importance that I trust that your Lordship will forgive me for again bringing it before you.

No. 103.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 305. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.)

Therapia, July 27, 1877, 1 P.M.

AUSTRIAN Ambassador got a Greek gentleman, who has access to the Sultan, to convey to His Majesty his advice that His Majesty should leave Constantinople at once and go to Brussa. His Majesty was excessively angry at the suggestion, and declared that rather than leave the capital he would shed the last drop of his blood on its ruins. Austrian Ambassador seems so convinced that some great disaster is to take place that he is making, I am told, preparations for removal of the archives of his Embassy. This advice to the Sultan was, it appears to me, very unwise. Nothing could be more likely to lead to a great calamity than departure of the Sultan at this moment from Constantinople.

No. 104.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 306.)
(Telegraphic.)

Therapia, July 28, 1877, 0 A.M.

WITH reference to your telegram of yesterday as to the readiness of the Emperor of Russia to treat for peace, do you wish me to act in the matter? I could, if you thought fit, sound the Sultan.

No. 105.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 384.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 28, 1877, 3 P.M.

HER Majesty's Government have considered your telegrams of yesterday. They share your apprehensions as to the maintenance of order at Constantinople and the safety of the European population. They would be ready, on the invitation of the Sultan, to send up the fleet, if necessary to avert these dangers. But this cannot be done without proper security for its safe return. It is understood that the heavy guns on the European side of the Straits command the passage, and in the present state of things it seems uncertain whether these will not fall into Russian hands. In that case the position of the English fleet might be gravely compromised.

Ascertain and telegraph without delay what heavy guns there are, and in what spots on the European side of the Dardanelles. Are the batteries now actually manned, and by what force? In what way, whether by purchase or otherwise, could we secure their being removed or disabled in case of necessity? They are of little use to the Porte in present circumstances, and in hostile hands they would be a danger to the Turkish fleet also.

There is no time to lose. The strictest secrecy must be observed.

No. 106.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.)
(Confidential.)

Foreign Office, July 28, 1877, 3·20 P.M.

YOU are authorised to sound the Sultan as to possible terms of peace. Her Majesty's Government are not disposed to take the initiative in proposing conditions, but the Sultan may rely on their friendly offices with a view to obtain the most favourable terms possible under the circumstances, if he is disposed to open negotiations.

No. 107.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 387.)

Foreign Office, July 28, 1877.

Sir,

HER Majesty's Government authorize you to sound the Sultan on the subject of possible terms of peace.

Should His Majesty be disposed to open negotiations, you may assure him that he may rely upon the friendly offices of Her Majesty's Government, which will be exerted with a view to obtain for him the most favourable terms possible under the circumstances; but Her Majesty's Government are not disposed to take the initiative in proposing any conditions.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 108

Confidential Memorandum communicated to the Russian Ambassador, July 28, 1877.

HER Majesty's Government have received with satisfaction, and will lose no time in making public, the contradiction which Colonel Wellesley has been authorized to communicate of the cruelties alleged to have been committed in Bulgaria by Russian soldiers, or those acting in concert with them, the report of which has so much excited the public feeling in this country.

Her Majesty's Government also receive with much satisfaction the statement which His Majesty the Emperor has authorized Colonel Wellesley to make, that he is ready to treat for peace if the Sultan will make suitable propositions.

Her Majesty's Government will be ready to use their influence, in concert with the other Powers, to induce the Porte to terminate the present disastrous war by acceding to such terms of peace as shall be at once honourable to Russia and yet such as the Sultan can accept.

Her Majesty's Government look with much anxiety at the state of things in Constantinople, and the prospect of the disorder and bloodshed, and even anarchy, which may occur there as the Russian forces draw nearer to the capital. The crisis which may at any moment arrive in Constantinople may be such as Her Majesty's Government could not overlook while they had the means of mitigating its horrors. Her Majesty's Government are fully determined (unless it should be necessary for the preservation of interests which they have already stated they are bound to maintain) not to depart from the line of neutrality which they have declared their intention to observe; but they do not consider that they would be departing from this neutrality, and they think that Russia will not consider that they are so doing, if they should find themselves compelled to direct their fleet to proceed to Constantinople, and thus afford protection to the European population against internal disturbance.

It must be clearly understood that no decision in favour of such a proceeding has been taken by Her Majesty's Government, but they are anxious that, in the event of its becoming necessary, no misunderstanding should arise as to their intentions, and that the Government of Russia, with which it is their sincere desire to remain on friendly terms, should not be taken by surprise.

No. 109.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 29.)

(No. 311. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.)

Therapia, July 29, 1877.

IT would be most difficult to obtain information required by Her Majesty's Government as to fortifications of the Dardanelles. Turkish Government has always maintained the greatest secrecy on the subject. General Dickson believes that the force for manning the batteries has received much reduction at Dardanelles, as it has in the Bosphorus, and that some of the guns on the European side are very heavy, but he cannot tell of what calibre. He is going immediately to visit works at Gallipoli lines, for which he has got permission. Admiral Hornby is to meet him; and perhaps

means may be then found to get information required. Porte is now so suspicious of our intentions that to hint at the idea of removing or disabling any guns in the Straits would lead to very serious mischief. I have had the greatest difficulty in getting the Turkish Government to commence works at Gallipoli, which are now, I believe, making progress. It was only by going direct to the Sultan that I succeeded. Under no circumstances whatever should our fleet pass the Dardanelles unless the Straits were in our possession or at our absolute command. It appears to me that there is only one thing to be done if we wish to protect Constantinople, and that is to be ready to take possession of Gallipoli lines at any moment, if we are not prepared to do so at present. I understand from Admiral Hornby that by landing a body of marines and sailors from the fleet, and by having ships at either end of the lines, we might defend them against a *coup de main*.

The last accounts from Adrianople seem to show that the forces under Suleiman Pasha have for the moment checked the Russian advance.

No. 110.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received July* 30.)

(No. 596. Most Confidential.)
Vienna, July 14, 1877.

My Lord,

ON my inquiring of Baron Orczy yesterday whether your Lordship had accepted as satisfactory Count Andrassy's answer to your proposal for the signature of a Protocol, he said that you appeared to wish previously to receive some explanations respecting the seventh point in Count Andrassy's despatch of the 29th of May, and that his Excellency, on the other hand, is of opinion that his statement of the point is already sufficiently clear; and that he is also very decided as to the correctness of his policy, as explained in his despatches to Count Beust. I urged in reply that in a question where a *casus belli* may arise, Her Majesty's Government might fairly expect every point to be so clearly defined that no doubt could exist as to how far they could reckon on Austrian co-operation, and that no point should, therefore, be susceptible of two interpretations. I observed, at the same time, that I fully appreciated Count Andrassy's unwillingness to show distrust in the promises of the Emperor of Russia, the sincerity of which no one could doubt, and that, as an honest man himself, he wished to place confidence in the honesty of others. But I said so many cases in Central Asia had come under my own personal observation, in which the Emperor's orders had been set aside, and his policy opposed by his agents, or as Lord Cardwell once observed to me, "by satraps who appeared to be more powerful than himself," that I thought it might be doubted whether His Majesty could successfully resist the will of the Panslavist and revolutionary party, by whose influence the present war is believed to have been principally promoted; and I asked whether Count Andrassy considered that due regard had been paid to the promises of Russia in the Proclamation to the Bulgarians, or that he had obtained, two years ago, from Prince Gortchakow the support which he had a right to expect, when the Herzegovinian insurgents declined to accept the provisions of the Andrassy note. I asked also whether there were not many cases in which "des faits accomplis" would never have occurred had it been known previously that they would lead to war, but which having been permitted to take place, it would be impossible to remedy without war, as national honour and feeling might prevent Governments from undoing what they might have been able to abstain from doing.

A confidential Secretary of Count Andrassy, who is an old and intimate friend of mine, having dined with me on the same day, I acquainted him with what I had said to Baron Orczy in the morning, and I suggested to him that he might point out to Count Andrassy that, though his Excellency might feel entire confidence in the success of his policy and in his optimist way of looking at the present question, as if he could give it any direction at the right moment which he might wish, he should not be surprised at Her Majesty's Government considering it so serious a matter that they wish to feel certain before embarking in it that they clearly understand under what circumstances they will be entitled to claim the co-operation of Austria. I added that, if Count Andrassy was well enough to receive visits, I was ready to express to him personally my reasons for entertaining these opinions.

Military men here, consider, as far as I can ascertain, that there is no probability

of the Balkans being passed before the winter unless the Turks risk a great battle in the plains, or a turning force from the Upper Danube can reach Sophia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 111.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received July* 30.)

(No. 612. Most Confidential.)
Vienna, July 23, 1877.

My Lord,

AT an interview I had to-day with Count Andrassy, I read to him confidentially your Lordship's despatch No. 215 of the 14th instant. He expressed general acquiescence in its statements, but explained, with respect to the autonomy to be granted to Bulgaria, that he had not said it would be difficult to grant it in the way foreshadowed by Russia; but what he meant to state had been that it would be difficult to induce the Porte to do so. The opinion also, he said, which he had expressed as to a large Slavonic State in the Balkan peninsula being inadmissible, would require explanation, because the extent of Bulgaria has not yet been clearly defined, and the Balkan range being also a term open to different interpretations, he does not think a mile or two of territory claimed for Bulgaria on the south of the mountains should be made a *casus belli*, although he would object to other nationalities being absorbed in the new State which it is proposed to create.

His views on this point, however, will, he said, be fully stated in a despatch which he is about to forward to Count Beust, and the draft of the declaration referred to in your Lordship's despatch will also be immediately transmitted to London, having already received the approval of the Emperor.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 112.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received July* 30.)

(No. 614. Very Confidential.)
Vienna, July 23, 1877.

My Lord,

I WAS informed to-day by Count Andrassy that he had received a telegram from Count Beust, which he was unable to show me as it had been sent to the Emperor, stating that Her Majesty's Government will not object to a temporary occupation by Russia of Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 113.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received July* 30.)

(No. 616. Confidential.)
Vienna, July 25, 1877.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of to-day, I have the honour to state that I was as much surprised as your Lordship at the information given to me by Count Andrassy, which I reported in my telegram of the 23rd, and in expressing my surprise to his Excellency, I observed that I had always considered the objections of Her Majesty's Government to a temporary occupation by Russia of Constantinople to be the principal point in which their views differed from those of his Excellency. He acquiesced in this opinion, and to satisfy me that he had accurately reported the contents of Count Beust's telegram, he endeavoured to find it among his papers, but afterwards recollected that it had been sent to the Emperor.

I presume, therefore, that there must have been some error in the cypher, as I cannot believe that I misunderstood Count Andrassy's language to myself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 114.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received July* 30.)

(No. 621. Confidential.) *Vienna, July* 26, 1877.

My Lord,

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch No. 244 of the 12th instant, acquainting me with a misunderstanding which appears to have occurred as to the language I held in a recent confidential conversation with Baron Orczy.

The observations which I made on that occasion, I stated to his Excellency, were my private and personal appreciations, and I have already acquainted your Lordship, in my despatch No. 596 of the 14th instant, marked Most Confidential, with the substance of our conversation, as far as I considered it worth reporting.

It is true, however, that I also observed to his Excellency that, though I knew nothing of the views and intentions of Her Majesty's Government beyond what appeared in your Lordship's communications to Count Beust, I was of opinion that the nature of their preparations for eventual active measures might depend, in some degree, on how far they could reckon on the co-operation of Austria, and that they might therefore wish that question to be clearly defined previously to their applying to Parliament for any credit for which they might deem it expedient to ask before the close of the Session, with a view to future possible eventualities; but Baron Orczy entirely misunderstood me, as I have explained to him and to Count Andrassy, in supposing that I had spoken of the probability of Parliament being made acquainted with the arrangements come to between the two Powers, or of Parliament not being likely to vote supplies for any active measures for the protection of British interests unless previously assured of the co-operation of some other Power, and that Her Majesty's Government would therefore feel themselves compelled to abandon the idea of an appeal to arms, and would confine themselves to taking precautionary measures, if their wish for an agreement were not complied with. I also referred, in the course of our conversation, to an opinion expressed by your Lordship to Count Beust, that England and Austria could protect their interests without any risk of war if they held the same language to Russia, but I did not intend to intimate that Her Majesty's Government considered a "joint caution" to be necessary.

I feel some difficulty in offering these explanations to your Lordship, for, while I am confident of having said nothing which could bear the construction given to it in Count Andrassy's telegram, I am equally certain that Baron Orczy, for whom I entertain a high regard, would not wittingly have misrepresented what I may have said to him; and I can only account for the misunderstanding which has arisen from the conversation having been in English.

But, however this may be, if Count Andrassy had been aware that my observations to Baron Orczy were the mere expression of my personal opinions, he would not, I presume, have deemed it necessary to telegraph comments upon them to Count Beust. These comments also appear to show that an opinion was not unfounded, which I expressed in my despatch No. 578, Secret, of the 7th instant, as to his Excellency being under the influence of a suspicion that Her Majesty's Government wish to put Austria prominently forward in their plans for the protection of British interests.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 115.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received July* 30.)

(No. 625.) *Vienna, July* 26, 1877.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegram of last night, I called at an early hour to-day at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and, as Count Andrassy had not come to town, I had an interview with Baron Orczy and Baron Calice, who were good enough to show me

Count Beust's original telegram, and also one, received from him this morning, reporting the conversation he had with your Lordship yesterday.

As the first of these documents has been communicated by his Excellency to your Lordship, and you have found it to report correctly the language which you had held to him, and which, it is quite understood here, cannot bear the signification attributed to it in my telegram of the 23rd, there can now be no misunderstanding respecting it.

The words, however, which were used by Count Andrassy to me, were that Her Majesty's Government "ne fera pas d'objection;" and I thought it, therefore, expedient to address my telegram to your Lordship on the 23rd instant, as it appeared to me his Excellency must be under some misapprehension on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 116.

Count Andrassy to Count Beust.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Count Beust, July* 30.)

M. le Comte, *Vienne, le 26 Juillet*, 1877.

L'ECHANGE d'idées auquel le Cabinet de St. James nous a convié a eu pour but de préciser celles des conséquences éventuelles de la guerre actuelle en Orient que nos deux Gouvernements ne sauraient admettre. Il résulte des pourparlers qui ont eu lieu à cette fin que nous considérerions comme inadmissible:—

1. La protection exclusive d'une Puissance sur les populations Chrétiennes de la presqu'île des Balkans.

2. Le règlement définitif des résultats de la guerre en dehors du concours des Puissances Garantes, ou une organisation politique de la presqu'île des Balkans octroyée par une seule Puissance.

3. Une acquisition territoriale par la Russie sur la rive droite du Danube.

4. L'incorporation de la Roumanie à la Russie, ou l'établissement d'un protectorat Russe sur cette Principauté.

5. L'établissement d'une secondo-géniture Russe ou Austro-Hongrois dans les contrées précitées;

6. La prise de possession de Constantinople par la Russie;

7. L'établissement d'un grand Etat Slave au détriment des populations non-Slaves de la presqu'île des Balkans. (En tous cas le maximum d'une nouvelle organisation ne devrait pas dépasser le cadre d'une autonomie politique des provinces actuelles avec un chef indigène à leur tête.)

Nous sommes prêts à ajouter à ces points la réserve Anglaise touchant les Dardanelles et le Bosphore. C'est-à-dire, nous estimons que l'ancienne règle sur la fermeture de ces défroits doit être maintenue, et que, s'il y avait lieu d'apporter une modification de détail, cette modification ne pourrait s'effectuer qu'à la suite d'un accord commun entre les Puissances Garantes.

Votre Excellence est autorisée à déclarer au Cabinet de St. James que, de même que le Gouvernement Britannique, nous estimons chacune des combinaisons précitées comme incompatibles avec nos intérêts réciproques, et que nous sommes résolus à ne pas les admettre.

Les conséquences inadmissibles de la guerre étant ainsi clairement constatées, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique et celui de Sa Majesté la Reine de la Grande Bretagne sont d'avis que le *modus procedendi* le plus apte à garantir les intérêts ci-dessus définis, consiste à ce que chacune des deux Puissances exerce de son côté et sans se référer l'une à l'autre une action parallèle mais indépendante à mesure que la nécessité s'en fera sentir.

A l'exception du point sur les Détroits, qui n'a pas fait l'objet d'une communication spéciale entre les Cabinets de Vienne et de St. Pétersbourg, et sur lequel nous ne connaissons pas les vues de ce dernier, nous avons lieu de croire que le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie respectera nos intérêts mutuels exposés plus haut. Jusqu'ici aucun fait ne nous autorise à présumer qu'il ait l'intention de se soustraire aux assurances qu'il nous a données ainsi qu'à l'Angleterre. Néanmoins si, sous la pression des événements qui se déroulent en Orient, ou d'une force majeure imprévue, le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg n'était plus en état de les maintenir, nous serions prêts à aviser, au moment donné, en commun avec le Gouvernement de la Reine, aux mesures

ultérieures pour la sauvegarde matérielle et pour la défense de ceux de nos intérêts réciproques qui seraient menacés d'une atteinte.

Telle est la déclaration que vous êtes autorisé à faire à Lord Derby. Vous pourrez laisser à sa Seigneurie une copie de cette dépêche, s'il vous en exprime le désir.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) ANDRASSY.

No. 117.

Précis of a Despatch from Count Andrassy, read to the Earl of Derby by Count Beust, July 30, 1877.

THE Austrian declaration is in conformity with what has been stated in Count Andrassy's telegrams. Count Beust is authorized to leave a copy of it with Lord Derby on condition that he expresses a desire for it, that he promises to send to the Austrian Government a corresponding declaration, and that he repeats the promise that no use shall be made of it either in Parliament or in communications to other Governments.

In presence of the events which are developing themselves in the East, and considering the impossibility of foreseeing their issue, it is only right that those who have the responsibility of the Government of a great State should weigh in time the chances of the future, and should exchange views with a friendly Cabinet which has common interests to preserve. It is their right and duty. The publication of transactions starting from the supposition of the non-execution of promises which have been given would easily assume a character offensive to the Power interested and might lead to the precise eventualities which it is desired to prevent. This is the reason which compels the Austrian Government to attach the highest importance to absolute secrecy as regards their exchange of views with Her Majesty's Government.

As regards the reservation relative to the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus implied in the Declaration.

It is understood that the Austrian Government are agreed with England as to the necessity of maintaining the ancient rule of the closing of the said Straits. On the other hand, as it would be possible that any one of the Powers should propose to make in this rule some modification which would injure neither the interests of Austria nor those of England, the Austrian Government have thought it right to insert in their declaration the passage stating that they would not consider a modification of detail as a *casus belli*.

Thus, for example, the abolition of the clause which gives the Sultan the right of opening the Straits in time of peace to vessels of war of the friendly and allied Powers would not be regarded by them as a *casus belli*.

From a feeling of loyalty towards Her Majesty's Government, and in order to guard against any misunderstanding, the Austrian Government lay stress upon Lord Derby's being informed of this.

The supposition in question, Count Andrassy says, is his own personal idea merely; it has not been suggested by anybody. The Austrian Government are entirely ignorant of the intentions of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh on this point, as they have entered into no discussion with them on the subject. Count Beust is authorized to give an assurance to this effect if Lord Derby should express an opinion that the Austrian Government have any grounds for presuming that the modification above-mentioned would be demanded by Russia, or would be regarded by her as sufficient.

As regards parallel but independent action.

In the present situation a collective representation or action—diplomatic or otherwise—or an appeal to the reciprocal understanding between the two countries (leaving out of the question the fact that the present attitude of the Russian Government does not as yet seem to justify it) would be calculated to wound national susceptibilities in Russia. To place the understanding on record by a declaration to Parliament or an appeal by one Government to the other in any communication to a third Power seems to the Austrian Government quite as inadmissible as to embody it in a Protocol. If any one of the common interests of the two countries, as they have been defined,

should be attacked, or even seriously menaced, an agreement as to the means of defending it could be arrived at without difficulty or delay. For this reason the Austrian Government consider that any collective step or demonstration is inopportune and excluded under present circumstances.

No. 118.

Colonel Wellesley to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 8. Confidential.)

Bucharest, July 15, 1877.

My Lord,

HAVING several purchases to make, I arrived here yesterday from the Imperial head-quarters at Simnitza.

I shall return to-morrow morning, and expect to find the Emperor at Tsarevitza.

To-day I called on Prince Gortchakow. His Highness received me with great kindness, and expressed his pleasure at the reception I had met with at head-quarters.

Prince Gortchakow hoped that your Lordship and Her Majesty's Government had been made aware of the manner in which the Emperor had welcomed me, and begged me to inform your Lordship that I meet with universal civility from the members of the Imperial staff, which is certainly the case.

His Highness then told me confidentially the news which had reached him of an intended Turkish crossing into Roumania from Silistria.

I begged Colonel Mansfield to telegraph this intelligence to your Lordship.

Prince Gortchakow went on to say that the news from England was not very satisfactory. His Highness said that there had been dissensions in the English Cabinet, and that there appeared to be an idea of addressing another protest to the Imperial Government against any attack on Constantinople; a measure the use of which Prince Gortchakow said he failed to see.

The Prince also told me that the party in the Government who wished to ask Parliament for a credit had been defeated mainly owing to the decided language of Lord Salisbury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Prince Gortchakow evidently entertains no hope of peace on this side of the Balkans. He said that he had determined in no way to interfere with the military plans until a certain point had been reached, but that when the time came he would insist upon his voice being heard.

With regard to Constantinople, his Highness repeated that neither he nor the Emperor would ever hear of its remaining in Russian hands; but it was evident that he forsees the possibility, if not the probability, of the temporary occupation of that capital by Russian troops. "The question of an occupation of Constantinople by Russia," said his Highness, "depends very much upon England. When we arrive at Adrianople, England will have an opportunity of rendering immense services (late if you will) in the interests of peace; but as long as the British fleet is in Besika Bay, so long will the Turks hope for British assistance."

I told Prince Gortchakow that I feared that the military feeling now awakened might prove difficult to control.

His Highness replied that he had also entertained grave doubts as to the influence of the military element on the Emperor, but that he had lately had several proofs that His Majesty has not allowed himself to be carried away by military pressure.

Prince Gortchakow believed that the Roumanian army would endeavour to cross the Danube, on the distinct understanding that all Roumanian troops south of that river should come under the orders of the Russian military authority.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRED. WELLESLEY.

No. 119.

Colonel Wellesley to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 9. Most Confidential.)

Imperial Head-Quarters, Biela, Bulgaria, July 23, 1877.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship will have received my telegram of the 20th instant, announcing the capture by the Russians of the Shipka Pass, and giving an idea of the military operations which preceded it.

This important event, and especially the ease with which it was accomplished, was hailed with the utmost delight by the Emperor and his staff.

There was, however, one exception, namely, General Ignatiew, who was evidently alarmed at the unexpected rapidity of the Russian advance.

I saw directly that his Excellency feared that so sudden and easy a victory might lead to plain speaking, if not to immediate action, on the part of Great Britain.

He begged me to impress on Her Majesty's Government the fact that if European complications are to be avoided, the moment has arrived for England to induce the Porte to make overtures of peace—overtures which, if couched in suitable language, his Excellency assured me the Emperor would be glad to entertain.

Again and again did General Ignatiew request me to telegraph in this sense to your Lordship.

I told his Excellency that I could not take upon myself such a responsibility without the orders of the Emperor, but that if His Majesty were directly, or through General Ignatiew, to authorise me to send a telegram in this sense to your Lordship, I should be only too happy to do so.

General Ignatiew then went to the Emperor's tent, and in about twenty minutes returned, and authorized me in His Majesty's name to inform your Lordship that, notwithstanding recent successes, the Emperor was still of the same peaceful disposition, and ready to treat for peace if "suitable" propositions were made by the Sultan.

I embodied the substance of the above in a cypher despatch to your Lordship on the 20th instant.

Now that the Russians are virtually masters of the Balkans, there appear to be only two courses open to them, that is, if the Turks refuse to make peace, and withdraw their field army to the walls of Constantinople:

The one is to march on Constantinople at all hazards, and the other to advance as far as Adrianopol only, and from thence appeal to Europe to force the Porte to come to terms, whereby Russia would prove the sincerity of her protestations with regard to the Turkish capital.

If Europe, however, were, in the latter case, to fail in persuading the Turks to commence negociations, Russia would repudiate the responsibility of a march to Constantinople, which would then become inevitable, provided, of course, that Russian successes continue.

Whether the Emperor would be powerful enough, or have the moral courage to stop a young and victorious army within so short a distance of the prize coveted by every Russian, it is impossible to say.

Judging, however, from the general spirit at head quarters, I entertain great doubts on the subject.

Policy and respect for the interests of other countries appear to have vanished entirely from the mind of the Emperor, who is entirely absorbed in military events of even daily occurrence.

In my humble opinion this is a danger which should not be lost sight of, for Russia is essentially a military nation, and one in which, under present circumstances, military honour has more weight than considerations of policy and solemn assurances.

Only yesterday General Ignatiew begged me again to impress on your Lordship that the time had arrived when England should bring her influence to bear on the Porte in favour of peace, and added that the dream of the Grand Duke Nicholas, and of those who surround him, is "de faire célébrer la messe dans l'Eglise de Sainte Sophie."

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRED. WELLESLEY.

No. 120.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 260. Most Confidential.)

Foreign Office, July 30, 1877.

Sir,

THE Austrian Ambassador read to me to-day the substance of an instruction which he had received from Count Andrassy in answer to my question as to what the Austrian Government understood by a temporary occupation of Constantinople.

Up to the present moment, Count Andrassy said, the Austrian Government had in no way allowed the Russian Government to suppose that they would tolerate a temporary occupation of the Turkish capital, although they had appreciated the reasons which made it difficult for the Emperor Alexander to enter beforehand into an engagement that no such occupation should take place. In their view it is to be desired that the Russians should not go to Constantinople at all, and that in the contrary case they should evacuate it without delay. This, in case of need, they would be ready to declare to Russia in their own name as soon as they clearly understand the views and intentions of England, which at present, Count Andrassy states, they cannot say they do. In no case do they consider that the establishment of Russian authority or the publication of administrative measures at Constantinople would be admissible, inasmuch as such acts would imply taking possession. It does not seem to his Excellency that it would be practical to fix any precise term beyond which the occupation should not last.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 121.

Colonel Wellesley to the Earl of Derby.—(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Secret.)

July 29, 1877.

I HEAR, confidentially, that Prince Bismarck has lately proposed to Russia to act contrary to her agreement with Austria respecting present war. Emperor replied that Austria having been faithful to her engagement, he would not be a party to such conduct.

I have not ascertained what Prince Bismarck proposed.

I have reason to believe that Servia will soon commence hostilities; and that General Ignatiew has encouraged this measure.

No. 122.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, July 31, 1877, 5 P.M.

WITH reference to your telegram of the 29th, in which you speak of suspicions entertained by the Porte, you are authorized to give whatever assurances may be necessary to restore confidence as to the motives of Her Majesty's Government. All rumours of English designs affecting the integrity of the Turkish Empire are absolutely unfounded.

Her Majesty's Government have received with anxiety your reports as to the danger of disturbance and bloodshed at Constantinople. They do not propose to depart from that policy of neutrality which they have always announced, but in the event of the danger above-mentioned becoming imminent, they would be willing, if invited, to send up the fleet for the purpose of giving protection to the European population and assisting in the maintenance of order.

You can sound the Sultan as to this.

No. 123.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 318.)
(Telegraphic.)

Therapia, August 1, 1877.

WITH reference to my telegram of yesterday, I am doing what I can to remove the suspicions of Porte as to our intentions. I do not think that there is any danger of disturbance and bloodshed so long as Sultan and his Government remain here. I cannot believe that they will leave except on a very great emergency. The chance of such an emergency seems now to be much lessened, as the Turks appear able to defend Adrianople. Under these circumstances it is better, in my opinion, not to say anything about the fleet coming to Constantinople.

No. 124.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 269. Secret and Confidential.)

Foreign Office, August 1, 1877.

Sir,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's confidential information, copies of further papers respecting the exchange of views between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Austria-Hungary.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 125.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received August 2.)

(No. 324. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.)

Therapia, August 2, 1877.

WITH reference to your telegram of the 28th ultimo, recent successes in Bulgaria and Roumelia have made the Turkish Ministers so confident of being able to repulse Russians, that I have reason to believe that the Sultan could not at this time either propose or listen to conditions of peace. I have informed him secretly that, should there be a favourable opportunity of opening negotiations for peace, he may rely on friendly offices of Her Majesty's Government. I do not think that anything more can be done at present.

No. 126.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received August 2.)

(No. 325. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.)

Therapia, August 2, 1877.

I AM told most confidentially that Musurus Pasha will be probably instructed to inform your Lordship that if a request be made by Her Majesty's Government that the British fleet should be allowed to come to Constantinople, it cannot be granted, as it would be contrary to the Treaty of Paris, and other Powers would be entitled to claim the same permission, and that if the British fleet comes here, it must be as an ally and upon no other condition. I trust that this telegram will be stopped. No hint whatever has been given by me either to the Sultan or to any Turkish Minister that the fleet should be invited up, nor has anything whatever passed on the subject. Any rumours to the contrary are entirely unfounded. There is a bitterness against England and a suspicion of her intentions on the part of the Grand Vizier, and of other members of the Turkish Government, for which I cannot account. These feelings do not, I think, extend to the Sultan.

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* No. 86.

No. 127.

Count Andrassy to Count Beust.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Count Beust, August 3.)

(Secret et Confidentiel.)

Vienne, le 26 Juillet, 1877.

M. le Comte,

EN me référant à votre dépêche télégraphique du 14 courant, et pour prévenir tout malentendu au sujet de la question de la délimitation future de la Bulgarie, je tiens à rappeler à votre Excellence que nous maintenons l'opinion que nous avons toujours émise. C'est-à-dire, nous continuons à considérer comme inadmissibles l'établissement d'un grand Etat Slave au détriment des populations non-Slaves, nommément des populations Grecques et Albanaises, et le règlement des conséquences de la guerre en dehors du concours des Puissances. Nous avons déjà agi et nous ne cesserons pas d'insister dans ce but. Mais d'autre part nous n'avons jamais eu en vue de considérer, et nous ne considérons pas *à priori*, [illegible] toute extension, quelle qu'elle soit, de la Bulgarie au delà des Balkans comme un *casus belli*.

C'est surtout pour cette raison que nous avons inséré dans notre dépêche du 20 Mai les clauses *sub* points 2 et 7 qui se retrouvent dans notre déclaration d'aujourd'hui.

D'abord une définition précise des Balkans est de toute impossibilité, vu leur étendue et leur configuration spéciale. Ensuite l'extension projetée ne saurait être que restreinte, attendu qu'elle ne pourrait pas s'effectuer sans notre assentiment ni celui de l'Angleterre.

Nous sommes loin de méconnaître les justes appréhensions qu'inspire aux hommes d'Etat de l'Angleterre la perspective d'une Bulgarie s'étendant jusqu'aux portes d'Adrianople, ce qui amènerait fatalement dans un temps plus ou moins rapproché l'acquisition de la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman. Seulement il nous semble que le point principal ne réside pas dans l'adjonction de quelques districts du versant méridional des Balkans à la nouvelle province Bulgare. La Russie devra-t-elle évacuer la Bulgarie et n'y exercer aucune protection spéciale? oui ou non? C'est là l'essentiel. Avec une occupation Russe permanente en Bulgarie, même la chaîne entière et intacte des montagnes n'aurait aucune valeur stratégique pour la Turquie et ne lui offrirait pas une ligne de défense effective. Par contre, si cette province est livrée à elle-même, si elle n'est occupée que par une milice nationale, et pourvu que la Roumanie soit soustraite à la dépendance de la Russie, le danger pour Constantinople nous paraît bien moindre. Quand les vœux des Bulgares auront été satisfaits, surtout si la frontière de leur contrée ne leur aura pas été mesurée avec trop de parcimonie, il est à prévoir que les aspirations vers l'indépendance prendront le dessus. L'ingratitude des peuples compte de nombreux exemples dans l'histoire.

Nous concluons de l'exposé qui précède que la démarcation des Balkans ne devrait pas être, à notre avis, le pivot de notre conduite politique, tandis qu'il importe surtout qu'à la fin de la guerre la Bulgarie soit évacuée aussitôt que faire se pourra par les armées Russes, qu'il n'y soit pas créé un grand état Slave, et que la Roumanie et la Bulgarie restent complétement indépendantes de la Russie.

Dans les circonstances présentes ce programme nous paraît la seule sauvegarde pratique et possible de nos intérêts et de ceux de l'Angleterre, engagés au même titre dans la question spéciale qui fait l'objet de cette dépêche.

Votre Excellence est autorisée à en donner lecture au Principal Secrétaire de Sa Majesté la Reine de la Grande Bretagne.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) ANDRASSY.

No. 128.

Aarifi Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha, August 7.)

(Télégraphique.)

Constantinople, le 5 Août, 1877.

IL nous revient qu'une alliance entre l'Angleterre et l'Autriche devient de plus en plus probable. Veuillez me télégraphier vos dernières informations à ce sujet.

No. 129.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 406. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, August 7, 1877.

Sir,

THE Turkish Ambassador read to me this afternoon a telegram which he had received from his Government, by which it appeared that the Porte was desirous of being confidentially informed whether or no an alliance existed between the British Government and that of Austria.

I answered that no such alliance existed, but that an exchange of ideas was taking place between the two Governments, and that I had reason to think that, in most respects, the opinion formed at Vienna as to the present situation of affairs in the East was not unlikely to be in accordance with that of Her Majesty's Government. I could not, however, speak with confidence or certainty on the subject.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 130.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 275.)

Foreign Office, August 9, 1877.

Sir,

IT was stated by your Excellency in your telegram of the 6th instant that you have been informed by M. Orczy that, notwithstanding the positive assurances of the Servian Agent at Vienna as to the defensive employment of the new levies, there was reason to believe that the Servian Government would resume hostilities on receiving the slightest encouragement from Russia. You added that M. Orczy had stated that Austria would not interfere to prevent warlike operations on the part of Servia.

The telegram received from you to-day states that the Servian Agent had renewed his assurances, but that it was thought at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that there was reason to fear that it is the intention of the Servian Government to send a force into Turkey to co-operate with the Roumanian forces in the combined movement against Plevna.

It appears from these reports that it is considered, in the quarters in which the intentions of the Servian Government are likely to be most accurately known, that it is probable that Servia will shortly resume hostilities against Turkey. The Austro-Hungarian Government must consequently be prepared for this contingency, and it is desirable to know what their policy will be. I should therefore wish your Excellency to ask Count Andrassy whether Austria-Hungary is prepared to take any steps to deter Servia from recommencing war with Turkey, and what would be her attitude in case the Servian forces should actually take the field.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 131.

Colonel Wellesley to the Earl of Derby.—(Received August .)

(No. 11. Secret.)

London, August 7, 1877.

My Lord,

ON taking leave of the Emperor of Russia at Biela (Bulgaria) on the 30th ultimo, His Majesty was pleased to make certain remarks to me respecting the present political situation, with a view to their being communicated to Her Majesty's Government.

After my interview I made a short Memorandum of His Majesty's observations, which I have now the honour to submit to your Lordship.

The Emperor was most anxious that my journey to England should not have the aspect of a diplomatic mission, and that it should not be thought that I proceeded to London by His Majesty's orders.

I was particularly requested by the Minister of War not to mention either to Prince Gortchakow or to Count Schouvaloff the object of my journey, which is supposed to have been undertaken with the sole view of explaining to your Lordship the true state of the case with regard to the alleged Russian atrocities.

I submitted the inclosed Memorandum to the Emperor before my departure, and His Majesty informed me that it was correct.

At the Emperor's request I had the honour to furnish him with a copy of it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRED. WELLESLEY.

Inclosure in No. 131.

Memorandum.

HIS Majesty the Emperor, in consequence of the false reports current in England respecting alleged Russian atrocities, thought it might be useful for me to report personally to Her Majesty's Government the true state of affairs.

In an interview which I had before my departure, His Majesty was pleased to make the following remarks to me, and at the same time authorized me to communicate them to my Government.

His Majesty repeated what he had already said to Lord A. Loftus at Livadia, and to myself at Simnitza.

The object of the present war was solely the amelioration of the condition of the Christian population of Turkey.

The conditions of peace required by the Emperor are those lately communicated to Lord Derby by Count Schouvaloff, and will remain the same as long as England maintains her position of neutrality; if, however, England abandons that position, matters will have entered a new phase.

His Majesty has no ideas of annexation beyond that perhaps of the territory Russia lost in 1856, and perhaps that of a certain portion of Asia Minor.

The Emperor will not occupy Constantinople for the sake of military honour, but only if such a step is rendered necessary by the march of events.

His Majesty is ready to enter into negotiations for peace if suitable propositions are made by the Sultan; but mediation in favour of Turkey could not be entertained.

Europe will be invited to a Conference for the final settlement of the conditions of peace.

The Emperor has not the slightest wish or intention in any way to menace the interests of England either with regard to Constantinople, Egypt, the Suez Canal, or India.

With respect to India, His Majesty not only considers it impossible to do so, but an act of folly if practicable.

His Majesty assured me that the Triple Alliance was formed for the preservation of peace, and without any idea of aggression, or of offence to England, with which country His Majesty has every desire to remain on friendly terms.

A temporary occupation of Bulgaria will be necessary.

His Majesty has never entertained hostile feelings towards England, nor has he desired to give her offence; but if one is determined to "chercher midi à quatorze heures," it is easy to take offence at anything.

The Emperor fears that the present policy of England only tends to encourage the Turks, and consequently to prolong the war, and considers that if English influence were brought to bear on the Porte, the Sultan would be ready to come to terms and thus a war regretted and felt by all Europe would be brought to a speedy conclusion.

Biela, Bulgaria, July ¼, 1877.

No. 132.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 278. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, August 13, 1877.

Sir,

COUNT BEUST communicated to me to-day confidentially the substance of a telegram which he has received from Count Andrassy which was to the following effect:—

The Austro-Hungarian Government had always maintained the view that Austro-Hungary, being a neutral Power, could not as such intervene in the military operations of the present war. So long as Servia should content herself with declaring war

FULLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE PUBLIC

against Turkey, no opposition would be offered either by military or diplomatic means to her eventual action. Russia had been told that Austria-Hungary could not allow the entrance into Servia of Russian troops, and on the same ground, as long as Servia should be acting as the belligerent, the occupation of her territory by Austro-Hungarian troops would be inadmissible. If, however, Servia should indulge in revolutionary courses which should take the form of an invasion of Bosnia, thus prejudicing the results of the war, and troubling the repose of the Austro-Hungarian frontier, the Imperial Government would meet this by an occupation of Bosnia, reserving to itself the right of further occupying Servia in case of need.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 133

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 283 A. Secret and Confidential.)

Foreign Office, August 14, 1877.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT herewith, for your Excellency's information, copy of a despatch from Count Andrassy to Count Beust respecting the future limits of Bulgaria.*

This despatch was communicated to me on the 3rd instant by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at this Court.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 134.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 284. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, August 14, 1877.

Sir,

HER Majesty's Government have had under their consideration the despatch addressed by Count Andrassy to the Austrian Ambassador at this Court on the 26th ultimo, of which his Excellency was authorized to leave a copy in my hands. The purport of that despatch is to define those possible consequences of the present war which the Governments of Great Britain and of Austria-Hungary would consider to be inadmissible, and would be prepared, if necessary, jointly to resist.

The following are the points which the Government of Austria-Hungary consider to be incompatible with the interests of that Empire:—

1. The exclusive protectorate of any one Power over the Christian populations of the Balkan Peninsula.

2. The definitive settlement of the results of the war without the concurrence of the Guaranteeing Powers, or the concession of any political organization to the Balkan Peninsula through the agency of a single Power.

3. Any territorial acquisition by Russia on the right bank of the Danube.

4. The incorporation of Roumania by Russia, or the establishment of a Russian Protectorate over that Principality.

5. The establishment of a Russian or Austro-Hungarian *secundo-geniture* in the countries above-mentioned.

6. The possession ("prise de possession") of Constantinople by Russia.

7. The establishment of a great Slav State, to the detriment of the non-Slavonic populations of the Balkan Peninsula. (In any case the maximum of a new organization should not exceed the limits of a political autonomy of the present provinces, with a native Chief at their head.)

To these points the Austrian Government are ready to add the reservation made by that of England regarding the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. That is to say, they consider that the ancient rule as to the closing of these Straits should be maintained, and that if there should be occasion to make in it any modification of detail, such modification could only be effected by means of a general agreement among the Guaranteeing Powers.

The Cabinet of Vienna are of opinion that the best method of guaranteeing the interests above defined would consist in parallel but independent action by each of the two Powers on its own part, and without reference to the other, as necessity may arise.

* No. 127.

They state that, with the exception of the question of the Straits, as to which they have had no special communication with the Russian Government, they have reason to believe that the latter will respect their interests as stated above. If, however, under the pressure of events, or of some unforeseen compulsion, the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh should be unable to fulfil its promises, the Austrian Government would be ready to join with that of Her Majesty in considering the further measures which might be necessary for the defence and material preservation of such of our reciprocal interests as might be menaced.

Such is the substance of the declaration which Count Beust has been authorized to make to me.

Her Majesty's Government, on the other hand, at the commencement of the war, laid down, in a note which I addressed to Count Schouvaloff on the 6th of May last, the following points as those, among others, which most immediately affected British interests.

They stated that any attempt to blockade or otherwise to interfere with the Suez Canal or its approaches would be inconsistent with the maintenance by them of an attitude of passive neutrality; that an attack on Egypt, or its occupation, even temporary, for purposes of war, could not be regarded by them with unconcern; that they were not prepared to witness with indifference the passing of Constantinople into other hands than those of its present possessors; and that there would be, in their judgment, serious objections to the alteration in any material particular of the existing arrangements regulating the navigation of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles.

In reply to this communication Her Majesty's Government have received from that of Russia assurances in regard to Egypt and the Suez Canal which appear to them entirely satisfactory.

As regards Constantinople, Prince Gortchakow has stated that the acquisition of that capital is excluded from the views of the Emperor, and has recognized that its future is a question of common interest, which cannot be settled otherwise than by a general understanding, adding at the same time, however, that the Imperial Cabinet are unable to prejudge the course or issue of the war. And with regard to the Straits, he has confined himself to admitting that the question is one which should be settled by a common agreement on equitable and efficiently guaranteed bases.

Her Majesty's Government have been glad to find that the Cabinet of Austria are agreed with them as to the necessity of preventing the possession of Constantinople by Russia, and as to the expediency of maintaining the present arrangements for the closing of the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to the ships of war of foreign Powers. With regard to the reservation made in Count Andrassy's despatch respecting the possible introduction of some modification of detail into these latter provisions with the concurrence of the Guaranteeing Powers, Her Majesty's Government, without rejecting absolutely the idea of all modification whatsoever, are still of opinion that such a change would be undesirable, and that in any case it would be necessary to guard carefully against proposals calculated to leave Constantinople at the mercy of a Russian fleet, or to allow unrestricted egress to the Russian naval forces for aggressive purposes from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean. For the same reason Her Majesty's Government would feel strong objections, which they doubt not would be shared by the Mediterranean Powers, to the provisional or permanent acquisition by Russia of a port on the Mediterranean coast.

The other points mentioned in Count Andrassy's despatch, though some of them do not affect British interests so immediately as those which I have just mentioned, are yet objectionable either in themselves or in their ulterior consequences, and Her Majesty's Government are prepared to join with that of Austria in opposing them, if occasion should arise.

The mode of proceeding proposed by Count Andrassy for effecting the object in view is not, perhaps, calculated to secure the same attention to the representations of the two Powers as might be effected by a more openly concerted action in the first instance. But Her Majesty's Government understand and appreciate the objections raised by Count Andrassy to the latter course, and are prepared to pursue that which the Austrian Government considers best fitted to their position.

Your Excellency is authorized to leave a copy of this despatch with Count Andrassy on the same conditions as the communication made by Count Beust to me.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 135.

Memorandum for Colonel Wellesley.

(Confidential.)

HER Majesty's Government have considered the communication brought by Colonel Wellesley from the Emperor of Russia with all the attention which its importance deserves.

They have received with satisfaction the statement made by His Majesty as to the objects of the war in which he is engaged, his disclaimer of any extensive ideas of annexation, and his readiness to enter into negotiations for peace. They are grateful for the assurance which he has given of his intention to respect the interests of England.

It is the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government to contribute to the re-establishment of peace, and in the meanwhile they have no intention of departing from that attitude of strict, though conditional, neutrality which they have hitherto observed. They would gladly use whatever influence they possess at Constantinople to encourage a pacific disposition on the part of the Sultan and his advisers. They cannot, however, admit that, as appears to be supposed by the Emperor, "the present policy of England tends to encourage the Turks and consequently to prolong the war." They fear that the influence which they are enabled to exercise on the counsels of the Porte is far less than His Imperial Majesty seems disposed to ascribe to them. So long as the Porte thought fit to expect the military support of England it was natural that English advice should be sought with eagerness and received with deference. But under the contrary circumstances that now prevail at Constantinople, the position of the English Government in Turkish opinion is no longer that of professors who must be conciliated at any cost, but of neutrals, from whom neither assistance nor hostility is to be anticipated. Further, it does not appear to Her Majesty's Government that the present juncture is one which offers a favourable opening for the commencement of negotiations. The military events which have occurred since the date of the communication made by the Emperor to Colonel Wellesley will have necessarily indisposed the Turkish Government to entertain any propositions of peace except on conditions such as it is unlikely that the Russian Government would accept.

Her Majesty's Government, however, will bear in mind the communication with which they have been honoured, and the Emperor may rest assured that they will lose no opportunity which appears to them suitable to assist in the restoration of peace.

August 14, 1877.

No. 136.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received August 15.)

(No. 887. Secret.)

Therapia, August 2, 1877.

My Lord,

I HAVE had means of ascertaining secretly whether the Sultan would be disposed to consider overtures for bringing the war with Russia to an end. I may, I think, state with some confidence that His Majesty could not, under present circumstances, either propose or listen to any conditions of peace. Although His Majesty, I have every reason to believe, is personally most desirous and anxious to save his Empire from the horrors of war, his Ministers and others who have influence on the country are now so much encouraged by the recent successes obtained by the Turkish armies over the Russians at Plevna and Eski-Zaghra and in Asia, and by the assurances given by Mehemet Ali Pasha that he will be able, within a few days, to commence offensive operations with every prospect of a favourable result, that they feel confident that the enemy will be ultimately repulsed and driven out of Bulgaria and Roumelia, as he has been out of Armenia. The manner, too, in which the Russians are stated to be carrying on the war has exasperated the Mussulmans, and has indisposed them to entertain any proposals for peace which Russia is likely to make or to accept.

I have given the Sultan to understand that Her Majesty's Government were not disposed to take the initiative in making any proposals for the termination of the war, but that, should a favourable opportunity offer for opening negotiations for peace, His

Majesty may rely upon their friendly offices to obtain for him the most favourable conditions that could be expected under the circumstances.

I am of opinion that nothing more can be done on our part at present in the interest of peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 137.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received August 15.)

(No. 909. Secret.)

Therapia, August 7, 1877.

My Lord,

THE Grand Vizier called upon me this morning. I had not seen his Highness for some time. When he is in one of those fits of excitement, to which he is liable, he is in the habit of expressing himself in language that cannot always be listened to without impatience. I was aware that he felt great irritation at the present moment against England, and I consequently thought it better, as I had no business of importance to transact with him, to avoid an interview.

After he had talked of the latest news from the seats of war, I told his Highness frankly why I had not seen him recently. I said that I had heard from many sources that he had spoken in very hostile and angry terms of England. I could not account for these feelings. What were the grounds of his complaints? I asked. In what had Her Majesty's Government departed from the declaration that they had repeatedly made from the time of the Conference to the breaking out of the war? They had distinctly and emphatically told Turkey that they would not help her in the war upon which she had entered. Although Her Majesty's Government had accordingly maintained a policy of strict neutrality, they had, nevertheless, given proofs to Turkey that there was no want of sympathy for her on their part, and they had already rendered the Turkish Government some important services. I was surprised, therefore, to learn that he thought he had reason to complain of England.

His Highness replied that it was not true that he entertained hostile feelings towards England. He was aware that I had been informed that such was the case, but this was part of an intrigue against him. However, after giving this denial to the reports that had reached me, he defended himself at some length for complaining of England. He said that Turkey had always looked upon England as her ally, and as the most earnest supporter of the Treaty of Paris. But now that Turkey was in the utmost danger, England had abandoned her, and, throwing over that Treaty, had left her at the mercy of her secular and powerful enemy. A friend, his Highness said, who deserts you in the hour of need is much worse than an open foe. His Highness continued for some time in this strain, adding that whilst England had turned against Turkey because of some atrocities committed by Bashi-Bazouks and others last year, which had been immensely exaggerated, she now appeared perfectly insensible to the cruelties perpetrated upon the innocent and inoffensive Mussulman population, not by irregular and undisciplined troops, but as part of a settled policy which General Ignatieff was advocating at the Emperor's head-quarters, and which consisted in the extermination of the whole Mussulman population of Bulgaria in order that Russia might claim that province as solely occupied by Christians of the same race as her own people. So shocking an outrage upon humanity and religion had never, his Highness declared, been before perpetrated. He said that he felt utterly broken down by the terrible slaughter that was taking place, and by the scenes of misery that he daily witnessed. His Highness proceeded to give me some details which he had received from Hassan Pasha (the son of the Khedive) and from other Generals of revolting cruelties alleged to have been committed by the Russian troops and the Bulgarians under their protection, and with their connivance, on Mahomedan women and children. I trust that they may be greatly exaggerated. If only a fraction of them be true, they far exceed anything that has ever been cast at the door of the Bashi-Bazouks.

His Highness was visibly affected by the relation that he had made to me. After he had calmed down a little he returned to the subject of England. He could not, he said, but think that she had declared that she could not help Turkey in the war which Russia had forced upon her. But did England still uphold the Treaty of Paris? If

she did, why did she allow Russia to violate it? Turkey clung to that Treaty, and had observed and respected it in every particular. She was still ready to do so. If England, his Highness said, could not assist Turkey with troops, she had other means of helping her. Had Turkey to deal with Russia alone, relying upon the admirable devotion and courage of the Mussulman population, she would not despair of success. But whilst England was declaring that Turkey and Russia should be left face to face to settle their quarrel without interference, and that the war should be what was called "localised," Greece and Servia were permitted to threaten her, and were preparing to attack her. If it were not for this Turkey would be able to dispose of all her resources against Russia, and might come victorious out of the struggle. She was now, however, compelled to employ a number of battalions to watch and keep in check the Greeks and Servians. She was, in fact, menaced and assailed from every side. Could not Her Majesty's Government, at least, give a proof of their sympathy for Turkey, and of their love of justice and fair play, by using their influence to keep Servia and Greece from attacking her?

I reminded his Highness that your Lordship had advised Greece to abstain from taking part in the war, and from making an unprovoked aggression on Turkey. His Highness replied that advice was not enough for the Greeks. They were determined to take advantage of the first favourable opportunity of falling upon Turkey. Greece and Servia ought to be called upon by Europe to observe their Treaties with the Porte, and, if necessary, be compelled to do so.

His Highness, after describing to me the lamentable condition to which the country had been reduced by the war, asked me whether, in my opinion, there was any way of bringing it to an end. I replied that I had reason to believe that the Emperor of Russia would not be indisposed to make peace, and I could venture to say that Her Majesty's Government would be ready to do all in their power to put an end to a struggle which was causing so much bloodshed, misery, and devastation; but that they were not disposed, under present circumstances, to propose conditions to either belligerents. What I asked were his own views as to the probability of overtures for peace being accepted by the Porte? He answered that he was personally desirous that they should be; but it depended upon the terms which Russia would put forward? What, I enquired, would you consider reasonable and acceptable terms? The observance of the Treaty of Paris, he replied, upon which Turkey has always relied, and upon which her foreign policy is based. Did he consider, I said, the terms of the Protocol of London as coming within that Treaty, and could the autonomy of Bulgaria be reconciled with it? He answered both questions at once in the negative. If such were the case, I observed, there appeared to me that there would be no hope of peace until the probable result of the war was more clearly defined. He agreed to this, adding that hitherto the Russians had achieved no signal victory against the Turkish troops; but that the progress they had made was owing to the incapacity and negligence of the Turkish commanders, whilst in every battle they had been worsted. He thought as Turkey had been so successful in Asia, and her prospects were so much improved in Europe, she had a right to insist on her own conditions, and would have still more right to do so after two more such victories as that at Plevna, which he was confident would be achieved.

But, said his Highness, if England will not offer mediation, to whom are we to look? Should it be Germany or Austria? I replied that I had heard that an opinion prevailed in some of the European Cabinets that Austria might be acceptable as a mediator to Russia, but I had no authority to say so. His Highness observed that he would like to know whether, when the time came for mediation, Austria would be disposed to come forward. He might, he said, sound Count Zichy on this subject, but for certain reasons he was unwilling to do so. It would immediately be known in certain quarters (he alluded to the German Embassy), and might cause jealously and serious mischief. What he should prefer would be that Her Majesty's Government should ascertain the views of the Austrian Government through Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna. Entire reliance could be placed upon his prudence and friendly disposition towards Turkey.

I told his Highness that I did not feel myself authorized at that moment to offer any opinion on the subject, but that I would inform your Lordship of what he had said to me, and that on some future occasion we might have an opportunity of recurring to it.

From the language and manner of the Grand Vizier I am led to believe that he is fully persuaded of the magnitude and difficulties of the task which his country has undertaken in entering on the war with Russia, and that he would gladly avail himself

of an opportunity to bring it to an end. But he feels that after the recent successes of the Turkish arms popular opinion would not permit him to accept any conditions that would be considered humiliating and opposed to the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. He still thinks that he can fall back upon the Treaty of Paris, and that the position of the Russian armies is such that there is a very fair prospect of Turkey being able to maintain her rights under it. At the same time, to obtain peace, he might be brought, even should the Turkish arms achieve any signal successes, to accept the Protocol of London, and to give guarantees for the future good government of the Christian subjects of the Sultan. I doubt whether at the present time the Porte would listen to anything more.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 138.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 435. Secret.)
Foreign Office, August 16, 1877.

Sir,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch from Colonel Wellesley,* forwarding a Memorandum of the observations made to him by the Emperor of Russia in regard to the present political situation, before his departure from the Imperial head-quarters at Biela, and also a copy of a Memorandum containing the remarks of Her Majesty's Government on the Emperor's communication, which has been given to Colonel Wellesley,† who has been authorized to deliver a copy of it to His Imperial Majesty.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 139.

The Earl of Derby to Count Beust.

Foreign Office, August 16, 1877.

THE Earl of Derby presents his compliments to Count Beust, and has the honour to forward, for his Excellency's confidential information, copy of a despatch addressed on the 14th instant to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, and sent by the Queen's messenger who left London yesterday evening.‡

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 140.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 310. Secret.)
Foreign Office, August 17, 1877.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch which has been addressed to me by Colonel Wellesley since his arrival in London,* forwarding a Memorandum of the observations in regard to the present political situation which were made to him by the Emperor of Russia before his departure from Biela for communication to Her Majesty's Government.§

The accompanying Memorandum, containing the remarks of Her Majesty's Government on the Emperor's communication, has been given to Colonel Wellesley, who has been authorized to deliver a copy of it to His Imperial Majesty.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

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* No. 131. † No. 135. ‡ No. 134. § Inclosure in No. 131.

No. 141.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 457. Secret.) *Foreign Office, August 23, 1877.*

Sir,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 887, Secret, of the 2nd instant, respecting the present disposition of the Sultan as regards peace, and stating that you had given His Majesty to understand that Her Majesty's Government were not disposed to take the initiative in making any proposals for the termination of the war, but that, should a favourable opportunity offer for opening negotiations for peace, His Majesty may rely upon their friendly offices to obtain for him the most favourable conditions that could be expected; and I have to inform your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve your proceedings in this matter.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 142.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received August 24, 5 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, August 24, 1877, 4·50 P.M.*

(Confidential.)

COUNT ANDRASSY having returned this morning to Vienna, I have delivered to him a copy of your Lordship's despatch of the 14th instant, relative to understanding between England and Austria. He observed that, notwithstanding his reservation, he concurs in Her Majesty's Government as to a change in the existing arrangements respecting the Straits being inadmissable, and he said that the exchange of declarations between the two Governments have now established a satisfactory basis for future action, should it be necessary.

No. 143.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 690. Confidential.) *Vienna, August 23, 1877.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the messenger Liddell delivered to me on the 15th instant your despatch No. 284 of the 14th instant, marked Confidential, in reply to a despatch addressed by Count Andrassy to Count Beust on the 26th ultimo, of which a copy was communicated to you by his Excellency, in conformity with the instructions of his Government.

Count Andrassy, whose absence from Vienna I reported in my despatch No. 677 of the 15th instant, will not return till to-morrow, and I have therefore been unable to communicate to his Excellency a copy of your Lordship's despatch before the departure of the messenger, who leaves to-day for London.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 144.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 955. Most Confidential.) *Therapia, August 18, 1877.*

My Lord,

THE Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has been sounding persons about the Sultan and the Porte as to the possibility of peace. I judge from what he has said to me that the conclusion to which he has come agrees with my own, namely, that whilst His Majesty and his principal Ministers would be glad to bring the war to an end, they would not, under present circumstances, accept any such terms as the Emperor of Russia would be likely to propose.

I have seen, during the last few days, several persons who are in a position to know the Sultan's views on the subject. They have given me to understand that His Majesty might accept the Protocol, and that he would enter into some engagement, not guarantees, for the good government of all his subjects, without distinction of race or creed, but that he would not make any concessions in favour of the Bulgarians alone. Beyond this, until his armies have received some signal defeat, he would not go. As to the Russian terms, submitted to your Lordship through Count Schouvaloff, they would not be listened to for a moment.

Count Zichy observed to me that the difficulty of putting an end to the war lies with the Emperor of Russia and not with the Sultan. His Excellency thought it scarcely possible that, after the reverses his arms had sustained, the Emperor could, in face of the public opinion of his country, accept any conditions which did not secure the object of the war. Count Zichy has probably been instructed by his Government to watch for any opportunity that may occur for offering the mediation of Austria, but he does not appear to me to be very sanguine that such an opportunity will soon present itself.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 145.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 299.) *Foreign Office, September 1, 1877.*

Sir,

THE Austro-Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires called at this Office to-day and read a despatch which he had received from Vienna in which Count Andrassy expressed the great satisfaction with which the Imperial Government had learnt the contents of my despatch to your Excellency No. 284 of the 14th ultimo, in which I stated the view taken by Her Majesty's Government as to the suggestion, which had been made by Count Andrassy, that the Governments of Austria-Hungary and Great Britain should act independently of each other in protecting their separate and joint interests against injury from certain possible consequences of the war between Russia and Turkey, but should reserve the right of joint action should necessity for it arise.

Count Andrassy recorded in the despatch his full appreciation of the advantages of the existence of a good understanding between the two Governments, and observed that though, so long as Russia did not, in the claims which she might ultimately advance, exceed the limits which should be considered admissible, the good understanding would have no immediate effect, it would still remain a valuable proof of mutual confidence; if, however, on the other hand, Russia should find herself, from any reason, unable to fulfil her promises, it would then offer a firm basis for ulterior agreement upon the best means of securing or defending such of the reciprocal interests of the two countries as might be menaced.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 146.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received September 10.)

(No. 699. Confidential.) *Vienna, August 24, 1877.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 690, Confidential, of the 23rd August, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that Count Andrassy returned from Ischl this morning; and it having been arranged that he would call at the Embassy, I read to him your despatch of the 14th instant, relative to the understanding between England and Austria, respecting the consequences of the war between Turkey and Russia; and I left a copy of it in his Excellency's hands. On my reading the passage in which it is stated that Her Majesty's Government consider that a change in the existing arrangements respecting the Straits would be undesirable, his Excellency said that notwithstanding the reservation he had expressed on this subject, he concurs in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government with respect to it

He appeared to be entirely satisfied with your Lordship's despatch, observing that the exchange of declarations between the two Governments affords a satisfactory basis for future action, should it be deemed necessary or advisable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 147.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received September* 28.)

(No. 1089. Confidential.)
Therapia, September 18, 1877.

My Lord,

THERE is no doubt a strong desire prevailing amongst the most intelligent and thoughtful Turks that Turkey should avail herself of the first opportunity to endeavour to obtain peace, and to put an end to a war which, whatever may be its ultimate results, can only bring the greatest calamities upon her. They are of opinion that if the Turkish arms should obtain any further successes, and the Russians be compelled to suspend the campaign for this year, the Sultan should appeal to the European Powers to intervene, expressing, at the same time, his willingness to grant of his own accord all the concessions that have been asked of him for the better government of his Christian subjects, except such as might be at variance with his sovereign independence and authority. On these terms Turkey should be prepared to make peace, and it is hoped that, if Russia persisted in carrying on the war without any definite or justifiable object, Europe would interfere to stop it.

I have reason to believe that the Sultan himself, and some, if not all, of his Ministers, would be ready to make such an appeal. Server Pasha, however, when speaking to me on the subject yesterday, observed that if the Turkish armies were victorious, and a peace were concluded, some guarantees ought to be exacted from Russia that she would not again make an unprovoked aggression upon Turkey. Neither the Treaty of Paris nor the transfer to the Danubian Principalities of a part of Bessarabia, which were both intended to prevent Russia from attacking Turkey, have, unfortunately, his Excellency said, been of any avail. Consequently, some more effective guarantees with this object ought to be obtained.

I asked Server Pasha what was the nature of the guarantees that he had in view. He replied that it was a matter which required great consideration, and that the time was not yet come to express an opinion upon it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 148.

Colonel Wellesley to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received October* 3.)

(No. 14. Most Confidential.)
Gorny Stooden, Bulgaria, August 30, 1877.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report my arrival at the Imperial head quarters on the evening of the 29th instant, and to submit the following account of my interviews with His Majesty the Emperor since my return.

Soon after my arrival I was received by the Emperor, who said that he had already heard from Count Schouvaloff of the conciliatory language I had held in London, and thanked me for the endeavours I had made to explain to Her Majesty's Government his views with respect to the relations at present existing between Russia and England.

I informed the Emperor in a few words of the substance of your Lordship's Memorandum, of which I was the bearer, and of which I was authorized to give him a copy.

His Majesty, being anxious to know the judgment I had formed on the state of public opinion in England, I took the opportunity of impressing on His Majesty's mind the advisability of ending the war this year, and the danger which would attend a renewal of hostilities in the spring.

I was in a position to assure the Emperor from personal experience of the warlike tendency of a very great proportion of public opinion in England, and to show how difficult it might become for Her Majesty's Government to restrain this feeling, should Russia determine to attack Turkey a second time with all the forces she could muster during the winter months.

I pointed out to His Majesty that the feeling of sympathy for the Turks among the English people increased in proportion to the brave resistance which they displayed in the defence of their country, and that if, after a campaign in which Turkey had been able more or less to hold her own, Russia were to collect all the immense forces at her disposal for a renewal of the attack at the commencement of next year, I had grave apprehensions as to the effect such a policy might produce on the public mind in England.

The Emperor replied that the intelligence he received from Count Schouvaloff entirely bore out my words, and added that he had himself forseen the influence which Turkish successes would have on the friends of that nation in England.

I explained to His Majesty that although perfect tranquility apparently reigns in England at the present time, His Majesty must not attribute this calmness to apathy on the part of the people, but rather to the confidence they have in the present Government, and to the conviction that it is prepared to act should the honour or interests of England be in any way menaced.

I endeavoured to disabuse the Emperor's mind of the idea prevalent in Russia that the Queen and Her Majesty's Government are desirous of engaging in war with Russia, and assured His Majesty that on the contrary it was the sincere wish of the Queen and the British Government to remain on friendly terms with the Emperor, and that consequently everything was avoided which could in any way be construed as an act of encouragement to the Turks.

I further added my belief that any Russian successes which might enable the Emperor to obtain conditions of peace at once honourable and satisfactory would be welcomed in England with joy.

I likewise informed the Emperor that I had reason to believe that anti-Russian meetings, and discussions in Parliament on the Eastern Question, had been discouraged by Her Majesty's Government in order to avoid any semblance of encouragement to Turkey.

His Majesty appeared much pleased at this, and said that he hoped sincerely to end the war this year, and above all to avoid a conflict with England, adding, "et pourquoi—Mon Dieu, pourquoi?"

I took this opportunity of begging the Emperor not to believe in the alleged weakness of the present British Government, and in the absurd strength attributed to to the Opposition, assuring His Majesty that faith in such reports could only lead to a false appreciation of the actual state of affairs.

As I left the room the Emperor thanked me sincerely for what I had told him, and "especially," said His Majesty, "for the frankness with which you have spoken."

On the following morning the Emperor sent for me again, and I read to His Majesty the Memorandum with which your Lordship had charged me.

The Emperor interrupted me twice during the reading, once to say that although Her Majesty's Government might now be desirous of seeing the war brought to a close, it could not be denied that they had done much towards bringing it on; and again to give his approval to that portion of the Memorandum which refers to the present not being a favourable opportunity for trying to obtain suitable conditions of peace from the Porte.

When I had finished reading, the Emperor said that he had been thinking a great deal about what I had said to him on the previous day, and that he could not but think that if I were correct in my idea that Russian successes would be welcomed in England, the fact must be attributed to the conviction that it is impossible for Russia to cross the Balkans this year.

I replied that I believed Her Majesty's Government earnestly desired to see the present war terminated in a manner honourable to the Emperor and his country, and that they would therefore receive with satisfaction the news of such Russian successes as would enable this result to be obtained.

The Emperor went on to say that he had commenced the war "son corps defendant," and with the object of obtaining the execution of the recorded wishes of the Great Powers, and that glad as he would be to terminate the war, even north of the Balkans, it would be impossible for him to do so otherwise than on conditions which would guarantee a solid and lasting peace.

With regard to the conditions of peace, His Majesty said that of course if he

continued to suffer reverses, he would be compelled to adapt himself to circumstances, but that if the Almighty were to bless his arms, he could not give his sanction to "une paix honteuse."

"God knows," said His Majesty, "I undertook this war 'mon corps défendant;' I had no wish for war; but now I am responsible to my country, and if, after the sacrifices in blood and money which I have called upon my subjects to make, I were to consent to an unstable peace, Russia would never forgive me. She has, as it is, been thrown back some twenty or thirty years, and has a right to demand some substantial result for so great a sacrifice."

"I have told you many times," continued His Majesty, "and I repeat it to you again in the most solemn manner, that I do not now, and never have, entertained the slightest intention or wish to menace the interests of England in any way. I bear her no malice, and my sincere desire is to live on friendly terms with her. I trust most sincerely that there will never be a collision between our two countries, and feel sure 'que vous travaillerez vous-même pour cela.' I have the same pacific intentions now which I have always entertained, and should be only too delighted to end the war now if I saw my way to a durable peace."

The Emperor also read to me a letter he had received from Prince Gortchakoff, relating conversations which his Highness and Baron Jomini had had with me when I passed through Bucharest, and in which I had impressed upon them the desirability of a speedy peace. I had stated, said Prince Gortchakoff, that the conditions as submitted by the Emperor were considered impossible in London, especially the one which relates to the destruction of the fortresses, to which it had been replied that, after all, the conditions presented were only the expression of what Russia required, but liable, of course, to modification according to the march of events.

As the Emperor did not disavow this answer, it may be supposed that the Russian Government are already disposed to entertain great modifications of the conditions as presented by Count Schouvaloff to your Lordship, and this idea is strengthened by a few words which my Austrian colleague was evidently asked to say to me, to the effect that as Russia had proposed certain conditions it was impossible for her to take the initiative in proposing modifications of them, but that he believed that she would be ready to listen to any counter-proposals on the part of Her Majesty's Government.

Other proofs are not wanting of the disposition on the part of Russia to be more reasonable in her demands.

Baron Jomini, for instance, told me that at the Grand Duke's head-quarters they had "added a great deal of water to their wine;" and one of the Grand Duke's Aides-de-camp, after saying what dispositions should, in his opinion, be made for carrying on the war, concluded by remarking, "that is my opinion as a soldier, but, as a man, I say that, having had advantages and reverses on both sides, we ought to make mutual concessions and come to terms of peace."

At the conclusion of my conversation with the Emperor, His Majesty said that he was often told of British interests, but that it must not be forgotten that Russia has interests also, which, as Emperor, it is his duty to protect.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FRED. WELLESLEY.

No. 149.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received October 11.)

(Telegraphic.) (Private and Secret.) *Constantinople, October 10, 1877.*

COUNT ZICHY asked to-day whether there was any chance of England offering mediation to bring the war to an end. I replied that my personal impression was that Her Majesty's Government were not disposed to take first step, but that they would willingly support any attempt made by another Power in favour of peace, and I inquired of him whether his Government were disposed to mediate. He led me to believe that they were; but said that, although time was not yet come to propose mediation, way might be prepared for it, and that he had reason to believe that persons of great influence at the Porte were in favour of peace. He asked me whether England would be inclined to go with Austria. I could only refer generally to the desire shown by Her Majesty's Government to act with her. He hinted that Count Andrassy had authorized him to sound me on this subject, but begged me to consider what he had said as strictly private,

and neither official nor officious. He expressed his conviction, founded on information he had received, that the Russian army would be unable to winter in Bulgaria, and expressed himself in terms favourable to Turkey which surprised me. He observed that no importance was to be attached to interview at Salzburg, and declared that Austria was not under the influence of Germany.

No. 150.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 135. Secret.) (Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 11, 1877.*

TURKISH Minister for Foreign Affairs called upon me to-day to inform me of a conversation he had had with Count Zichy, who appears to have held to him precisely the same language as to Austrian mediation he held to me yesterday, as reported to you in my private and secret telegram. Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs said that whilst endeavouring to ascertain views of Austrian Government, he had taken care not to commit in any way his own, as he was determined that no step should be taken by the Porte without previous consultation and understanding with England. He added that, in reporting Count Zichy's communication to the Sultan, he had so advised His Majesty, who completely approved. Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs wishes me, therefore, to inform Her Majesty's Government of this overture on the part of Count Zichy, which, he is convinced, from what the Austrian Ambassador said, was authorized by Count Andrassy, and to ask opinion of Her Majesty's Government with respect to it. I inquired of Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the Porte was disposed to accept the mediation of Austria. He answered that it was. To my inquiry as to terms of peace which would be accepted by Turkey, he replied that, as Russia had provoked the war, and the Turkish arms had been victorious, Turkey had a right to demand securities against future aggression from Russia. What she would require would be the Treaty of Paris as a basis, a return to the two separate provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, the right of Turkey to have fortified positions on the Pruth, the fortress of Belgrade to be restored to the Sultan, and a rectification of the Armenian frontier by the transfer of Daghestan or a part of that province to Turkey.

Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Count Zichy spoke disparagingly of Prince Bismarck and German policy, and gave him the idea that there was a coolness between Austria and Germany.

Count Zichy's language yesterday conveyed the same impression to me. It is, I think, very desirable that your Lordship should give me some instructions as to what I should say to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, as he tells me that he shall avoid giving any answer or encouragement to the Austrian ouvertures until he knows the opinion of Her Majesty's Government.

No. 151.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 13, 1877, 2·15 P.M.*

THE Turkish proposal will require careful consideration. It is right I should tell you that Count Beust brought me a message from Count Andrassy two days ago, to the effect that he thought the time not opportune for mediation. There must, therefore, be some misunderstanding between Count Andrassy and Count Zichy, as their language is directly contradictory. Count Andrassy represents himself as acting in complete harmony with Prince Bismarck. In my personal opinion, it would be hopeless to ask for such terms as the Turkish Government has suggested.

No. 152.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 328. Most Confidential.) *Foreign Office, October* 15, 1877.

Sir,

THE Austrian Ambassador having returned to England, requested an interview, in order to make me acquainted with the views of Count Andrassy, with whom he told me that he had had two long conversations before leaving Vienna.

Count Beust accordingly came down at my invitation to Knowsley on the 10th instant, and spoke to me at length on the policy of the Austrian Government with regard to affairs in Turkey.

He said that Count Andrassy was opposed to any attempt at mediation between Russia and Turkey, even should one of the parties ask for it. If the request came from both belligerents the case might be different, but that was not a probable contingency. Count Beust explained that Count Andrassy's resolution on this point was founded on the following considerations:—

A year ago, when General Sumarokoff had been sent to Vienna with a proposal from the Emperor Alexander that Russia should occupy Bulgaria, and that Austria should at the same time occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Emperor of Austria had said in reply to that proposal "We cannot prevent you from going to war if you are determined to do so, but we warn you that, having once invaded Bulgaria with the professed intention of emancipating the Christian population, it will not be easy for you to retire, and it will be necessary for Austria to insist on your retiring, even if we have to resort to force."

Having thus acted loyally to Russia, continued Count Beust, and given her fair warning of the possible consequence of the course on which she has entered, it is not the business of the Austrian Government to afford the Emperor Alexander an opportunity of saying that he has been again prevented from fulfilling the "historical mission" of Russia in the East by the intervention of a foreign Power. Russia must and will show that she is unable, with full liberty of action, to settle the Eastern Question in her own way and for the exclusive benefit of the Slav races.

I asked his Excellency how Count Andrassy's views would be affected, supposing that in a second campaign or in the winter the Turkish defence should collapse, or that Russia obtained a decisive success. In that case the reason alleged for maintaining a policy of inaction would be inappropriate.

Count Beust was unable to reply to my inquiry, but said he would take the question *ad referendum*. He seemed to think that the answer would be that interference would be contrary to the understanding which existed between Austria and Russia. His Excellency appeared to agree with me when I said that to give Russia an excuse for withdrawing from the contest seemed to me desirable rather than otherwise. We had no wish, I said, to humiliate Russia; we only desired that the war should be brought to a speedy conclusion.

In answer to a further question, Count Beust said that Count Andrassy and Prince Bismarck were closely united and acting in common. Prince Bismarck, he observed, was entirely in favour of the Russian cause and would do what he could to help the Emperor Alexander. I commented on the singularity of the situation—Austria and Germany adopting an identical policy from apparently opposite motives.

His Excellency said that Count Andrassy had heard some rumours of a direct understanding between Russia and Turkey, but that he did not think anything of the kind was to be apprehended.

In this I agreed. I said that the same reports had reached me, but that I thought an arrangement of this nature, though possible at the commencement of the difference, was now out of the question.

Count Beust went on to say that if the Turkish forces continued to have the advantage, the policy of Austria would be directed to the maintenance of the same European control over the Porte as had been established by the Treaty of Paris. I pointed out that there might be some difficulty in doing this under such circumstances, that the Porte might not unnaturally object to the continuance of a control by the European Powers when the protection which, if not explicitly, was at least virtually the condition on which such control had been conceded had been withheld. This part of our conversation was, however, entirely unofficial, and had merely the character of a hypothetical discussion.

His Excellency proceeded to explain why the Austrian Government had abstained

from any interference to prevent Servia from resuming hostilities against Turkey. He said, in the first place, that the Austrian Government were convinced that Servia would hold back as long as the Russians were at a disadvantage, and would only come forward, if at all, when the Russian arms were successful, and when, in fact, her assistance would be practically useless. But further, the position of Austria was such that she could not confine herself to verbal remonstrances. The British Government were differently situated: they could not send a fleet to Belgrade, and if their advice was unheeded they might, without loss of dignity, leave matters to take their course. But if Austria warned, and her warning was neglected, she would have no alternative but to follow up the warning by action; and military action against Servia would be inconvenient, and would involve the risk of war with Russia.

Count Beust said that Austria was prepared in any case to insist on the withdrawal of the Russian forces from Bulgaria immediately on the conclusion of peace.

I remarked that the withdrawal of the troops might be a matter of little concern if it were preceded by the razing of the fortresses, and other measures calculated to make the country dependent for the future on Russia rather than Turkey.

Count Beust did not, however, seem to think that there was much danger of the Russians being able to effect this.

His Excellency had met Prince Bismarck at Gastein. He described the German Chancellor as speaking of England with the greatest sympathy, and asserting his anxiety to act with Her Majesty's Government. He had explained his policy as regards the present question very briefly by saying that Germany had no frontier conterminous with Turkey, but a very long one with Russia, and that he was, therefore, chiefly anxious to keep on good terms with the latter Power. Count Beust said that he seemed very apprehensive of a European coalition against Germany. I said I had heard the same before, and I asked if his Excellency could explain the reason. Count Beust seemed unable to suggest any cause other than a consciousness that Germany had not come by her late acquisitions in a manner to conciliate the friendship or goodwill of her neighbours. He said that Prince Bismarck had entertained an idea of sending troops into Poland, in case any disturbance broke out there, thinking that a Polish rising formed part of the programme of the great Catholic movement, which he considered hostile to Germany. From this purpose Count Andrassy had succeeded in dissuading him.

In conclusion, Count Beust made some remarks as to the policy of the Italian Government. He said that the Cabinet of Vienna were very distrustful of the intentions of Italy, that they believed her to be on the watch to take advantage of any opportunity for acquisitions at the expense of Austria.

I could not say that I thought these suspicions wholly unreasonable, but I told his Excellency the purport of what had been said to me by M. Crispi at a recent interview, as recorded in my despatch to Sir A. Paget, No. 328, Confidential, of the 5th instant, of which you have received a copy.

Count Beust seemed confident that, if any contest took place between the two countries, Austria would have no difficulty in crushing her opponent. He said that in that case no cession of territory would be demanded of Italy. Austria would follow the example of Germany in the recent war with France in demanding a large pecuniary indemnity.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 153.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 15, 1877, 3·40 P.M.

IS there any objection to Sir A. Buchanan mentioning to Count Andrassy the language held to you and to the Porte by Count Zichy as to mediation, and asking how far it is authorised?

No. 154.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received October 16, 2·30 P.M.)

(No. 439. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 16, 1877, 9:30 A.M.*

WITH reference to your telegram of yesterday, I think it very advisable that Count Andrassy should not be informed of language held to me and the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs by Count Zichy, who is now pressing Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs for an answer. I will keep you fully informed of what occurs here, and the tone and the proceedings of Count Andrassy should be carefully watched to see whether there is anything in them to confirm Count Zichy's language, which I am convinced has not been held without authority. Upon this conviction also Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs is acting; but will not, he assures me, commit himself without first knowing your views. The matter is most secret. I have told Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs that your Lordship informs me that Count Zichy's language is not confirmed by that held by Count Andrassy to other persons. I write fully by messenger to-morrow.

No. 155.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 16, 1877, 7 P.M.*

YOUR telegram No. 439 has been repeated secretly to Vienna.

No. 156.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 17, 1877.*

IN reply to your secret telegrams of the 10th and 11th instant I have now to state to you that Her Majesty's Government approve your language to Count Zichy. They had understood that the Austrian Government were of opinion that the time was not opportune for mediation and had been disposed to share that view. At the same time they would by no means wish to discourage any attempt at mediation which the Austrian Government may make, and would readily second the initiative which appears to have been taken by Count Zichy should the Austrian Government think fit to prosecute it, since no opportunity should be lost which may afford an opening for peace. You may speak in this sense to Count Zichy and to the Porte.

Her Majesty's Government do not think it necessary at this stage to offer any opinion on the Ottoman terms of peace, which it is to be presumed would be subject to future discussion should any negotiations for peace be proceeded with.

No. 157.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 604. Secret.)
Foreign Office, October 17, 1877.

Sir,

I HAVE received your telegrams of the 10th and 11th instant, in which you inform me of the communications which have passed between yourself, Count Zichy, and the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the subject of mediation, with a view to bring the present war to an end; and, in reply, I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to the Austrian Ambassador, to the effect that, though Her Majesty's Government were not disposed to take the first step, yet they would willingly support any attempt made by another Power in favour of peace.

From the communications hitherto made to them, Her Majesty's Government had understood that the Austrian Government were of opinion that the time was not opportune for mediation, and they were themselves disposed to share that view. At the same time they would by no means wish to discourage any attempt at mediation, which the

Austrian Government may make, and they would readily second the initiative which appears to have been taken by Count Zichy, should the Austrian Government think fit to prosecute it, for they are strongly of opinion that no opportunity should be lost which may afford an opening for peace negotiations.

I authorize your Excellency to speak in this sense to Count Zichy and to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Her Majesty's Government do not think it necessary at this stage to offer any opinion on the terms of peace which his Excellency Server Pasha mentioned as likely to be demanded by the Porte, as it is presumed that they would be subject to future discussion, should any negotiations for peace be proceeded with.

I have, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 158.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 448. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 18, 1877.*

SULTAN told me this morning that, although mistrusting Austria, his earnest desire to put an end to the war made him willing to accept Austrian mediation, providing the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the Treaty of Paris were made the basis of the negotiations. I spoke to His Majesty as instructed by your telegram of yesterday, and shall do the same to Count Zichy.

No. 159.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)
(Confidential.) *Foreign Office, October 18, 1877.*

COUNT BEUST called upon me to-day and said that Count Zichy had never received any instructions to propose mediation, or to sound the Turkish Government on the subject. He is expressly instructed to tell me this.

No. 160.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 446. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 19, 1877.*

COUNT ZICHY has just called upon me. He said that he is now convinced, from information that has reached him, that Russia is determined to continue the war next year, and that he is not authorized to propose mediation or to "tâter le terrain." I suspect that he has received a hint from Vienna, in consequence of Sir A. Buchanan's communications there.

No. 161.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 20, 1877.*

MR. LAYARD telegraphs the following, dated yesterday:—

"Count Zichy has just called upon me. He said that he is now convinced from information that has reached him that Russia is determined to continue the war next year, and that he is not authorized to propose mediation, or to 'tâter le terrain.' I suspect that he has received a hint from Vienna in consequence of Sir A. Buchanan's communications there."

I presume I may contradict the supposition that you made any communication on the subject to Count Andrassy.

No. 162.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 338. Secret.) *Foreign Office, October 20, 1877.*

Sir,

I SENT your Excellency to-day a copy of a telegram from Mr. Layard, in which he stated that Count Zichy had assured him that he was now convinced that it was the determination of Russia to continue the war during the ensuing year, and had informed him that he was not authorized to propose mediation to the Porte, nor to sound the ground with the view of ascertaining whether such a proposal would be likely to be entertained. As Mr. Layard observed in the telegram that he thought that Count Zichy had used this language in consequence of his having received a hint from Vienna owing to the communications made by your Excellency, I have telegraphed to you stating that I presume I may contradict the idea that any communications on the subject had been made by you to Count Andrassy.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 163.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received October 21.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 20, 1877.*

(Secret.)

I HAVE never said a word here to any one respecting Count Zichy's wish to mediate at Constantinople, and I have always contradicted the reports in circulation as to probability of negotiations for peace when my colleagues have spoken to me of them.

No. 164.

The Earl of Derby to Colonel Wellesley.

(Most Confidential.) *Foreign Office, October 21, 1877.*

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 14, Most Confidential, of the 30th August, in which you give an account of your interviews with the Emperor of Russia after your return to the Russian head-quarters, and I have to state to you that I have read this Report with much interest.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 165.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 801. Secret.) *Vienna, October 17, 1877.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's secret telegram of to-day and others which preceded it, respecting overtures for a mediation by Austria-Hungary, which appear to have been made to the Porte by Count Zichy, I have the honour to state that I have not yet been able to discover any confirmation here of Austria being disposed to mediate between the belligerent Powers.

I have also to observe that, on my lately referring in a conversation with Baron Orczy to rumours which have been circulated by the press as to the prospect of negotiations of peace, his Excellency answered that, while the Porte expects to dictate peace at Warsaw, it would be absurd in neutral Powers to attempt to promote so desirable an object.

Count Andrassy is at present absent from Vienna, but as I understand that he is to be at Buda Pesth on Monday, I hope to meet him there.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 166.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received October 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

(Private and Secret.) *Constantinople, October 21, 1877.*

A PERSON who has considerable influence over the Sultan wishes to induce him to write to the Emperor of Russia, appealing to him to put an end to the war which is causing so much bloodshed, giving assurances that he will do all that can be required of him for the good government of his Christian subjects, and asking for term of ten years to fulfil his promise.

It is proposed that copy of the letter should be communicated to Sovereigns of States parties to Treaty of Paris. This suggestion has only, I believe, been communicated to myself and Count Zichy, who, I am told, warmly approves of it, and says his Government will do so likewise. I refrained from giving an opinion without knowing your views. I venture to ask you to keep this quite secret.

No. 167.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 25, 1877, 5·35 P.M.*

(Secret.)

WITH reference to your secret telegram of the 21st, Her Majesty's Government would look with favour on any overture for peace which had any probability of success.

You may say so in the proper quarter. It is presumed that, before taking any action on Count Zichy's statement of the approval of his Government, the Porte would take steps to ascertain that he is authorized to make it and will not be again disavowed.

Should not the Sultan also ascertain beforehand, through the Austrians or otherwise, that the Emperor will receive a letter from him?

These are matters which you may suggest for the consideration of the Sultan's advisers.

No. 168.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 1207. Secret.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 15, 1877.*

I INFORMED your Lordship, by a private and secret telegram, on the 10th instant, of a conversation that I had had with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at the Porte. On that day Count Zichy called upon me, stating that he did so in order to speak to me very seriously and confidentially upon a subject of the greatest importance. But before entering upon it he wished me to understand that what he was about to say must be considered, not only as not "official or even officious," but as strictly private and secret. So much injury, he observed, had been done by the publication in Blue Books, and by statements in the British Parliament, to the policy and interests of Austria, that Austrian statesmen were compelled to be exceedingly cautious in opening themselves to English Ministers and English Diplomatic Representatives. It was necessary that he should speak to me on the present occasion with the most complete frankness and without any reserve. He, therefore, begged me to promise that no official use should be made of what he was about to communicate to me.

After he had satisfied himself on this point, Count Zichy asked me whether Her Majesty's Government had made any offer of mediation to the Porte, or were prepared to make one. I replied that I had no authority to answer him officially in the negative; but that my personal impression was that, whilst Her Majesty's Government were not, at present, disposed to take the first step in proposing mediation, they would willingly give their support to the efforts of any other Power in favour of peace. But why, I asked, did he put this question to me; was I to understand by it that the Austro-Hungarian Government had offered mediation, or were prepared to do so? He replied that no official step had yet been taken by his Government in that direction; but he hinted that Count Andrassy was not disinclined to mediate if the Porte would accept Austrian

mediation. His Excellency added that he did not consider the time has yet come to make any direct proposal of mediation; but he thought that the way ought now to be prepared for one. He had, he said, spoken to Server Pasha and to some persons of great influence at the Porte on this subject, and had found that they were far from unfavourable to mediation; they seemed, indeed, desirous that an offer of mediation should be made, and that it should come from Austria. He then asked me whether I would support him in preparing the way for such mediation.

I told Count Zichy that my impression as to the readiness of the leading members of the Turkish Ministry to avail themselves of an offer of mediation agreed with his own, and that I had considered it my duty to encourage, as far as I could properly do so, any tendency that I might observe on the part of the Porte in the direction of peace; but that I did not feel authorized to take any official steps in the matter, or to go beyond giving friendly counsel.

His Excellency then asked whether I thought that England would be willing to go with Austria in an endeavour to bring the war to an end by mediation. I could only refer generally, in reply, to the desire shown by Her Majesty's Government to act with Austria, of which your Lordship, I had reason to believe, had given proof to Count Andrassy. He said that he was acquainted with what had passed between Count Andrassy and your Lordship, and that the Count was prevented going as far as he was ready to do from fear of the Blue Book.

Count Zichy then went on to hold the remarkable language of which I shall endeavour to give your Lordship the substance, as far as my memory will permit me. He first referred to his recent private audience of the Sultan, of whose character and good qualities he spoke in almost enthusiastic terms. He said that he had found a young Sovereign, who, it might reasonably be supposed, would be intoxicated by his signal and unexpected victories, and by the flattery of those who surrounded him, showing the utmost modesty and moderation in alluding to the success of his arms; giving proofs of the most earnest desire for peace, and of his interest in the happiness and welfare of all his subjects, without distinction of race or creed; and dealing with political questions with a good sense and ability which had caused him the utmost surprise. He believed the present Sultan capable of regenerating the Turkish Empire, and of taking his place amongst the greatest Sovereigns that had ruled over it.

I observed to Count Zichy that I was glad to find that his impression of the Sultan's character agreed, on the whole, with the one I had formed of it, and I asked him whether he had communicated his opinion on the subject to his Government. He answered that he had, and that he was certain that his report would have the effect of exciting a very profound sympathy for His Majesty.

When, two or three years ago, Count Zichy went on to say, an insignificant outbreak took place in Bosnia, and a superior force of Turkish troops took to flight before a small band of ill-armed Christians, Europe was led to form the lowest estimate of the military power of Turkey, and of her ability to keep down her discontented subjects. To Austria, the question was then a very serious one. Successful insurrection amongst the Christian Slavs of a province adjacent to Dalmatia might have had grave consequences for her. The flame might have spread to her own Slav populations. Consequently, Austria could not view with indifference what was passing in Bosnia, and found herself compelled, for her own security, to propose measures for dealing with a state of things which appeared to threaten to become one of chronic insurrection and anarchy in a neighbouring country. But all this had now changed. Turkey had shown extraordinary and unexpected vitality and resources, which placed her in the first rank amongst the military Powers of Europe. She had defeated single-handed the armies of Russia, who had been compelled to ask for the aid of Roumania, and was even under the necessity of appealing to Servia for help. In addition, she had been able, at the same time, to keep down her own populations, which had been incited to rise against her, and to hold Greece in check. Count Zichy expressed his belief, founded upon information received from trustworthy sources, that the Russian army would not be able to winter in Bulgaria, and that the Russians would either be compelled to recross the Danube altogether, or at least to move the greater part of their army across it, constructing "têtes-de-pont" at Sistova and Nicopolis, which they would attempt to hold until next year, when the weather would permit the renewal of military operations. The Russian army had already suffered enormously, and the Russian campaign in Bulgaria might still end in a great disaster.

The condition of things that he had described, Count Zichy observed, entirely altered the political position of Austria. Turkey might now become an ally of the greatest importance, instead of being treated as a weak and crumbling Empire. She

was strong enough to maintain her own independence, and it was neither to the interest of the balance of power in Europe, nor to the advantage of Austria, that she should be ultimately crushed or weakened by Russia, if a prolongation of the war were to lead to this result. It was, however, by no means certain that Russia would be able to carry on the war for another year. Without attributing too much importance to the revolutionary spirit said to exist in Russia, Count Zichy thought that there could be no doubt that great dissatisfaction and discontent with the Government prevailed amongst all classes in that country owing to the result of the war, and the financial difficulties which were now threatening her would add to these feelings. It was, consequently, by no means impossible that the internal condition of Russia might prevent the Emperor from entering upon a second campaign next year, and might dispose him to listen to an offer of mediation with a view to obtaining peace.

Under these circumstances, Austria had naturally to take into very serious consideration her relations with Turkey and the fact that she had now on her eastern frontiers a powerful military Empire that might become either a source of great strength or of great danger to her. Count Zichy, in fact, hinted very pointedly that the true policy of Austria was to seek an alliance with Turkey. Too much importance, his Excellency remarked, should not be attached to the interview at Salzburg between Count Andrassy and Prince Bismarck. Nothing that had occurred there could affect the policy of Austria, which had been plainly indicated by the answer given by the Government in the Hungarian Chambers. The declarations there made by the Hungarian Ministers should be carefully studied, as they showed what Austria was prepared to do with a view to her own interests. Her policy was founded upon national considerations alone, and it was a serious mistake to suppose that she was under the guidance or control of any foreign Power. She naturally looked to England as an ally, as the interests of Austria and those of England in the East were identical, and together they could settle the Turkish question in a manner which would conduce to the peace of Europe and to the true welfare of the Christian subjects of the Sultan.

I replied to Count Zichy that without entering upon the general questions of policy, which he had been good enough to place before me, and which I did not feel myself either competent or authorised to discuss, I desired to put one question to him. I feared, I said, that a spirit of fanaticism and hatred might be growing up against the Christians in consequence of the Russian invasion, of recent events in Bulgaria and Roumelia, of the feeling that prevailed amongst the Turks that they had been abandoned by Christendom, and of the successes of the Mahommedan arms. I had, I thought, observed symptoms of it of late; did he not think that if the triumph of Turkey were too complete, she would be disposed to treat her Christian populations in a manner which would excite the indignation of Europe, and might lead in the end to a more serious intervention than that of Russia alone? Count Zichy answered that he was convinced that, with the influence that England and Austria could bring to bear, no such danger need be apprehended. He had every reliance upon the personal character of the Sultan, who would now establish his authority as Caliph over the whole Mahommedan world, and be able to do anything he might think fit. Too much importance, he observed, must not be attached to isolated acts of ill-treatment of Christians, and to the occasional outbursts of fanaticism against them. They were to be attributed to the excitement and indignation caused by the great struggle for their religion and country in which the Turks were now engaged. When peace was restored, such acts would be repressed, and the influence of England and Austria, and the good intentions of the Sultan, would secure fair and impartial government to the Christian populations.

The day following my conversation with Count Zichy, Server Pasha called upon me. He also began by saying that he had come to me to speak about a matter of the greatest importance, but that I must consider what he was going to say as strictly secret. I asked him if the communication he was about to make to me was official. He answered that it was, and that he wished me to report it to your Lordship; but on the condition that the most complete secrecy should be observed with regard to it. His Excellency then went on to say that a few days ago Count Zichy had called upon him, and had held language which had very much surprised him. In fact, he had hinted not only at Austrian mediation to put an end to the war, but at an alliance between Austria and Turkey. His Excellency added that he was so much astonished at this overture, that he asked Count Zichy whether he spoke with the authority of Count Andrassy. The Count, although not actually saying that he did, gave him very clearly to understand that such was the case.

Server Pasha then repeated at some length, and with great minuteness, what Count Zichy had said to him, which tallied so completely, indeed almost word for word, with the

Austrian Ambassador's language to me, that it is unnecessary for me to do more than to refer your Lordship to what I have already written on the subject in this despatch.

His Excellency then told me that he had neither encouraged nor discourged Count Zichy's overture respecting an Austrian mediation. He had only given him to understand that the Porte was not unwilling to entertain a proposal for mediation. He had not said more as he was determined not to take, nor to commit his Government to, any step whatever in the matter, without previous consultation with Her Majesty's Government. His Excellency added that he had immediately informed the Sultan of Count Zichy's communication, and had advised His Majesty that nothing should be done with regard to it without first coming to an understanding with England. His Majesty expressed, at once and emphatically, his entire concurrence in this opinion. His Excellency then requested me to inform your Lordship by telegraph of what had passed between him and Count Zichy, and to ask your Lordship's opinion with regard to it. He added that he could not give me a better proof of his own views as to what he considered the true policy of the Porte, than to tell me that, on a recent occasion when he had dined, and had some confidential conversation with Count Zichy, he had said that Turkey would be willing to do anything that could be fairly required of her, if England and Austria were united in asking it, and had urged on the Austrian Ambassador in the strongest way the importance of an alliance with England. Count Zichy did not then respond to this advance, but gave him the impression that Austria was acting entirely with Germany in her policy with regard to Turkey. He had been much struck, his Excellency said, with the disparaging tone in which the Austrian Ambassador had spoken, at his last interview with him, of Prince Bismarck, leading him to infer that Austria had now dissociated herself from Germany, and was resolved to pursue a line of her own in the Turkish question.

His Excellency replied to my inquiry whether the Porte would be willing to accept the mediation of Austria, in the affirmative. He then asked my opinion as to Count Zichy's overture.

I replied that I was not authorized to give him an official one, and that I would not venture to give him a personal one for fear of misleading him. But there was one thing I said to which I attached great importance, and upon which I thought Her Majesty's Government ought to be fully informed before they could take any part, supposing them ready to do so, in a mediation between Turkey and Russia, namely, if the respective positions of their armies remained as they were, or if the Turkish arms achieved further successes, what were the terms of peace which Turkey would be prepared to accept?

I did not wish, I added, to ask this of him officially, but I thought it most desirable, for the sake of Turkey herself, that, without binding herself to any declaration, he should, at least, give me his personal views on the subject.

His Excellency replied that he had expected that I would put this question to him, and he was prepared to answer it. He went on to say that as Russia had provoked the war, and had invaded Turkey, and the Turkish arms had proved victorious, she had a right to demand securities against future aggression from Russia. The Porte was determined to pass over all that had taken place at the Conferences and the London Protocol. It would not listen to any proposal for Conferences. It was prepared to return to the Treaty of Paris as a basis for its future relations with Russia and with Europe. That Treaty was framed with the express object of protecting Turkey against the designs of Russia. It had failed in its object; consequently it was now to be considered how that Treaty could be amended so as to meet its purpose. With this view the Porte thought that it would be entitled to put forward the following conditions, upon which it would consent to a peace:—

1. That the Provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia should be again completely separated, and should return to the political condition in which they were placed by the Treaty of Paris.

2. That the Porte should have the right of occupying and fortifying certain positions on the River Pruth as a guarantee against invasion from Russia.

3. That the fortress of Belgrade should be again placed under the direct administration of the Porte.

4. That there should be a rectification of the Turkish frontier in Armenia, which would give to Turkey the whole, or a part, of the Province of Daghestan.

I asked Server Pasha whether these conditions were decided upon after mature and serious consideration, and whether he authorized me to communicate them officially to Her Majesty's Government. His Excellency replied in the affirmative. I accordingly sent your Lordship my secret telegram No. 435 of yesterday, reporting the substance of

my conversation with his Excellency and with Count Zichy, and venturing to suggest that it was very desirable that I should receive instructions from your Lordship as to the language which Her Majesty's Government might wish me to hold to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. Server Pasha informed me that Count Zichy was pressing him for an answer, but that he would endeavour to avoid returning one, or giving any encouragement to the Austrian Ambassador's overture until he was made acquainted with the views of Her Majesty's Government.

I cannot but believe that Count Zichy's communications to Server Pasha and myself were made in pursuance of instructions from Count Andrassy. My Austrian colleague is too cautious and reserved a diplomatist to commit himself in a matter of so much importance without having received some kind of authority to do so. I had observed some time ago a very marked change in his language and bearing with regard to myself. Your Lordship will remember that I brought the fact to your notice. For some time after Count Zichy's arrival here, although our social relations were always of a very friendly character, I could not help perceiving that there was a certain coldness on his part in our diplomatic intercourse, and an unwillingness to speak, except with great reserve, upon political matters. At the same time, the most intimate relations existed between him and Prince Reuss, so much so, that the impression at the Porte was that the policy of the German and Austrian Governments was identical on the Turkish question, and that that policy was very hostile to the interests of Turkey, and altogether favourable to those of Russia.

The friendly advances made to me of late by Count Zichy, and the desire he showed to speak with me unreservedly upon political matters, and the change of his tone with regard to Russia, whose ultimate defeat in her attempt to impose her exclusive influence upon Turkey he now appears to consider certain, although some time ago he looked upon her advance upon Constantinople as inevitable, could not fail to strike me. Count Zichy now goes so far as to express his opinion that an alliance between England, Austria, and Turkey is necessary for the protection of British and Austrian interests in the East, and would be eagerly accepted by his Government. He even hints that Austria is ready to throw over Germany to secure such an alliance. Such, it appears, is the language he has even held to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, who stated to me that he told Count Zichy that what the Porte desired most to see was an alliance between England and Austria, and very strongly urged upon him the importance of Austria coming to an understanding with England, in whom the Porte had greater confidence than in any other Power, and to whose counsels she was most ready to listen.

Whether the views of Count Zichy as to the policy which Austria should pursue in the Turkish question are only his own, or are those of Count Andrassy also, your Lordship will be best able to judge. The following is the substance of the language held to me by my colleague:—

When the war first began, Austria, like the other European Powers, was under a false impression as to the relative strength of the two belligerents. She thought that Russia would have no difficulty in overpowering Turkey, and that the result of a Russian invasion would be the break up of the Turkish rule in Europe. She believed that there was little or no vitality left in the Turkish Empire, that the Sultan had no longer the power to enforce his authority in his European dominions, and that it was consequently absolutely necessary that some other authority should be substituted for it. She feared that, under these circumstances, Russia would establish such a direct influence in the Slav provinces of European Turkey, as would make them virtually Russian dependencies. A great homogeneous Slave Empire would thus extend to the Ægean Sea, which would be dangerous to the interests of Austria by acting upon her own Slav populations. As long, therefore, as there was a prospect of the Russian invasion of Turkey proving successful, it was absolutely incumbent upon her to come to an understanding with Russia in the event of a partition of the Turkish territories in Europe.

These considerations no longer weighed with Austria since the failure of Russia in her campaigns in Europe and in Asia. Turkey had proved herself to be a great military Power. She had resisted single-handed the attack of Russia, who had been compelled to call the Roumanians, and even the Servians, to her aid, and had reduced these Principalities to the condition of Vassal States. The victories of the Turks had called forth the sympathies of the Hungarians, and had led to a stronger resolution than ever on their part to resist the preponderance of the Slav influence in the Austro-Hungarian Government, which would be established if Russia were successful. Russia had shown that she was not the great and formidable military Power that she had hitherto been supposed to be. She had proved, on the contrary, that she had elements of weak-

ness in herself which rendered her little to be feared as an aggressive Empire. Under these circumstances, it was for Austria to consider whether she should not in future look to Turkey as an ally, and seek to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire, which the Porte had shown itself capable of defending with so much courage and success. Such a policy would relieve Austria of the necessity that existed, before Turkey had thus proved her vitality, of making provision in case Russia should succeed in her attempt to bring under her direct control the Slav populations of Turkey in Europe, and of adding for this purpose to her own Slav populations, which would be a serious source of inconvenience and danger to her. She was ready to adopt and pursue this policy if England would go with her.

Such, as far as I could gather, was the general drift of Count Zichy's arguments. Since I commenced this despatch, I have received your Lordship's telegram of the 13th instant, pointing out the contradiction between his language and that held to your Lordship by Count Beust, by direction of Count Andrassy. Nevertheless, I cannot believe that Count Zichy would have made the communications that I have described, to Server Pasha and myself, without having some authority to do so. The almost verbal identity of what he said to me and to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs tends to confirm this impression. As I have stated, both Server Pasha and I asked him the same question,—whether he was authorized to speak as he did by Count Andrassy? Without actually saying so, he gave us both unquestionably to understand that he was.

One way of testing the real opinions of Count Andrassy is to carefully watch his policy with respect to the Slav populations on the Austrian, Dalmatian, and Croatian frontiers. That it has of late undergone a change there cannot be a doubt. Your Lordship will have been struck by Consul Kirby Green's account of the present attitude of Austria towards Montenegro, as described in his despatch to your Lordship No. 107 of the 29th ultimo. I have, on more than one occasion, mentioned to your Lordship that the Turkish Ministers had expressed themselves to me as being much more satisfied than they were some time ago with the conduct of the Austrian authorities on the Bosnian frontiers, who have been giving proofs of their desire to assist the Porte in putting an end to the insurrection in that province, by arresting and removing the insurgent leaders who had crossed into Austrian territory; by endeavouring to induce the refugees to return to their homes; and by discouraging the rebellion against the authority of the Porte.

Before concluding this despatch, I may mention that Server Pasha, when he informed me of the terms of peace upon which the Porte was prepared to insist, asked my personal opinion of them, and especially whether I thought Her Majesty's Government would object to Turkey obtaining any extension of territory on her Asiatic frontier,—a question which he had before put to me. I replied, that I was not in a position to give even a personal opinion upon the subject; but that I could not help pointing out to him that the conditions he would impose upon Russia were such as could only be entertained by her after a complete and decisive defeat, which she had not yet sustained, and that it could not be supposed that she would consent to terms of peace which would inevitably be resisted by the whole Slav race, and the acceptance of which might destroy that influence over it which she had made immense and persistent efforts for some 200 years to obtain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 169.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received October* 27.)

(No. 1208. Secret.) *Therapia, October* 16, 1877.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my Secret despatch No. 1207 of the 15th instant, when I called yesterday upon Server Pasha his Excellency immediately and eagerly asked me whether I had communicated to your Lordship his conversation with me respecting Count Zichy's overtures to him for an Austrian mediation, and whether I had heard from your Lordship on the subject. I told him that I had telegraphed to your Lordship what he had told me, and that your Lordship had, in reply, informed me that Count Zichy's language did not appear to agree with that held by Count Andrassy to other persons. His Excellency said that Count Zichy was pressing him for an answer, and that he was very anxious to have the opinion and views of Her Majesty's Government before giving him one. He expected to see Count Zichy that afternoon, but he should not commit himself in any way. He would endeavour to learn more as to the real intentions of Count Andrassy, and to ascertain how far Count Zichy was authorized to enter into serious communication with him as to Austrian mediation. I remarked that I thought this the most prudent course to pursue, and that I would not fail to acquaint him at once with any information that your Lordship might instruct me to give him on the subject.

Server Pasha entered into a long argument to prove that Count Zichy's overtures to him were authorized by Count Andrassy, and pointed out many circumstances which justified his opinion. I confess that I share in his Excellency's conviction.

I thought it better not to say anything to his Excellency with reference to your Lordship's personal opinion as to the terms of peace mentioned to me by him at our previous interview as those which Turkey expected to obtain. It appears to me that the important point, at present, is to ascertain whether it would be possible to bring about a mediation, and that it is very desirable not to discourage the Porte in the desire for one which I have reason to believe is very strong, at least amongst some of the Ministers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 170.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received October* 28.)

(No. 457. Secret.) *Constantinople, October* 27, 1877.
(Telegraphic.)

COUNT ZICHY spoke to me again to-day about mediation. I told him that I was authorized to second the initiative that he might take in the matter, should the Austrian Government think fit to prosecute it. He asked me whether he might telegraph this to Vienna. I said that I saw no objection to his doing so, as I had said the same to him before and to the Grand Vizier.

Grand Vizier observed to me yesterday that there were persons who were endeavouring to induce him to come to a separate understanding with Russia; but he would not tell me who they were. He only said that he had not received the advice from Germany.

As regards the proposed letter referred to in my secret telegram of the 21st instant, the matter is now before the Sultan and Grand Vizier, and I shall probably be able to tell you more on the subject in a day or two. I am endeavouring to persuade them that the first measure to be taken is to put an end to Bulgarian executions, and to issue a proclamation granting a general amnesty and promising protection and good treatment with the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution to those who have been faithful and who may return to their allegiance.

No. 171.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received October* 31.)

(No. 460. Secret.) *Constantinople, October* 30, 1877.
(Telegraphic.)

I HAD a long interview this morning with the Sultan at his request. His Majesty said that he would not appeal to the Emperor of Russia unless the position of affairs was desperate, and that the safety of his Empire rendered it imperative upon him to do so. He would rather have recourse to the mediation of Europe, to which he seems disposed to recur. As regards the terms of peace, he said that Turkey went to war to maintain her integrity and independence, and that any peace must have them for its basis, otherwise his people were determined to continue the struggle to the last. He seemed disposed to issue a Proclamation to the Bulgarians, and he gave me the most positive and distinct assurances as to his intention of giving a general amnesty and guarantees for the future good government of his Christian subjects as soon as the war was at an end.

He asked me to come to him again in a day or two, when he would be able to give me a more definite opinion upon the steps that he would be prepared to take to obtain peace.

If you should think it desirable that I should give any advice, will you inform me without delay?

No. 172.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 806. Secret.)
My Lord, *Vienna, October 20, 1877.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of this date, marked Secret, I have the honour to state that I have never spoken to any one here of Count Zichy's wish to offer the mediation of Austria to the Porte, and that when any of my colleagues have spoken to me of the reports in circulation as to the probability of negotiations for peace, I have always declared them to be without foundation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 173.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 661. Secret.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 31, 1877.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 1207, Secret, of the 15th instant, in which you report in detail the communications which have passed between yourself, Count Zichy, and the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the subject of mediation with a view to bring the present war to an end, and, in reply, I have to refer your Excellency to my despatch No. 604, Secret, of the 17th instant, in which I communicated to you the views of Her Majesty's Government upon this subject.

I have, moreover, to state to you that Her Majesty's Government approve your judicious language and treatment of this delicate matter as now further reported in your above-mentioned despatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 174.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 462. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 31, 1877.*

I HAVE received information from a trustworthy, though not official, source, that there is some idea of sending to Russian head-quarters a Turkish officer on the pretence of asking for an armistice, but with the real object of sounding the Emperor of Russia as to treating for peace directly with the Sultan. German Ambassador and Italian Minister have been asked, I am told, if their Governments would be disposed to offer mediation, but have answered that they did not see on what basis mediation could be proposed.

Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs have asked me to meet them to-morrow, and I hope then to learn more as to what is going on.

No. 175.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 666. Secret.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 1, 1877.*

YOUR telegram No. 457, Secret, of the 27th ultimo, has been received, and I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government approve your having urged upon the Sultan and Grand Vizier the importance, in view of any overtures for peace, of putting an end to the executions of Bulgarians, and of granting a general amnesty to all who may return to their allegiance.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 176.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 1232. Secret.)
My Lord, *Therapia, October 20, 1877.*

COUNT ZICHY called upon me late yesterday afternoon to tell me that he had received information which led him to believe that Russia was determined not to listen to any proposals, or offer of mediation, for peace, and to continue the war next year. His Excellency added that he had received no authority to propose mediation to the Porte. I remarked to him that he had informed me that he was to prepare the way for mediation, although the time had not yet come for actually proposing it. He replied that he was not even authorized to "tâter le terrain!" His Excellency begged me to consider this communication as strictly private.

As your Lordship may believe, I was not a little surprised at this declaration, after the explicit statements made by Count Zichy to Server Pasha and myself. I cannot doubt that it was made in consequence of a hint from Count Andrassy. I am equally persuaded that Count Zichy would not have spoken to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs as he did, without having some authority to do so. Under the circumstances, I did not think it necessary or desirable to allude to the instructions that I had received from your Lordship in your telegram of the 17th instant.

Count Zichy came up from Pera to Therapia in very bad weather, evidently on purpose to make this communication to me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 177.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 1236. Secret.)
My Lord, *Therapia, October 21, 1877.*

I HAD promised Server Pasha to see him yesterday, to inform him of the answer I might receive from your Lordship with reference to the overture made by Count Zichy for an offer of mediation from Austria. I told his Excellency that your Lordship had been assured from Vienna that Count Zichy was not authorized to take any steps in that direction; and that, on the contrary, Count Andrassy was of opinion that the time was not yet come for any proposal of the kind. I added, that I had now received a similar statement from Count Zichy himself. His Excellency expressed the greatest surprise at what I had told him. He observed that nothing would induce him to believe that Count Zichy would have ventured to commit himself as far as he had done in so delicate and important a matter, without some authority from Count Andrassy. His Excellency said that during my short absence at Besika, Count Zichy had pressed him daily for an answer to the communication that he had made to him, and he had even found it difficult to evade giving one until he had spoken to me on the subject. The Austrian Ambassador had even hinted at the possibility of an alliance between England, Austria, and Turkey,—an alliance which, his Excellency remarked, would be above all things acceptable to Turkey. His Excellency is convinced that Count Andrassy had instructed Count Zichy to sound the Porte secretly as to an Austrian mediation, if not as to an alliance with Turkey, and that the secret having transpired at Vienna, he was now alarmed, and was drawing back. Server Pasha added that he had heard that Prince Bismarck thought that in consequence of the success of the Turks and the failure of the Russians, Austria was "getting too strong." Count Andrassy might, therefore, be afraid to give umbrage to the Prince by showing a desire to assist Turkey in endeavouring to bring the war to an end.

Server Pasha then inquired whether Turkey had no hope for assistance from England; would she not interfere to procure peace? I replied that I could only answer that Her Majesty's Government were ready to second the efforts that might be made by Austria, or, indeed, I believed, by any other Power in favour of peace, but that they were not disposed to take the initiative in offering mediation. "What, then," said his Excellency, "if we should decide upon coming to a separate understanding with Russia?" I asked his Excellency whether he meant me to infer that Turkey was prepared to take, or had taken, steps in that direction. He at once protested in energetic terms that he had merely put the question to me to learn my personal opinion,

and that nothing would induce him to make any proposal to Russia, or to listen to any that might come from her, without first consulting Her Majesty's Government.

This is the first time that a Turkish Minister has dropped a hint to me of the possibility of the Porte coming to a separate understanding with Russia. What Server Pasha said may have been intended to urge England to interfere to put an end to the war, or he may have made the remark without any other object than that of hearing what I might say on the subject. At any rate, it is sufficient to put me on my guard, and to suggest great watchfulness.

After leaving Server Pasha I saw the Grand Vizier, and informed him that your Lordship had learnt that Count Zichy was not authorized to make any overtures for an Austrian mediation. His Highness expressed as much surprise as the Minister for Foreign Affairs, observing that the Sultan had shown more perspicacity than his Ministers, as he had, from the first, mistrusted Austria, and, although ready to listen to any proposals in the interest of peace, had suspected that no reliance could be placed on Count Andrassy.

It may perhaps be worthy of remark that I passed two hours alone with Count Zichy before I saw Server Pasha yesterday, and that he most carefully avoided any allusion to what had passed between us as to Austrian mediation. I did not think it advisable to recur to the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 178.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received November 2.*)

(No. 1242. Secret.)
Therapia, October 19, 1877.

My Lord,

I HAD an opportunity yesterday, after presenting Admiral Hornby to the Sultan, to have some private and very confidential conversation with His Majesty. The only other person present was Said Pasha.

His Majesty seemed somewhat depressed, but by no means disheartened, by the news of the defeat of Mukhtar Pasha. He spoke of it with his usual good sense. Mukhtar, His Majesty observed, was a spoilt General. He had been so successful, and had received so much praise for his victories, that his head had been somewhat turned, and he fancied that he had only to attack the Russians to defeat them. He had, consequently, left his strong position, which he could have held against the enemy, and had taken the offensive. His Majesty said that Mukhtar Pasha had still 30,000 men for the defence of Kars, and had occupied the strong passes in the Soghanlee Dagh with 10,000 men. His Majesty expressed his hopes that the state of affairs was not so bad as it had been at first represented to him, and added that every effort was being made to send additional troops to Erzeroum, and that by his orders seventeen battalions were to be embarked for Trebizonde on that very day.

The Sultan said that he had been very anxious to see me in consequence of the overtures which had been made by the Austrian Ambassador to the Minister for Foreign Affairs as to an offer of mediation on the part of Austria. Server Pasha had communicated to him what had passed with Count Zichy, and had informed him that I had been made fully acquainted with it.

Server Pasha had advised that no step should be taken in the matter without previous consultation with Her Majesty's Government. Such also was his own view, and he was desirous of asking my opinion on the subject.

I replied that I had informed Her Majesty's Government of the language held by Count Zichy to Server Pasha and myself. They had decided, as I had already told His Majesty, not to take the first step in proposing mediation; but I was authorized to state that they would readily second any efforts that Austria might make to put an end to the war, as they thought that no opportunity should be lost which might afford an opening for peace. I then asked His Majesty whether he was prepared to accept an offer of mediation from Austria or any other Power.

His Majesty answered that he had nothing more at heart than to bring to an end a war which was bringing such incalculable misery upon his subjects, Mussulmans as well as Christians. But he could not be expected to agree to terms which were inconsistent with his dignity, and with the integrity and independence of his Empire, for the maintenance of which he had been forced into war. His Majesty then went into a long statement of his views as to the Treaty of Paris, and as to the basis which it might afford for a peace conducive to the interests of his country and of Europe. I need not endeavour to repeat to your Lordship His Majesty's words, as they agree in all essential points with the language of Server Pasha, which I have reported to your Lordship in other despatches, but I am bound to say that I was surprised at the remarkable ability and clearness with which he placed his views before me and enforced his arguments. Their drift was, that the Treaty of Paris had not effected its object of preventing Russian aggression on Turkey, and that such being the case the Powers who signed it ought to amend it, so as to make it really effective for that purpose. His Majesty did not enter into any details as to what in his opinion those amendments should be; but he hinted at those mentioned to me by Server Pasha, as reported to your Lordship in my secret despatch No. 1207 of the 15th instant.

I ventured to observe to His Majesty that, whilst the Treaty of Paris was, no doubt, entered into with the object he had described, there was an implied reciprocal engagement on the part of Turkey to govern her Christian subjects, in whom the Christian Powers could not but feel a deep interest, with justice, and to place them on a perfect equality with the Mohammedans. Unfortunately that engagement had not been fulfilled to the extent that those Powers had reason to expect.

His Majesty with perfect frankness admitted the truth of what I had said. He assured me that it was his earnest desire and intention to satisfy Europe on that point. He would afford proof of it when he could act freely, and was no longer hampered by the war. His Majesty repeated an observation that he had made to me on a previous occasion—that it was extremely difficult for a Sovereign who had just ascended the throne, and who had been previously kept in ignorance of public affairs, to separate the good men from the bad. He had not yet, he said, sufficient knowledge and experience to select the best men for his Ministers. He had very probably made on some occasions a bad choice. He could, however, give me the most positive assurances that he was not under the influence of any irresponsible persons, and that he endeavoured to form his own opinions and to act upon them for the best. He knew that there was a great deal said about "the influence of the palace," by which was meant, he presumed, some influence which was secret and opposed to the true interests of his people. When anything went wrong it was immediately attributed to "the palace." This idea was entirely unfounded. Ministers, His Majesty observed, took credit for all the good that was done, and sought to shift upon his shoulders all the bad. Midhat Pasha, for instance, boasted that he was the sole author of the Constitution. This was not the case. He had himself suggested the Constitution and the Parliament. They were his own work. "Do you think," asked His Majesty, "that I wish to destroy what I have myself made?"

"As I thus consider myself," His Majesty went on to say, "the author of the Constitution and of the Parliament, I am bound in honour to maintain and respect them. I will do so, and this is the best guarantee I can give to Europe that my subjects shall be well and justly governed, without distinction of race or creed."

I replied to His Majesty that I was fully convinced of his good intentions, but that I thought that if some measures were taken at once to prove their sincerity, a favourable impression might be made on public opinion in Europe, which could not be but of great advantage to his interests.

His Majesty asked me to what measures I alluded. He would be very glad, he said, to have any advice that I would give him. I answered that the subject was a very wide one, and that, as I had already occupied so much of his time, I would, if His Majesty permitted me, enter upon it on some other occasion. His Majesty replied that I could see him on any day that I might wish, and he begged me to come to him in the following week, as he was desirous to talk these matters over very fully with me.

On my leaving His Majesty, he was good enough to say that he had heard with great pleasure and satisfaction from Musurus Pasha that the Queen had been pleased to confirm me as Her Ambassador to him, adding that he looked upon me as a friend in whom he could place complete trust and confidence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 179.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 466. Secret.) *Constantinople, November 1, 1877.*
(Telegraphic.)

I HAD a long interview to-day with Grand Vizier and Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. They assured me most distinctly that no appeal of any kind will be made to Russia, or any direct understanding come to with her without previous consultation with England, and until all hope of mediation or intervention on her part or on that of the other European Powers is gone. They are going to communicate to me, for submission to Her Majesty's Government, the terms of peace which they are ready to accept. No application, they state, has been made either to Italy or Germany for mediation. The matter has been only casually mentioned in conversation, when the German Ambassador observed that he was quite ignorant of the conditions upon which Russia would consent to peace.

Grand Vizier informs me that Mukhtar Pasha is confident of being able to hold his positions in front of Erzeroum, and that the reinforcements sent to him will reach him in a day or two. He admits that Plevna is invested, but hopes that communications with it will be re-established. He does not consider the position of affairs desperate, says the country can carry on the struggle, and depends on the weather to impede operations of the Russians. The quantity of provisions in Plevna is doubtful, but Grand Vizier thinks that it is sufficient for at least two months.

No. 180.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 472. Secret.) *Therapia, November 5, 1877, 9·45 P.M.*
(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE seen Grand Vizier and Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs again to-day. They say the Sultan would be willing to make peace on following terms:—

1. The Treaty of Paris to be accepted as a basis.

2. All the concessions made at the Conference, and reforms referred to in the London Protocol, to be adhered to by the Porte.

3. Servia to be left as before the war, but with a modification of the XXIXth Article of the Treaty of Paris, which renders it necessary for the Porte to come to a previous understanding with the Signatary Powers before having recourse to armed intervention.

4. The *status quo ante* as regards Montenegro. The Porte might agree to a rectification of frontiers, but as at present advised would not consent to surrender Nicksich.

5. The Bessarabian territory ceded by Russia to be restored, but means to be found to prevent Russian and Turkish frontiers being conterminous.

6. Sultan would be disposed to surrender suzerainty over Roumania to Austria-Hungary, the surrendered territory to be annexed to Hungary. Austria, on the other hand, to consent to unrestricted use by Turkey of the port of Klek. In addition to these conditions, the Sultan might undertake to carry out the proposed reforms within ten years, and to repeat publicly and solemnly his determination to abide by the Constitution. The Grand Vizier further intimated that Batoum might be declared a free port, and be connected by a branch line with the Russian railway at Poti, which would give Russia all the commercial advantages that Russia can require. His Highness undertakes, if the Cretans will send a joint Commission of Mussulmans and Christians to Constantinople, to make such modifications in the organization of the law as will satisfy them. His Highness is not unfavourable to a Mixed Commission being appointed to inquire into and report upon the reforms needed in Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, provided that the foreign members on it shall be named by the Porte. His Highness wishes it to be understood that these conditions are not yet laid formally or officially before Her Majesty's Government. If Her Majesty's Government consider them sufficient and satisfactory, and would advise their adoption by Russia, they would be communicated officially after receiving the approval of the Council of Ministers, which has not yet been consulted, as the matter is altogether secret. The draft of a Proclamation to the Bulgarians is being prepared, and Grand Vizier assures me that there will be no more executions except in exceptional cases.

No. 181.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 1261. Secret.)
My Lord, *Therapia, October 27, 1877.*

COUNT ZICHY called upon to-day, and in the course of conversation reverted to the subject of an Austrian mediation between Turkey and Russia to bring the war to an end. He repeated what he said to me on previous occasions as to the calamities occasioned by the present conflict, and the dangers it threatened to Europe. I told Count Zichy that Her Majesty's Government, as I had already informed him, although not prepared to take the first step in proposing mediation, were ready to support any attempt to obtain so great and desirable an object as peace: that I was authorized to second him in any initiative that he might take in that direction should the Austrian Government think fit to prosecute it; and that, consequently, I was quite ready to do so. Count Zichy then asked me whether he was at liberty to telegraph what I had said to Vienna; I replied that I saw no objection to his doing so, as I had before spoken in the same terms to him, as well as to the Grand Vizier, and as I had every reason to believe that your Lordship's views in this sense had been communicated to Count Andrassy. His Excellency replied that he was aware that such was the case, but that he thought it very important that he should be able to inform Count Andrassy that I had received instructions to support him should he be authorized to propose mediation, and that I was ready to do so.

As Count Zichy has no doubt reported our conversation to Vienna, it is desirable that your Lordship should be made acquainted with it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 182.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 1262. Secret.)
My Lord, *Therapia, October 27, 1877.*

THE Grand Vizier, when speaking to me yesterday on the subject of foreign mediation to bring about peace, observed that there were persons who were endeavouring to induce him to come to a direct and separate understanding with Russia. I asked his Highness who these persons were, whether Turks or foreigners. He could not, he replied, tell me who they were; he could only say that the advice did not come from Germany. He assured me that he was not disposed to listen to it.

The remarks of the Grand Vizier, coupled with that made to me by Server Pasha, as reported in my despatch No. 1226 of the 21st instant, goes far to prove that attempts are being made from influential quarters to persuade the Sultan and his Ministers to enter into direct communication with Russia in order to put an end to the war.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 183.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 1274. Secret.)
My Lord, *Therapia, October 30, 1877.*

I RECEIVED a message early this morning from the Sultan, begging me to come to him at the Yildiz Kiosk. His Majesty, after giving me some information respecting military operations, asked me whether I could hold out any hopes of peace. I replied that I had heard that a suggestion had been made to His Majesty that he should make a direct appeal to the Emperor of Russia to put an end to a war which was causing so much misery and bloodshed. Had he considered that suggestion? His Majesty answered that it was true that he had been advised to address such an appeal to the Emperor of Russia; but that he was resolved not to do so until the position of his affairs was desperate, and the safety of his Empire rendered such a step absolutely imperative.

He would rather have recourse to the mediation of the Powers who were parties to the Treaty of Paris. It was upon that Treaty that he took his stand. He could consent to no peace which had not the recognition of the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire for its basis. To maintain them Turkey went to war, and her people were determined to fight to the very last in support of them. Let this basis be admitted, and he did not believe that there would be any difficulty in settling the details of a peace. He must add, however, that some means ought to be found to make that peace lasting, so that his Empire should no longer be exposed to constant aggression from Russia.

His Majesty said that he readily admitted that the European Powers had cause of complaint against Turkey for not having fulfilled her promises as regards her Christian populations. He knew well that there had been much misgovernment in the Empire. Bad and incompetent Valis, Mudirs, and other functionaries had been guilty of oppressing his Christian subjects, and of treating them with injustice. He was willing to accept several of the proposals made at the Conference (he did not say which they were), and he had expressed his displeasure when they had been rejected. He was convinced that a thorough reform was necessary in the administration, and he was determined to effect it as soon as he could have peace, and could occupy himself with the government of his Empire. His thoughts were now occupied exclusively with the war and military matters. He had neglected everything for them, His Majesty added, even his own household affairs, to which he had always considered it right to attend.

I told His Majesty that I was convinced of his sincere desire to govern his people justly without distinction of race or creed. I believed, I ventured to say, that he had not only the wish to do so, but that he had abilities and high qualities, which would enable him to institute and carry out reforms tending to the happiness and prosperity of all his subjects. Such, I was persuaded, would be the case if he followed his own generous and enlightened impulses, and would not allow himself to be influenced by evil counsellors. I rejoiced to hear him say, I observed, that he was determined that good and just men should be chosen as local governors. Much depended upon those to whom authority was intrusted, and I pointed out one or two Valis, amongst them Ahmed Vefyk Pasha and Abdurahman Pasha of Diarbekir (of whom Mr. Ressam had written very favourably), as instances of just and upright functionaries, performing their duties to the satisfaction of both Christians and Mahommedans, and maintaining the most friendly feelings between them.

His Majesty said that he had already learnt with great satisfaction that the functionaries I had mentioned were behaving in accordance with his wishes and instructions. He knew no difference amongst his subjects. A man might go to the mosque or to the church; no one had a right to interfere with the religious opinions of another. He desired that all should be equal before the law. He was now endeavouring to obtain direct information as to the conduct of those who were in military command, and to ascertain their character. For this purpose he had sent his own Aide-de-camp in order that he might learn the truth. He would do the same with respect to the civil functionaries in the Provinces. He would obtain direct reports as to how they discharged their duties. He would punish those who abused the powers entrusted to them, and would reward those who did well

I ventured to suggest to His Majesty that the time was not inopportune, in my opinion, for him to give a proof of his just and benevolent feelings towards all his subjects by issuing a proclamation to the Bulgarians promising an amnesty and pardon to those who would return to their allegiance, and kind and just treatment to all. A stop should, at the same time, be put to the execution of those who had been concerned in the insurrection, as already a large number had been punished.

The Sultan replied that he had already resolved to grant a full and complete amnesty to the Bulgarians when the war was at an end; but that he did not think the time yet come for it. He had the day before, he said, sent a telegram to the medjis of some Bulgarian villages in the Balkans, whose inhabitants had remained faithful and loyal, ordering that his thanks should be conveyed to them, and a promise from him that they should be rewarded. He would treat all his Bulgarian subjects with justice and clemency; but there were many still in arms against him. They had committed the most revolting cruelties upon their fellow subjects. He was frequently unable to sleep at night when he received accounts of the shocking outrages they had perpetrated, and he had sometimes "wished that he were dead" to have been spared the knowledge of the dreadful calamities that had befallen his country and people in consequence of the Russian invasion. As regards the execution of those who, after a fair trial, were found guilty of murder and other horrible crimes, he had no power to interfere. He was bound to comply with the law. His Majesty mentioned the instance of a Bulgarian who had been brought to Constantinople and who was condemned to be hanged. His Majesty said that he had endeavoured to prevent the execution of the sentence, but the man was proved to have committed, according to his own confession, so many murders upon innocent persons, that it was impossible to save him from the fate he deserved.

I had a good deal of further conversation with His Majesty as to a proclamation and amnesty to the Bulgarians, and as to putting a stop at once to the executions.

His Majesty ended by begging me to speak to the Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject, and by promising that he would think over the matter. His Majesty requested me to see him again in a day or two, when he would be able to place before me, in a clearer and more definite manner, his opinion as regards the steps that might, in his opinion, be taken with a view to bringing the war to an end through mediation.

My conversation with His Majesty, of which I have only been able to give your Lordship a brief outline, was of peculiar interest. Nothing could have been more liberal and just than the sentiments he professed, and if he were to act up to them in the government of his people, something might yet be done for Turkey.

I ventured to remark to His Majesty that I wished he had Ministers who were willing and competent to carry out the views and intentions he had expressed to me, and that he should endeavour to find them.

He spoke a good deal about Ahmed Vefyk Pasha, whom, he said, he intended to appoint again President of the Chamber, if his name were included in the six which were submitted to him by the Chamber for selection. He praised his independence, honesty, and straightforwardness, and when I observed that he had the reputation of being what, in Turkish, is called "sert" (hard), he answered that every man who told the truth boldly was "sert," and that such men had his confidence and trust.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 184.

Colonel Wellesley to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received November* 12.)

(No. 22. Most Confidential.)
My Lord, *Bucharest, October 29, 1877.*

I ARRIVED here from the Imperial head-quarters the day before yesterday, in order to purchase winter clothes, &c.

The day after to-morrow I go to Poradim, near Plevna, to which village the Emperor and his staff moved yesterday.

This afternoon I called on Baron Jomini, who seemed much depressed at the present state of affairs.

He did not appear to think that the victories which the Russians have lately gained in Asia Minor and to the west of Plevna have materially affected the position of Russia.

As he spoke to me with great frankness and apparently with little reserve, his opinions with regard to the prospects of peace may be interesting to your Lordship.

Alluding to the above-mentioned victories, his Excellency said that although they somewhat brightened the hitherto sombre aspect of affairs, it "was not enough."

"What we want," said Baron Jomini, "is the fall of Kars as well as that of Plevna, and should we be fortunate enough to take these two fortresses, I see no reason why negotiations should not be commenced without at the same putting an end to military operations.

He said that the military party in Russia was far less pretentious than it was a few months ago, a fact which would diminish the difficulties of negotiation.

"In fact" said Baron Jomini, "the military element has at last realized the truth of what we diplomatists told them at Pleschti when the war first commenced.

"When I first arrived at that place, I had in my pocket the proposal of Count Schouvaloff that Russia should at once declare that her military operations should be limited to that portion of Bulgaria which lies north of the Balkans.

"This proposal was received with scorn on the part of the Grand Duke Nicholas and his staff, and during the discussion I made the following statement:—

"If you gentlemen consider the invasion of Turkey so easy, and will prove by your victories that such is the case, then we diplomatists will be very glad to be able to add a considerable amount of wine to our water; but if, on the contrary, you experience

difficulties which render what you now consider a military promenade a campaign fraught with danger, you will be compelled to add still more water to your wine."

Baron Jomini considers that the military authorities, being now convinced of the difficulties attending an invasion such as Russia has undertaken, are ready and willing to be very moderate in imposing conditions of peace.

He believes that the only question of vital importance, and the one which Russia will be compelled to insist on, is that of the destruction of the fortresses, which he thinks would be a sufficient guarantee for the liberty and better government of the Bulgarians.

He sincerely hoped that the Grand Duke Michael would succeed in capturing Kars before the winter puts an end to military operations, as he thought that Turkey might then agree to give up Batoum to Russia in exchange for the former fortress.

Baron Jomini thinks that the question of the Dardanelles will not be an obstacle to peace negotiations, and that it is a matter which could hereafter be settled according to the general wish of Europe.

He told me that M. Nelidoff, formerly First Secretary of the Russian Embassy at Constantinople, and at present attached to the staff of the Grand Duke Nicholas, is strongly of opinion that the question of the fortresses should not be insisted upon by Russia, if by doing so a winter campaign would be rendered inevitable.

Baron Jomini, however, does not think that a durable peace can be obtained without the destruction of these fortresses, which, as he naively said, would enable the Russians to march into Bulgaria without difficulty should the Turks recommence the oppression of the Christian subjects of the Porte.

The possible renewal of hostilities in the spring is evidently a matter of serious danger in the opinion of Baron Jomini, who fears that such an event would very probably lead to European complications, on account of the excited state of Hungary and the present attitude of England.

In conclusion, his Excellency expressed his grave anxiety respecting future events in Russia at the termination of the present war.

"I believe," said his Excellency, "that our serious troubles will only commence when the war ends.

"I look with great apprehension to the future ('croyez-moi nous aurons nos comptes à faire chez nous')."

The impression which this conversation made on me is that both the Government and the military party in Russia are most desirous of terminating the war, and would make great concessions were it to do so this year.

The Russians do not disguise the fact that they no longer consider the Bulgarians in this war, and General Greig, the Controller of the Empire, lately at head-quarters, himself told me that Russia was now fighting, not for the Bulgarians, but for the re-establishment of her military honour.

In the army both officers and men are much discontented. They openly complain of having been deceived with regard to the alleged miserable condition of the Bulgarians, and the soldiers are particularly exasperated at being required to fight for the amelioration of the position of a people infinitely better off and more well-to-do than the peasantry of Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRED. WELLESLEY.

No. 185.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November* 12, 1877, 10·50 A.M.

HER Majesty's Government have considered your telegram of the 5th instant, respecting the proposed Ottoman terms of peace. They appreciate highly the confidence shown in you by the Sultan.

Her Majesty's Government are anxiously waiting for a favourable opportunity to assist in bringing about a peace, but, at the present moment, Her Majesty's Government have reason to believe that overtures would not be received with the favour which they could desire.

They think, therefore, that it would be better that the conditions mentioned to you should not, for the present, be placed formally or officially before them.

No. 186.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 483. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Therapia, November* 13, 1877.

I LEARN from good military authority that the position of affairs in Western Bulgaria is most critical. There is very great doubt whether Plevna can be relieved, or Osman Pasha force his way out. The Russians are surrounding and menacing Orchanie, and the road to Sofia may be soon open to them. They are also preparing forces to cross the Balkans upon Adrianople. A Russian advance to the south of the Balkans would probably lead to the most serious consequences. A direct appeal to the Emperor is being again pressed upon the Sultan, and if there be no hope of mediation or intervention he may be compelled to resort to it, and may probably have to accept conditions which would be dangerous to our interests. Count Zichy says that Russia, besides demanding the autonomy of Bulgaria north and south of the Balkans, and destruction of fortresses on the Danube, will insist upon the opening of the Dardanelles and the surrender of Batoum and a large (tract of?) East Armenia, certainly including Kars, and probably Erzeroum. I do not know what the grounds for his opinion may be.

I have communicated the substance of your telegram of yesterday to the Grand Vizier.

No. 187.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received November* 14.)

(No. 486. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Therapia, November* 14, 1877, 6·15 P.M.

TURKISH Ambassador at Vienna has telegraphed to the Porte that Count Andrassy has declared to him that Austria will not depart from her neutrality even should Servia take part in the war, which he did not consider imminent, but as depending upon an important Russian victory. Austria would only consult her own interests, and would not offer mediation unless applied to directly and formally by one of the belligerents.

Porte has telegraphed to the Ambassador to the effect that he is to state to Count Andrassy that, after the repeated assurances given by him and Count Zichy that Austria will not allow Russian forces to enter Servia in order to attack Turkey, nor permit Servia to take active part in the present war, Porte has been painfully disappointed in receiving the above communication from its Ambassador; and that as there exists a kind of identicality of interests between the two countries in the present instance, Turkish Government had fully relied on energetic action on the part of Austria in the event of Servia again attacking Turkey, or the Russians crossing into Servia for that purpose. As far as I know, Austria never gave assurances that she would interfere to prevent Servia from attacking Turkey.

This information comes to me from a very confidential source, and should not be communicated to Musurus Pasha.

No. 188.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received November* 15.)

(No. 1286. Secret.)
My Lord, *Therapia, November* 1, 1877.

I MET to-day at the Porte, by invitation, the Grand Vizier and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. They desired to see me, his Highness said, to talk over very confidentially and in an unofficial manner, the means by which peace might be obtained, especially with reference to my conversation with the Sultan, reported to your Lordship in my Secret despatch No. 1274 of the 30th ultimo. His Highness went on to say that His Majesty had decided, and in his opinion rightly, not to make an appeal to the Emperor Alexander, or to entertain any proposals for a direct and separate understanding with Russia, without first consulting Her Majesty's Government, and until he had no hope left of mediation or intervention on the part of England or of some other European Power. Persons of great influence and consideration were advising His Majesty to come to such an understanding; but until the safety of his Empire absolutely required it, His Majesty was resolved not to do so. His Majesty was ready to accept mediation, and to

agree to honourable terms of peace. The war had been forced upon him; it was causing great calamities to his country, and he was most desirous to bring it to an end, if he could do so without yielding any of his sovereign rights, or infringing upon the integrity and independance of his Empire, which he had entered upon the struggle to maintain, and which his people were prepared to make every sacrifice to uphold. It now remained for some Power to make an effort in the interest of peace, and Turkey could not but look to England for help in obtaining conditions founded upon the basis he had mentioned.

I asked his Highness whether there was any truth in the reports that had reached me that overtures had been made to Germany and Italy for mediation. His Highness declared that they were entirely unfounded, and appealed to Server Pasha to confirm what he said.

His Excellency replied that the question of mediation had been spoken of in a vague and informal manner in general conversation with the German Ambassador and the Italian Minister, but no proposal for mediation had been made on either side. Prince Reuss, when the subject was alluded to, spoke vaguely of peace, but observed that he was quite ignorant of the terms which Russia would be willing to accept.

A long and desultory conversation then took place as to the course to be pursued should the Porte decide upon asking for mediation, and as to the conditions which Turkey would be prepared to offer. It is unnecessary to report it to your Lordship in detail, as what passed was clearly understood to be a mere exchange of personal ideas, and to have no official character whatever; His Highness and Server Pasha promising to consider the matter deliberately and seriously, and to give me, in a day or two, a statement of their views that I could submit to Her Majesty's Government. The principal points discussed were: the manner in which an appeal for mediation might be made; whether it should be addressed to one Power, or to all the Powers parties to the Treaty of Paris; and what concessions Turkey could make to Russia, which, whilst not infringing upon the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire, would secure the ostensible object of the war, and would enable the Emperor Alexander to withdraw with honour from the contest. The Protocol of London was mentioned as the basis of reforms for the improvement of the condition of the Christians, and his Highness said that further reforms might be conceded which were not in violation of the Constitution, and which would apply equally to all the subjects of the Sultan. The position of Roumania and Servia were discussed, as well as the necessity of making some concessions to Montenegro, this Principality, and Servia, his Highness observing, being the "enfants gâtés" of Europe.

The Grand Vizier admitted that owing to the disaster that had befallen Moukhtar Pasha, and the success of the Russians in cutting off the communications with Plevna, a change had taken place in the position of affairs unfavourable to Turkey. But he did not, he said, despair; Turkey had still resources left in men, and the Mussulman populations were resolved to resist to the last if an attempt were made to impose terms upon them inconsistent with their honour, dignity, and independence.

Moukhtar Pasha believed that he could defend his positions before Erzeroum against any Russian attack, and the reinforcements sent to him would probably reach him to-morrow or next day. Although Plevna was invested, Osman Pasha could hold the position as long as his provisions lasted, which, he believed, would be for at least two months. In the meanwhile, every effort would be made to reopen communications with the place. The winter was now rapidly approaching, and His Highness relied upon the weather to impede the Russian military operations.

In the discussion with the Grand Vizier and Server Pasha I particularly dwelt upon two points which, I urged, should be kept in view in any overtures the Porte might make for peace:

1st. The necessity of giving some guarantee to Europe that the reforms proposed for the better government of the Christians should be carried out; and

2ndly. That some means should be found, by reasonable concessions, which would not practically interfere with the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, to meet the just demands of the Emperor of Russia, and to enable him to satisfy his people that the war had not been without result.

I also dwelt most emphatically upon the absolute necessity of putting an end to the execution of Bulgarian prisoners, and strongly advised that an Imperial proclamation should be issued, offering an amnesty to the insurgents, and promising the Bulgarians kind and generous treatment, and just and equal government under the Constitution.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 180.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 1300. Secret.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November 5, 1877.*

IN my Secret despatch No. 1286 of the 1st instant, I reported to your Lordship a conversation that I had had with the Grand Vizier and the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, on their invitation, with reference to the conditions of peace which the Porte might be prepared to accept. I informed your Lordship at the same time that what had passed between us was to be considered as a mere exchange of personal ideas, without any official character. Last night the Grand Vizier again sent to ask me to meet him and Server Pasha. I called upon them accordingly this morning, but did not see them together, as it was the day on which the latter receives, at his own house, the foreign Representatives. Both, however, made a similar communication to me, referring to notes which, I gathered, had either been written by the Sultan himself, or at his dictation. They both requested me to consider what they were about to say to me as still strictly secret and unofficial, to be submitted, *ad referendum*, for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

As the communications made to me by both Ministers were nearly identical, I will confine myself to reporting to your Lordship what passed with the Grand Vizier, who went somewhat more into details than his colleague. His Highness stated that he was authorized by the Sultan to inform me that His Majesty might accept the following terms of peace:—

1. The Treaty of Paris to be the basis of negotiations.

2. The Porte to adhere to, and carry out, all the concessions it had made at the Conference, and all the reforms referred to in the Protocol of London, but without admitting foreign "surveillance."

3. Servia to be left in the same condition as she was before the war; but a modification to be made in the XXIXth Article of the Treaty of Paris, which renders it necessary for the Porte to come to an understanding with the signatary Powers before having recourse to armed intervention; a condition which, his Highness observed, absolutely and unjustly deprived Turkey of the right of taking measures for her own defence and for preventing aggression on the part of the Principality.

4. The *status quo ante* as regards Montenegro. The Grand Vizier intimated that the Porte might be disposed to agree to a rectification of the frontiers of the Principality which would give it some additional territory; but would not consent, as at present advised, to the cession of Nichsich, which, in the opinion of the best Turkish military authorities, was absolutely necessary for the defence of the Province of Herzegovina.

5. The Sultan would be prepared to surrender to Russia that part of Bessarabia which was given to Turkey by the Treaty of Paris, but means should be found to prevent the frontiers of the two States being conterminous.

6. The Sultan might be disposed to cede to Austria-Hungary his suzerainty over Roumania, on condition that the Roumanian territory should be annexed to Hungary, and that Austria should consent to the unrestricted use by Turkey of the port of Klek, which was required for the development of the commercial and agricultural resources of the Turkish Slav Provinces. His Highness remarked that he would be willing to make Klek a free port.

Such were the terms which the Grand Vizier said he was authorized by the Sultan to suggest to me for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government. In the course of a long conversation, further conditions were referred to which His Majesty might be disposed to accept. I reminded his Highness that the Sultan himself had said to me that he would be ready to undertake that the reforms which he was prepared to make for the better government of his Christian subjects, should be carried out within ten years to the satisfaction of the Powers parties to the Treaty of Paris. His Highness said that, without wishing to commit himself to anything like a promise, he did not see any objection to the Sultan giving such an undertaking. His Majesty would, moreover, avail himself of an early opportunity to repeat publicly and solemnly his determination to abide by the Constitution which he had of his own free will given to his people.

The Grand Vizier further stated that the Sultan could not agree to any alteration in the Asiatic frontiers of Turkey by the cession of territory in Armenia; but that as Russia attached great importance to Batoum, as necessary to commerce and trade in her Circassian Provinces, he would be ready to make the place a free port, and to connect it by rail with Poti,—an arrangement which ought to satisfy all her legitimate require-

ments, although it would have the effect, at the same time, of seriously injuring the commerce of Turkey, by almost stopping the trade route from Trebizond to the Russian and Persian frontiers through Erzeroum.

In order to remove a source of complaint on the part of Greece against Turkey, his Highness said that if the Cretans would send a joint Commission of Mussulmans and Christians to Constantinople, he would take into the most favourable consideration all their grievances, and make such modifications in their Organic Law as would fully satisfy them. If they came to the capital, as the Porte had proposed, he would ensure them a kindly and honourable reception. His objection to sending a Commission to Crete was that, when in former cases such a measure had been taken, it had led to further trouble, and even to insurrection in the island, by exciting popular feeling. As regards the appointment of a Christian Governor, his Highness said that he saw no objection to it in theory, but the difficulty was to find the man. Hitherto, the experiment had failed.

I asked his Highness whether he would be inclined to assent to the appointment of a Mixed Commission to inquire into the condition of the Christians in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria, and especially as regards the land question in the first two provinces, and to suggest measures for its amelioration.

His Highness replied that such a Commission might be appointed, but that its foreign members must be named by the Porte, otherwise Turkey would be admitting the right of foreign Powers to interfere in her internal affairs, an interference which she had gone to war to resist.

The Grand Vizier, in concluding our conversation, again observed that he wished me to understand distinctly that the conditions of peace which he had placed before me were not communicated officially to Her Majesty's Government as those which the Sultan had finally decided to accept. They had not yet, his Highness said, been submitted to and approved by the Council of Ministers. They must consequently be viewed merely in the light of suggestions which the Sultan, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and himself desired me to place before Her Majesty's Government in the strictest secrecy for their consideration. If Her Majesty's Government thought that they were just, sufficient, and satisfactory, and would be prepared to place them before the Russian Government and advise their adoption, they would be communicated to Her Majesty's Government in an official and formal manner.

In my conversation with the Grand Vizier and Server Pasha I took the greatest care to make it perfectly clear to them that I only received their communications as an unofficial indication of their individual opinions, and that I was in no way authorized to express the views which Her Majesty's Government might entertain with regard to them, or to state what course Her Majesty's Government might think fit to take in the matter. All I could undertake to do was to submit them to Her Majesty's Government for their consideration.

Before leaving the Grand Vizier I inquired of him whether he had considered my suggestion that, as a preliminary to all further proceedings, the Sultan should put a stop to the execution of Bulgarians implicated in the insurrection, and issue a proclamation promising an amnesty and kind and clement treatment to those who submitted to his authority, and just and equal government to the Bulgarians in general. His Highness replied that he had done so; that a stop had already been put to the executions, and none would take place but in exceptional cases; and that he had requested Server Pasha to prepare the draft of such a Proclamation as the Sultan could properly issue.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 190.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 716. Secret.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 15, 1877.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 1261 of the 27th ultimo, and I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language held by you in the course of your conversation with Count Zichy on the subject of an Austrian mediation between Turkey and Russia, as reported in that despatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 191.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 718. Secret.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 15, 1877.

HER Majesty's Government approve the language held by your Excellency in the course of your conversation with His Majesty the Sultan, on the 30th ultimo, respecting the prospects of peace, as reported in your despatch No. 1274, Secret, of that day.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 192.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 404.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 17, 1877.

THE Russian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon, and in the course of conversation remarked to me that there was one passage in Lord Beaconsfield's speech at the Guildhall which, as Russian Ambassador, he felt bound to notice, though he had no instructions to do so, lest an argument should hereafter be drawn from his having allowed it to pass without comment.

The passage to which he referred was thus reported in one of the London daily journals:

"I cannot forget that the Emperor of Russia, with a magnanimity characteristic of his truly elevated character, announced, on the eve of commencing this war, that his only object was to secure the safety and happiness of the Christian subjects of the Porte, and he pledged his imperial word of honour, and not upon one occasion only, that he sought no increase of territory.'

Count Schouvaloff said that he was not aware that the Emperor had, since the outbreak of the war, made any declaration which could preclude territorial cessions forming a portion of the eventual terms of peace.

I said in reply that, without denying his statement, I thought he would admit that any declarations such as those in question would not be affected by the circumstance that they were made either before or after the outbreak of hostilities, and that the language of the Emperor Alexander had throughout been to the effect that he was not waging a war of conquest, but that the conflict had been begun and was carried on by Russia for other objects.

To this remark Count Schouvaloff took no objection.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 193.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 742. Secret.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 20, 1877.

HER Majesty's Government approve the language which your Excellency held to the Grand Vizier and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the subject of the prospects of peace and mediation, in the interview reported in your despatch No. 1286, Secret, of the 1st instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 194.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 743. Secret.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 20, 1877.

YOUR despatch No. 1300, Secret, of November 5, has been received, in which you report the communications made to you by the Grand Vizier and the Turkish Minister

for Foreign Affairs as to the terms of peace which the Sultan might possibly accept, and which you were requested to submit for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government; and, in reply, I have to refer your Excellency to my telegram of the 12th instant, in which I explained to you the reasons why Her Majesty's Government thought it better that the conditions in question should not, for the present, be placed formally or officially before them.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 195.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 22, 1877, 7 P.M.*

WE are anxious to know what impression has been produced at Constantinople by the fall of Kars?

The Russian Ambassador here affirms that Plevna must be taken or surrendered in a few days, and professes to disbelieve in the possibility of protracted resistance by Turkey. I have doubts, however, whether the confidence of success expressed by his Excellency is sincere.

What is the state of the case in your judgment?

We are willing to do what is possible in the way of mediation, but I fear the Russian demands are likely to be far in advance of what the Porte is prepared to concede.

No. 196.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 764. Confidential.) *Foreign Office, November 22, 1877.*

Sir,

IT is important that Her Majesty's Government should be informed what impression the fall of Kars has produced at Constantinople.

Count Schouvaloff declares that the fall of Plevna is imminent, and he professes to disbelieve in the possibility of Turkey offering a protracted resistance.

I have some doubt, however, as to whether his Excellency is really as confident of success as he professes to be.

I have to request that you will report to me your views upon the state of the case.

Her Majesty's Government are prepared to do what is possible in the way of mediation, but there is reason to fear that the Russian Government will advance demands far more onerous than the Porte is at present disposed to concede.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 197.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 1332. Very Confidential.) *Therapia, November 13, 1877.*

My Lord,

I ASKED Count Zichy yesterday whether he had heard anything of a suggestion made to the Sultan that he should address a letter to the Emperor of Russia with a view to obtaining peace. His Excellency replied that he knew nothing of the matter, although I have good reason for knowing that he was consulted on the subject at the same time that I was. He observed that such a step might have been taken with great propriety and advantage some weeks ago, when the Turkish arms had been successful; but that after the recent defeats that the Turks had sustained in Europe and Asia, he was of opinion that such a personal appeal on the part of the Sultan to the Emperor Alexander would have no result whatever, and could not be made unless the Sultan was prepared to accept very onerous terms of peace.

I asked Count Zichy what conditions he was of opinion the Emperor would demand? His Excellency said that they would probably be, amongst others, autonomy for Bulgaria,

including the provinces inhabited by Bulgarians to the south of the Balkans, the destruction of the Turkish fortresses on the Danube, the opening of the Dardanelles to the Russian fleets, the surrender of Batoum, and the cession of a large part of Armenia, certainly including Kars, and probably Erzeroum. Count Zichy did not tell me on what grounds he had formed this opinion, nor did I think it desirable to press him upon the subject. It may, therefore, be but the expression of his personal views.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 198.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 1342. Secret.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November 14, 1877.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 12th instant, informing me that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the conditions of peace which Turkey might be disposed to accept should not for the present be placed formally or officially before them, I have the honour to state that, not having been able to see the Grand Vizier, I have communicated that opinion to his Highness by a private and confidential letter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 199.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received November 23.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Secret.) *Therapia, November 23, 1877.*

THE fall of Kars was only known here officially on Wednesday night. I have seen Grand Vizier to-day. He says, that although considering it a great disaster, the Turkish people are not discouraged, and are still disposed to resist to the utmost the attempt of Russia to crush and exterminate them. One hundred thousand more men are to be called to arms at once, destined for defence of Adrianople, and the lines of Gallipoli and Constantinople. His Highness says that an attempt will be made to relieve Plevna next week by a combined movement on the part of Suleiman and Mehemet Ali Pashas, and that if Osman Pasha can hold out for a few days there are still hopes of his relief. Moukhtar Pasha is doubtful as to whether he will be able to hold Erzeroum, in consequence of great addition the fall of Kars will give Russian forces before the city. Troops are coming from Baghdad to Erzinghian, where another stand may be attempted. But I fear that Armenia is lost, and perhaps for ever. The consequences to England will be, in my opinion, incalculable.

The Grand Vizier states the number of Mussulmans driven out of Bulgaria by the Russians to be above 500,000, a large number of whom must perish. The losses already sustained by Mussulman population in Europe and Asia he calculates at more than 1,500,000. His Highness begged me to tell Her Majesty's Government that, anxious as the Sultan is for peace to put an end to the terrible calamities that are befalling his people, and to carry out those reforms which he intends for their better government, rather than sacrifice honour and independence of his country, he and his Mahomedan subjects were determined to resist to the last drop of their blood. His Highness says that such is the exasperation caused by the conduct of Russians, if Plevna falls, and they advance into Roumelia, the greatest disasters may await Christians, which the Government would be powerless to prevent. His Highness would be glad if Her Majesty's Government could ascertain and inform him of the conditions which Russia is likely to demand; but he is very anxious that she should not be led to think that Turkey is either discouraged or at the end of her resources. The state of affairs is certainly most critical. I will telegraph again as soon as I can judge better of the state of public opinion. All the Turkish newspapers published to-day are, I understand, in favour of carrying on the war, notwithstanding fall of Kars.

No. 200.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received November 26.*)

(No. 648.) *St. Petersburgh, November 21, 1877.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship, in translation, by Mr. Michell, articles from the Russian press, referring to the conditions on which Russia should conclude peace with Turkey.

I also annex a *précis* of two articles in the "Golos" by Mr. Stephen, which is the most moderate and the ablest organ of the Russian press. These articles refer to the rumours of mediation, and seek to prove that an armed mediation or intervention, which would alone be undertaken by England, would be too late to be effective after the fall of Plevna.

I have learnt here, from a reliable military source, that on the fall of Plevna there are two military plans under consideration for further operations, on which no final decision had yet been taken at head-quarters. They are, namely:—

1. Either to leave the Roumanian corps with a sufficient Russian force to hold Plevna and to secure it from attack on the western and southern side, the remainder of the Russian army now before Plevna being directed against the army of Suleiman Pasha, with a view to reducing the fortresses of the quadrilateral before further advance across the Balkans; or,

2. To march immediately on Sofia and Adrianople, with a view to forcing the Ottoman Government to conclude peace.

I have reason to believe, from what my informant stated, that the second plan is the one most favourably entertained by the military party, and the most likely to be adopted.

With regard to the conditions of peace as discussed in the inclosed articles, your Lordship will see that some fears are entertained by the ultra Russo-Slav party in regard to the future consequences to Russian influence should the independence of Roumania be confirmed by Europe, and its neutrality placed under an European guarantee in the same manner as Belgium. Such a position for Roumania would preclude hereafter the possibility of Russia making use of Roumanian territory as the basis of her military operations against Turkey, and in that case Russia would be virtually deprived of direct contact with Turkey. This would be more especially the case if the Dobrudscha should be given to Roumania in exchange for the slip of Bessarabia ceded by Russia in 1856.

This separation of Russia from contact with Bulgaria would, it is feared, likewise deprive Russia of exercising that influence over the Christian Slavs in northern Turkey which has been her constant aim and ambition, for the purpose of undermining the Ottoman rule.

This question is specially referred to in a letter from Prince Wassiltchikoff, in which, in view of this eventuality, he sets forth the necessity for Russia to have the sole command of the Black Sea, and to demand the cession of the Turkish fleet in lieu of a pecuniary war indemnity.

The same ideas are put forth in a violent article in a Slavophil paper published at Moscow; and although the Imperial Government may not participate in the extravagant pretensions of this ultra party, still their circulation at this moment by the press is calculated to influence the popular mind, and to render more difficult, if not impossible, the avenue to peace.

The pretensions and demands of the Russian press augment with every Russian victory, as your Lordship will perceive by the inclosed articles from the "Novoe Vremia" and "Golos" on the fall of Kars, both of which organs maintain that there can be no question of restoring that fortress or Pashalic to Turkey, but that it must be kept by Russia, and serve as a basis for "future offensive operations."

From the general tone of these articles it may be clearly deduced that the national opinion in Russia seeks to acquire sole and undisputed command of the Black Sea and its littoral, to render that sea a *mare clausum*, whilst reserving free outlet for the Russian navy to the Mediterranean.

Should a Russian army advance to Adrianople (and of this intention there is not the shadow of a doubt), a force could easily be detached to occupy Gallipoli and the Dardanelles, and I have no doubt that if that important strategic and maritime position should ever fall into the hands of Russia it will be converted into an impregnable fortress, and will not be easily given up.

The same observation may apply to the forts commanding the entry from the Black Sea into the Bosphorus, which, should they ever fall into Russian hands, will be permanently retained and converted into a second Gibraltar.

These are grave eventualities, not only of possible but probable occurrence, and at no distant date, which it behoves Europe, and more especially England, to take into serious consideration before it may be too late to provide measures to prevent their realization; and it is on this account that I now venture to bring them under your Lordship's notice.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 200.

Probable Demands of Russia for conclusion of Peace with Turkey, abstracted from the Russian Press by Mr. Michell.

THE following are some of the opinions expressed by the Russian press with regard to the conditions of peace which Russia ought to impose on Turkey on the defeat of the latter:—

The "Yacht" newspaper of the 11th November, 1877, considers that Russia cannot remain satisfied with the acquisition of a small slice of territory in the Dobrudscha, but that her principal compensation should be sought in a free development of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. The Black Sea must be converted into free Russian waters, out of which Russian ships may be able to penetrate to the ocean without any permissive Firmans. As regards the Turkish fleet, the "Yacht" argues: that if the existence of Turkey is guaranteed by the protection of the Great Powers of Europe, then the fleet of these Powers is sufficient for enforcing such protection, and the money hitherto spent on the construction of Turkish iron-clads could be employed for the amelioration of the condition of the suffering subjects of the Sultan. The maintenance of a formidable Turkish fleet in the Black Sea serves as a constant threat of aggression which Russia must not allow.

Prince Vasiltchikoff, in a letter addressed to the "Severnoi Vestnik" of the 12th November, says that the present war was undertaken by Russia with the openly expressed object of emancipating the Slavs of the Balkans, and at the same time Russia, in order to quiet the apprehensions of the Cabinets of Europe, pledged herself not to annex a single inch of Turkish territory in Europe. Russia, however, did not restrict herself in any way with respect to Asiatic Turkey and the Black Sea; on these lines, therefore, all future peace negotiations will be conducted. In the opinion of Prince Vasiltchikoff the most effectual compensation that Turkey can make Russia would be the cession to the latter of its fleet in the Black Sea. "It may happen," he adds, "that Roumania having consolidated her political existence, and acquired some territory in compensation for her co-operation with Russia in the present war, will no longer wish to serve as a base of operations for Russian armies, under which circumstances she may, by declaring strict neutrality, entirely isolate us from the Balkan peninsula. Austria also may find it inconvenient to resist any longer the Turcophil tendencies of the Magyars and Galician Poles, and may possibly unite with them in defence of their interests on the Danube. In a word, the position of Russia in European Turkey is so unstable and indefinite, and the line of communication between Russia and the Turkish Slavs so extended, that it is not possible to establish and preserve Russian influence and relations over the future destinies of the Balkan peninsula. Another basis and line of communication must be sought which would present fewer political obstacles and less complicated interests. The Black Sea presents all these advantages."

The "Petersburg Vedomist" declares that no idea of peace can be entertained by Russia until she has completely vanquished her enemy in the field, and attained the great object of the war, namely, the emancipation of Bulgaria from the Turkish yoke. Both the military honour and the vital interests of the country will not be satisfied with less. As regards compensation and indemnity which are to be demanded by Russia from Turkey, the "Petersburg Vedomist" observes a discreet silence.

Inclosure 2 in No. 200.

View of Extreme Section of the Russian Press respecting Conditions to be secured by Russia for the conclusion of Peace with Turkey.

THE "Sovremenoi Isvesti" ("Contemporary News"), a violent Slavophil and patriotic organ, published at Moscow, expresses itself as follows on this subject:—

"Turkey must surrender her fleet to Russia, and the Black Sea must be exclusively Russian, while Turkey must only be tolerated there as a guest on sufferance. She must not have the right to maintain a fleet on our sea, nor the right of introduction of such a fleet in our sea. She must, moreover, abandon the right of erecting and maintaining fortresses at Varna and Sinope, and generally along the whole coast of the Black Sea. The Black Sea is ours, as also must be its Straits. The territories adjoining them must also belong to us, though not in the sense, maybe, of permanent occupation. They may belong to anyone, and rather to the Sultan than to anyone else; but not a single vessel of war of any Power, not even excepting Turkey, must possess the right of approaching those territories. How can such a condition of the Straits be best established? It is possible to stipulate that the Russians should possess the right of maintaining garrisons in fortresses on the coast, that of permanent anchorage for ships-of-war in the Bosphorus, or, lastly, which would be much simpler, the right of immediate occupation of the capital of Turkey and both shores of the Bosphorus at the appearance of an armed foreign cruizer in the Dardanelles. With the prohibition against the entrance of any foreign vessels into the Bosphorus, are we to exercise the right of free entrance into the Mediterranean? Most certainly we must, together with the right of free exit. This is only the natural consequence of our exclusive right over the Black Sea; without this right the Black Sea would not be ours, and this must be made an essential condition."

As regards acquisition of territory in Asia, the "Sovremenoi Isvesti" expresses great surprise at the ignorance which prevails with respect to the importance of Mesopotamia, by the possession of which Russia will most effectually destroy that insect which destroys all the links that Russia may form in the East. That insect, the "Sovremenoi Isvesti" proceeds to say, is England:—

"So long as the question of Mesopotamia is not finally settled, so long as that key to the old world is not placed in firm hands, a thousand pretexts will always be found by England for the purpose of wresting from her rival, Russia, the dominion over the world. Divide the watershed of Mesopotamia between Turkey, Russia, and Persia, so that the first should be as much isolated from the Persian Gulf as the approach of the latter to that Gulf is now facilitated, and such an event will be to England a second secession of the United States of America; she will then find herself forced to bow before the irrevocable."

The "Sovremenoi Isvesti," in its patriotic fervour, also informs its readers, with reference to the recent prohibited exportation of sheep-skins from Russia, that English agents still continue to buy up these skins in Moscow and to transport them abroad in barrels under the guise of salt beef.

Inclosure 3 in No. 200.

Extract from the "Golos" of November $\frac{9}{21}$, 1877.

The "Golos" in its impression of Wednesday, November $\frac{7}{19}$, commenting on an article in the "Times" on the prospects of peace, concludes as follows:—

"We should strive to keep England in her present isolated position. To do this we must carefully weigh all that can possibly affect the interests of the Continental Powers, and not alone consider the interests of Great Britain. This is not difficult. The new order of things in European Turkey may not, in certain details, be entirely in harmony with the interest of some of the Continental Powers, but nothing of the kind can be said with regard to Asia.

"If the programme of the conditions of peace advanced by Russia is only drawn up in such a way as not to affect the interests of Austria, Italy, France, and Germany, we need not be so particular as to the manner it may affect English interests."

Inclosure 4 in No. 200.

Extract from the "Golos" of November $\frac{4}{16}$, 1877.

RUMOURS of mediation continue to circulate; they refer, of course, to mediation on the part of England alone, as it has long been evident to all that the Western Powers are firmly determined to remain passive spectators of present military events until circumstances should induce the Porte to sue for peace, and enter upon negotiations with Russia.

Up till now nothing has occurred to change this resolve. Germany and Italy entertain the same views that have led them from the outset of the war to maintain a neutrality sympathetic to Russia; Austria-Hungary sees no cause for fear in a Russian success at Plevna until our advanced guard shall have crossed the Balkans, and be threatening Adrianople, nor does she show any intention of renouncing the policy of the Triple Alliance. Alone, England, or more correctly speaking, the Conservative Cabinet of Lord Beaconsfield, regards the approach of our troops on Erzeroum, together with the disasters of Mukhtar Pasha, as sufficient ground for an effort to avert from Turkey the consequences of the complete triumph of the Russian troops over the armies of the Ottoman Empire. It is only from this quarter that any proposal of mediation may be expected.

What are the results that the English Government look for as the outcome of mediation? It ought to be well known in London that Russia will accept no mediation unless the conditions of peace proposed by the St. James' Cabinet include the concessions on the part of Turkey which the Russian Government have declared to be unconditionally requisite. As nothing of the kind can be looked for from Lord Beaconsfield, English mediation will undoubtedly be rejected, and England will either have to resume her inaction, or adopt a course of armed intervention in support of Turkey.

Such an intervention can only have practical results in the event of its preventing the fall of Plevna, and the march of the Russian troops across the Balkans. Practically speaking, the question resolves itself into one of rapidity of action. The first step taken by England, should she decide on armed intervention, would naturally be to dispatch a strong British force to Turkey. To accomplish this, it is true, no considerable space of time would be needed. Three weeks after their dispatch from the Channel, English troops might well appear at Gallipoli; but the difficulty lies in the fact that, before the troops can embark the Government must call Parliament together and obtain the necessary supplies, without which the dispatch of any considerable body of troops to Turkey would be utterly impossible. Two weeks would be required at least for these preliminaries, so that the descent of the English troops on Turkish soil could not be effected earlier than five weeks from the date of the fall of Plevna, which event alone can decently justify interference. These five weeks are more than military events should require to convince the Porte of the necessity of separate negotiation with Russia. The English troops would arrive, in any case, too late to execute Lord Beaconsfield's schemes.

All this is well known to the Premier's colleagues, who would assuredly not allow England to be drawn into such a scandalous fiasco. Thus these rumours of English intervention will remain mere rumours, indicative of no firm decision on the part of the English Government, but rather of the impotent "covetousness" of the head of the Cabinet.

Inclosure 5 in No. 200.

Opinions of the Russian Press respecting the Capture of Kars.

THE "Novai Vremya" of the $\frac{7}{19}$th November expresses the greatest satisfaction on the subject of this great military success of Russia, and records the fact that Kars has been captured thrice by Russian arms, namely, on July 3, 1828; November 16, 1855; and now on November $\frac{6}{18}$, 1877. It observes, that having now fallen into Russian hands for the third time with great sacrifice of life, and after such sustained and strenuous efforts, Kars must not be surrendered, but must remain a Russian town, a Russian fortress, and one of Russia's strongest bulwarks in Asia Minor. Russia, it also remarks, will henceforward pursue the same policy in Asia Minor as in the Balkan

peninsula, that is, she will endeavour to destroy Turkish rule over the Christians, and to secure her southern boundaries.

The "Golos" of the same date says that the fall of Kars constitutes the factitious establishment of Russian power in the Pashalic of Kars, and serves as a firm basis for future offensive operations. In what direction and for what objects such further operations are to be conducted, it considers the present hour inopportune to discuss. Exultation and rejoicing are, in its opinion, only appropriate to this hour of triumph.

No. 201.

Server Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha, November 26.*)

(Extrait.)
(Télégraphique.)
(Confidentielle.)

IL n'est jamais entré dans l'intention de la Sublime Porte de s'entendre directement avec la Russie. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique peut être assuré qu'en aucun cas nous ne consentirons à traiter de la paix en dehors de lui. Nous savons combien l'appui de l'Angleterre nous est nécessaire. Nous y attachons un immense prix, et nous croyons de notre devoir de faire tout notre possible pour le conserver. Il me suffit d'en appeler à ce sujet au témoignage de Mr. Layard que nous nous sommes fait une loi de consulter toujours dans les graves questions qui nous occupent actuellement.

Les derniers revers que nos armes ont malheureusement essuyés ne sont pas de nature à nous alarmer. Vous savez qu'au commencement de la guerre les Russes s'étaient une première fois déjà avancés jusqu'à Erzéroum, et que nos troupes les avaient victorieusement repoussés. La gloire dont nos armes se sont couvertes en Roumélie restera dans l'histoire; et, si, par un concours de circonstances fatales ou par le fait de la négligence de quelques uns de nos généraux, les Russes sont parvenus à traverser le Danube, ils n'en ont pas moins rencontré depuis, de notre part, une résistance telle qu'ils ont perdu, d'après des données positives, plus de 120,000 hommes.

La Turquie lutte pour la sauvegarde de son indépendance et de son intégrité. La force et la vitalité qu'elle a montrées doivent nous attirer la sympathie et le respect de l'Europe. Elle se bat à elle seule avec un ennemi redoutable contre lequel se sont heurtées, lors de la guerre de Crimée, les forces de quatre grands Puissances; avec un ennemi qui s'est, en outre, assuré la coopération de cinq peuples, car outre les Moldo-Valaques qu'on a laissés agir librement, et les Bulgares qui se battent à côté des Russes, et le Monténégro qui agit isolément, les velléités belliqueuses de la Grèce et de la Servie nous obligent de maintenir sur leurs frontières plus de 160 bataillons. Indépendamment de tout cela, un nouveau corps d'armée sera bientôt prêt sous le commandement de Mehmed Ali Pacha à Sofia, et nous avons déjà pris, en prévision d'une durée plus longue de la guerre, nos mesures pour appeler au printemps sous les drapeaux des troupes fraîches.

Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, son Gouvernement et le pays tout entier, Musulmans comme Chrétiens, sont prêts à tous les sacrifices pour sauvegarder l'honneur et l'intégrité de la patrie. Nous comptons pour atteindre ce but sur l'appui moral et effectif d'Angleterre, dont les intérêts sont intimément liés avec les nôtres. Nous espérons que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique nous prêtera son assistance un moment plus tôt, car tout retard serait de nature à empêcher, d'un côté, la réalisation des réformes déjà arrêtées par notre auguste Maître et, de l'autre, à paralyser la bonne administration de l'Etat.

Je ne peux m'empêcher d'ajouter que le Gouvernement Impérial, qui n'a jamais cherché la guerre, et qui a tout fait, au contraire, pour éviter cette calamité, déplore profondément l'effusion du sang et n'en appelle pas moins de tous ses vœux la cessation des hostilités. Notre désir est sincère et nous nous déclarons prêts à signer toute paix qui ne porterait aucune atteinte à l'indépendance et à l'intégrité de l'Empire.

En résumé, je dois dire à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement Impérial est fermement décidé à déployer tous ses efforts pour la défense de son indépendance et de son intégrité. Mais votre Excellence comprendra aisément que la mise à exécution des nouvelles mesures militaires que nous avons arrêtées demande forcément du temps qui pourrait tourner à l'avantage de l'ennemi.

Veuillez vous exprimer dans ce sens auprès de son Excellence Lord Derby.

No. 202.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received November 27.*)

(No. 504. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.)

Therapia, November 27, 1877.

INFORMATION I receive from a person who has great experience, is well capable of forming an opinion, and who has seen most of the leading Turks in and out of office, leads me to believe that there is a real determination to carry on the war until resources of country are completely exhausted. This course was resolved upon at a Council at which the Sultan presided. I have reason to believe that Mahmoud Damat will be forced to resign.

No. 203.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 367. Most Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 28, 1877.

IN a conversation held to-day with the Austrian Ambassador, I mentioned to his Excellency the general anticipation which existed that Plevna would not be able long to hold out, and that, after its fall, the advance of the Russian armies in European Turkey would be virtually unopposed. I said that I did not personally hold this opinion, having observed that, as a rule, the Turkish defence became most obstinate when their military position appeared most desperate. But the language of the Russian Ambassador held to me on several occasions within the last few days seemed to imply that he expected an early and decisive victory. I thought it full time, therefore, for all the Powers interested in the fate of Constantinople to consider what course they would take in the event of that capital being threatened with a Russian occupation. I said I was aware, from the language previously held by Count Andrassy, that the Austrian Government would object to the retention of Constantinople by Russia, but that was obviously a different question; and I now wished to ask what course Count Andrassy would be prepared to pursue if a Russian army should approach the Turkish capital with an evident intention to occupy it?

Count Beust promised to put the question to his Government, and to obtain for me as early an answer as he could.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 204.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received November 30.*)

(No. 1967. Most Confidential.)
My Lord,

Therapia, November 19, 1877.

SERVER PASHA anxiously inquired of me to-day whether I had heard anything more from your Lordship as to the probability of any action on the part of Her Majesty's Government with a view to peace. I replied that I had not, and that all that I was authorized to say upon the subject had been communicated by me to the Grand Vizier, who had no doubt informed him of it. His Excellency observed that Turkey still looked to England to help her in the critical circumstances in which she was placed. It had again been suggested that the Sultan should make a direct appeal to the Emperor of Russia. What, he asked, would Her Majesty's Government think of such an appeal? I answered that I had already stated that Her Majesty's Government would look with favour upon any overture for peace of which the success was probable; but that, before appealing to the Emperor of Russia, it would be desirable to ascertain whether such an appeal would be received. His Excellency remarked that he was still resolved not to take any step without previous consultation with England, and her approval, and that the Sultan and the Grand Vizier entirely agreed with him.

His Excellency went on to say that, a report having appeared in the European press that Germany and Italy were concerting an offer of mediation to Turkey and Russia, he had availed himself of it (although he did not believe in it) to instruct the Turkish

Ambassador at Berlin to speak to Baron Bülow on the subject, with a view to sounding the German Government as to its real intentions. Baron Bülow had replied to Sadoullah Bey that Germany could not offer mediation until both belligerents were "sincerely desirous of peace." On receiving this answer, he had directed the Ambassador to tell Baron Bülow that Turkey was "sincerely desirous of peace," if it could be obtained upon the basis of the recognition of the independence and integrity of Turkey.

Prince Reuss, Server Pasha added, had spoken, the last time he had seen him, but in general terms, about mediation, observing that Germany could not offer it unless she was prepared to go further, and insist upon its acceptance, as it would be an affront to her were it to be refused.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 205.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received November* 30.)

(No. 1368. Very Confidential.)
Therapia, November 19, 1877.

My Lord,

SERVER PASHA observed to me to-day, when I was calling upon him, that he was surprised and indignant at the language used by Count Andrassy to the Turkish Ambassador at Pesth. He could have no more reliance upon Austria, his Excellency said, nor confidence in any assurances that Count Andrassy might give. After Count Zichy had distinctly stated that Russia would not be allowed to send her armies through Servia, and that Servia would not be permitted to join her forces with those of Russia in the present war, Count Andrassy had informed Ejnel Bey, who had represented the present threatening attitude of Servia to him, that he should not interfere in any way with her proceedings, as all he had to consider was the interests of Austria-Hungary, which would not be affected by them.

I asked his Excellency whether he was quite sure that Count Zichy had given any promise that the Servians would not be allowed by Austria to attack Turkey; my impression was, I said, that whilst the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had referred to a promise given by the Emperor of Russia that his troops should not pass through Servia during the present war, a promise which the Emperor of Austria expressed his belief would be adhered to, he had stated, at the same time, that if the Servians entered Turkey Austria would not interfere. I reminded his Excellency that he had himself mentioned to me that when he had asked Count Zichy what Turkey should do in such case, he had replied that if the Porte chose to send 20,000 irregulars into the Principality no one would have a right to interfere.

Server Pasha maintained that I had misunderstood him. Three things were referred to, he said, by Count Zichy:—

1. The passage of Russian troops through Servia, to which the Emperor of Russia had pledged himself not to have recourse;
2. The union of the Servian troops with those of Russia in making war upon Turkey, which Austria would not permit; and
3. The invasion of Bosnia by the Servians, with which Austria would not interfere, and which Turkey might resist by employing her irregular troops.

Notwithstanding this explanation, I cannot but believe, from the language held to me by Count Zichy, that Server Pasha is mistaken, and that no distinct promise was given by Count Andrassy that in the event of the Servians threatening to attack Turkey, Austria would interfere to prevent them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 206.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received December* 1.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Most Confidential.)
Buda-Pesth, December 1, 1877, 10 P.M.

THE Foreign Minister has spoken to me of a telegram from Count Beust inquiring, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, what Austria would do in the event of an

advance of Russian army on Constantinople. He has replied that he is surprised Count Beust should not have answered this question without asking for instructions, as his declarations on the subject are sufficiently explicit, and he has shown no inclination to withdraw them. He said he had stated his objections to a Russian army occupying Constantinople, though he did not intend to interfere with the operations of the war; but he will insist, in the event of an occupation of Constantinople by the Russian army, on its not remaining there, and as he thinks that such a demand from a Government who can support it by 1,000,000 soldiers would be complied with, he feels confident that Russia will not expose herself to the risk of its being addressed to her.

No. 207.

Memorandum communicated by Count Beust, December 3, 1877.

(Confidential.)

YOUR Excellency must be aware that a most definite answer is contained in our previous communications.

My despatch of the 22nd June exposes the reasons why we declined, and still decline, to demand beforehand a promise from Russia not to march on Constantinople. My telegraphic despatches Nos. 80 and 90, say distinctly that we wish to see avoided even a temporary Russian occupation of Constantinople; that we would not look on in silence at a more protracted occupation; but that we should regard a permanent "prise de possession" as *casus belli*, and act in consequence, and that we would loyally give notice of the above to Russia at the moment when a real danger of the occupation of Constantinople by her became existant.

If, in spite of our understanding, Lord Derby points to the difficulties of eventually dislodging the Russian troops from Constantinople, his Lordship either overlooks circumstances of which Russia takes the greatest heed—that is our million of soldiers and our geographical position—or he doubts the sincerity of our declarations. We have done nothing to justify such doubt.

Your Excellency will be pleased to express yourself to Lord Derby in the above sense. You will further declare that we do not share the opinion of the British Government about the imminence of the Russian advance on Constantinople in this season. We expressed the same opinion we now hold upon that subject in June last, and as we proved to be in the right then, this opinion seems to hold still more good now, when the Russian army would have to cross the Balkans.

Your Excellency will add that in every case we maintain, word for word, one and all of our declarations.

No. 208.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 371. Most Confidential.)
Foreign Office, December 3, 1877.

Sir,

THE Austrian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon, and communicated to me the answer which he had received from Count Andrassy to the question, put at my request, as to the course which the Austrian Government would be prepared to pursue if the occupation of Constantinople by Russian forces should appear to be imminent.

Count Andrassy states that a definite answer on this point is contained in his previous communications. He refers to his despatch of the 22nd June last as explaining the reasons why the Austrian Government had declined and still decline to demand beforehand from Russia a promise that her armies would not march on Constantinople. His Excellency adds that in two subsequent telegraphic despatches he had distinctly stated that the Austrian Government were desirous that even a temporary Russian occupation of Constantinople should be avoided, that they could not remain silent spectators of a more protracted occupation, but that they would regard a permanent "prise de possession" as a *casus belli*, and take the necessary action in consequence; further, that they would loyally give notice of the above to Russia as soon as there existed any real danger of the occupation of Constantinople by her.

If, Count Andrassy says, notwithstanding the understanding between England and

Austria, the British Government still dwells upon the difficulty of eventually dislodging the Russian troops from Constantinople, they must either overlook circumstances to which Russia is fully alive,—the geographical position of Austria, and the million of soldiers she has at her command,—or they must doubt the sincerity of the Austrian declarations. The Austrian Government, his Excellency declares, have done nothing to justify such a doubt.

Count Beust is instructed farther to state that the Austrian Government do not agree in the opinion that a Russian occupation of Constantinople is to be apprehended during the present season. They had expressed the same view in June last, and, as they then proved to be correct, their opinion seems to have still more foundation now, when the Russian army have first to accomplish the crossing of the Balkans.

In conclusion, Count Beust is instructed to affirm that the Austrian Government maintain word for word one and all of the declarations they have made.

I promised, at Count Beust's request, that this communication should be considered strictly confidential and should not be published.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 209.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 792. Most Confidential.)
Foreign Office, December 5, 1877.

Sir,

HER Majesty's Government approve the language employed by your Excellency in a conversation with Server Pasha respecting the prospects of peace and German mediation, as reported in your despatch No. 1367, Most Confidential, of the 19th November.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 210.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 796. Secret.)
Foreign Office, December 5, 1877.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT to you herewith, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna, giving the substance of the answer given by Count Andrassy to the question, put at my request, as to the course which the Austrian Government would be prepared to pursue if the occupation of Constantinople by Russian forces should appear to be imminent.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 211.

Colonel Wellesley to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December .)

(No. 28. Most Confidential.)
Poradim, near Plevna, November 24, 1877.

My Lord,

I LEARN from General Werder, my German colleague, that a few days ago the Emperor received a telegram from Prince Gortchakow stating that the German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had informed M. de Giers that the Turkish Government had requested Germany, through its Representative at Constantinople, to mediate between Russia and Turkey, but that Prince Reuss had refused his services in this sense, and had referred the Turkish Government to the Russian head quarters.

In further conversation, General Werder, who is in constant communication with his Sovereign, expressed his conviction that whatever might happen, Germany would not draw the sword in favour of Russia in the present contest, even in the event of Turkey being able to find an ally.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRED. WELLESLEY.

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* No. 208.

No. 212.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 820. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Therapia, December 6, 1877.*

SULTAN, whom I have seen to-day, says that he is satisfied with military operations, and is confident that the Russians will be unable carry war to the south of Balkans this year.

His Majesty hopes to receive news from Plevna within three or four days.

Reinforcements are being sent to Suleiman and Mehemet Ali Pashas.

German Ambassador is urging the Porte to lose no time in coming to a separate and direct understanding with Russia.

No. 213.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 1394. Secret.)
Constantinople, November 23, 1877.

My Lord,

THE fall of Kars was not officially known to the Porte until last Wednesday night (the 21st), when a telegram from Moukhtar Pasha stated that an officer on the Russian staff had been sent to announce to him the capture of the fortress, and to demand the surrender of Erzeroum. The German Ambassador had, however, learnt the event from Berlin on Monday morning (the 19th); he hastened of course to communicate the intelligence to the Greek Minister. I chanced to meet M. Condouriottis at Server Pasha's house in the middle of the day. Drawing a paper out of his pocket, he said that it was a telegram from M. Tricoupi, acquainting him that the Russian Minister at Athens had informed the Hellenic Government officially that Kars had been taken by assault on the previous day. I have reason to know that he had received no such telegram; but one must not expect too great accuracy from that quarter.

The Turks were unwilling to believe in this fresh disaster until it was confirmed by the telegram from Moukhtar Pasha. They have received the news with their usual resignation; as they were not elated by unexpected victories, so they are not depressed by untoward defeats. It is curious and instructive to watch the behaviour of this much-abused and "anti-human" people, in the face of calamities which would drive any other race to almost utter despair; they bear their misfortunes with patience and dignity, trusting in God and their right. The newspapers which represent Turkish public opinion do not attempt to conceal the magnitude of the disaster which has befallen the Empire in the loss of an historic fortress, one of its bulwarks, but they exhort the people to mak renewed efforts and fresh sacrifices to maintain their independence, and resist to the e an implacable enemy who is bent upon their destruction.

The Grand Vizier called upon me this morning on his way to the Palace; his language was similar to that of the public journals; his Highness said that the Turkish people were not discouraged by this great calamity, but were determined to persist in the struggle. The Sultan was about to call one hundred thousand more men under arms at once. Some would be sent to reinforce Mehemet Ali Pasha, but they were principally intended for the defence of Adrianople and the lines of Bujuk Tchemedgi and those of Gallipoli. I urged upon him the vast importance of having forces sufficient and ready to hold the latter in case of a successful advance of the Russians upon Adrianople; he promised that this should be attended to without delay.

His Highness informed me that Mehemet Ali Pasha was rapidly concentrating his troops, and that within a very few days he would have fifty or sixty battalions under his command. He would then make a combined movement with Suleiman and Raouf Pashas for the relief of Plevna. If Osman Pasha could hold out for a few days more, there was hope that the attempt might prove successful. Everything, his Highness said, depended upon Plevna. If Osman Pasha could, with the aid of the relieving army, compel the Russians to raise the investment, or could withdraw from his position, the Russian army might yet be compelled to abandon the campaign in Bulgaria.

I asked the Grand Vizier whether full reliance could be placed upon Suleiman Pasha. I could only speak, I said, from report; but an impression undoubtedly existed that that General was of an exceedingly jealous and ambitious nature, and he was suspected of desiring the discomfiture of a rival who had achieved a world-wide reputation by his brilliant defence of Plevna. He was supposed to have brought about the fall of Mehemet Ali Pasha by refusing to co-operate with him, and by intrigue, in order to obtain the

supreme command. Raouf Pasha, I was informed, had resigned as soon as Suleiman Pasha had been appointed Serdar Ekrem (Generalissimo), declining to serve under a superior whom he mistrusted. I had heard, I said, that Suleiman Pasha was extremely unpopular with his officers, as they suspected that he was resolved not to attempt the relief of Osman Pasha, whose defeat he desired. If there were truth in the reports to which I alluded, success could scarcely be hoped for. I reminded his Highness that three months ago I had expressed my fears to him that Suleiman Pasha would prove "the fatal man" for Turkey. I trusted that my prediction would not be verified.

His Highness appeared a good deal disconcerted by what I had said. He admitted that Suleiman Pasha had been on bad terms with the other Generals; but he could not believe him capable of the want of loyalty and patriotism attributed to him. The differences which had existed between them had, he assured me, been now made up. Raouf Pasha had withdrawn his resignation, and the three Commanders were acting cordially together. They were in constant communication, and had agreed upon a combined and simultaneous movement, which would probably commence next week, for the relief of Plevna.

As regards Erzeroum, His Highness said that Moukhtar Pasha was doubtful as to whether he should be able to defend the place much longer. The fall of Kars would enable the Russians to concentrate their whole force against the city. If Erzeroum fell, another stand would be made at Erzinghian, where twelve battalions would arrive in a few days from Baghdad, and where further troops would be concentrated.

The loss of Kars and Erzeroum will place the whole of the province of Armenia in the power of Russia. Batoum might still be defended for a short time with the assistance of ironclads; but must eventually fall. The road from Erzeroum to Trebizonde would be open, and if it suited the Russian plans, this part could be occupied without serious resistance. The fleet could afford no help to it, in winter, from an open roadstead. Once in possession of this important province, Russia would probably not leave it again, or would, at any rate, retain that part of it which would enable her to carry out hereafter her designs upon Western Asia. I have already ventured to submit to Her Majesty's Government my views as to the consequences of giving Russia the complete command of the vallies of the Tigris and Euphrates, of the north of Persia and of Asia Minor. These consequences, although, perhaps, fatal to the influence and interests of England in the East, have unhappily been regarded with indifference by some English statesmen, who have, I fear, misled the public opinion of their country upon the subject. It is now probably too late to prevent the inevitable result.

The Grand Vizier, and indeed every Turkish statesman, is alive to the danger to Turkey, as well as to England, of the annexation by Russia of Armenia. The Grand Vizier dwelt upon it, in his conversation with me to-day, in forcible terms. He seemed to think that "British interests" being at last seriously threatened, Turkey might expect that the hand of England would be held out to her to prevent a catastrophe, which might, in the end, prove fatal to both countries. I could give no hope to his Highness that such would be the case. I could only remind him that Her Majesty's Government had declared their intention of taking no part in the war, and that as yet there was no reason to believe, as far as I was aware, that they would depart from their neutrality.

The Grand Vizier then drew a touching picture, with much emotion, of the shocking calamities which this "iniquitous" ("infâme") war had already brought upon the Turkish Empire. Would the nations of Europe, his Highness asked, permit all this bloodshed and devastation to continue without making an effort to stop them? Was it thus that they sought to promote the cause of humanity and civilization? His Highness stated that, according to information received at the Porte, more than 500,000 Mussulman inhabitants of Bulgaria and Roumelia, chiefly women and children, had been driven from their homes, and were wandering, almost without food and clothing, over the country to the south of the Balkans. A great part of them would perish by winter cold. He had given orders, he said, that they should be kept where they now were, and that every effort should be made, at whatever cost, to supply them with food. The Mahommedan population, terrified by the horrors and massacres committed by the Russians and Bulgarians, were flying on the approach of the Russian army. The war was waged upon innocent and defenceless women and children. It was one, he repeated, for the extermination of the Turkish race in Europe.

His Highness calculated the loss already sustained by the Mussulmans in Europe and Asia, including those who had fallen in battle, who had been made prisoners, who had been massacred in cold blood, and who had died from wounds, want, and exposure, at about 1,500,000. To these victims must be added, his Highness observed, those who would perish from the consequences of the war. The drain upon the Mahommedan

population was so great, that whole districts were left without cultivation, and famine was almost inevitable, as the fields were left untilled, and there had, in many places, been no hands to gather in the crops of this year.

In the face of such fearful and overwhelming calamities, could it be doubted, his Highness enquired, that Turkey desired peace? Yet he begged me to tell Her Majesty's Government that, anxious as the Sultan was to bring to an end this cruel war, both in order to spare his people further misfortunes and suffering, and to enable him to occupy himself with those reforms which he was bent upon carrying out for their better government, he and his Mahommedan subjects were ready and determined to shed the last drop of their blood in the defence of the honour and independence of their country.

Such, his Highness added, was the feeling of exasperation caused by the conduct of the Russians and Bulgarians towards the defenceless Mussulman populations, and by the sight of the innumerable victims of their cruelty and persecution, that he feared that if Plevna fell, and the Russian army were to advance upon Adrianople, the greatest disasters might befall the Christians. The Government would be powerless to prevent them. How could it do so with its army defeated and the country reduced to a state of anarchy by a ruthless invasion? Russia had excited the Christians to rise against their Sovereign, and to massacre their fellow subjects. She alone was responsible for the result.

I asked His Highness whether I was to understand from what he had said that, provided the honour and independence of Turkey were maintained, the Sultan was still disposed to accept the mediation of a third Power with a view to bringing the war to an end, and was prepared to consider the terms of peace which might be put forward by Russia. He replied that His Majesty was still ready to listen to overtures for peace and to accept any mediation which might conduce to that result, on the conditions he had mentioned. But he could not say whether the terms which Russia might offer were such as could be even taken into consideration. It was first necessary for him to know what they were likely to be. He would, he added, be very grateful to Her Majesty's Government if they would ascertain what they were, and would communicate them to him through me, confidentially and unofficially.

His Highness, however, is very anxious that nothing should be said or done to induce Russia to believe that Turkey is either discouraged by the reverses she has experienced, or is at the end of her resources. He sought to persuade me that she could still carry on a formidable resistance, and that she was prepared to make every sacrifice rather than submit to terms which would deprive her of territory or compromise her independence. He seemed still to have hopes that events might happen which would arrest the progress of the Russian arms, and that the European Powers might at length be roused to the danger to themselves of a conquest and dismemberment of the Empire by Russia. The weather in Bulgaria and Armenia might yet, he thought, compel the Russians to abandon the siege of Plevna and Erzeroum, and might even expose them to a serious disaster. We were in no less danger in the spring, his Highness remarked, and suddenly fortune favoured us, and we drove the enemy back on all sides. The same thing may happen again. If Plevna can be relieved, we shall have two powerful armies in Bulgaria, and the Russians will have great difficulty in maintaining their communications and in supplying their army, which will be threatened and harassed on both flanks.

I endeavoured to point out to his Highness that the position of affairs had changed since last spring. Then Russia, unprepared for the task she had undertaken, and underrating the power of Turkey, and ignorant of her resources and of the courage and devotion of her soldiers, had invaded the Turkish Empire with inadequate forces. She had learnt her mistake, and was now seeking to remedy it by putting forth all her strength. She had large armies in Bulgaria and Armenia, and was daily sending reinforcements to them. She had Roumania, and would probably soon have Servia with her in the field; Greece was threatening an invasion. On the other hand, the Porte had only the Mussulman population to depend upon, and that source was nearly exhausted. However, the only hope of salvation for the Empire might still consist in putting on a bold face, and convincing the Russians that Turkey could not even yet be crushed and dismembered without sacrifices which Russia would be unwilling to make, and dangers, which prudence might lead her to avoid.

The condition of affairs is, however, most critical. The fall of Plevna may open the road to Constantinople. It is to be feared that, with all the exertions the Porte is undoubtedly making, and the large number of men who are answering to the new call for troops, it will not have a sufficient force to check the advance of a Russian army

upon Adrianople and the capital. Some military authorities are of opinion that, in order to defend Constantinople and the Dardanelles, at least fifty battalions should be detached from the army of Suleiman Pasha, leaving the fortresses on the Danube and Shumla and Varna to be defended by their present garrisons. The command which the Porte has of the sea would enable it to do this without difficulty.

As far as I can judge from the tone of the Turkish press, and from what I learn from persons who are well acquainted with the opinions of Turks of all classes, the fall of Kars, although no doubt regarded as a great national calamity, and a most serious blow to the Turkish Empire in Asia, has not had the effect of so far discouraging the Mussulman populations as to induce them to believe that future resistance to Russia would be hopeless, and that the time is come or coming for Turkey to accept any terms of peace that it may suit Russia to impose upon her. On the contrary, the general feeling amongst the Mahommedans would appear to be that the war should be carried on with a resolute determination not to yield whilst men and resources can yet be found to oppose an invasion, which, they are convinced, is intended to destroy the Turkish race and rule in Europe.

I shall not fail to continue to observe the state of public opinion as carefully as the means at my disposal will allow, and to keep Her Majesty's Government fully informed with regard to it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 214.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received December* 8.)

(No. 1413. Secret.)
Constantinople, November 27, 1877.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1394, Secret, of the 23rd instant, I have the honour to state that at my request a gentleman well acquainted with the leading Mahommedans in Constantinople, of great experience, and capable of forming a correct and trustworthy judgment as to public opinion, has been visiting the Ministers and many important personages in and out of office, with a view to ascertaining the state of public feeling as to carrying on the war.

His impression is, very decidedly, that the Mussulman population is resolved upon continuing the struggle with Russia until the resources of the Empire are utterly exhausted, rather than consent to a humiliating peace. My informant states to me that the language held to him by all the persons he has seen, including the present Ministers, and most of the members of former Governments, convinces him that this resolution is perfectly sincere.

A Council has been held under the presidency of the Sultan, at which it was decided to resist the Russian invasion in Europe and Asia as long as men could be found in the Empire capable of bearing arms.

My informant also tells me that he found no inclination in any quarter to come to a separate and direct understanding with Russia, although a good deal of irritation exists against England, who is accused of having abandoned Turkey to her fate.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 215.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received December* 11.)

(No. 627. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.)
Constantinople, December 10, 1877.

I WAS asked to-day whether I thought the Porte could propose an armistice. The only reply that I could give was that I did not believe that Russia would consent to an armistice which would enable the Porte to relieve Plevna.

German Ambassador is still endeavouring to prevail upon the Turkish Ministers to come to a direct understanding with Russia.

Judging from language of Grand Vizier and Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, they would be inclined, if they saw no hope of assistance from England, to cede to demand from Russia to open the Dardanelles to her fleet.

No. 216.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received December* 12.)

(No. 635. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.)
Constantinople, December 11, 1877.

TURKISH Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that it is proposed to make an appeal at once to the Powers parties to the Treaty of Paris for their intervention to put a stop to the war. He has shown me a draft of this appeal, which is moderate in language, not in any way offensive to Russia, and renews the promises of the Porte to give guarantees for the carrying out of the Constitution. It makes no mention of the conditions of peace.

Would you let me know as soon as possible whether, in your opinion, there would be any objection to this course, as the appeal will probably be settled to-morrow morning with the Sultan, and will be sent off at once, but I might stop it if I hear from you in time.

I am inclined to think that, in the event of this appeal being discouraged, a request for an armistice may be made to Russian head-quarters, and direct communications for peace opened with the Emperor. This is very secret, and I am not authorized to state it to you.

No. 217.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.)
Foreign Office, December 12, 1877, 7·20 P.M.

IN answer to your secret telegram No. 635 received this morning, it is not desirable that you should take any steps to prevent the appeal of the Porte being addressed to the Powers. The proceeding appears a wise one; but all will depend on the conditions of peace.

No. 218.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 628. Secret.)
Foreign Office, December 12, 1877.

Sir,

I HAVE received your telegram No. 635, Secret, of the 11th instant, in which you state that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed you that the Porte proposes to make an immediate appeal to the Powers who were parties to the Treaty of Paris for their intervention with a view to put a stop to the war.

You add that his Excellency has shown you the draft of this appeal, and you request to be informed, with as little delay as possible, whether Her Majesty's Government see any objection to the course which the Porte proposes to follow.

In reply, I have to state to you that it is not desirable that you should take any steps to prevent the Porte from addressing such an appeal to the Powers. The course proposed appears to Her Majesty's Government to be a wise one. All, however, will depend on the conditions of peace which the Porte may be disposed to accept, and I gather from your telegram that no allusion is made to these in the draft appeal which has been shown to your Excellency.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 219.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received December* 13.)

(No. 1440. Very Confidential.)
Constantinople, December 4, 1877.

My Lord,

SERVER PASHA observed to me yesterday that the state of affairs was such that the idea of making a direct and separate arrangement with Russia was gaining ground amongst the Turkish people. Although, his Excellency said, some members of the present Cabinet were in favour of it, he could assure me that the Grand Vizier and himself were determined not to come to any understanding with Russia, or to enter into any communication with her with that view, without previous consultation with Her

Majesty's Government. He desired, he added, to repeat this to me in the most solemn manner. But an extract from a speech made by your Lordship, received by the telegraph, and published in the newspapers, had caused the most painful impression upon the Porte and the public. Your Lordship was stated to have declared that as long as the line of the Suez Canal was not interrupted or disturbed England had a sufficient communication with India without requiring one by the valley of the Euphrates. It was consequently inferred that Her Majesty's Government would be indifferent to any conquests and annexation of territory that Russia might effect in the Asiatic portion of the Turkish Empire. If such were the case Turkey, deprived of all hope of help, and finding herself at the mercy of an inexorable and irresistible foe, might be compelled, for her own safety and preservation, to make her own terms with Russia without considering any other Power.

I remarked to his Excellency that hasty conclusions should not be drawn from newspaper summaries, received here by telegraph, of speeches made in England, and that I advised him to wait before judging of your Lordship's until he could receive an authentic version of what your Lordship may have said.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 220.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received December* 13.)

Constantinople, December 12, 1877.

(Telegraphic.)

I AM informed that at a Council of some of the Ministers held to-day in the presence of the Sultan, it was decided to prosecute the war as if it were to be carried on to the last extremity. But there was a general feeling expressed in favour of an immediate peace. Three courses were proposed with a view to obtaining it. First, to appeal directly to Russia, which is strongly urged by the German Ambassador, who gives the Turks to understand that by so doing they will obtain much better terms than if they have recourse to mediation; second, to ask England to mediate; and third, to apply to all the Great Powers for their collective mediation. This last course was approved, and draft note referred to in my telegram of yesterday No. 535 was discussed, but objected to on the ground that it did not offer sufficient guarantees for amelioration of condition of Christians, but no decision was taken. Porte is anxious for peace as soon as possible, to prevent Servia and Greece from taking part in the war, and putting forward claims.

It is proposed to bring Suleiman Pasha with part of his army into Roumelia, for the defence of Adrianople, and to cover Constantinople.

No. 221.

Memorandum communicated by the Earl of Derby to Count Schouvaloff, December 13, 1877.

AT the outbreak of the present war those of its possible results which, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, would most directly affect British interests, were enumerated in a note addressed to Count Schouvaloff on the 6th May last.

Amongst these it was stated that Her Majesty's Government were not prepared to witness with indifference the passing of Constantinople into other hands than those of its present possessors.

The reply of the Russian Government, conveyed in Prince Gortchakow's despatch of 15th May, contained the following assurance on this point:—

"Pour ce qui concerne Constantinople, sans pouvoir préjuger le cours et l'issue de la guerre, le Cabinet Impérial répète qu'une acquisition de cette capitale est exclue des vues de Sa Majesté l'Empereur. Il reconnait qu'en tous cas le sort de Constantinople est une question d'intérêt commun, qui ne peut être réglée que par une entente générale, et que si la possession de cette ville devait être mise en question, elle ne saurait appartenir à aucune des Puissances de l'Europe."

While appreciating the courtesy and friendly character of this Answer, Her Majesty's Government feel that it does not sufficiently meet the dangers against which they desire to guard. They are strongly of opinion—and opinion which the course of events tends still more to confirm—that the occupation of Constantinople by the Russian forces, even though it should be of a temporary character and for military purposes only, would be an event which it would on all accounts be most desirable to avoid.

They cannot conceal from themselves that if such an occupation appeared imminent, public feeling in this country, founded on a just appreciation of the consequences to be apprehended, might call for measures of precaution on the part of Great Britain from which they have hitherto felt justified in abstaining.

It is with the view of avoiding what might endanger seriously the good relations happily maintained between the two countries that Lord Derby has been charged by the Cabinet to express to the Russian Government their earnest hope that, should the Russian armies advance to the south of the Balkans, no attempt will be made to occupy Constantinople or the Dardanelles.

In the contrary event Her Majesty's Government must hold themselves free to take whatever course may appear to them necessary for the protection of British interests, but they sincerely trust and confidently believe that any such necessity will be averted by mutual understanding between the two Governments.

In making this communication they think it right to add that they will be willing, as they have been from the first, to avail themselves of any suitable occasion that may present itself for assisting in the work of mediation and in the restoration of peace.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 222.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 442. Secret and Confidential.)

Foreign Office, December 13, 1877.

My Lord,

THE Russian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon by appointment, when I placed in his hands a Memorandum embodying a communication which Her Majesty's Government had decided to make to that of Russia. I enclose a copy of this paper herewith for your Excellency's confidential information.[a]

I had already stated the general purport of the Memorandum to Count Schouvaloff on Saturday last in a conversation which I had held with him after the meeting of the Cabinet, and I pointed out to his Excellency that the opinions expressed had been formed before the fall of Plevna. The event, I said, had not altered or influenced the communication I was now making.

Count Schouvaloff promised to submit the contents of the Memorandum to his Government without delay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 223.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received December* 13.)

(No. 537.)

Constantinople, December 13, 1877, 1·45 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

THE appeal to the Powers, slightly modified, was sent to the foreign Representatives to-day. Could anything more be done to restrain the Servians?

No. 224.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 847. Most Confidential.)

Foreign Office, December 13, 1877.

Sir,

I HAVE received your telegram No. 537 of the 13th instant, in which you inform me that the Porte has dispatched an appeal to the Great Powers, asking for their good offices with a view to put an end to the war, and inquiring whether anything more can be done to restrain the Servians from declaring war upon Turkey; and, in reply, I have to state to you that I fear that Her Majesty's Government can do nothing more to restrain Servia, but I may add that Her Majesty's Government have learnt secretly

[a] No. 221.

that Count Andrassy has spoken in strong terms to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna upon the subject of Servia joining in the war.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 225.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received December* 14.)

(No. 540. Very Secret.)
(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, December 13, 1877.

SULTAN expressed a wish to see me after he had opened Parliament this morning. His Majesty charged me with the following message for the Queen:—

"He would be most grateful to Her Majesty if she would direct his compliments to be conveyed to Osman Pasha, and his Majesty's deep sympathy for him in his misfortune; and his high appreciation of the devotion that he had shown in his service and in that of his county. His Majesty is very anxious to know the nature of his wound, and whether it is serious. He trusts to the generosity of the Emperor of Russia to have proper care taken of him, and to treat him kindly. His Majesty is desirous of learning some details of fall of Plevna, as none have yet reached him, especially as to losses sustained by his army."

His Majesty further desired me to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they would ascertain without delay whether the Emperor of Russia would agree to an armistice for about three months. If the Emperor would consent to an armistice, an official request will at once be addressed to Her Majesty's Government to employ their good offices in obtaining one. His Majesty believes that during a [pause in?] military operations terms of peace might be discussed and agreed, and that, relieved from anxieties of war, he would be able to introduce such measures for improvement of his Christian subjects as would satisfy Europe of his firm intention to carry out the reforms that he has promised.

His Majesty requests me further to say that by obtaining for him an armistice England would be rendering the greatest possible service to Turkey, and earn her deepest gratitude. His Majesty expressed his hope that there would be another Conference, and his earnest desire to act in all matters with England. It would be of the utmost importance if an armistice could be obtained. It would be the means of avoiding the greatest dangers to Europe as well as to Turkey, and of sparing a terrible amount of misery and bloodshed of which the defenceless population, Christian as well as Mussulman, will be the victims if the war continues and Russian forces cross the Balkans and advance upon Adrianople.

No. 225*.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 353.)

Foreign Office, December 14, 1877.

Sir,

I HAVE received your telegram No. 540, Very Secret, of the 13th instant, in which you state that the Sultan has requested you to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they would ascertain, without delay, if the Emperor of Russia would agree to an armistice for about three months; and in reply I have to state to your Excellency that I am unable to return an immediate reply to His Majesty's inquiry, as the question of proposing an armistice to the Russian Government must be referred to the Cabinet, which cannot meet before Monday next.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 226.

Server Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha, December* 14.)

Constantinople, le 12 Décembre, 1877.

(Télégraphique.)

TOUT le monde connaît l'origine des événements malheureux qui s'accomplissent depuis quelque temps dans l'Empire. Le Gouvernement Impérial à la conscience de

n'avoir en rien provoqué la guerre que nous soutenons contre la Russie, et d'avoir, au contraire, tout fait pour l'éviter. A la voix de leur Souverain, les populations de l'Empire ont accouru pour remplir simplement et héroïquement un devoir, celui de défendre leur territoire menacé. Mais, de leur côté, elles n'ont menacé et ne menacent personne.

On a beau chercher des motifs que pourrait avoir la Russie pour justifier son agression. Désire-t-elle voir se fondre et se développer, au profit de certaines populations qui font l'objet de sa sollicitude, des institutions et des réformes propres à améliorer leur sort?

La Sublime Porte est allée au devant de ce désir, en se décidant à réorganiser son système judiciaire et à réaliser dans le pays des réformes utiles et pratiques, destinées à satisfaire les vœux de tous ses sujets sans distinction de race ou de religion. Cette œuvre de réorganisation gouvernementale et administrative a pour base la Constitution octroyée par Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan. Le pays a accueilli avec bonheur et reconnaissance cette charte dont l'application, libre de toutes entraves, est appelée à produire tous les effets que l'on a en vain attendus de mesures incomplètes et de réformes dépourvues de sanction. Une réforme partielle qui ne viserait que certaines Provinces, à l'exclusion du reste de l'Empire, présenterait de graves inconvénients. En effet, dans l'ordre administratif, les exceptions et les faveurs qu'on accorderait à certaines Provinces pourraient avoir inévitablement pour corrélatif d'opposer, les unes aux autres, les populations de races diverses qui vivent sous le sceptre de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, et seraient une prime offerte à la révolte. Si quelque doute peut encore subsister sur l'exécution rigoureuse de notre Constitution et des réformes que nous avons promis dans la Conférence de Constantinople, ce doute doit disparaître devant la déclaration formelle et solennelle que nous faisons pour la sincérité de nos résolutions. C'est une garantie que nous offrons et dont nous convions l'Europe à prendre acte. La véritable et l'unique cause des entraves qui peuvent ralentir nos efforts dans cette voie, réside dans le maintien de l'état de guerre. Cette situation n'est pas seulement fâcheuse au point de vue des réformes; elle est également funeste à la prospérité générale du pays. Elle tue l'agriculture et l'industrie en maintenant sous les armes les travailleurs les plus valides. Elle impose au trésor des charges énormes et met ainsi obstacle à toute amélioration de l'état économique et des finances de l'Empire, au grand préjudice des intérêts généraux du pays et des intérêts particuliers des créanciers de l'Etat.

Ainsi qu'il résulte de ce qui précède, la question des réformes étant hors de cause, quelle raison peut-il exister pour la continuation de la guerre? L'esprit de conquête a été hautement et publiquement répudié, dès le commencement des hostilités, par Sa Majesté l'Empereur Alexandre. L'honneur militaire du grand Empire qu'il gouverne est resté intact au milieu des diverses péripéties de la campagne, et les deux armées en présence se sont également couvertes de gloire sur les champs de bataille. Dans quel but porteraient-elles plus longtemps la désolation et la ruine dans leurs pays respectifs? Nous pensons, au contraire, que le moment est venu où les deux parties peuvent accepter la paix sans forfaire à leur dignité, et l'Europe pourrait utilement interposer ses bons offices. Quant au Gouvernement Impérial, il est prêt à la demander, non pas que le pays se sente arrivé au terme de ses ressources. Il n'y a pas de sacrifices que la nation toute entière ne s'impose pour maintenir l'indépendance et l'intégrité de la patrie. Mais le devoir du Gouvernement Impérial est d'arrêter, si c'est possible, une plus grande effusion de sang. C'est donc au nom de l'humanité que nous faisons appel aux sentiments de justice des Grandes Puissances, et nous espérons qu'elles voudront bien accueillir favorablement notre démarche.

Veuillez donner lecture de cette dépêche à son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, et lui en laisser une copie.

No. 227.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 357.)

Foreign Office, December 14, 1877.

Sir,

THE Turkish Ambassador read to me to-day a telegram expressing the thanks of the Porte for the assurance which I had given his Excellency, some days ago, that whenever negotiations for peace were set on foot, Her Majesty's Government would do what lay in their power to obtain favourable conditions for Turkey. Musurus Pasha was instructed to and that any discussion of the terms of peace without the co-operation of the Turkish Government might, as had happened in the case of the Conferences at Constantinople, and of the Protocol of London, give rise to serious difficulties, and only end in disagreement. The Porte seemed to have gathered, from what I had said to his Excellency of the probable demands of Russia in regard to Bulgaria, that I was already acquainted with the conditions on which Russia would agree to the re-establishment of peace.

I explained to Musurus Pasha in reply, that his Government were mistaken in supposing that I knew what were the conditions of peace likely to be insisted on by Russia. I had no information on the subject, and any remarks that I might have made in reference to it were founded solely on general considerations connected with the origin of the war, and the attitude assumed by the Russian Government towards the Bulgarian population.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 228.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 858. Confidential.)
Foreign Office, December 14, 1877.

Sir,

THE Turkish Ambassador called this afternoon and placed confidentially in my hands a telegram from his Government, stating that, according to trustworthy information received by them, it was understood that the Emperor of Russia had authorized his Ambassador in London to give Her Majesty's Government fresh assurances that he has no intention of making conquests in Europe, that he will not push on to Constantinople unless the events of the war render it absolutely necessary, and that in no case will he continue the occupation of the Turkish capital after the conclusion of peace. The Porte had learned from the same source that Prince Bismarck was showing himself more and more favourable to Russia, that he advocated the plan of a separate peace, and was opposed to a mediation which should terminate in a Conference. The above-mentioned declaration of the Czar and this attitude of the German Chancellor, the telegram continued, were understood to have great weight in inducing the British Cabinet to continue their policy of inaction.

I told Musurus Pasha, in reply to this communication, that I had received no recent communications from the Russian Government in the sense supposed.

In regard to what was said of the attitude of Prince Bismarck, I observed that it appeared to be true as alleged that he was showing a more and more decidedly favourable disposition towards Russia, but that I had no certain information of his being opposed to mediation or to a Congress, nor had he expressed to Her Majesty's Government any opinion in favour of direct negotiations between Russia and the Porte.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 229.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 884. Most Confidential.)
Vienna, December 13, 1877.

My Lord,

I AM told by Baron Orczy that in the Secret Session of the Hungarian Delegation, referred to in my despatch No. 883 of yesterday's date, Count Andrassy made no allusion to the negotiations that have taken place, or to the understanding that has been come to between Great Britain and Austria, in regard to future arrangements in Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 230.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Lyons.

(No. 701A. Confidential.)
Foreign Office, December 18, 1877.

My Lord,

I HAD some conversation with the French Ambassador a few days ago on the subject of the appeal addressed by the Porte to the Powers signatories of the Treaty of Paris.

I told his Excellency that I feared that the plan of collective mediation would prove to be impracticable in consequence of the refusal of some of the Powers appealed to. Her Majesty's Government would, however, reserve to themselves the

right of attempting mediation, either singly or in conjunction with other Powers, whenever they might think it expedient.

I made this observation to the Marquis d'Harcourt merely as an indication of possible policy. I had given no promises of the kind to Musurus Pasha or to the Porte, but had said no more than that Her Majesty's Government were considering the question of mediation.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 231.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 1016. Confidential.)
Paris, December 18, 1877.

My Lord,

IN the course of our conversation this afternoon respecting the Turkish application for the good offices of the neutral Powers, M. Waddington observed that he feared that this application would be rendered fruitless by the opposition of Russia to it.

He said that no communication respecting the views of Russia, Germany, or Austria had been made to him by the Russian, the German, or the Austrian Ambassador here, but that the reports he received from the French Representatives abroad, led him to think that Russia would refuse to admit mediation; that Germany would support her in the refusal; and that Austria felt great embarrassment, but would not separate herself from Russia and Germany.

He added, however, that according to the information which had reached him, Count Andrassy, while acquiescing in a direct and separate negotiation between Russia and Turkey, had not committed himself as to the form in which the result of the negotiations should be communicated to the other Powers, or as to the extent to which it should be subjected to the sanction of those Powers.

He added, however, that, for his own part, he felt sure that Russia and Germany had already quite settled between themselves what the terms of peace were to be.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 232.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Secret.)
(Telegraphic.)
Foreign Office, December 19, 1877.

HER Majesty's Government propose to address an instruction to Lord A. Loftus, of which the following is the substance:—

Time has arrived when it has become their duty to make an effort to bring the war to a close. Course of events has now brought about the situation contemplated in Count Schouvaloff's communication of 8th June last, in which he stated that if the neutrality of the Powers were maintained, and Porte asked for peace before the Russians crossed the Balkans, the Emperor would consent not to cross that line. The Emperor used similar language to Colonel Wellesley on the 30th July.

The conditions of peace in question were those mentioned in the Memorandum inclosed in my despatch No. 202A of the 12th June last, beginning at "la Bulgarie," and ending "prompte paix." With regard to the Dardanelles, see the paragraph beginning "Pour ce qui concerne," ending "contre elle." Her Majesty's Government cannot let the occasion pass without acquainting the Russian Government with the readiness of the Porte to ask for peace, as shown by its Circular of the 12th instant.

Lord A. Loftus is accordingly instructed to recall to the attention of the Russian Government the assurances received by Her Majesty's Government in June and July, and to inform the Emperor that Her Majesty's Government are willing to communicate to the Porte the conditions of peace then mentioned, not as expressing approval of, or assuming responsibility for, them in their present shape, but as a possible basis for an interchange of views, which may lead to more formal negotiations for the restoration of peace.

Despatch concludes by saying Her Majesty's Government are confident the Emperor will see in this offer proof of sincere desire to second His Majesty's wishes for prevention of further bloodshed.

Communicate this proposed instruction secretly to Count Andrassy, and say that Her Majesty's Government defer sending it until they have heard whether he has any observations to offer. They believe that in deciding on such a step they are following the line of policy indicated by him, and may succeed in bringing to a practical issue the overtures for peace made in the Porte's Circular with a view to a basis for peace being formulated on which Great Britain and Austria may subsequently act in concert.

No. 233.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 401. Secret.)

Foreign Office, December 19, 1877.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a draft of an instruction which Her Majesty's Government propose to address to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, directing his Excellency to remind the Russian Government of the assurances received by Her Majesty's Government from them and from the Emperor in June and July last, and to state that Her Majesty's Government are willing to inform the Porte of the conditions of peace then mentioned; not, however, as expressing approval of, or responsibility for, them in their present shape, but as a possible basis for an interchange of views which may lead to more formal negotiations for the restoration of peace.

I have to instruct your Excellency to communicate this proposed instruction secretly to Count Andrassy, and to say that Her Majesty's Government defer sending it until they have heard whether he has any observations to offer.

They believe that in deciding on taking this step they have followed the line of policy indicated by Count Andrassy, and are making an earnest effort to bring to a practical issue the overtures for peace which the Porte has made in its recent appeal to the Powers. They trust that the result may be to bring about an understanding between the Russian Government and the Porte, with a view to formulating a basis for peace on which the Governments of Great Britain and Austria-Hungary may subsequently act in concert.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

Inclosure in No. 233.

Draft of a Despatch from the Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. .)

Foreign Office, December , 1877.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government consider that the time has arrived when it has become their duty to make an effort to bring to a close the war unhappily existing between Russia and the Porte.

The course of events has now brought about the situation contemplated by the Emperor of Russia when, on the 8th of June last, Count Schouvaloff was authorized to communicate to me His Imperial Majesty's views.

His Excellency then stated that the Russian Government could give the assurance from that date ("dès-à-présent"), that if the neutrality of the Powers were maintained and the Porte asked for peace before the Russian armies had crossed the Balkans, the Emperor would consent not to cross that line.

His Imperial Majesty used similar language to Colonel Wellesley at an interview with that officer on the 30th of July, saying that "the object of the present war was solely the amelioration of the condition of the Christian population of Turkey.

"The conditions of peace required by the Emperor are those lately communicated to Lord Derby by Count Schouvaloff, and will remain the same as long as England maintains her position of neutrality; if, however, England abandons that position, matters will have entered a new phase."

The conditions of peace in question were as follows:—

"La Bulgarie jusqu'aux Balkans serait érigée en province vassale autonome sous la garantie de l'Europe.

"Les troupes et les fonctionnaires Turcs en seraient éloignés, les forteresses désarmées et rasées.

"Le 'self-government' y serait établi avec l'appui d'une milice nationale à organiser le plus tôt possible.

"Les Puissances s'accorderaient pour assurer à la partie de la Bulgarie au sud des

Balkans, ainsi qu'aux autres provinces Chrétiennes de la Turquie, les meilleures garanties possibles d'une administration régulière.

"Le Monténégro et la Serbie recevraient une augmentation de territoire qui sera déterminée en commun.

"La Bosnie et l'Herzégovine seraient dotées des institutions jugées d'un commun accord compatible avec leur état intérieur et propres à y assurer une bonne administration indigène.

"La situation limitrophe de ces deux provinces avec l'Autriche-Hongrie donne à cette dernière une voix prépondérante dans leur organisation future.

"La Serbie, comme la Bulgarie, resteraient placées sous la suzeraineté du Sultan; les rapports du suzerain et des vassaux seront définis de manière à prévenir les conflits.

"Pour ce qui est de la Roumanie, qui vient de proclamer son indépendance, l'Empereur est d'avis que c'est une question qui ne peut être réglée que par une entente générale.

"Si ces conditions sont acceptées, les Cabinets pourraient exercer une pression collective sur la Porte, en l'avertissant qu'en cas de refus elle serait abandonnée aux conséquences de la guerre.

"Si la Porte demandait la paix et acceptait les conditions énumérées plus haut avant que nos armées n'aient franchi la ligne des Balkans, la Russie accepterait la paix, mais se réserve le droit de stipuler quelques avantages particuliers comme compensation des charges de la guerre.

"Ces avantages ne dépasseraient pas la restitution de la partie de la Bessarabie cédée en 1856 jusqu'au bras septentrional du Danube (c'est-à-dire, le delta des bouches de ce fleuve reste exclu), et la cession de Batoum avec un territoire adjacent.

"En pareil cas, la Roumanie pourrait d'un commun accord être dédommagée, soit par la proclamation de son indépendance, soit si elle restait vassale par une partie de la Dobroudja.

"Si l'Autriche-Hongrie réclamait de son côté une compensation, soit pour les acquisitions faites par la Russie, soit comme gage de sécurité contre les remaniements ci-dessus mentionnés au profit des Principautés Chrétiennes de la presqu'île des Balkans, la Russie ne s'opposerait pas à ce qu'elle cherche ces compensations en Bosnie et en partie en Herzégovine.

"Telles sont les bases auxquelles Sa Majesté l'Empereur donnerait son assentiment, en vue d'établir l'entente avec l'Angleterre et l'Europe, et d'arriver à une prompte paix."

With regard to the Dardanelles, Count Schouvaloff stated:—

"Pour ce qui concerne les Détroits, les arrangements en vertu desquels la Mer Noire, fermée en temps de paix, est ouverte en temps de guerre à toutes les flottes ennemies de la Russie, ont été conçus dans un sentiment de défiance et d'hostilité à son égard. C'est une question qui ne peut être révisée que d'un commun accord, de manière à garantir la Mer Noire contre les conséquences de la position anormale et exceptionnelle des Détroits. Serait-il possible pour la Russie de s'engager, au début d'une guerre qui peut être heureuse pour elle, à ne pas faire valoir devant l'Europe la nécessité d'une révision d'un ordre de choses qui a été établi contre elle?"

In the Circular despatch addressed by the Porte to the Powers on the 12th instant, the Turkish Government has signified its readiness to ask for peace, and, although a joint mediation may not be undertaken by the Powers, Her Majesty's Government cannot let the occasion pass without making the Russian Government acquainted with this intimation from the Porte.

I have accordingly to instruct your Excellency to recall to the attention of the Russian Government the assurances received by Her Majesty's Government, to which I have above referred, and to request that the Emperor may be informed that Her Majesty's Government are willing to communicate to the Porte the conditions of peace therein mentioned, not as expressing approval of or assuming responsibility for them in their present shape, but as a possible basis for an interchange of views which may lead to more formal negotiations for the restoration of peace.

Her Majesty's Government are confident that His Imperial Majesty will see in this offer on their part a proof of their sincere desire to second the wishes which they cannot doubt that His Majesty entertains for the prevention of further bloodshed.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 234.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 561.)

Foreign Office, December 19, 1877.

Sir,

YOUR despatch No. 1440, Very Confidential, of the 4th instant, has been received, in which you report a conversation with Server Pasha on the subject of a speech which I recently made to a deputation upon the Eastern question; and I have to convey to your Excellency my approval of the language which you held on that occasion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 235.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 894. Most Confidential.)

Vienna, December 15, 1877.

My Lord,

ON the receipt of your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, on the subject of the despatch communicated to you by the Turkish Ambassador with a view to a European mediation for the restoration of peace, I requested an interview with Count Andrassy, and his Excellency answered that he would call later in the day at the Embassy, which he has now done.

He said that until he had taken the Emperor's orders he could only express personal opinions upon the steps which have been taken by the Porte; and reserving, therefore, to himself the right to formulate later his views in an instruction to Count Beust, he would submit them at once to your Lordship's consideration, in order that he might show how anxious he is that England and Austria should act in conformity with the understanding existing between them.

From the Turkish despatch, he said, it appeared that the Porte would be willing to place the general constitution for the Empire under the guarantee of Europe, an arrangement which, in his opinion, would be extremely detrimental to its interests; and, on the other hand, the Powers could not support a proposal for peace on such a basis without acting in contradiction to the London Protocol and to the declarations and proposals which they have already made to Turkey with respect to certain of its provinces.

He therefore submits to the consideration of Her Majesty's Government whether the Powers should not answer that they are most desirous to promote the conclusion of peace, but that if a proposal were made to them to use their good offices for that purpose on the basis indicated in the Turkish despatch they would not be able to accept it; and he said, if Her Majesty's Government should concur in this opinion, Austria and England together might suggest to the other Powers that they should all make a communication in this sense at Constantinople, thus indicating their readiness to support proposals for peace if made on a satisfactory basis.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 236.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 896. Very Confidential.)

Vienna, December 15, 1877.

My Lord,

WHILST speaking to me to-day on the subject of the Turkish overtures for peace, Count Andrassy told me in confidence that Prince Bismarck would be unwilling to make any communication to Russia in which Germany might appear to be an advocate of the views of the Porte. His Excellency said he could not agree with his Highness on this point, though if the Porte were to ask formally for the good offices of the Powers on the basis of the general reforms granted under the Turkish Constitution, he could only forward their proposals to Russia, and would be unable to support them.

Though he did not make any distinct suggestion on the subject, he appeared to me to be of opinion that the best course for the Porte to adopt would be to induce Russia

No. 234*.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 865.)

Foreign Office, December 19, 1877.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 853 of the 14th instant, in which I stated to you that the Cabinet would take the earliest opportunity of considering your telegram of the 13th instant, forwarding a request from His Imperial Majesty the Sultan that Her Majesty's Government would ascertain whether the Emperor of Russia would agree to an armistice of three months, and stating that if His Majesty would consent to such an armistice, an official request would at once be addressed by the Porte to Her Majesty's Government to employ their good offices in obtaining one, I have informed you this day by telegraph that Her Majesty's Government feel convinced that it would be hopeless to ask the Emperor to agree to an armistice of three months, and that such an attempt would only have the effect of weakening their influence in other respects.

I should add that the Cabinet have the question of mediation under their most serious consideration.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

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to state the terms on which she would be willing to make peace, and then to ask the good offices of the Powers with a view to obtain a modification of these terms, and by the means he seemed to think that the position of England and Austria, whose neutrality is conditional, would be more easily maintained, and that they would be able to exercise their influence more effectually than if they submitted to Russia proposals on the part of the Porte.

I found it difficult, from his Excellency's manner of expressing himself, to distinguish the views which he wished me to submit to your Lordship's consideration from others on which he has not yet formed clearly an opinion himself, but nothing could be more decided than the declaration of his anxiety to maintain his understanding with England and his desire that the two Powers should move in concert for the attainment of the object, and in conformity with the programme that had been agreed upon between them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 237.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 898.)
Vienna, December 16, 1877.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that an article has appeared in the "Fremden Blatt" of this morning, which seems to me to express Count Andrassy's views respecting the Turkish overtures better than he did himself.

It is stated in this article that Russia will answer to any proposal for peace on the basis suggested by the Porte, that Europe had rejected before the war what Turkey offers to-day, and would ask whether Russia, with Armenia and Bulgaria in her hands, could be expected to negotiate a peace on such a basis.

The "Fremden Blatt," however, is of opinion that the negotiation for the re-establishment of peace should not be broken off. It says the way to that object may be difficult, but it will lead to a successful issue, if the connection ("Fühlung") with the Porte, which has been established by the Turkish note, is not given up by the Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 238.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 900. Most Confidential.)
Vienna, December 18, 1877.

My Lord,

I TOOK an opportunity to-day to speak to Baron Orczy of the report that the opening of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus to ships of war is one of the conditions of peace which Russia will propose to Turkey; and I said that rumours are in circulation, which probably came from a German source, and to which I attached no importance, that the condition would not be seriously objected to by Austria.

From the language which his Excellency held to me in reply, I think your Lordship may be assured that no change has taken place in the policy of Austria as to the expediency of maintaining the exclusion of ships of war from the Straits,—an arrangement to which, he said, Count Andrassy attached very great importance.

It is probable, therefore, that the opinions which Count Zichy appears to have expressed upon it to Mr. Layard merely reflected those of Prince Reuss, with whom he is alleged to be now on the confidential terms on which he formerly lived with General Ignatiew.

Baron Orczy has allowed me to read confidentially the telegram to Count Beust, in which Count Andrassy states his opinions on the Turkish Circular, and I observed that his Excellency mentions a question which I put to him, as to whether he was of opinion that the Porte should endeavour to ascertain the terms on which Russia may be willing to make peace, in order to find a basis on which the Powers might undertake a mediation.

His Excellency, however, has entirely mistaken the object of my question, as

I merely asked it with a view to ascertain whether I was to understand from some of his previous observations that he considered such a course of proceeding to be the most expedient.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 239.

Mr. Monson to Sir A. Buchanan.—(Received at the Foreign Office, December 21.)

(No. 126.) *Buda-Pesth, December 18, 1877.*
Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 125 of yesterday, respecting the mass meeting held here on the 16th instant, I have to report that a debate was raised yesterday in the Lower House of the Diet upon the extent to which the Parliamentary privileges inherent in the person of the Prime Minister had been violated by the mob.

His Excellency, whose entrance into the House had been the signal for an uproarious outburst of enthusiasm, defended his conduct in refusing to see the deputation on the ground that, having declared that he would receive one of twenty-five persons only, he considered the additional presence of a large crowd as a demonstration contrived with a quasi-intimidating object.

Deputy Helfy explained that there had been no intention of committing an illegality, and that he and other Deputies had done their best to prevent any disturbance of the peace.

On the proposition of President Ghyczy an inquiry was agreed to.

The end of the sitting, which was throughout an excited one, was devoted to a speech by M. Ucrményi (Right), giving notice of an interpellation respecting the Turkish proposals for mediation, and asking whether the Government was prepared to use its influence for the restoration of peace on the basis of the *status quo* guaranteed by the Treaties of 1856, to which Austria-Hungary is a party.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDMUND MONSON.

No. 240.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 464. Confidential.) *Berlin, December 16, 1877.*
My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 460 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to add that the Turkish Circular of the 12th instant was submitted yesterday to the Emperor, and that His Majesty's reply was communicated to-day to the Turkish Ambassador.

The German Emperor declines altogether to accede to the Sultan's request for mediation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 241.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 466. Secret.) *Berlin, December 18, 1877.*
My Lord,

IN the course of a conversation I had with Sadoullah Bey, the Turkish Ambassador, on the subject of the refusal of the German Emperor to entertain the Sultan's request for the mediation of the Powers, His Excellency told me that he had reason to believe that Prince Bismarck wanted Turkey to appeal direct to Russia for peace without the mediation of the other Governments, but that the Turkish Government would never do so, because they knew that by waiting until the Russian army approached the Dardanelles and threatened Constantinople, England must come to the rescue of her own interests, which were also those of the Sultan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 242.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 21.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Secret.) *Vienna, December 20, 1877, 11·50 P.M.*

COUNT ANDRASSY has just called on me to receive communication which I was instructed to make to him by your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, and as he was prepared for it by Count Beust, he brought with him the draft of a telegram—which will be forwarded to England to-morrow—deprecating the expediency of Her Majesty's Government making the conditions of peace formulated by Russia in June last the basis of a communication to St. Petersburgh, or of their consenting to present them in any form whatever to the Porte. His Excellency said that the clause respecting future administrative institutions of Bulgaria could not be carried out without leading to an exodus of the whole Turkish population, and could never be accepted by the Porte, and to adopt it, and "rasure" of the fortresses, would be the first step to the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and the expulsion of Turks from Europe. He said he was surprised to find that Her Majesty's Government were under an impression that he had expressed no decisive objections to Russian conditions, as his whole correspondence respecting them showed the reverse, and that he had indeed ceased to develop his objections to them merely because Count Beust had informed him that Her Majesty's Government had declined to consider them further on Russia proposing to extend Bulgaria beyond the Balkans. He trusts, therefore, that Her Majesty's Government, with a view to the protection of British and also of Austrian interests, will reconsider expediency of allowing the conditions in question to form basis of any communication which they may address to Russia. He said he has always been of one opinion—that neither England nor Austria should intervene to stop war by an offer of mediation between the belligerents.

The safer course, he said, would be for the Porte to communicate directly to Russia her wish to make peace. If satisfactory conditions were then proposed to her so much the better, but of that there is no prospect; and the Porte would then come to Europe, as having guaranteed her independence and being interested in her welfare, to obtain for her the modification of conditions incompatible with both. He said that England and Austria could then defend with success the interests of Turkey as identic with their own.

His Excellency spoke very warmly at times, and hinted that two courses are open to adhesion of Austria, viz.: to go hand in hand with England to prevent destruction of Turkey and the substitution of Russian power in her European provinces, which he is prepared to do, if Her Majesty's Government do, with all resources of Empire, or he will be driven to advance interests of Austria in a different direction.

The war, he said, should be terminated by belligerents themselves; but the position of Turkey being different from state of European Powers, no peace can be made between them except with the concurrence of Europe. He mentioned to me that Bosnia and the Herzegovina had been offered to Austria by the Sultan and declined, but though he hoped it may long remain a province of Sultan, Austria alone can be His Majesty's heir.

Servia having asked him, through her Agent, to induce Porte to neutralize Bosnian frontier, he has said that he will answer an application on the subject if made to him in writing; and he intends to declare that Servia having made war on her own responsibility the Porte may invade her territory wherever she thinks fit, but that Servian troops in Bosnia would meet with those of Austria. He considers also that no increase of territory should be granted to her on the restoration of peace.

I did not fail to point out to his Excellency that Her Majesty's Government do not propose to express any approval or to assume any responsibility for Russian conditions, which I said would only be communicated to Porte if Russia wished it as a Russian counter-proposal to the overtures in its note of 12th instant; but he argued that any reference whatever to these conditions would place Her Majesty's Government in the position, at Constantinople, of having entertained as not unacceptable proposals in which

every Turkish statesman, or any one who is thoroughly acquainted with the East and with the circumstances of Turkey in Europe, would see an intention of bringing about destruction of the Ottoman Empire.

All Count Andrassy's observations were not intended to be reported, but I have felt that I could not fully represent his opinions without reporting some of them, which may have been addressed merely to myself.

One thing is, I think, certain, that he is quite decided to maintain—by force, if necessary—in concert with Her Majesty's Government, the interests which they have agreed to consider common to Great Britain and Austria, and that he is most anxious that no concession should be made to Russian diplomacy which he considers may weaken hands of two Governments hereafter, or diminish their influence in the councils of Sultan.

I ought to add, in explanation of his views, that he said that the real difficulties of Russia will begin when she wishes to make peace, whether it be on the northern or the southern side of the Balkans, and other Powers have a right to intervene.

With respect to Bulgaria, he also said that the Russian scheme could not be attempted without a Russian force remaining in the province after the conclusion of peace, which he could not permit.

No. 243.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 423.)
Rome, December 15, 1877.

My Lord,

WHEN I called on M. Melegari the day before yesterday, his Excellency informed me that the Turkish Minister, whom I met coming out of his room, had just placed in his hands a copy of a despatch from his Government, appealing to the mediation of the Great Powers to bring about peace with Russia. His Excellency was kind enough to allow me to read the despatch, which was dated the 12th instant, and is the same as that recorded in your Lordship's telegram of yesterday's date.

When I had finished reading it I asked M. Melegari what answer he had made to Turkhan Bey.

His Excellency replied that he had informed him that Italy would be happy to associate herself with the other Powers in endeavouring to restore peace, but the formal acknowledgment of the despatch, his Excellency said, would not be sent for a few days, and in the meantime he should endeavour to ascertain the views of the other Governments as to the best course to be pursued. M. Melegari paid a tribute of praise to the ability with which the despatch is drawn up, and he informed me that he had told the Turkish Minister that after the splendid defence of Plevna his Government might justly speak of the armies of the two Powers having covered themselves with glory.

This morning I again called at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and M. Melegari being at the Council of Ministers, I saw Count Tornielli, whom I informed that your Lordship was anxious to know the views of the Italian Government respecting the Turkish communication.

Count Tornielli said he could not better reply than by giving me the words of the instructions which had been sent to the King's Representatives respecting it, which were as follows:—"Le Gouvernement Italien ne veut pas se séparer de la ligne de conduite que les autres Puissances jugeront préférable pour amener les résultats pacifiques qui sont certainement dans leur désir commun."

In the course of the conversation which followed, Count Tornielli expressed the opinion, which he believed was shared in London, that there was not much chance of obtaining the assistance of Austria and Germany in any effort to procure peace at this moment, and that without their co-operation there was not much to be done.

I said that this might probably be the case, but that nevertheless I could not help the remark, as an expression of my own opinion only, that if nothing was attempted all the Governments might have reason to reproach themselves afterwards.

I could quite understand, I said, that no Government, unless they were prepared for ulterior measures, would willingly incur the rebuff which would probably attend any spontaneous and uninvited overture to Russia with the view of stopping the war; but the Turkish communication appeared to me to alter the position of affairs, for here was a distinct appeal on the part of one of the belligerents for the good offices of the other Powers, and, if it was neglected, it appeared to me that the Powers would be doing the very thing which some of them at least, I believed, were anxious should not take place,

sidelined, forcing the Porte to enter into direct negotiations with Russia to the exclusion of the rest of Europe.

Count Tornielli replied that, as a matter of fact, a copy of the Turkish communication had been given unofficially to the Russian Ambassador here, in case he should see fit to bring it before his Government, and he thought that very possibly your Lordship had also communicated it to Count Schouvaloff, so that at the present moment the Emperor, it was to be presumed, was fully aware of the Porte's desire to conclude peace.

I asked Count Tornielli if he had any news as to how the Turkish despatch had been received at Berlin and Vienna. He replied that he had nothing direct from Berlin, but that his impression was that that Cabinet would not be much inclined to take action upon it, and he believed that up to yesterday the Turkish Ambassador had not been able to deliver the despatch to Count Andrassy.

From further observations made by Count Tornielli, it was easy to see that the belief here is that Russia will not listen to peace proposals until she at least reaches Adrianople, even if she does not intend to push on further. If she was to be stopped before, Count Tornielli thought the best chance of doing so would be by a direct appeal from the Sultan to the Emperor.

The military resources of Turkey are here considered to be completely exhausted. Count Tornielli said that, according to accounts which had reached the Ministry, it seemed doubtful if even Adrianople could offer a serious resistance, owing to their not being sufficient troops to defend the works; and, he added, that at Constantinople itself there were not above 6,000 men, being Mussulmans, including people from the dockyards, who could be employed in the defence of the city.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 244.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 1027.)
Paris, December 21, 1877.

My Lord,

M. WADDINGTON said to me last night that he presumed that the Turkish application for the mediation of the Great Neutral Powers must be held to have failed. He had, he told me, received information that the German Government had not only determined to decline to take any part in the proposed mediation, but had officially announced this determination to the Porte.

I said that Her Majesty's Government had received information to the same effect.

M. Waddington proceeded to observe that this positive refusal of Germany to join in a mediation seemed to put an end to the question and to be fatal to the proposal of the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 245.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 22.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Secret.)
Vienna, December 22, 1877.

IN consequence of the opinions expressed by Count Andrassy, I did not leave with him on the 20th instant a copy of your Lordship's telegram respecting the proposed instruction to Lord A. Loftus. Shall I now communicate to his Excellency the text of your secret despatch No. 401 and its inclosure, or shall I consider him to have answered the communication it instructs me to make to him.

No. 246.

Substance of a Telegram from Count Andrassy, dated Vienna, December 21, 1877.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Count Beust, December 22, 5 P.M.)

SIR A. BUCHANAN has placed before me a telegram from Lord Derby, communicating the substance of an instruction to Lord Augustus Loftus, stating at the same time that this instruction would not be sent off until my remarks upon it had been received in London.

This document centres in the following declaration to be addressed to Russia:—

"Whereas Russia on the 8th of June, 1877, communicated to Great Britain the conditions of peace, the acceptance of which by Turkey would make Russia forbear from crossing the Balkans, the British Government is now prepared to communicate these conditions to the Porte, without either criticising them or advocating their acceptance, but only with the view of facilitating an exchange of opinion between Russia and the Porte which might lead to peace negotiations."

I told the British Ambassador, in reply, that he ought strongly to dissuade his Government from such a step. The fact alone of conditions, such as those involved in the first point of the Russian conditions, as to the erection of Bulgaria into a Vassal State, being officially communicated to the Porte, whether their acceptance were advocated or not, must persuade Turkey that England is a more deadly enemy to her than even Russia, that she has nothing more to hope from England, and that, therefore, she could not fare worse if she were to surrender to Russia at discretion.

I reminded Sir A. Buchanan that the first of the conditions further stipulated the withdrawal of all the Turkish functionaries and troops from Bulgaria, the razing of the fortresses, and the creation of a Bulgarian militia, while maintaining the suzerainty of the Porte: that is to say, the first of these conditions would create an autonomy in Bulgaria that would hand over the remaining Mahometan population without the protection of troops or of civil functionaries to the Bulgarians; this would probably mean to ill-treatment and massacres, from which they could only escape by emigration, in the same way as the whole of Servia had been evacuated by the Turkish population, although there the Turks had retained the right of garrisoning the fortresses. It would be utterly devoid of sense, I said, to expect that the Porte herself would ever establish such a state of things under the suzerainty of the Sultan, but even if this absurd idea were to be accepted it would be found impossible to realize it in practice.

Every autonomy, every administrative reform, requires money to carry it out. As Bulgaria herself could not find the money, all the projects of reform hitherto put forward were based on the assumption that Turkey would provide the necessary means. Now, is it seriously to be proposed that Turkey is to pay with her own money the cost of the ejection of her Mussulman subjects from Bulgaria, and of the evacuation of her Danubian fortresses?

Therefore I contend that there are only two alternatives for the future constitution of Bulgaria: either a completely dissevered independent Bulgaria, such as Servia is in fact (in which case every trace of Turkish dominion and Turkish inhabitants would vanish), or the maintenance of Bulgaria as a Turkish Pashalic, the utmost concession in this case being the nomination of Christian Pashas and an autonomous administration.

Each of these alternatives is feasible; the first would necessarily involve the throwing open of the land route to Constantinople ("Preisgebung des Landweges nach Constantinopel").

Everything else is intrinsically absurd, and could only be put forward without the slightest account being taken of the state of things as it really exists.

Such an idea would not even lead to a controversy with Russia. It would collapse at the very first discussion as to its feasibility in practice.

I added that if the British Ministers did not agree with my opinion, they could ask Sir Henry Elliot for his.

He had never communicated his views on the subject to me, but I was prepared beforehand to accept his judgment.

The above telegram is to be read in a textual translation to Lord Derby, and notes of it may be taken by him for strictly confidential use.

No. 247.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 404. Most Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 22, 1877.*

THE Austrian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon and read to me confidentially a telegram which he had received from Count Andrassy. Of the substance of this despatch I made a memorandum, of which a copy is inclosed herewith for your Excellency's own information only.*

Count Beust proceeded to state that he was in expectation of a further communication from Count Andrassy, of which he had received notice, and in which Count Andrassy intended to propose a different mode of action, in the event of Her Majesty's Government not being irrevocably committed to that which had been under discussion.

I expressed my willingness to receive this further communication, saying that I had abstained from mentioning in any quarter the step which we had contemplated taking until I had received the opinion of his Government upon it. I reminded Count Beust that the Russian proposals, our acceptance of which as a point of departure was so severely criticized in the telegram which he had read to me, had been discussed between us in June last; that I had then expressed a strong personal opinion as to the impossibility of their acceptance, whereas Count Andrassy had considered that, though they might not be acceptable in their present form, they ought not to be rejected, inasmuch as they might serve as a basis for future negotiations.

It was, therefore, in reality the suggestion of Count Andrassy himself on which I had acted, and I had done so mainly with a view to secure the co-operation of his Government. I did not, however, attach any special importance to this particular form of proceeding, and I should be quite ready to consider and discuss the alternative plan which Count Andrassy had announced.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 248.

Count Andrassy to Count Beust.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby, December .)

(Secret.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December 22, 1877.*

UP to the day before yesterday, when Sir Andrew Buchanan made his latest communication, we were not clear whether it was the intention of England to negotiate in the first instance with Russia on the basis of the Russian conditions communicated in June, or whether England, according to the agreement between us, was going previously to come to an understanding with us on the conditions of peace. In the former eventuality (which is now discarded) we could also have been obliged to sound Russia and to draw nearer to her ("mit Russland Fühlung nehmen"). Russia would, in that case, easily have forced our mutual isolation to her profit, in order to exact her most sweeping conditions. If on the contrary, England stands fast by our agreement, we can both of us, to our own good and to that of Europe, prevent Russia from bringing about a situation which would either establish Russia's preponderance in the East or lead to war.

Our standpoint remains the same, such as I often have explained it to your Excellency.

All along we have refused to take the initiative of mediation, and we still refuse to do so.

The following were and are the reasons for our refusal:—

1. We cannot imagine any conditions of peace to which it would be possible to make the Neutral Powers agree.

2. We cannot either imagine any propositions emanating from Powers that have not taken part in the war, which the belligerents would not necessarily reject. Thus the *modus procedendi* lately contemplated by England would, besides the disadvantages already previously mentioned, have the further one, that the first point would be unacceptable to the Porte, whereas the others would to-day be unacceptable to Russia.

3. We do not feel ourselves called upon to take the responsibility for insoluble

* No. 246.

problems that have been put forward by others; such, for instance, as the Russian idea of a Bulgarian vassal State, in which Christians and Mussulmans are to live peaceably together.

I agree with Lord Derby that it would be idle to expect satisfactory proposals from the Porte; therefore I have no objection to the Porte's addressing herself first of all to Russia directly, in order to induce the latter to state her conditions.

But just as, for the above reasons, we still decline to take an initiative towards mediation, so we remain equally determined that peace shall no tbe made without our participation and that of Europe.

The danger of a direct conclusion of peace between Russia and Turkey, which may well suit the plans of General Ignatieff, does not seem very probable to us.

The Porte will hardly assent to the Russian conditions without at least making the attempt to get them softened by an appeal to Europe. It will surely be easy to convince Turkey that it must serve her interests better to make such appeal to Europe, only when she is able to point to tangible signs of the injustice and oppressiveness of the propositions actually put forward by Russia, instead of appealing now on the basis foreshadowed in her late Circular. In the former case, every Guaranteeing Power will be obliged to take up a position in view of those specified conditions, whereas to-day the Powers will be able to reject mediation *en principe* and will so reject it. If, on the contrary, the course we have sketched out is followed, mediation will follow by itself in the most natural way, and must in one form or the other be brought before Europe.

We are resolved not to put any obstacles into the way of a peace honourable for Russia, and taking account of her military achievements in such a way as to give her a moral satisfaction; we will even readily contribute to the conclusion of such a peace. But we maintain steadfastly all the points mentioned in our exchange of declarations with England as well as their connex ("deren Connex").

We are especially determined not to tolerate the creation of a state of things which would lead directly or indirectly to a predominant position for Russia in the East.

This is our point of view. We have stated it with the utmost clearness and precision. We, on our side, attach great importance to receive, in the present phase of the crisis, a clear statement about the standpoint taken up by Great Britain. I look forward to your Excellency's reports on this subject at the earliest date possible.

Your Excellency will be pleased to read the above to Lord Derby in a literal translation, and to let him take a copy thereof under the proviso that he shall only make a personal use of the same.

No. 249.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 466.) *Foreign Office, December* 23, 1877.

Sir,

THE Austrian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon and brought me a further telegram from Count Andrassy, of which I inclose a Memorandum.

This telegram reiterates the arguments previously urged by his Excellency, and states that the Austrian Government consider that there would be no objection to the Porte addressing itself direct to the Russian Government in order to ascertain the conditions of peace.

I explained to Count Beust that Her Majesty's Government would not feel justified in neglecting any opportunity for bringing about negotiations for peace, and could not, therefore, after the urgent appeals made to them by the Porte, now abstain from making an effort with that object, but, in deference to the opinion of Count Andrassy, they would be prepared to adopt a different course to that which had been contemplated, and would confine themselves, at all events in the first instance, to instructing Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to inquire of the Porte whether the Sultan is willing that Her Majesty's Government shall ask the Russian Government if the Emperor will entertain overtures for peace.

I observed that his Excellency would see that in thus avoiding any reference to the conditions of peace mentioned in June, Her Majesty's Government were following the policy recommended by Count Andrassy, and I trusted this would afford to his Excellency a proof of the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government to act in hearty co-operation with the Austrian Government in accordance with the understanding arrived at between them.

Count Beust replied that he would report what I had said to Count Andrassy, and

added that he understood* that what Count Andrassy desired in the first place was that the Porte should address itself to Russia directly, which, for the reasons given in the telegram he had just communicated, Count Andrassy thought the best course to follow.

If, however, the British Government, for reasons of their own, should consider themselves obliged to take some step for mediation, in which, for the reasons stated in the same telegram, the Austrian Government could not join, Count Andrassy would think it advisable that, instead of the course originally proposed by the British Government (referring to the June conditions), they should simply convey to Russia the willingness of the Porte to enter into negotiations; this being, in fact, the course now contemplated by Her Majesty's Government, necessitating, as a matter of course, a previous inquiry at Constantinople as to whether the Porte agreed to England's taking such a step on its behalf or not.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 250.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 478. Secret.) *Berlin, December* 22, 1877.

My Lord,

THE policy of Germany in regard to the Turco-Russian War has entered into a phase of unconditional neutrality.

It is in the name of neutrality that the Emperor declines to entertain the Sultan's request for mediation, and it is to avoid committing himself to any opinion on it that Prince Bismarck prolongs his absence from Berlin.

Herr von Bülow, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, declares that the German Government are determined to adhere to the principle of neutrality, and to take no initiative in the matter. They are content, his Excellency says, to leave the belligerents to negotiate separately, or the Powers to mediate between them, according to circumstances, and according to the interests of the Powers more directly concerned in Eastern affairs. The only interest Germany has in the settlement of the question is the establishment of a sound and lasting peace, and to that much-desired object and end Germany will give her full and cordial support as soon as the Powers are agreed amongst each other.

So far the attitude of Germany is clear and precise.

From the reports of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, we gather that Prince Reuss urges the Porte to address itself directly to Russia and to make peace at once, and Mr. Layard's information is confirmed here by the Turkish Ambassador, who says he knows the German Government to be in favour of direct and separate peace negotiations between Turkey and Russia.

Well informed persons here say that the Austrian Government agree with that of Germany in preferring the preliminaries of peace to be negotiated by the belligerents alone, without the interference of the other Powers.

There is, however, no danger of Turkey following the advice of Prince Reuss, or of Count Zichy, I am assured by my Turkish colleague, Sedoullah Bey, since the Sultan knows he can reckon on the protection of England when Russia threatens Constantinople. His Majesty will always prefer to be under the protectorate of Great Britain to being at the mercy of Russia.

The speeches of Count Andrassy to the delegations at Vienna, and the attitude of the Austrian Government generally, have given great satisfaction at Berlin.

There is reason to believe that the understanding between the two Governments is as cordial and intimate as heretofore, and that both Austria and Germany are agreed that their neutrality shall continue to be more benevolent towards Russia than towards Turkey, and the more so if the Tripartite Northern Alliance should be put to the test by coming events.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

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* See unofficial note from Count Beust of December 23.

No. 251.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 687.) *St. Petersburgh, December 13, 1877.*

My Lord,

I AM informed that the Emperor of Russia is expected to return here on the 22nd instant. His Majesty will return viâ Warsaw, and not viâ Moscow.

Prince Gortchacow will join the imperial train at Bucharest, and will accompany His Majesty to St. Petersburgh.

From private information I have received, it has been decided, after the fall of Plevna, to continue the military operations with increased vigour, unless the Sultan should appeal directly to the Emperor for peace. In that event it is thought probable that an armistice would be agreed to.

On the other hand, I very much doubt whether any offer of foreign mediation would be accepted by the Imperial Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 252.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 24, 1877.*

IN reply to your telegram of 22nd instant, you need not communicate No. 401 and inclosure to Count Andrassy.

No. 253.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 24, 1877, 1 P.M.*

YOU are authorized to ask the Porte whether the Sultan is willing that Her Majesty's Government shall inquire of the Russian Government if the Emperor will entertain overtures for peace.

No. 254.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 886.) *Foreign Office, December 24, 1877.*

Sir,

HER Majesty's Government have delayed replying to the Circular from the Porte, dated the 12th instant, inviting the Powers to interpose their good offices for the restoration of peace, until they could become acquainted with the views entertained of that appeal by the Governments to which it was severally addressed.

It soon became evident that there was little prospect of joint mediation being agreed upon, and the refusal of the German Government rendered it impracticable.

Her Majesty's Government nevertheless feel that, after the urgent representations of the Porte and the willingness expressed by the Sultan to ask for peace, they would not be justified in abstaining from making an effort to initiate negotiations for peace, and they cannot but hope that the initiative thus taken may meet with the support of the other Powers, who must be equally desirous with Her Majesty's Government to assist in bringing the war to a close.

I have accordingly to authorize your Excellency to ask the Porte whether the Sultan is willing that Her Majesty's Government shall inquire of the Russian Government if the Emperor will entertain overtures for peace.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 255.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 24, 1877.*

(Confidential.)

COUNT BEUST has communicated to me two telegrams from Count Andrassy, objecting to the proposed instructions to Lord A. Loftus, and saying that if Her Majesty's Government feel they must take some steps for mediation he would prefer that it should be a simple statement to Russia that the Porte is willing to treat for peace. I said that Her Majesty's Government could not abstain from making an effort to bring about negotiations for peace, but, in deference to Count Andrassy's opinion, they would confine themselves, at all events in the first instance, to instructing Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to ask the Porte whether the Sultan is willing that Her Majesty's Government shall inquire of the Russian Government if the Emperor will entertain overtures for peace.

No. 256.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 902.) *Foreign Office, December 25, 1877.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 886 of the 24th instant, your Excellency will bear in mind that on the 28th of July last Her Majesty's Government authorized you confidentially to sound the Sultan on the subject of possible terms of peace, and to state that, should His Majesty be disposed to open negotiations, you might assure him that he might rely upon the friendly offices of Her Majesty's Government, which would be exerted with a view to obtain for him the most favourable terms possible under the circumstances, but Her Majesty's Government were not disposed to take the initiative in proposing any conditions.

Your Excellency replied that you had reason to believe that conditions of peace could not at that time be proposed or listened to, but that you had informed His Majesty that should there be a favourable opportunity for opening negotiations for peace he might rely on the friendly offices of Her Majesty's Government. You added that you did not think that anything more could then be done.

The language held by you to the Sultan was approved by Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 257.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 578.) *Constantinople, December 25, 1877.*

(Telegraphic.)

WITH reference to your telegram of yesterday, I am authorized by the Grand Vizier to state that the Sultan is willing that Her Majesty's Government should inquire of the Russian Government if the (Emperor will?) entertain overtures for peace. His Highness informs me that an appeal in this sense has been already addressed to Her Majesty's Government through Musurus Pasha.

No. 258.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Lyons.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 26, 1877, 3·20 P.M.*

WITH reference to my telegram of this morning, recording a telegram to Mr. Layard, sound the French government as to their intended policy, telling them confidentially of this step on the part of Her Majesty's Government.

No. 259.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received December 26, 4·15 P.M.*)

(Telegraphic.)
(Secret.)
Berlin, December 26, 1877, 1·35 P.M.

I LEARN on good authority that Count Andrassy and Prince Bismarck have agreed to throw every impediment they can in the way of mediation until Porte is compelled to appeal direct to Russia without the intervention of the Powers.

No. 260.

Musurus Pasha to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received December 26.*)

Ambassade Impériale Ottomane, Londres, le 26 Décembre, 1877.

My Lord,

JE m'empresse de communiquer à votre Excellence la copie ci-jointe d'une dépêche télégraphique que je viens de recevoir de son Excellence Server Pasha, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, et par laquelle il m'informe que la démarche que la Sublime Porte avait faite, par sa dépêche Circulaire du 12 de ce mois, auprès des Puissances signataires du Traité de Paris, pour manifester son désir de voir le rétablissement de paix, n'ayant pas abouti au résultat qu'elle était en droit d'en attendre, Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, constamment animé du désir de mettre fin à une guerre qui désole les deux pays belligérants, a décidé de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, qui a porté de tout temps une sollicitude bienveillante à l'indépendance et à l'intégrité de l'Empire, base fondamentale de sa vie politique.

Je viens, par conséquent, d'ordre de mon auguste Maître demander, au nom de la Sublime Porte, la médiation du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique—médiation qui, la Sublime Porte en est convaincu, ne lui sera pas refusée par son ancienne et constante amie.

J'ai, &c.
(Signé) MUSURUS.

Inclosure in No. 260.

Server Pasha to Musurus Pasha.

(Télégraphique.)
Constantinople, le 24 Décembre, 1877.

IL y a une dizaine de jours, la Sublime Porte s'adressait aux Grandes Puissances signataires du Traité de Paris pour manifester son désir de voir le rétablissement de la paix. Bien que cette démarche, qui faisait l'objet de ma dépêche Circulaire du 12 Décembre, ait rencontré en principe un accueil sympathique en Europe, elle n'a pu cependant aboutir au résultat que nous étions en droit d'en attendre. Dans cet état de choses, et devant les raisons développées dans ma dépêche précitée, et qui subsistent toujours, Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, constamment animé du désir de mettre fin à une guerre qui désole les deux pays belligérants, et d'épargner une plus grande effusion de sang, a décidé de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, qui a porté de tout temps une sollicitude bienveillante à l'indépendance et à l'intégrité de l'Empire, base fondamentale de notre vie politique. Je viens donc, d'ordre de notre auguste Maître, vous inviter, M. l'Ambassadeur, à demander, au nom de la Sublime Porte, la médiation du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique ; médiation qui, nous en sommes convaincus, ne nous sera pas refusée par notre ancienne et constante amie.

No. 260A.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 894. Confidential.)
Foreign Office, December 26, 1877.

Sir,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 1475, Most Confidential, of the 12th instant, reporting that you had communicated to the Grand Vizier the telegraphic news of the fall of Plevna; and I have to convey to you my approval of your language to Server Pasha with reference to the proposed appeal by the Porte to the Powers who were parties to the Treaty of Paris for their intervention in favour of peace.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 260B.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received December 27.*)

(No. 1476. Confidential.)
Constantinople, December 15, 1877.

My Lord,

YESTERDAY morning the Grand Vizier and some other of the Ministers held a Council at the Palace, over which the Sultan presided, to consider what was to be done in consequence of the fall of Plevna.

I am informed, from what I believe to be a trustworthy source, that three courses were proposed to His Majesty: 1st, To ask for peace at once, without imposing, uselessly, further sacrifices on the country; 2ndly, to continue the war with all the resources that still remain, without attempting to obtain peace; and 3rdly, to open negotiations for peace, but, at the same time, to make every effort to arrest the advance of the Russians. No definite decision was, I understand, come to; it was only resolved to take such military measures as would prove that Turkey was prepared to resist, if necessary, to the last extremity.

The unanimous opinion was in favour of peace; but some difference prevailed as to the steps to be taken to obtain it. Several members of the Cabinet are in favour of a direct understanding with Russia, without the intervention of any other Power. This course, as I have already informed your Lordship, has been strongly urged upon the Turks by Prince Reuss, whether in pursuance of instructions from his Government or as an expression of his individual opinion, I am unable to say. His Highness has represented that an appeal from the Sultan to the Emperor Alexander would be favourably received, and would probably obtain for Turkey far better terms than the mediation of a third Power. Some are the more disposed to take this advice as they believe that by acting upon it they will secure the friendly support of Germany.

Other members of the Cabinet were of opinion that England should be asked to offer her mediation, but I am told that this idea has been abandoned, on a hint from Vienna that the intervention of England would be disagreeable to Russia, and that negotiations commenced under her auspices would probably end in failure.

It was ultimately decided that the best course would be to ask for the collective mediation of the Great Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris.

The Circular to the Turkish Representatives abroad, to which I referred in my despatch of yesterday, was then discussed. It was not, I understand, entirely approved.

It was objected that it would scarcely be acceptable to those Powers, as it merely renewed the assurances given by the Porte on previous occasions of its determination to improve the condition of the Christians, but offered no other guarantee for the performance of the promise than the promulgation of the Constitution, which inferred a simple return to the *status quo ante*. The Grand Vizier appears to have differed from this opinion, and the terms of the Circular were left for further consideration.

At a subsequent meeting, held at the Ministry of War, the military measures to be adopted were discussed, and it was proposed that Suleiman Pasha should be ordered to transfer a part of his army to Adrianople to defend that place, and to cover the capital, but no decision on this point was, I believe, come to.

The Porte is the more desirous of entering into negotiations for peace without delay, as it fears that Servia and Greece will now begin hostilities, with a view to

claiming the right of putting forward pretensions to increase of territory at the end of the war.

I telegraphed to your Lordship the substance of this despatch yesterday evening.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 281.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received December 27.*)

(No. 1486. Secret.) *Constantinople, December 16, 1877.*

My Lord,

GENERAL KLAPKA, for whom the Sultan entertains a very friendly feeling, tells me that a short time ago His Majesty authorized him to inform Count Andrassy, and, through the Austro-Hungarian Prime Minister, the Emperor, that Turkey would be ready to cede Bosnia and Herzegovina to Hungary if Austria would enter the field as the ally of Turkey in the present war with Russia. General Klapka received this morning a reply from Count Andrassy, to whom he had transmitted the Sultan's message. The Count answers that he does not intend to deviate from the policy which he has deliberately adopted, and which is neither to annex nor to occupy Bosnia nor Herzegovina, and not to permit, if he can prevent it, the formation of any new semi-independent Slav State in Turkey; and that he is resolved to maintain the principle of the *statu quo* of the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire. He directs General Klapka to thank the Sultan in his own and the Emperor's name for the offer made to them by His Majesty.

General Klapka informs me that the communications which have passed between himself and Count Andrassy in this matter, which were, of course, very secret, were transmitted and received in cypher by Count Zichy himself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 281*.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received December 27.*)

(No. 1482. Secret.) *Constantinople, December 13, 1877.*

My Lord,

AFTER the ceremony of opening the Parliament this morning the Sultan sent Said Pasha to tell me that he wished to see me. His Majesty received me in one of the smaller apartments of the Palace. He seemed a good deal depressed by the fall of Plevna. I remarked that the heroic defence of Osman Pasha would take its place amongst the most glorious deeds in the annals of the Empire. This reflection, I said, might afford him some consolation. He replied that it did; but he added, with his usual good feeling, that the thought of the terrible loss of life, and the misery which this war was causing to his subjects, left him no rest.

"I should be most grateful to the Queen," His Majesty said, "if she would direct my compliments to be sent to Osman Pasha, and, at the same time, the assurance of my deep sympathy for him in his misfortune, and my high appreciation of the devotion that he has shown in my service and in that of his country; I am very anxious to learn the nature of his wound, and whether it be serious. I trust to the generosity of the Emperor of Russia to have proper care taken of him and to treat him kindly, as well as my troops who have been made prisoners, and who have suffered so greatly. I am desirous of receiving some details as to the fall of Plevna, for none have yet reached me, and I am especially anxious to learn the losses that my army has sustained."

His Majesty then said that he wished to take every means in his power to put a stop to hostilities, and asked me whether Her Majesty's Government would be willing to ascertain, without loss of time, whether the Emperor of Russia would consent to an armistice for about three months. If Her Majesty's Government found reason to believe that the Emperor would agree to an armistice, he was prepared to address a formal request to them to use their good offices to obtain one for him. His Majesty expressed his belief that if a suspension of military operations could be once obtained, terms of

peace might be agreed to. His Majesty added that if he were relieved from the anxieties of war, he would be able to devote his thoughts and his time to measures for the improvement of the condition of his Christian and other subjects, which would satisfy Europe of his firm intention to carry out the reforms in the administration of his Empire to which he had pledged himself.

His Majesty further requested me to state to Her Majesty's Government that by procuring an armistice for him they would be rendering a service to Turkey for which she would ever be grateful to England. Her Majesty's Government had assured him that they would help him to obtain as favourable a peace as possible. He fully relied upon their friendship in this hour of need. The cardinal object of his foreign policy, His Majesty said with great earnestness, was a good understanding with England, and he was resolved not to take any step whatever without first consulting with her and without her concurrence.

I replied to His Majesty that I would lose no time in informing your Lordship of what he had said to me, and in requesting your Lordship to transmit his message to the Queen. I observed that I was convinced that he need not be under any anxiety as to the treatment of Osman Pasha and of his troops who had been made prisoners at Plevna. The Emperor of Russia would be the first to respect men who had so nobly and faithfully performed their duty, and to treat them with all the kindness and consideration that their position would admit.

His Majesty then asked me whether I had seen the appeal addressed by the Porte to the Great Powers, which had just been sent to the Turkish Representatives abroad to be communicated to the Courts to which they were respectively accredited, and whether I approved of it. I answered that Server Pasha had shown me the draft of it, and that I had told his Excellency that although, personally I thought well of the step the Ministers proposed to take, I could not express an opinion upon it officially until I had first consulted your Lordship. I was now able to tell His Majesty, I said, that your Lordship had informed me that Her Majesty's Government considered the step a very wise one, but that all depended upon the conditions of peace which Turkey was prepared to accept.

His Majesty expressed his satisfaction that Her Majesty's Government approved of the appeal, and asked me whether I thought the other Governments to which it would be made would do so likewise, and, if so, whether they would at once make a collective offer to Russia of mediation. I replied that I was unable to answer His Majesty's question, but that I had no doubt the step taken by the Porte would lead to an exchange of communications between the Powers to which the appeal was addressed, and I trusted that the result would be an understanding between them that might eventually lead to peace. But I wished to remind him that, as your Lordship had pointed out, everything must depend upon the conditions which Turkey was prepared to accept.

His Majesty said that of course the conditions must be discussed; but he expressed his earnest hope that there would be no question of a Conference. He attributed the war to the Conference held at Constantinople. He was opposed to it from the beginning, and Mehemed Rushdi Pasha had assented to it against his express wishes and orders. It was in consequence of this breach of duty that he had removed Mehemed Rushdi from his office of Grand Vizier.

I asked His Majesty whether, in the event of an armistice being agreed to, he was prepared to put into execution such of the measures as were proposed at the Conference for the protection and better government of his Christian subjects as admitted of being carried out at once; a substantial proof might thus be given to Europe of his intention to introduce the reforms that he had promised. He answered that he was, and that he would not lose a moment, when hostilities were suspended, in doing so. He referred me to his Speech just read to the Parliament, in which those reforms were specified. He had anew, he said, pledged himself to the Constitution, which applied to all his subjects, without distinction of race or creed, and on which he believed the safety of his Empire to depend. His Majesty repeated, what he has frequently said to me before, that his good faith on this subject could not be doubted, as he had from his youth, fifteen years before he came unexpectedly to the throne, formed the deliberate conviction that a Constitution was absolutely necessary for the regeneration of his country. Such being the case, and the Constitution being his own work, it was to his honour as well as to his interest to maintain it.

I observed to His Majesty that he could not be surprised that sympathy was felt in England for the Christian populations of the Turkish Empire, who were known to be misgoverned and to be deprived of rights to which they were entitled, and which were enjoyed by their Mussulman fellow-subjects. If His Majesty, I said, had learnt that the

Mussulmans of India, instead of being placed upon perfect equality with the other populations, were ill-treated, oppressed, and denied all redress by their English rulers, he would naturally feel sympathy for them, and would consider it his duty to use his influence on their behalf. There were certain grievances of a very grave character of which the Christians in Turkey had just cause to complain, and the existence of which was considered by Europe as a reproach to Turkey, and as calling for interference on its part. I might mention, for instance, the rejection of Christian evidence before Turkish tribunals, which amounted to an absolute denial of that justice to which every one of his subjects, whatever might be his race or creed, was entitled; and the want of protection for the lives and property of the Christians, as well as Mussulmans, in consequence of the absence of a properly organized and trustworthy police.

His Majesty replied that I would find that he had referred to both these subjects in his Speech, and that they were amongst the first to which his attention would be directed. He ended by saying that when peace was restored, and he had time to attend to the administration and civil affairs of his Empire, he hoped that I would often come to him that he might consult me on such matters. He looked, His Majesty said, to England alone for advice and help in his attempts to improve the condition of his country. He knew that she had its real welfare at heart, and that her counsels would be disinterestedly given in the true interests of Turkey.

I venture to think think that it is of the utmost importance that the armistice, for which the Sultan is prepared to apply, should, if possible, be obtained. The moment would seem favorable for it. Russia has achieved a signal victory. Although she could now, no doubt, advance at once in irresistible force across the Balkans, and enter Roumelia, a winter campaign must, under any circumstances, entail great sacrifices of every kind upon her. The Turks may yet make a formidable defence at Adrianople, which may become another Plevna. In the meanwhile the Servians and Greeks will probably take part in the war, and greatly add to the danger to the peace of Europe. Moreover, a march of the Russians upon Adrianople would lead to an amount of misery and bloodshed to the defenceless populations, both Christian and Mussulman, that it is truly dreadful to contemplate. They are now flying in all directions before the Russian advance, terrified by the fate which befell those who remained in the northern districts of Roumelia on the Russian invasion in the summer. The immense number of fugitives who are now collected at Sofia, Philippopolis, and Adrianople, and in the surrounding villages, would again seek safety by moving to other districts. In this season of the year thousands upon thousands of aged men, women, and children would die from want and exposure, and the amount of human suffering would be incalculable. It might surely be hoped that those who have brought about this war from pure feelings of humanity would not view with indifference the horrors which its further prosecution would entail.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 262.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received December 27.*)

(No. 1487. Secret.) *Constantinople December* 16, 1877.

My Lord,

I LEARNT this morning, from a person who is usually well informed, that Count Zichy was endeavouring to dissuade the Turkish Ministers from making any direct overtures to Russia, and to obtain from them, confidentially, their views as to the terms of peace which they would be ready to accept, but that they had not satisfied him upon the latter point.

They would pledge themselves to nothing beyond the Constitution, the reforms that had been promised, and the establishment of perfect equality between Christians and Mussulmans.

The Austrian Ambassador, on the other hand, sought to engage them to assent, as a basis of negotiations, to the following conditions:—

1. The cession to Russia of Batoum and of the Valley of the Tchouruk Su.

2. An autonomous administration for Bulgaria under the sovereignty of the Sultan; the Governor-General of the Province to be a Christian, to be named by the Porte in concert with the Powers; the fortresses to continue in the occupation of the Turkish troops.

3. Free passage of the Straits for the fleets of all nations.

4. The independence of Roumania.

5. The cession to Servia of Little Zvornik and of a small portion of Bosnian territory.

6. The cession to Montenegro of the parts of Herzegovina now held by her.

The Porte was led to believe by Count Zichy that if it would admit these conditions in principle the Cabinet of Vienna might make use of them as the basis of an "officious" mediation.

My informant further stated that he was confident that the Porte would refuse to agree to any such conditions unless the present Ministers were replaced by men like Safvet and Sadyk Pashas, who, however, were disposed to treat directly with Russia, but only with the approval and concurrence of England.

I subsequently saw Count Zichy. From what dropped from him and from the opinions that he expressed to me on each of the conditions above mentioned, I have little doubt that the communications to which my informant had referred had taken place, either directly or indirectly, between him and some of the Turkish Ministers. He spoke, however, in very bitter terms against Servia and Prince Milan, who, he said, from his disloyal and unprincipled conduct, deserved no consideration. He added, moreover, that although the independence of Roumania might in some respects be of advantage to Austria, it might at the same time be prejudicial to her by the effect it might have upon her Wallachian population in Transylvania.

He argued that the possession by Russia of Batoum would not be injurious to the interest of England, and as the place had not yet been captured by her, its cession might be used to induce her to renounce in return her pretentions to Bayazid, Van, or even Erzeroum. As to the Dardanelles, Count Zichy observed that if the freedom of navigation were granted to all other States, Russia would not gain or Turkey lose much by it; but his Government would never, he was persuaded, consent to the Straits being closed against all nations but Russia, and to the Black Sea being made a *mare clausum*.

Count Zichy told me that he had seen Server Pasha yesterday, and that he was convinced, from what passed between them, that neither his Excellency nor the Grand Vizier would have the courage to propose to the Sultan any concessions to Russia which might affect the independence and integrity of his Empire. He was therefore of opinion that if terms of peace such as Russia would be prepared to accept were discussed, it would be necessary to have a change of Ministry, and he believed that the present Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs should be replaced by Safvet Pasha and Sadyk Pasha.

The idea that Safvet Pasha would be named Grand Vizier, should negotiations for peace be entered upon, has prevailed for some time past. I believe that had Edhem Pasha refuse to withdraw his resignation which he recently sent in, the Sultan was prepared to name Safvet in his place.

I telegraphed the substance of this despatch to your Lordship this morning. After what took place a short time ago, it is possible that Count Zichy has not been authorized by his Government to enter into communication with the Porte on the subject of the conditions of peace. But nevertheless I have considered it my duty to report to your Lordship, under this reserve, what has undoubtedly passed between his Excellency and the Turkish Ministers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 263.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received December 27.*)

(No. 1496. Confidential.) *Constantinople, December* 18, 1877.

My Lord,

THE Sultan sent me this morning a telegram just received from the Turkish Ambassador at Berlin, of which I have the honour to inclose translation. Sandullah Effendi states in it that M. de Bülow had sent for him to inform him that the appeal from the Porte to the Powers for mediation had been submitted to the Emperor, who had replied that, although desirous of peace, he would not depart from the positions of neutrality that he had assumed at the commencement of the war. He could not, therefore, comply with the Porte's request that he should unite with the Powers in offering mediation to Russia. He trusted, however, that the Porte would not infer from the answer that he had given that he was not in favour of peace.

M. de Bülow, after having communicated the Emperor's reply to the Turkish Ambassador, said, confidentially, that Prince Reuss had some time ago told Safvet Pasha that if Turkey desired to have peace she should apply to Russia direct, as Germany has determined not to mediate between the belligerents. If the advice of the Cabinet of Berlin were now asked, he added, it would be given in the same sense.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

Inclosure in No. 263.

Saadullah Effendi to Server Pasha.

(Translation.)
(Telegraphic.)
(Most Confidential.)

December 16, 1877.

I HAVE just seen M. Bülow by special appointment. He told me that he had submitted to the Emperor your Excellency's Circular telegram of the 12th instant; that the re-establishment of peace and tranquillity was very desirable; but that His Majesty being unwilling to depart, by entertaining the appeal for mediation, from a policy of reserve and neutrality, had charged him (M. Bülow) to express His Majesty's regret not to be able to forward the wishes of the Sublime Porte, and add that he hoped this answer will not be considered as implying on his part the want of any wish respecting the re-establishment of peace. M. Bülow then went on to say, under strictest confidence, that some time ago Prince Reuss, in a conversation with Safvet Pasha, had stated that, in order to secure peace, it would be necessary for the Porte to address itself directly to Russia; that Germany would not undertake mediation, and that since Russia and Turkey had entered directly on the present war, the two Powers should in the same manner treat also directly for peace. M. Bülow concluded by saying that if the Cabinet of Berlin were again consulted at the present moment, it would still express the same opinion.

No. 264.

The Earl of Derby to Musurus Pasha.

Foreign Office, December 27, 1877.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 26th instant, inclosing a copy of a telegraphic despatch from his Excellency Server Pasha, inviting the mediation of Great Britain; and I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government instructed Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, by telegraph, on the morning of the 24th instant, to ask the Porte whether His Imperial Majesty the Sultan was willing that Her Majesty's Government should inquire of the Russian Government if the Emperor of Russia will entertain overtures for peace.

Her Majesty's Ambassador having telegraphed that the Sultan is willing that this should be done, and that your Excellency had been instructed to address an appeal in this sense to Her Majesty's Government, Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh has, upon the receipt of your communication, been desired to make the inquiry accordingly.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 265.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 402.)

Foreign Office, December 27, 1877.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government consider that the time has arrived when it has become their duty to make an effort to bring to a close the war unhappily existing between Russia and the Porte.

In the communication made to Her Majesty's Government on the 26th instant, of which a copy has been forwarded to your Excellency, the Turkish Government have signified their readiness to ask for peace, and Her Majesty's Government feel that it is incumbent on them to make the Russian Government acquainted with this intimation from the Porte.

With this view, they have to instruct your Excellency to inquire of the Russian Government if the Emperor will entertain overtures for peace.

Her Majesty's Government are confident that His Imperial Majesty will see in this initiative on their part a proof of their sincere desire to second the wishes which they cannot doubt that His Majesty feels strongly for the prevention of further bloodshed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 266.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Lyons.[*]

Foreign Office, December 27, 1877.

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh,[†] requesting his Excellency to inquire of the Russian Government whether His Majesty the Emperor of Russia will entertain overtures for peace.

I have to request your Excellency to communicate a copy of this despatch to M. Waddington, and to express the hope of Her Majesty's Government that the initiative thus taken by Her Majesty's Government may meet with the support of the French Government and of the other neutral Powers, who must be equally desirous with Her Majesty's Government to assist in bringing the war to a close.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 267.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 911.)

Foreign Office, December 27, 1877.

Sir,

WITH reference to your telegram of the 25th instant, I transmit to your Excellency herewith, for your information, a copy of a communication which I received yesterday from Musurus Pasha, together with copies of my reply and of the instructions sent to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh respecting overtures for peace.[‡]

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 268.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 912. Most Secret.)

Foreign Office, December 27, 1877.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith, for your own confidential information only, copies of communications, as marked in the margin,[§] which have passed between Her Majesty's Government and that of Austro-Hungary relative to proposals for mediation between Russia and Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

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[*] A similar letter was addressed to Sir A. Buchanan, Sir A. Paget, and Lord Odo Russell.
[†] No. 265.
[‡] Nos. 260, 264, and 265.
[§] Nos. 233, 242, 245, 246, 248, 254, and 255.

No. 269.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 915.) *Foreign Office, December 27, 1877.*

Sir,

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris and Rome,* forwarding copies of the instructions to Lord A. Loftus, of which a copy is inclosed in my despatch to your Excellency of this day.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 270.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 28.)

Vienna, December 27, 1877.

(Telegraphic.)

TURKISH Ambassador, who has daily been pressing Count Andrassy for an answer to the Circular of the Porte of the 12th instant, had an interview with his Excellency to-day, at which he gave him a verbal answer, accompanied by a Memorandum stating his Excellency's reasons for being unable to accept the proposal to mediate made by Turkey, as it could not lead to a practical result; but expressing at the same time his intention to take part in any negotiation which Turkey may induce Russia to enter into for the re-establishment of peace.

Since writing foregoing, after a conversation with M. Orczy, I have received Lord Odo Russell's telegram of yesterday, communicated to me to-day by your Lordship, and I presume that the answer to the Turkish Circular may be intended to carry out the agreement therein referred to.

No. 271.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 28.)

Vienna, December 28, 1877, 7 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE allowed the Minister for Foreign Affairs to read instructions to Lord A. Loftus, forwarded to me yesterday. From his observations respecting it, I saw no intention on his part to endeavour to prevent its being formally considered at St. Petersburgh.

He appears to be of opinion that it cannot be met by an absolute refusal to take any notice of the overtures made, and that they must either state that they will themselves reply to the Turkish intimation, or give an answer to Her Majesty's Government which might be treated by them as an invitation to the Porte to make a direct overture for peace to St. Petersburgh.

This is confidential.

No. 271A.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December 28, 1877.*

(Confidential.)

WITH reference to my telegram of last night, I subjoin a translation of the memorandum therein referred to, which has been communicated to me confidentially by the Turkish Ambassador.

"We earnestly desire the cessation of the bloodshed and the end of the war. But to our regret the Circular of the Porte of the 12th instant does not offer a basis of negotiation calculated to terminate in the conclusion of peace.

"The neutrality which we have observed does not permit us to take the initiative in a mediation which would oblige us to formulate peace proposals.

* No. 266.

"The Imperial Government reserves to itself, on the other hand, its participation as soon as negotiations between the two belligerents shall be commenced. The Imperial Government likewise reserves to itself, in its quality of a guaranteeing Power, and of a conterminous country, the legitimate influence which belongs to it in the definite settlement of affairs in the East."

No. 271B.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 583.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 28, 1877.*

COUNT Zichy has just communicated to Porte answer of Austro-Hungarian Government to its appeal for mediation. It is to the following effect:—

"We earnestly desire cessation of bloodshed and the end of the war. In our opinion the Ottoman Circular does not, however, offer a basis of a nature to bring about peace. The duties of neutrality do not permit us to take the initiative for a mediation between two belligerents which would impose upon us the necessity of formulating conditions of peace. On the other hand, the Imperial and Royal Cabinet reserves to itself the right to participate in the negotiations as soon as they are commenced between the belligerents. It reserves to itself equally the legitimate influence to which it is entitled as a guaranteeing and bordering Power in the definitive settlement of the state of things in the East."

No. 272.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 421. Most Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 28, 1877.*

IN the course of a conversation which I had to-day with the Austrian Ambassador, his Excellency referred to the concluding passage of the telegram which he had placed in my hands on the 23rd instant, and in which Count Andrassy, after having explained the views of the Austrian Cabinet, expresses a desire to be put in possession of those of Her Majesty's Government.

I said, in reply, that, so far as concerned the general principles of action by which the two Cabinets would be guided, I saw nothing to add to the exchange of views which had taken place between us some months ago; that we had adhered to the understanding which had thus been come to, and should be ready to act accordingly in the negotiations which were likely to take place. If it were desired to discuss the terms of peace, I thought it would be obviously better to wait until we had ascertained what, on the one hand, the Russian Government intended to ask, and what, on the other hand, the Porte would be ready to concede.

It would be useless to agree upon proposals which might turn out not to be acceptable to either of the belligerents. If, however, there was any point on which Count Andrassy desired a further exchange of ideas beyond that which had already passed between the two Governments, I hoped that he would name it, and I should be willing to discuss the question.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 273.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 422. Secret.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 28, 1877.*

IN the conversation with the Austrian Ambassador, to which I have referred in my immediately preceding despach, I took the opportunity of mentioning to Count Beust, in an unofficial and private manner, the mistaken impression which appeared to prevail everywhere as to the real attitude of Austria. It was taken for granted, I said, in every European capital, that the three Emperors had acted in concert from the first, and intended to do so to the end, whereas from the communications which had passed between the Cabinets of Vienna and London, it was evident that this was very far from being the

case. I did not presume to offer advice to the Austrian Government as to the language they should hold, but it was obvious that we had much less chance of arriving at an amicable arrangement where Russia was concerned if the Russian statesmen remained under what appeared to be their present impression—that they could rely absolutely and unconditionally on Austrian support. I thought, too, that it would be more fair to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh itself that it should be made acquainted with the real position of affairs. As concerned English policy, I observed that it would be difficult for an English Minister to make any public allusion to the prospect of Austrian support, so universal was the impression that whatever was decided upon at St. Petersburgh and Berlin would not be opposed at Vienna.

I concluded by saying that I had offered these remarks in order that he might make such use of them as he thought best, and I relied on his doing so in a manner which would not convey the impression that I was interfering in a matter with which I had no right to deal.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 274.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received December 29.*)

(No. 1042. Confidential.)
Paris, December 27, 1877.

My Lord,

IN obedience to instructions which I received from your Lordship by telegraph last evening, I called to-day upon M. Waddington and informed him confidentially that your Lordship had authorised Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to ask the Porte whether the Sultan was willing that Her Majesty's Government should enquire of the Government of Russia whether the Emperor would entertain overtures for peace.

In answer to inquiries which I made as to the views of the French Government, M. Waddington said that at the present moment no initiative and very little action with regard to the Eastern Question was to be looked for from France.

He proceeded to observe that he could not but think that the preliminary conditions of peace had already been settled in concert with each other by the Three Emperors. He had, of course, no direct and positive information that this was the case, but still he entertained very little doubt on the subject.

He went on to say that in this stage of the question the French Government was not disposed to take any steps. Hereafter, however, a Conference might be summoned, or the Great Powers might be consulted in some other form. In such a case the French Government would not hesitate to express its opinion on all questions of general European interest, or of special interest to France, and it would expect that on such questions its voice should be listened to with proper respect.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

December 28.

P.S.—I send to-day to Mr. Layard, by the messenger, Mr. Johnson, a copy of this despatch.

L.

No. 275.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received December 29.*)

(No. 1043.)
Paris, December 28, 1877.

My Lord,

THIS afternoon, in obedience to the intimation conveyed to me by your Lordship's despatch No. 721 of yesterday, I put into M. Waddington's hand a copy of the despatch No. 422, also of yesterday, in which you have directed Lord Augustus Loftus to inquire of the Russian Government if the Emperor will entertain overtures for peace.

At the same time I gave M. Waddington your Lordship's despatch to read, and supported to the best of my ability the desire it expresses that the initiative taken in

this matter by Her Majesty's Government may meet with the support of the French Government and of the other neutral Powers.

M. Waddington said that there would be a Council of Ministers to-morrow morning, and that he would then submit the matter to his colleagues, and as soon as possible afterwards make known to me the view taken of it by the French Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

P.S.—I send a copy of this despatch to-day by the messenger, Mr. Johnson, to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

L.

No. 276.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received December 29.*)

(Telegraphic.)
St. Petersburgh, December 29, 1877.

I COMMUNICATED to Prince Gortchakow the substance of your Lordship's telegraphic instruction of the 27th instant.

His Highness charged me to reply to your Lordship's inquiry "that Russia desired nothing (better?) than to arrive at peace; but for that purpose the Porte must address itself to the Commanders-in-chief in Europe and Asia, who will state conditions upon which an armistice can be granted.

(Confidential.)
From what Prince Gortchakow said I am convinced that no foreign mediation will accepted.

No. 277.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received December 29.*)

(No. 584.)
(Telegraphic.)
Constantinople, December 29, 1877.

PORTE has sent a Circular to the Powers informing them that, in consequence of its appeal for collective mediation not having led to any result, it has asked Her Majesty's Government to mediate with Russia.

No. 278.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received December 29.*)

(Telegraphic.)
St. Petersburgh, December 29, 1877.

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW told me this morning that he had sent by post to Count Schouvaloff an answer to your Lordship's Memorandum.

No. 279.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received December 30.*)

(Telegraphic.)
Vienna, December 29, 1877.

I HAVE not felt myself authorized to give Comte Andrassy any information on the subject of your Lordship's Memorandum to Count Schouvaloff, of which a copy was inclosed in your despatch No. 808, and nothing has been said here to show that he is aware of the communication made to Russia. Have I been acting in this matter in conformity with your Lordship's wishes?

No. 280.

Colonel Wellesley to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 30. Confidential.)
Bucharest, December 24, 1877.

My Lord,

THE Emperor of Russia arrived here from Bulgaria on the morning of the 15th instant, and proceeded to Russia on the same evening.

I took leave of His Majesty before he left, and availed myself of that opportunity to mention the desire of the Sultan to have conveyed to Osman Pasha His Majesty's thanks for the services rendered by that General to his country, as also his sympathy with him in his distress.

The Emperor having promised that the Sultan's wishes should be complied with, expressed a hope that the fall of Plevna would lead to a speedy peace based on "suitable conditions."

The Sultan had already, said His Majesty, applied to the Powers for mediation, but the Emperor could not for a moment allow any such intervention on the part of Europe.

He wished the Sultan to apply directly to him, in which case he would be ready to come to terms with him, and then consult the opinions of his allies.

The Emperor laid significant stress on the words "suitable conditions," which conveyed the impression that he was resolved to obtain material compensation for the sacrifices entailed by the war, other than the conditions which Count Schouvaloff communicated to your Lordship in the summer.

On former occasions the Emperor has invariably assured me that he had no intention of even menacing the interests of Great Britain, but during this conversation His Majesty never alluded to England, except to say that he heard from Count Schouvaloff that at a Cabinet Council recently held in London the peace party had been in the ascendant ("avait pris le dessus").

I telegraphed to your Lordship from Poradim the gist of a conversation I had with M. de Hamburger on the subject of Kars, and his opinion respecting the necessity of annexing that fortress.

When his Excellency complained of the tone of the English press since the fall of Kars, I ventured to say that the public in England, being in doubt as to the intentions of Russia, were naturally anxious with regard to the future, and to suggest that, if Russia were openly to disavow any intention of territorial aggrandizement, public opinion in England would, no doubt, be considerably calmed.

To this M. de Hamburger replied that Russia had already promised too much, and that if he were consulted he would use all his influence to prevent the Emperor from binding himself by any further assurances.

With regard to Kars, General Meyentsoff (Chief of the Secret Police) told me that in his opinion the annexation of that fortress was a matter of necessity, and that public opinion in Russia was so strong on this point that the Emperor's throne would be in danger were he to turn a deaf ear to the demands of his people.

The news of the meeting of Parliament in January has had a most sobering effect on the Russians here, who, elated by the fall of Plevna, had already commenced to talk of Constantinople.

The general opinion appears to be that if England declares her policy, Russia will make any concessions in order to avoid the possibility of a conflict.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRED. WELLESLEY.

No. 281.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 30.)

(Telegraphic.)
Rome, December 30, 1877.

I HAVE communicated to Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs your Lordship's despatch instructing Lord A. Loftus to inquire whether the Emperor of Russia will entertain overtures for peace, and expressed hope that the Italian Government will support initiative thus taken by Her Majesty's Government.

His Excellency begged time for reflection. I am to see him again the day after to-morrow.

No. 282.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 30.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Secret.)
Berlin, December 30, 1877.

I LEARN on good authority that Count Andrassy and Prince Bismarck have said (?) that the Russian answer to English mediation should express readiness to make peace, but propose direct negotiations with Turkey.

No. 283.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 480. Secret.)
Berlin, December 25, 1877.

My Lord,

IN the course of a private conversation I had with an old Hungarian friend, who is in a position to see the Emperor and the leading statesmen of Austria frequently, I asked him how he accounted for the subservient policy adopted by Count Andrassy towards Russia and Germany.

My friend replied that the key to it was the conviction prevalent at Court and in the Cabinet that any serious attempt to resist the progress of Russia in the East would give Germany an excuse to take the part of Russia and invade Bohemia, and Italy an excuse to invade the "Trentino."

Austria would then have to defend a line of frontier against Germany, Italy, and Russia, extending from Bregenz to Orsova and even Kronstadt, which was beyond her military strength and power, and her dissolution would precede even that of the Ottoman Empire; whilst by consenting to share in the prospective partition of Turkey she secured peace and a new lease of her otherwise precarious existence at the hands of her two powerful neighbours.

Exaggerated as this dismal view appears, it is not uncommon among elderly Austrians.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 284.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 482. Secret.)
Berlin, December 26, 1877.

My Lord,

I LEARNT on good authority this morning that, after some private correspondence on the subject, Count Andrassy and the German Chancellor had agreed to compel the Turkish Government to appeal directly to the Czar, by throwing every possible impediment in the way of mediation, and discouraging the intervention of the other Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 285.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 488. Confidential.)
Berlin, December 28, 1877.

My Lord,

KNOWING that the Emperor had been somewhat concerned by the warlike tone of the Press in regard to the future policy of Her Majesty's Government, I thought it

desirable to inform Herr von Bülow confidentially that the Turkish Government had, on the 20th instant, signified their readiness to Her Majesty's Government to ask for peace, and that Her Majesty's Government had conveyed this intimation from the Porte, through Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to the Russian Government.

Herr von Bülow, in thanking me, said that he would hasten to submit "this good and important news" to His Majesty the Emperor and to the German Chancellor at Varzin, whose earnest desire, as I well knew, was to see England and Russia agree and act in cordial concert together in regard to Turkey now, and for the peace of Europe generally in the future.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 286.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 480.) *Berlin, December 29, 1877.*

My Lord,

IN obedience to your Lordship's instruction No. 454 of the 27th instant, just received, I have addressed the note of which copy is herewith inclosed to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, communicating to his Excellency a copy of your Lordship's despatch No. 462 of the 27th instant to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh on the subject of the readiness of the Turkish Government to ask for peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 284.

Lord Odo Russell to M. von Bülow.

Berlin, December 29, 1877.

M. le Secrétaire d'Etat,

I HAVE been instructed by Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to communicate to your Excellency copy of a despatch, herewith inclosed, which the Earl of Derby has addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, requesting him to inquire whether His Majesty the Emperor of Russia will entertain overtures for peace.

Her Majesty's Government hope that the initiative thus taken by them may meet with the support of the German Government, as well as of other neutral Powers, who must be equally desirous with Her Majesty's Government to assist in bringing the war to a close.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 287.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 1062. Secret.) *Vienna, December 20, 1877.*

My Lord,

ON receiving this morning your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, I immediately requested an interview with Count Andrassy to communicate to his Excellency the substance of the proposed important instruction to Lord Augustus Loftus which it had transmitted to me, and he replied that he would call at the Embassy late in the afternoon.

As he had been prepared by Count Beust for the nature of the communication which I was to make to him, he brought with him a draft telegram, which he read to me, and which will be forwarded to England to-morrow, deprecating the expediency of Her Majesty's Government making the conditions of peace which were formulated by Russia in June last the basis of such a communication as they propose to make to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, or of their consenting to present these conditions in any form whatever to the Porte. His Excellency said that the clauses in the Memorandum communicated to your Lordship by Count Schouvaloff respecting the future administrative institutions to be given to Bulgaria and the position which that province was to hold in the Ottoman Empire, could not be carried out without leading to an exodus of the whole Turkish population, and could never, therefore, be accepted by the Porte; and that the adoption of such a scheme and the proposed razing of the fortresses would be the first step to the destruction of the Empire and the expulsion of the Turks from Europe; observing, also, that it could not even be attempted to carry it out without a Russian force being left in Bulgaria after the conclusion of peace, an arrangement which he could not permit.

His Excellency said that he was surprised to learn from Count Beust that Her Majesty's Government are under an impression that he had expressed no decided objections to the Russian conditions in question, as his whole correspondence and the instructions respecting them which he had addressed to the Austrian Ambassador in London proved the reverse to have been the case; and it was only, indeed, on Count Beust's informing him that Her Majesty's Government had declined to consider these conditions further, on Russia proposing to extend Bulgaria beyond the Balkans, that he had himself ceased to develop his objections to them. He trusts, therefore, that Her Majesty's Government, with a view to the protection of the common interests of Great Britain and Austria, will reconsider the expediency of making these conditions the basis of any proposal for a mediation which they may address to Russia. He said he has hitherto been of opinion, and still thinks, that neither England nor Austria should intervene, with a view to stop the war, by an offer to mediate between the two belligerents; and a safer course would, in his opinion, be for the Porte to communicate to Russia directly her wish to make peace, while it would, at the same time, be more satisfactory to the military party at St. Petersburgh. If such a step on the part of the Porte were met by proposals for peace on terms as favourable as she could expect to obtain under the circumstances, so much the better, but of that there is no prospect; and the Porte when called upon, as would probably be the case, to accept conditions incompatible with her independence and her future welfare, would naturally turn to the European Powers who have guaranteed the former and are interested in promoting the latter, and that England and Austria might then defend successfully the interests of Turkey, so far as they are identical with their own.

His Excellency, who spoke very warmly at times, hinted that there were two courses open to Austria-Hungary, either to go hand in hand, as he wishes to do, with England to prevent the destruction of the Turkish Empire and the substitution of Russian power in its European provinces, which he is prepared to do if necessary with the great military resources at his disposal, or he will be obliged to provide for the interests of Austria in a different direction.

The war, he said, should be terminated by arrangements between the belligerents themselves; but as the position of Turkey, as existing under a European guarantee, is different from that of other Powers, no peace can be made between them except with the sanction and concurrence of Europe, and more particularly of those Powers who are interested in the maintenance of the Treaty of 1856.

In speaking of the proposal in Count Schouvaloff's Memorandum that Austria should seek compensation in Bosnia and the Herzegovina for the other territorial arrangements suggested, his Excellency mentioned that an offer of these provinces had already been made by the Sultan to the Emperor, and declined by His Majesty; and he said he trusted they would long continue to form part of the Turkish Empire, but the Emperor is the only "heir" into whose hands they can be permitted to pass if the Sultan's sovereignty expires.

With respect to Servia, he said her present proceedings deprived her of any claim on Europe to sanction her territorial aggrandizement, and, referring to a declaration which he had made to the Austrian delegation that she would not be permitted to make conquests in Bosnia or the Herzegovina, he said that the Servian Agent had applied to him five days ago to request his good offices at Constantinople with a view to inducing the Porte to abstain from military operations on the Bosnian frontier, and that he had replied that he could give no answer to such an application until it was made to him in writing; but he proposes, if he receives one, to declare that Servia having made war against Turkey on her own responsibility, Austria-Hungary cannot interfere to prevent the Porte invading her territories wherever it may think fit to do so, and should Servian troops, on the other hand, attempt to make conquests in Bosnia or the Herzegovina, Austria-Hungary would take military measures to prevent them.

I did not fail, in reply to Count Andrassy's observations, to point out to his Excellency that Her Majesty's Government do not intend in their proposed instruction to Lord Augustus Loftus to express any approval of the Russian conditions in question, or to

assume any responsibility for them; and I said it appeared to me that, in the event of Russia wishing them to be communicated to the Porte, they could only be considered as a Russian counter-proposal to the overtures made by the Porte in its note of the 12th instant.

His Excellency argued, however, that any reference whatever to the conditions as a basis for mediation by Her Majesty's Government would place them in the position at Constantinople of having entertained, as not inadmissible, proposals in which every Turkish statesman, or any one thoroughly acquainted with the East and with the circumstances of the European provinces of Turkey, would see an intention to bring about the destruction of the Ottoman Empire.

Many of Count Andrassy's observations were not intended for communication to your Lordship, but I have felt that I could not adequately represent his opinions without reporting some of those which he said were merely addressed to myself, or which he may have intended me to consider as being so.

One thing is, I think, certain, that his Excellency is quite decided to maintain by force, if necessary, in concert with Her Majesty's Government, the interests which it has been agreed to consider as common to Great Britain and Austria, and that he is, therefore, most anxious that no concession should be made to Russia diplomatically which might, in his opinion, weaken the hands of the two Governments hereafter, or diminish their influence as friendly Powers in the councils of the Sultan.

I ought to add also, in explanation of his views, that he considers that the real difficulties of Russia will begin when she wishes to make peace, whether it be on the northern or southern side of the Balkans, and other Powers will have a right to intervene.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 288.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received December 31.*)

(No. 910. Secret.)
Vienna, December 26, 1877.

My Lord,

WHILE I felt that it would be satisfactory to myself, I thought it might be equally so to your Lordship were I to ascertain from Count Andrassy whether I had correctly represented, in my despatch No. 902, Secret, of the 20th instant, the views by which his future policy in the Eastern question will be guided; and I therefore read to him to-day the extracts of that despatch of which the inclosure is a copy.

His Excellency admitted that they fairly reported the opinions and intentions which he had expressed to me; observing, however, that he had spoken in strict confidence, and trusted that his statements would be kept secret, as he had hitherto considered all that has passed between the two Governments—the only Ministers here or at Pesth who are acquainted with the understanding between them being the Prime Ministers of Austria and of Hungary. He has, therefore, been much surprised, he said, at a telegram from London, published in a Vienna paper of this day, stating that overtures made to him by the English Government had been declined by a very long argument ("un long refus motivé"), to the effect that the Austrian Government would not admit as a basis for negotiation the conditions of peace put forward by Russia in June.

These conditions, he said, were not generally known, and he was at a loss to divine from whence the author of the telegram in question could have derived his information.

He then went on to speak of his own position, stating he would maintain his past reserve as long as circumstances would justify his doing so, being determined to act loyally towards all parties.

He said the promises which he had received from Russia to respect Austrian and European interests had not yet been broken, and his attitude towards her had consequently never varied during the vicissitudes of the war; but when the Prince of Montenegro, "as the ally of Russia," commenced hostilities against Albania, he told M. de Novikow that His Highness was free to carry on any operations he might think fit there, but that at the peace he must be satisfied with the increase of territory which the Powers had recommended the Porte to grant to him, and that Austria-Hungary can only recognize him as the Chief of a petty Principality on her frontier, permitted to exist on the terms which will suit her convenience.

On M. de Novikow also informing him that the Prince had addressed a complaint to the Emperor of Russia against the Austrian Agent at his head-quarters, he answered that the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary resided either at Vienna or at Pesth, and if Prince Nicholas had complaints to make of His Majesty's Agents, they must be addressed to one of those capitals.

With regard to Servia, he also stated to M. de Novikow, in equally distinct terms, that any aggression on Bosnia or the Herzegovina would be immediately repelled by Austria; but as he is unwilling to make a declaration, or take measures which would show a distrust of Russia, he will maintain a strict neutrality until she has clearly shown that she will not abide by her engagements. If, however, she is led by her military successes to forget them, as, indeed, it now appeared probable, "si la poudre lui monte à la tête," she will find that, while he himself deceives no one, he is determined not to be deceived, and that Austria-Hungary, if he is the Emperor's Minister, will not only insist on the maintenance of the proposals made to her, but will show that she has the power to enforce it.

He said he had no fear as to the future; that he had been calm while the danger was distant, and is equally so now that it is at hand, and he will await patiently the course of events until the interests of Austria demand his interference.

He spoke also with confidence of the policy of Prince Bismarck, observing that, although his Highness may render small services to Russia, such as he had just done by preventing a European mediation, he felt assured that he has no intention of sacrificing European interests in the East to Russian ambition, and he believed, therefore, that it would be impolitic to act towards him as if he were unfriendly to the interests of Austria or of England.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 288.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.

(Secret.)
(Extract.)
Vienna, December 20, 1876.

COUNT ANDRASSY said he has hitherto been of opinion, and still thinks, that neither England nor Austria should intervene with a view to stop the war by an offer to mediate between the belligerents; and a safer course would, in his opinion, be for the Porte to communicate to Russia directly her wish to make peace, while it would be at the same time more satisfactory to the military party at St. Petersburgh.

If such a step on the part of the Porte were met by proposals for peace on terms as favourable as she could expect to obtain under the circumstances, so much the better, but of that there is no prospect; and the Porte, when called upon to accept conditions incompatible with her independence and her future welfare, would naturally turn to the European Powers, who have guaranteed the former, and who are interested in promoting the latter; and that England and Austria might then defend successfully the interests of Turkey, as far as they are identical with their own.

The war, he said, should be terminated by arrangements between the belligerents themselves; but as the position of Turkey, as existing under a European guarantee, is different from that of other Powers, no peace can be made between them except with the sanction and concurrence of Europe, and more particularly of those Powers who are interested in the maintenance of the Treaty of 1856.

One thing is, I think, certain, that his Excellency intends to act in concert with England to prevent the destruction of the Turkish Empire, and the substitution of Russian power in its European Provinces, and that he is prepared, if necessary, to defend, with the great military resources at his disposal, the interests which it has been agreed to consider as common to Great Britain and Austria; and that he is, therefore, most anxious that no concessions should be made to Russia diplomatically which might, in his opinion, weaken the hands of the two Governments hereafter, or diminish their influence as friendly Powers in the councils of the Sultan.

He appears also to consider that the real difficulties of Russia will begin when she wishes to make peace, whether it be on the northern or southern side of the Balkans, and other Powers have a right to intervene.

No. 289.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 611. Confidential.) *Vienna, December 27, 1877.*

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to receive, last night, your Lordship's telegram informing me that the Turkish Ambassador has been instructed to request Her Majesty's Government to inquire of the Government of Russia if the Emperor will entertain overtures for peace, and I immediately acquainted Count Andrassy with the decision which has been taken at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 290.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 31, night.)

Paris, December 31, 1877.

(Telegraphic.)

THE French Government cannot associate itself officially with the representation made by Her Majesty's Government at St. Petersburgh, nor identify itself with any step which might possibly be a prelude to active intervention. But the French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh will be instructed to-night, by telegraph, to impress privately upon the Emperor the earnest desire of the French Government that the war may be ended at once, and to endeavour to induce His Majesty to state the conditions of peace.

The Ambassador will also be directed to entreat His Majesty to avoid arousing the susceptibility of England, and to be conciliatory in the form in which he deals with the English representation.

No. 291.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 31, night.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December 31, 1877, 6 P.M.*
(Confidential.)

IN acquainting me to-day with the Russian suggestion that the Porte should apply for an armistice to the Russian commanding officers in Bulgaria and Armenia, M. Orczy expressed an opinion that if an armistice is arranged and negotiations for peace ensue, Russia will not object to the other Powers taking part in them.

No. 292.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received December 31, night.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December 31, 1877, 6·30 P.M.*
(Confidential.)

THE Turkish Ambassador communicated to-day to M. Orczy a telegram from Constantinople thanking Count Andrassy for his answer to the Turkish Circular, and in which the Porte, while appreciating his reason for declining to mediate, expresses its satisfaction that Austria intends to take part in any eventual negotiation for peace, inasmuch as it trusts her influence will be exerted in favour of the maintenance of Treaty of Paris, by which the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire are guaranteed.

No. 293.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

Foreign Office, January 1, 1878.

(Telegraphic.)

IN reply to your telegram of the 29th ultimo, you are authorized to communicate quite confidentially to Count Andrassy the substance of the Memorandum delivered by me to Count Schouvaloff.

No. 294.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 2, 1878.)

(No. 1053.) *Paris, December 31, 1877.*

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to report to your Lordship, in my despatch No. 1048 of the 28th instant, that I had communicated to M. Waddington the desire of Her Majesty's Government that the initiative they had taken in inquiring whether the Emperor of Russia was willing to listen to overtures for peace might meet with the support of the French Government and of the other neutral Powers.

M. Waddington has made known to me this evening the sentiments of the French Government on the subject.

The substance of what he has said to me is as follows:—

Nothing can be done officially by France in the matter. She cannot associate herself officially with the representation made by Her Majesty's Government to the Emperor of Russia. In fact, she cannot identify herself with any step which might by any possibility be a prelude to active intervention.

The French Government is not, however, less desirous than that of Her Majesty to see the war brought to an end; and instructions will be sent to-night to General Leflô, the French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to seek an opportunity of impressing upon the Emperor, in a private unofficial manner, this earnest desire of this Government.

General Leflô will also be directed to use, in the same unofficial manner, all the influence at his command in order to obtain from the Emperor a declaration of the conditions on which His Majesty would be willing to make peace.

General Leflô will, moreover, be desired to represent earnestly to the Emperor the importance of being courteous and conciliatory in the form in which he deals with the representations of Her Majesty's Government; and the General will be requested to entreat His Majesty, in the name of the French Government, to avoid taking any step likely to irritate public opinion in England.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 295.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 2.)

(No. 1.) *Paris, January 1, 1878.*

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to transmit to your Lordship yesterday by telegraph a summary of the verbal communication made to me that evening by M. Waddington in answer to the request of Her Majesty's Government that the support of France might be given to the initiative they had taken in inquiring whether the Emperor of Russia was willing to listen to overtures for peace.

I proceed to report to your Lordship in more detail the substance of what M. Waddington said to me.

He told me that he had come to me to let me know the view taken by himself and his colleagues of the communication I had made to him; and he proceeded to observe that while the French Government had the strongest reasons for desiring the restoration of peace, they could not depart from their policy of reserve. It would, he said, be impossible for them to associate themselves officially with the representation made by Her Majesty's Government. They must carefully abstain from identifying themselves with any step which might by possibility be a prelude to active intervention.

But while France abstained from putting herself prominently forward, she might,

M. Waddington hoped, as a Power entirely disinterested, and as a friend to all parties, express her sentiments privately and unofficially at St. Petersburgh with some good effect. He intended, therefore, to send at once to General Leflô instructions to seek a suitable opportunity of expressing upon the Emperor Alexander the earnest desire of the French Government for the restoration of peace; and of pointing out to His Majesty the special reasons which rendered it important to France that war should cease, as well as the advantages which might accrue to Russia from agreeing to reasonable conditions of peace.

With a view to bringing on a commencement of negotiations, General Leflô would be instructed to exert, in an unostentatious and unofficial manner, any influence which France might possess at St. Petersburgh, in order to obtain from the Emperor a declaration of the terms on which His Majesty would be willing to conclude peace, and in order to induce His Majesty to make those terms as moderate as possible.

M. Waddington went on to say that there was nothing the French Government more deprecated than a misunderstanding between England and Russia. The French Government were desirous, as the common friends of both, to remove every possible cause of irritation between them. With this object General Leflô would be requested to entreat the Russian Government to be moderate in form as well as in substance, and to beg the Emperor, in the name of the French Government, to be courteous and conciliatory in the form of dealing with the English representation, and especially to avoid any step likely to give offence to public opinion in England.

M. Waddington observed that the instructions to General Leflô had not yet been actually drawn up, so that he was not able to tell me exactly how they would be worded, but the substance of them would, he said, be what he had just described. He should, he told me in conclusion, have them put into form directly he returned to his office, and they would be despatched by telegraph in the course of the night.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYOSS.

No. 296.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January 2.*)

(No. 1.) *Constantinople, January 1, 1877.*
(Telegraphic.)

M. ORLOFF informed Turkish Ambassador at Vienna yesterday that Prince Gortchakow has replied to the overture of Her Majesty's Government to the effect that Russia also desired to stop the effusion of blood and the re-establishment of peace, but that to obtain these objects an armistice was necessary, and that to obtain one the Commanders of Turkish armies in Europe and Asia should address themselves to the Russian Etats-Majors. Porte is very desirous to know whether such is the case.

No. 297.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January 2.*)

Belgrade, January 1, 1877.
(Telegraphic.)

DEEP impression produced here by reported offer of mediation between belligerents by Her Majesty's Government, though particulars unknown. Servians still draw hopes from alleged sympathy for them of Germany and visible one of the Italian Government.

The new French Representative has arrived, and is accredited to Prince Milan, who is at war with his Suzerain.

No military news since taking of Pirgot was confirmed, but the engagements before that place turn out to have been more sanguinary than was admitted.

No. 298.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January 2.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, January 1, 1877.*

THE Russian Ambassador has communicated Prince Gortchakow's answer to Lord A. Loftus, to the effect that Russia desires no better than to make peace, but that in order to ascertain conditions for a suspension of hostilities the Turkish Commanders in Europe and Asia must address themselves to the Russian head-quarters, and that Russia will not admit mediation, even in a disguised form.

In view of this answer Italian Government feels it can do nothing under present circumstances in favour of peace. Minister for Foreign Affairs is most anxious to know impression of Her Majesty's Government respecting Russian reply.

No. 299.

Prince Gortchakow to Count Schouvaloff.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Count Schouvaloff, January 2, 1878.*)

St. Pétersbourg, le 16 Décembre, 1877.

LORD DERBY a bien voulu communiquer à votre Excellence un écrit où il exprime l'avis qu'une occupation de Constantinople par les troupes Russes, même d'un caractère temporaire et uniquement pour des considérations militaires, pourrait porter le sentiment public de l'Angleterre, basé sur une juste appréciation des conséquences à appréhender, à exiger des mesures de précaution dont le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique s'est jusqu'à présent senti justifié de s'abstenir. Il devrait, dans ce cas, se considérer comme libre d'adopter toute ligne de conduite qui lui paraîtrait nécessaire pour la protection des intérêts Britanniques; mais il compte sincèrement et espère avec confiance que toute nécessité semblable sera écartée par une entente entre les deux Gouvernements.

Je transmets à votre Excellence un écrit en réponse à cette communication. Veuillez le placer sous les yeux de Lord Derby.

Notre auguste Maître est toujours disposé à se prêter à toute entente destinée à maintenir les bonnes relations entre les deux pays.

C'est dans cet ordre d'idées que nous croyons devoir signaler à l'attention de Lord Derby que des prévisions semblables à celles qu'il exprime, si elles sont connues à Constantinople, sont précisément de nature à rendre inévitables les éventualités contre lesquelles le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique a pour but de se prémunir. Si les Turcs acquièrent la conviction qu'une menace ou une attaque dirigée contre Constantinople ferait sortir l'Angleterre de la neutralité, leur calcul sera naturellement de prolonger leur résistance malgré son évidente inutilité, de manière à forcer la Russie à poursuivre ses opérations jusque dans la capitale. Il en serait autrement, selon toute probabilité, si l'attitude et le langage du Cabinet de Londres étaient de nature à bien persuader la Porte qu'elle n'a aucune assistance à attendre du dehors.

En pareil cas, elle se résignerait plus promptement à cesser une résistance qui ne peut qu'aggraver sa position.

Recevez, &c.

Inclosure in No. 299.

Memorandum.

LES vues du Cabinet Impérial, quant aux conséquences éventuelles de la guerre, auxquelles l'Angleterre s'intéresse particulièrement, n'ont nullement varié.

Une acquisition de Constantinople n'entre pas plus aujourd'hui qu'avant la guerre dans les intentions de Sa Majesté l'Empereur. Sa Majesté Impériale persiste à considérer le sort de cette capitale comme un intérêt commun ne pouvant être réglé que par une entente générale. Sa Majesté Impériale persévère également dans l'opinion que, si la possession de Constantinople devait être mise en question, elle ne saurait appartenir à aucune des Grandes Puissances de l'Europe.

Toutefois, Sa Majesté l'Empereur se croit en droit et en devoir d'obliger la

Turquie à conclure une paix solide, sérieuse, offrant des garanties efficaces contre le retour des crises permanentes qui troublent le repos de la Russie et celui de l'Europe.

Ces crises ne peuvent cesser qu'avec l'état de choses qui les engendre.

L'Europe entière a reconnu l'impossibilité de sa prolongation.

C'est pour y mettre un terme définitif que Sa Majesté l'Empereur a pris les armes et exposé ses peuples à des lourds sacrifices.

Ces sacrifices, supportés avec dévouement, font d'autant plus un devoir à Sa Majesté de ne point s'arrêter avant d'avoir obtenu un résultat qui préserve la Russie du renouvellement de semblables épreuves, qui satisfasse ses sentiments Chrétiens, garantisse son repos, et consolide en même temps la paix de l'Europe.

Ce but doit être atteint. Si l'obstination ou l'illusion de la Porte obligeaient Sa Majesté à poursuivre les opérations militaires, afin de dicter une paix répondant au but hautement proclamé de la guerre, Sa Majesté Impériale s'est toujours réservée et continue à revendiquer à cet égard la pleine liberté d'action qui est le droit de tout belligérant.

Mais après les assurances formelles qu'elle a maintes fois données, et qu'elle réitère, Sa Majesté ne saurait comprendre en quoi les intérêts Anglais, tels qu'ils ont été définis par les communications du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, pourraient être lésés par la marche que Sa Majesté poursuit et doit poursuivre jusqu'à ce que le but de la guerre soit atteint.

Le Cabinet Impérial, appréciant l'intention amicale qui a dicté la communication de Lord Derby au Comte Schouvaloff, et animé du même désir de maintenir les bonnes relations entre les deux pays, ne croit pas pouvoir mieux y répondre qu'en priant le Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique de vouloir bien préciser plus clairement quels sont les intérêts Anglais qu'il juge pouvoir être affectés par les éventualités de la guerre dans les limites où les assurances du Cabinet Impérial les ont circonscrites, afin de rechercher en commun les moyens de concilier ces intérêts avec ceux de la Russie, que Sa Majesté l'Empereur a le devoir de sauvegarder.

No. 300.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 20.)

Foreign Office, January 3, 1878.

Sir,

I APPROVE the language employed by you at your interview with the Sultan, as reported in your Excellency's despatch No. 1432 of the 13th ultimo, when His Majesty requested you to state that he was anxious to know whether Her Majesty's Government would endeavour to ascertain whether the Emperor of Russia would consent to an armistice.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 301.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 3.)

(Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, January 3, 1878.

MY confidential informant tells me that Count Andrassy and Prince Bismarck have advised Prince Gortchakow to adhere firmly to the principle of direct negotiation between Russia and Turkey, but at the same time to invite Her Majesty's Government to explain with more precision than heretofore what the interests of England are (which ?) Her Majesty's Government expect Russian Government to respect.

Count Andrassy, Prince Bismarck, and Prince Gortchakow have further agreed that Russian conditions of peace to be communicated to Turkey should be so framed as to avoid giving umbrage to France and Italy, or any cause for serious objection or interference to England.

No. 302.

Server Pasha to Musurus Pasha:—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha, January 3.)

Constantinople, le 1 Janvier, 1878.

(Télégraphique.)

JE vous communique ci-après, pour votre information, la réponse du Comte Andrassy à notre démarche du 12 Décembre:—

"Nous appelons de nos vœux la cessation de l'effusion du sang et la fin de la guerre. A nos yeux, la Circulaire Ottomane n'offre cependant pas base à des négociations de nature à amener le rétablissement de la paix. Les devoirs de la neutralité ne permettent pas de prendre l'initiative de médiation entre les deux belligérants, qui nous placerait dans la nécessité de formuler des propositions de paix. Par conséquent, le Cabinet Impérial et Royal se réserve sa participation, une fois que des négociations seraient entamées entre les belligérants. Il se réserve également l'influence légitime qui lui revient comme Puissance garante et limitrophe, au règlement définitif de l'état de choses en Orient."

Voici le télégramme que j'ai adressé hier à Esad Bey en réponse à cette communication du Cabinet de Vienne:—

"L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie m'a communiqué la réponse de Son Excellence le Comte Andrassy à ma Circulaire du 12 de ce mois. Je l'ai immédiatement soumise à Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan. Veuillez dire au Comte Andrassy que le Gouvernement Impérial apprécie, à leur juste valeur et avec reconnaissance, les importantes déclarations contenues dans ce document, et qu'il a d'autant plus lieu d'en être satisfait qu'elles démontrent, à nos yeux, la ferme intention du Cabinet de Vienne d'exercer son influence pour le maintien du Traité de Paris, qui garantit l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman."

No. 303.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 10. Most Confidential.)

Foreign Office, January 3, 1878.

Sir,

THE Austrian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon and read to me a telegram from Count Andrassy, of which he was not authorized to give me a copy, commenting upon the conversation which had passed between Count Beust and myself on the 28th ultimo, and of which an account is given in my despatches to your Excellency No. 421, Most Confidential, and No. 422, Secret, of that date.

Count Andrassy began by offering his thanks for my expression of willingness to consult with the Austrian Government as soon as the Russian conditions of peace were known. Until then his Excellency agrees with me that an exchange of views beyond what has already taken place would be a mere discussion "en l'air."

Alluding to the observation I had made as to the general impression that prevailed of the policy of Austria, Count Andrassy says that he did not understand the nature or ground of my misgivings. His Excellency refers to a despatch of the 14th July last (which I presume to be the telegram communicated to me by Count Beust on that day as stated in my despatch No. 245, Most Confidential, of the same date) as showing the attitude taken up by the Cabinet of Vienna from the beginning with regard to the terms of peace. He does not admit that Russia and Germany have any right to say that Austria will always follow their lead, though he admits that it is true that neither of those Powers have anything to fear from Austria so long as they adhere to the assurances Austria has received. The Cabinet of Vienna had stated to both Governments in question what were the results of the war which Austria could not accept, and further, that she reserved the right to make her voice heard at the conclusion of peace.

The alliance of the three Emperors, Count Andrassy continues, never had the Eastern complications specially in view. Its object was the maintenance of peace, and in that respect it has rendered substantial services. But where such large issues and such incalculable eventualities are concerned as are involved in the present contest, a previous understanding would have been impossible.

It says Count Andrassy, the British Government are compelled to make some statement as to the policy of Austria, they are free to say that the Austrian Government have explicitly declared their neutrality to be conditional, and have reserved full liberty of action for the protection of Austrian interests.

Count Andrassy concludes by the expression of a hope that the idea of "some

mysterious understanding" between Austria and Russia will be finally dismissed from the minds of the British Cabinet.

I thanked Count Beust for this communication, which I said I would at once lay before my colleagues.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 304.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, January 3, 1878.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 454 of 17th (?) ultimo, Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that, although the Emperor fully shares the wish of Her Majesty's Government for the early termination of the war, the absolutely neutral and reserved attitude his Government has hitherto observed does not even now admit of any deviation in favour of mediation between the belligerents.

No. 305.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 4, 1878.*

HER Majesty's Government have received with satisfaction the declaration made to your Excellency by Prince Gortchakow to the effect that Russia desired nothing better than to arrive at peace.

In reply to the further statement of Prince Gortchakow that to accomplish this purpose it is desirable that there should be an armistice, and that this temporary cessation of hostilities should be effected through the instrumentality of the Commanders-in-chief in Europe and Asia, Her Majesty's Government have to remark that, although the Porte has not made any application for an armistice, they would not be unwilling to convey the suggestion of the Government of Russia to Turkey, provided the communication were framed in a manner which, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, might lead to a practical result.

It is evident that the projected armistice, if it is to be effectual, must include operations in Asia, as well as in Europe, and would not be complete without the concurrence of Servia and Montenegro. But in this case it is clearly indispensable that the conditions on which it is to be granted should be discussed between the two Governments, and not merely between Generals commanding a portion of the contending forces.

Her Majesty's Government invite the consideration of Prince Gortchakow to this modification of his Highness' views.

They fully appreciate the distinction recognized by him between an armistice, which may well be arranged between the immediate belligerents, and the conditions of peace in which other Powers also are interested.

No. 306.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.)
(Confidential.) *Foreign Office, January 4, 1878, 8 A.M.*

WITH reference to telegram of the 27th ultimo, the following communications have passed between Her Majesty's Government and the Russian Government.*

You may inform the Porte confidentially and unofficially. Her Majesty's Government reserve any official communication to the Porte for the present.

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* See Nos. 270 and 305.

No. 307.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Lyons.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 4, 1878, 8 A.M.*

WITH reference to my telegram of the 27th ultimo, the following communications have passed between Her Majesty's Government and the Russian Government.†

You may inform the Government to which you are accredited confidentially of the substance of these communications.

No. 308.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 27.) *Foreign Office, January 4, 1878.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch to your Excellency No. 911 of the 27th ultimo, I transmit herewith, for your information, a copy of a telegram which I have received from Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh,‡ in reply to my despatch to him No. 462 of the 27th ultimo, in which I instructed his Excellency to inquire of the Russian Government if the Emperor would entertain overtures for peace.

This telegram contains the answer of Prince Gortchakow to the inquiries made by Lord A. Loftus in obedience to my instructions; and I now inclose a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to his Excellency, stating the views of Her Majesty's Government, in reply.§

Your Excellency may inform the Porte, confidentially and unofficially, of the substance of this despatch; but Her Majesty's Government reserve any official communication to the Porte for the present.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 309.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 5.) *Foreign Office, January 4, 1878.*

My Lord,

I RECEIVED on the 29th instant your Excellency's telegram of that date, reporting that you had communicated to Prince Gortchakow the substance of my despatch No. 462 of the 27th instant, in which I instructed you to inquire of the Russian Government if the Emperor was prepared to entertain overtures for peace, and that his Highness had charged you to reply that Russia desired nothing better than to arrive at peace, but that for that purpose the Porte must address itself to the Commanders-in-chief in Europe and Asia, who would state the conditions upon which an armistice could be granted.

Her Majesty's Government have received with satisfaction Prince Gortchakow's declaration that Russia desired nothing better than to arrive at peace.

With regard to his Highness' further statement that to accomplish this purpose it is desirable that there should be an armistice, and that this temporary cessation of hostilities should be effected through the instrumentality of the Commanders-in-chief of the Russian armies in Europe and Asia, Her Majesty's Government have to remark that, although the Porte has not made any application for an armistice, they would not be unwilling to convey the suggestion of the Government of Russia to Turkey, provided that the communication were framed in a manner which, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, might lead to a practical result.

It is evident that the projected armistice, if it is to be effectual, must include operations in Asia as well as in Europe, and would not be complete without the concurrence of Servia and Montenegro. But in this case it is clearly indispensable that the conditions on which it is to be granted should be discussed between the two Governments, and not merely between Generals commanding a portion of the contending forces.

Her Majesty's Government invite the consideration of Prince Gortchakow to this modification of his Highness' views.

They fully appreciate the distinction recognized by him between an armistice, which

* Identic telegrams to Lord Odo Russell, Sir A. Buchanan, and Sir A. Paget.
† See Nos. 270 and 305. ‡ No. 276. § No. 309.

may well be arranged between the immediate belligerents, and the conditions of peace, in which other Powers also are interested.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 310.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 5, 1878.)

(No. 1512.) *Constantinople, December 25, 1877.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that, in pursuance of the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, which reached me late last night, I called this morning upon the Grand Vizier and asked his Highness whether the Sultan was willing that Her Majesty's Government should inquire of the Russian Government if the Emperor would entertain overtures for peace. His Highness replied that, not only was the Sultan willing that such an inquiry should be made by England, but that a request had already been addressed to Her Majesty's Government through Musurus Pasha in that sense, as some days had now passed since the Porte had made an appeal to the Powers Signatories of the Treaty of Paris for their mediation, to which no answer had been received, and the Sultan was most anxious to put an end as soon as possible to a war which was bringing such terrible calamities upon his people.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 311.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 5, 1878.)

(No. 913. Confidential.) *Vienna, December 27, 1877.*

My Lord,

THE Turkish Ambassador, who called upon me this morning, stated that though he has been daily pressing Count Andrassy for an answer to the Circular of the Porte of the 12th instant, he has not yet succeeded in obtaining one.

I met, however, in the evening, Baron Orczy, who informed me that Essad Bey had had an interview in the course of the day with Count Andrassy, when his Excellency gave him a verbal answer to the Circular, accompanied by a Memorandum stating the reasons why he is unable to accept the proposal for a mediation which has been made by Turkey, as it could not lead to a practical result; but expressing, at the same time, his intention to take part in any negotiations hereafter which the Porte may induce Russia to enter into for the re-establishment of peace.

Since writing the foregoing I have received the copy of Lord Odo Russell's telegrams of yesterday, which was forwarded to me by your Lordship, and I presume that the answer now given to the Turkish Ambassador may be intended to carry out the agreement therein referred to as having been come to between the Governments of Austria and Germany.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 312.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 5, 1878.)

(No. 918.) *Vienna, December 31, 1877.*

My Lord,

BARON ORCZY informed me to-day that the Russian Government had suggested, in reply to the communication made to them by Lord Augustus Loftus of the Porte's readiness to ask for peace, that an application should be made for an armistice directly by the Turkish Government to the Russian Commanding Officer in Bulgaria and Armenia; and his Excellency at the same time expressed an opinion that if an armistice is arranged, Russia will not object to the other Powers taking part in the negotiations for peace which may subsequently be opened.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 313.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 5, 1878.)

(No. 920. Confidential.) *Vienna, December 31, 1877.*

My Lord,

I HAVE been informed, confidentially, by the Turkish Ambassador that he communicated to-day to Baron Orczy a telegram from Constantinople, thanking Count Andrassy for his answer to the Turkish Circular, and in which, while the Porte states that it fully appreciates his reasons for declining their proposal for a mediation, it expresses its satisfaction at learning that Austria-Hungary will take part in any eventual negotiations for peace, and its confidence that her influence will be exerted to maintain the Treaty of Paris, which guarantees the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 314.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 5.)

(No. 2.) *Vienna, January 2, 1878.*

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to receive on the 30th instant your Lordship's despatch No. 419 of the 27th ultimo, and I immediately sent it to Count Andrassy in the letter of which I inclose a copy, and I communicated at the same time to his Excellency a copy of your Lordship's despatch to Lord Augustus Loftus of the 27th ultimo, instructing him to acquaint the Russian Government with the readiness of the Porte to ask for peace, and to inquire if the Emperor will entertain overtures for that object.

In requesting also that your Lordship's despatch might be returned to me, I stated that his Excellency would learn from it that I was to express to him the hope of Her Majesty's Government that the initiative which they have taken may meet with the support of Austria-Hungary and of the other neutral Powers.

On the following day I received a letter from Baron Orczy returning me your Lordship's despatch, and merely stating that the instruction to Lord Augustus Loftus had been delivered to Count Andrassy.

In speaking to me afterwards, confidentially, of my communication to Count Andrassy, Baron Orczy observed that his Excellency, previously to receiving a copy of your Lordship's instruction to Lord Augustus Loftus, had fully acquainted Her Majesty's Government, through Count Beust, with his views on the subject to which it relates.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 314.

Sir A. Buchanan to Count Andrassy.

Vienna, December 30, 1877.

Dear Count Andrassy,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Excellency a despatch which I have received this morning from Lord Derby, requesting me to communicate to you a copy of a despatch addressed by his Lordship to Lord Augustus Loftus on the 27th instant, instructing him to inquire of the Russian Government if the Emperor will entertain overtures for peace, the Turkish Government having signified their readiness to ask for peace.

Your Excellency will also learn from Lord Derby's despatch to myself, which I request may be returned to me, that I am to express the hope of Her Majesty's Government that the initiative which they have taken may meet with the support of the Austro-Hungarian Government and of the other neutral Powers, who must be equally desirous with Her Majesty's Government to assist in bringing the war to a close.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 315.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 5.)

(No. 3. Confidential.)
Vienna, January 3, 1878.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 1st instant, I have this day acquainted Count Andrassy, confidentially, with the substance of the Memorandum which you communicated to Count Schouvaloff on the 13th ultimo, relative to the objections of Her Majesty's Government to the military occupation of Constantinople by Russia, and I found that his Excellency had already received a telegram respecting it from the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to whom it had been read by Prince Gortchakow.

I said that your Lordship had probably intended me to communicate it to his Excellency on my receiving it ten days ago, but that as I had special instructions as to the use I might make of it, I had delayed doing so until I could ascertain your Lordship's wishes on the subject.

In thanking me for acquainting him with the step taken by Her Majesty's Government, he said they were already aware that he did not think it necessary for Austria-Hungary to take a similar one; and I answered that it was doubtless in consequence of their intention to make such a communication to Russia that they had recently thought it expedient to inquire whether any change had taken place in his views respecting the possible advance of the Russians to the Bosphorus.

His Excellency having then observed that nothing can be more clearly stated than the points on which Austria-Hungary is prepared to insist, he said that in his last instruction to Count Beust respecting them he had expressed a hope that the sea-serpent might not appear again, by which I presume his Excellency meant that no doubts should hereafter arise as to the interests which Austria-Hungary intends to defend.

I answered that I felt assured Her Majesty's Government could have no doubts on that subject, but, as a proof of the falsehoods circulated upon it, I might mention that Colonel Wellesley, who had arrived to-day on his way to London, has been led to believe that Austria-Hungary would not object to the razing of the fortresses in Bulgaria, and, as I said, I had told him if Russia entertained such a hope she would probably be disappointed. His Excellency answered that she cannot be disappointed, as she is already aware of Austria's serious objections to such a measure; but some persons may have possibly thought it expedient to circulate such rumours at the Russian head-quarters.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 316.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 5.)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.)
Constantinople, January 4, 1878.

TURKISH Minister for Foreign Affairs has shown me a telegram from Musurus Pasha, reporting that at his (interview) with you to receive Russian answer, your Lordship stated that England had not undertaken to mediate, but merely to obtain from Russia whether she was prepared to make peace. This, his Excellency said, had caused him great surprise, as the Porte had formally applied to Her Majesty's Government to offer their mediation, and fully understood its request had been acceded to. His Excellency appeared much discouraged. I understood from him that the Porte was disposed to accept an armistice, and that Musurus Pasha would be instructed to ask you to ascertain upon what basis Russian Government would agree to one; leaving the details to be settled by commanders of respective armies, and that as a basis for peace Porte proposed the Treaty of Paris, which guaranteed the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. However, before sending this answer he was going to consult Grand Vizier, and it may, therefore, be changed or modified. Count Zichy tells me that he has reason to believe that Russia would ask for an armistice on moderate and acceptable terms, but I cannot say whether this is only his individual opinion or whether it is founded on information from Vienna.

No. 317.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 5.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Confidential.)
Vienna, January 5, 1878.

I HAVE communicated to Count Andrassy the substance of your Lordship's answer to Prince Gortchakow (? 's) suggestion that the Porte should ask for an armistice, and his Excellency seemed to appreciate the reason why Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the discussion of conditions of an armistice should take place between the two Governments. He said, however, that if Servia and Montenegro declined accepting armistice, the Porte could crush them with the force which an armistice with Russia would place at its disposal, but he seemed to concur in an observation on my part that, as the Porte could not be expected to apply to these Principalities, the Russian Government alone could take measures for including them in any armistice which may be arranged.

On my stating to his Excellency that Lord A. Loftus had no hope of Russia accepting mediation, he said that will not prevent us taking part in the negotiations for peace as Guaranteeing Powers.

No. 318.

Server Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha, January 5.)

(Télégraphique.)
Constantinople, le 5 Janvier, 1878.

REÇU télégramme No. 7 Spécial. Le Gouvernement Ottoman accepte en principe l'armistice proposé par la Russie. En attendant que les bases de cet armistice puissent être arrêtées conformément à l'opinion exprimée par Lord Derby, la Sublime Porte prie le Cabinet de St. James de vouloir bien engager le Gouvernement de Russie à envoyer à ses commandants en Europe et en Asie l'ordre de s'abstenir de toute opération militaire. Nous sommes prêts à transmettre, de notre côté, des ordres dans ce sens à nos commandants. Veuillez faire part de ce qui précède à Lord Derby.

No. 319.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 5.)

(Telegraphic.)
Paris, January 5, 1878, 5·15 P.M.

FRENCH Minister for Foreign Affairs says that, from information he has rec d Sophia appears to be in imminent danger of being surrounded, and the Turkish military position to be such as to render it important to the Porte to seek an armistice without delay.

(Most Confidential.)
He seems to think that Russia herself desires peace, but that Prince Bismarck endeavours to prolong the war.

No. 320.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 5.)

(Telegraphic.)
St. Petersburgh, January 5, 1878, 5·25 P.M.

I COMMUNICATED to Prince Gortchakow this morning your telegram of yesterday (received last evening) on the question of peace overtures. I transposed the telegram for the safety of the cypher, retaining your own phrases throughout, and I left this document as an *aide-mémoire* in Prince Gortchakow's hands. His Highness replied that he maintained the answer given to me on the previous occasion, namely, that the Porte must address itself directly, through some one of note and confidence, to the Commanders-in-chief in Asia and Europe. His Highness observed that he had not asked for an armistice, but had indicated this mode of arriving at peace, and that military commanders were instructed to state conditions on which an armistice would be agreed to. I found his Highness immoveable on this point.

No. 321.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 6, 1878.)

(No. 442.) *Rome, December* 30, 1877.

My Lord,

I HAVE had the honour to receive this morning your Lordship's despatch No. 417 of the 27th instant, inclosing a copy of your Lordship's despatch No. 462 of the 27th instant, to Lord A. Loftus, instructing his Excellency to inquire of the Russian Government whether His Majesty the Emperor of Russia will entertain overtures for peace, and directing me, in communicating a copy of this despatch to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to express the hope of Her Majesty's Government that the initiative thus taken by Her Majesty's Government may meet with the support of the Italian Government and of the other neutral Powers, who must be equally desirous with Her Majesty's Government to assist in bringing the war to a close.

I lost no time in calling upon M. Depretis, to whom I read, first your Lordship's despatch to me, and then your instructions to Lord A. Loftus, of which I placed a copy in his Excellency's hands, while stating that I trusted his Excellency would enable me to inform your Lordship that the Italian Government would give its support to the step now taken by Her Majesty's Government.

M. Depretis received the communication in a manner which gave me the impression that he approved the course which had been taken by the Porte in making an appeal for peace through Her Majesty's Government, and also the action which had thereupon been taken by Her Majesty's Government; but he said that in an affair of such importance—entirely new, too, as he was to his present office—he should like, before replying to the request for the support of the Italian Government, to have a little time for reflection; and it was consequently arranged that I should call upon him again on this subject the day after to-morrow.

M. Depretis having expressed a wish that the substance of your Lordship's despatch to me should be communicated to him in a note, I immediately on my return home addressed him one, in the terms of which I have the honour to inclose herewith a copy.

In the course of the conversation which ensued during this interview, I made use of such arguments as I thought most calculated to ensure the object desired by Her Majesty's Government. I called his Excellency's particular attention to the conciliatory tone of your Lordship's communication to the Russian Government, pointing out that anything which could possibly arouse susceptibility had been studiously avoided, that it simply made known to the Russian Government the desire which had been manifested by the Porte to make peace, and inquired whether the Emperor would be willing to entertain overtures for this purpose.

It must, therefore, be looked upon, I said, as a service which Her Majesty's Government was doing to Russia as well as to Turkey, if, as we were bound to believe until we were informed to the contrary, the former Power was really desirous of putting an end to the carnage and misery which was now going on, and I could not doubt that the Italian Government would wish to be associated in so good a work.

I reminded M. Depretis of the assurances I had at various times received from him of his desire that Italy and England should act together in Eastern affairs, as he considered their interests identical, and I ventured to observe that I did not think he could better inaugurate his reign at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs than by giving a proof of this desire on the present occasion.

M. Depretis, in a general reply, said that no Power was more desirous of peace than Italy, that there would be nothing changed in her foreign policy except the name of the person who directed it, that Italy had no ambitious designs or aggressive views in regard to any Powers, and that all the reports which had been circulated on this subject were entirely without foundation. His only object, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, he might say, would be, first, the care of the interests of his country, and next to contribute, as far as was in his power, to the restoration and maintenance of peace and the general good relations between the Powers. He should always be glad, he said, to act in concert with England, of whose unambitious views he was fully persuaded, and with whose interests in the East he considered those of Italy to be in accordance, but it was only natural that, before replying to my present communication, he should wish for a little time for reflection.

M. Depretis having asked if I knew why Parliament was called together earlier than usual, I said that I was without information on this subject; but that I could take upon myself to say, from what I knew of the general policy of Her Majesty's Government, that

I was convinced they desired nothing so much as the maintenance of the neutral position they had held since the beginning of the war, and that they would not abandon it, unless the course of events appeared to them to menace British interests.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. PAGET.

Inclosure in No. 321.

Sir A. Paget to M. Depretis.

M. le Ministre, *Rome, December* 30, 1877.

IN compliance with the instructions which I have received from Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy of a despatch which the Earl of Derby has addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, requesting his Excellency to inquire of the Russian Government whether His Majesty the Emperor of Russia will entertain overtures for peace.

In communicating this despatch to your Excellency, I have been further directed by Lord Derby to express the hope of Her Majesty's Government that the initiative thus taken by Her Majesty's Government may meet with the support of the Italian Government and of the other neutral Powers, who must be equally desirous with Her Majesty's Government to assist in bringing the war to a close.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 322.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 6.)

(No. 2.) *Rome, January* 1, 1878.

My Lord,

IN compliance with the arrangement reported in my despatch No. 442 of the 30th ultimo, I called this afternoon on M. Depretis, in order to learn whether the Italian Government would support the initiative for peace taken by Her Majesty's Government at St. Petersburgh.

On my making the inquiry, his Excellency asked me if I was not acquainted with the answer which had been returned to Lord Augustus Loftus by Prince Gortchakow, and, on my negative reply, he sent to Count Tornielli to bring him the text of it, as it had been communicated to him by the Russian Ambassador on the afternoon of the 30th instant, and he read it to me in nearly the following words:—

"La Russie ne désire pas mieux que de conclure la paix, mais pour savoir les conditions pour une suspension d'hostilités, il faut que les Commandants Turcs en Europe et en Asie s'adressent aux quartiers-généraux Russes; et que la Russie n'admettrait pas une médiation même déguisée."

M. Depretis said that, in view of this answer, it was obvious the Italian Government could do nothing under present circumstances to bring about peace.

His Excellency said he was most anxious to know the impression this answer had made on Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 323.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 6.)

(No. 3. Confidential.) *Rome, January* 1, 1878.

My Lord,

IN my conversation this afternoon with M. Depretis I asked him if he had any notion of the conditions of peace which Russia intended to put forward, to which his Excellency replied that he had not.

I took the opportunity of alluding to a conversation which I had with his Excel-

lency last summer, when, I said, he appeared to think that any change in the present regulations for the navigation of the Straits and Bosphorus by ships of war could with difficulty be admitted. (See my despatch No. 265, Confidential, of the 30th June, 1877.)

M. Depretis answered that he still continued to consider this a matter of the gravest importance, but that until it was known what changes it was proposed to introduce, it was impossible to say how they should be received.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 324.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 14. Most Confidential.) *Paris, January 5, 1878.*

My Lord,

M. WADDINGTON said to me this afternoon that he had reason to believe that in Russia there existed a real desire to bring the war to an end. He added, however, most confidentially, that it seemed doubtful whether it would suit Prince Bismarck to see Russia extricated so soon from the difficulties in which the war involved her, and that there was reason to fear that the obstacles to peace might come from Berlin rather than from St. Petersburgh.

M. Waddington observed, moreover, that if the Turks were wise they would do all in their power to obtain an armistice without a moment's delay. He believed that Sofia was in immediate danger, and was in fact on the point of being surrounded; and, in short, the information which reached him respecting the military situation of the Turks led him to think that they had everything to lose and nothing to gain by prolonging hostilities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 325.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 15.) *Paris, January 5, 1878.*

My Lord,

I HAD yesterday the honour to receive your Lordship's instruction to make known confidentially to the French Government the substance of the communications which have passed between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Russia with regard to the inquiry which Her Majesty's Government made, on behalf of the Porte, as to whether the Emperor would entertain overtures for peace.

In execution of this instruction, I went this afternoon to M. Waddington, and recited to him fully and accurately the substance of the statement made in answer to that inquiry by Prince Gortchakow to Lord Augustus Loftus, and the substance of the communication which your Lordship instructed Lord Augustus Loftus yesterday to make to Prince Gortchakow in reply to that statement.

M. Waddington said that his instructions to the French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh were to exert discreetly but earnestly all the influence at his command, in order to promote the restoration of peace. He added that his instructions to the French Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople were in the same sense.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 326.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 16. Most Confidential.) *Paris, January 6, 1878.*

My Lord,

WHEN I had communicated to M. Waddington this afternoon the substance of the reply of Her Majesty's Government to Prince Gortchakow's communication, he expressed

satisfaction with the passage respecting the distinction between an armistice which might be arranged between immediate belligerents and conditions of peace in which the other Powers also were interested.

M. Waddington proceeded to tell me that he had heard a rumour from Berlin which had not a little disquieted him. It was in fact, he said, affirmed that it was the intention of Prince Bismarck that the conditions of peace between Russia and Turkey should be settled by the three Emperors without the participation of the Western Powers. He had no official information to this effect; and, indeed, in conversation, Prince Orloff, the Russian Ambassador here, seemed always to take it for granted that England and France would be consulted on points, such for instance, as the opening or closing of the Dardanelles, which were of European concern. Nevertheless, considering the source from which the present rumours came, he could not but attach some importance to it.

This, M. Waddington went on to say, was a matter which concerned France and England alike. A most painful impression would be produced among the French people if any attempt were made to settle the Eastern question without giving their country a full share in the negotiation. The French were not at all prepared to admit that the terms should be arranged behind their backs, and simply communicated to them when the acceptance or rejection of them by the Western Powers could have no practical effect. Of course he did not pretend in any way to commit the French Government beforehand, but still he could not help expressing a doubt whether France, even in her present weak state, would submit to be set aside in this way. At all events, it was a matter with regard to which France and England might naturally be expected to act together. He begged me to call your Lordship's particular attention to it, and to say that he should be very much obliged if you would from time to time communicate to him any information bearing upon it which you might receive.

M. Waddington repeated that he had sent instructions to the French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to do all in his power to induce the Russian Government to make peace. He said that the intelligence he received led him to believe that the Russian Government in fact felt the need of peace, and was really desirous of attaining it. Indeed, he had reasons to fear that the difficulties would be raised rather at Berlin than at St. Petersburgh. It was not to be doubted that Russia had been egged on by Prince Bismarck to engage in war, and it might not suit the Prince that she should so soon extricate herself from it. Besides which, it seemed, he must confess, plain to him that the Prince was endeavouring to involve England in war also. This was one of the grounds for apprehending that attempts might be made to exclude England and France from participation in the negotiations for settling the future condition of the East. Prince Bismarck might think that this exclusion would cause a resentment in England which would make the English people choose to go to war rather than submit to it.

M. Waddington again requested me to put Her Majesty's Government on their guard against endeavours to set the Western Powers aside in the settlement of questions of European interest.

He concluded by begging that what he had said might be treated as most strictly confidential.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 327.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 11 (?). Secret.) *Pera, January 6, 1878.*

(Telegraphic.)

WITH reference to your despatch No. 912, Most Secret, am I to communicate unreservedly with Count Zichy? He has hinted to me that he is acquainted with the secret communications that have passed between Count Andrassy and your Lordship, but without mentioning their nature, and expressed a desire that there should be no reserve between us, and that we should act cordially together.

I have not thought it expedient to encourage his overtures without first consulting you.

No. 328.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January 7, 1878.*)

(No. 731.) *St. Petersburgh, December 29, 1877.*

My Lord,

ON the receipt, on the 28th instant, of your Lordship's telegraphic instruction of the 27th instant, I requested an interview with Prince Gortchakow, who received me this morning.

I informed his Highness that Her Majesty's Government considered that the time had arrived when it has become their duty to make an effort to bring to a close the war unhappily existing between Russia and Turkey.

I stated that, in a communication made to Her Majesty's Government on the 26th instant, the Turkish Government had signified their readiness to ask for peace, and Her Majesty's Government felt that it is incumbent on them to make the Russian Government acquainted with this intimation from the Porte.

That with this view I had been instructed by your Lordship to inquire of the Russian Government if the Emperor will entertain overtures for peace.

I added, in the terms of your Lordship's instructions, that Her Majesty's Government were confident that His Imperial Majesty will see in this initiative on their part a proof of their sincere desire to second the wishes which they cannot doubt that His Majesty feels strongly for the prevention of further bloodshed.

Prince Gortchakow received this communication in a courteous and friendly spirit, and charged me to reply to the inquiry of Her Majesty's Government that Russia desired nothing better than to arrive at peace ("d'arriver à la paix"), but that for this purpose the Porte must address itself to the Imperial Commanders-in-chief in Europe and Asia, who will state the conditions on which an armistice can be granted.

Prince Gortchakow promised to inform Count Schouvaloff of the communication I had made by your Lordship's instructions, and of the reply he had given.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 329.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January 7, 1878.*)

(No. 732. Confidential.) *St. Petersburgh, December 29, 1877.*

My Lord,

PREVIOUS to waiting on Prince Gortchakow to-day for the purpose of carrying out your Lordship's telegraphic instruction of the 27th, I embodied the terms of your Lordship's telegram in a note, of which I annex a copy, addressed to his Highness, with the intention of placing it in his hands.

After reading it and delivering it to Prince Gortchakow, and receiving his reply, I requested his Highness to give me his reply in writing, or to address it to Count Schouvaloff for communication to your Lordship. Prince Gortchakow observed that as I had been instructed to address a verbal inquiry, he was of opinion that it was better to avoid a written communication (d'éviter des écritures), and that as I had received his reply there was no necessity for the note.

I replied that I had taken this course to cover my responsibility, but that I was ready to confine my communication to a verbal inquiry if his Highness would communicate it to Count Schouvaloff, together with the reply with which he had charged me. This his Highness promised to do, and as he had read the note I made no objection in assenting to his proposal.

In the course of our conversation Prince Gortchakow referred to the previous appeal addressed by the Porte on the 12th instant to the several Governments, observing that it had been declined by Germany and Austria, and, as he believed, by the other Governments.

His Highness expressed his doubts as to the sincerity of the Porte for peace, stating that it had not yet given up all hopes of receiving aid from England. His Highness seemed also to think that the sudden convocation of the English Parliament might reanimate these hopes, and thus indispose the Porte to those concessions on which alone peace could be obtained. Prince Gortchakow further observed that no peace could be durable without efficient guarantees for the future government of the Christian provinces,

for which, in his opinion, the Turkish Constitution did not suffice, and he stated very explicitly that without sufficient guarantees there would be no security against the renewal of the former state of misgovernment.

He remarked that the principle of centralisation introduced by Ali and Fuad Pashas had been in great mistake, and that until this system was abolished, there could be no amelioration of government. His Highness strongly maintained that Russia had no wish or intention of destroying the Turkish Empire in Europe. On the contrary, the principal aim of the Imperial Cabinet was to maintain the Sultan at Constantinople, placing the Christian provinces under his suzerainty, as were Roumania and Servia.

If, said His Highness, the Turkish Empire in Europe should break up, England, and England alone, will have been the cause of it.

I strongly repelled this charge, stating that Russia, and Russia alone, was responsible for this needless war and for all the consequences of it.

Prince Gortchakow mentioned an armistice or suspension of hostilities as necessary in order that the conditions of peace might be agreed upon, but it was evident to me that he discards any idea of peace being concluded under foreign mediation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 329.

Lord A. Loftus to Prince Gortchakow.

St. Petersburgh, December 28, 1877.

Mon Prince,

I AM directed by the Earl of Derby, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to state to your Highness that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the time has arrived when it has become their duty to make an effort to bring to a close the war unhappily existing between Russia and the Porte.

In a communication made to Her Majesty's Government on the 26th instant, the Turkish Government have signified their readiness to ask for peace, and Her Majesty's Government feel that it is incumbent on them to make the Russian Government acquainted with this intimation from the Porte.

With this view I am instructed by the Earl of Derby to inquire of your Highness if His Majesty the Emperor will entertain overtures for peace.

Her Majesty's Government are confident that His Imperial Majesty will see in this initiative on their part a proof of their sincere desire to second the wishes which they cannot doubt that His Imperial Majesty feels strongly for the prevention of further bloodshed.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 330.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January 7, 1878.*)

(No. 734.) *St. Petersburgh, December 29, 1877.*

My Lord,

IN the course of conversation this morning Prince Gortchakow referred to a memorandum which he had received from your Lordship through Count Schouvaloff, and stated that he had sent off by post to Count Schouvaloff an answer to it in the same form, as a memorandum without signature.

His Highness said that it was expressed in the same friendly tone which characterized your Lordship's communication, and he appeared hopeful that it would lead to an understanding between the two Governments.

He spoke of England in the most friendly terms, and of the kind and hospitable reception he had received there some years ago, adding that he had sent his son as First Secretary to the Embassy in London in order that he might study the institutions of a country for which he had the highest admiration.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 331.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January 7, 1878.*)

(No. 742. Confidential.) *St. Petersburgh, December 25, 1877.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Prince Gortchakow returned to this capital on the 22nd instant, and has resumed the direction of the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

I called on his Highness this morning, and after an exchange of compliments I stated that I had no communication to make to his Highness, nor had I received any official information bearing on the war.

Prince Gortchakow observed that the moment was one of considerable importance. He said that he could not understand the cause of the feverish alarm and agitation in England. "We have," said his Highness, "been frank and straightforward with England. At the commencement of the war we were told of British interests. Well, when they were submitted in form, we gave the most explicit assurances that these interests should be duly respected, and they were considered as satisfactory to your Government. There was the Isthmus of Suez; the road to India; the possession of Constantinople. What could we do more? We cannot beforehand state that we shall not cross the Balkans; that we may not be under the necessity of advancing to Constantinople (although we have no wish to do so), in order to force our enemy to sue for peace. But we have given solemn assurances that we have no intention of keeping possession of Constantinople; and we have further pledged ourselves to respect any British interests which may be supposed to be endangered. Now," continued his Highness, "what are those British interests which all of a sudden are springing up and producing this alarm? Name them to us, and we shall then know what is their nature, their value, and how they can best be safe-guarded."

I replied to his Highness that every country must be the judge of its own interests, and that their safeguard and protection could not be confided to other hands but its own. It could not be denied that the passage of the Balkans by a colossal Russian army constituted a danger which threatened the existence of the Turkish Empire in Europe, and it was therefore incontestably the duty of England, in view of such a contingency, to be prepared for the protection of her interests, but that I could not see that the performance of this duty intimated any intention of hostility, or even bore the character of an inimical act towards Russia.

Prince Gortchakow refuted the idea that the existence of the Turkish Empire in Europe would be threatened by the advance of a Russian army across the Balkans, and added that should it so happen, it was England and England alone that would be the cause of it.

"If," said his Highness, "you should determine to occupy Gallipoli, or any other point, and to send your fleet into the Bosphorus, you will be encouraging Turkey to prolong the resistance, and you will be thereby participating in her hostility to Russia."

To this I could not agree, and I again repeated that in my opinion the measures which might be necessary for the protection of our interests did not in any way imply hostility to Russia, but could only be considered of a precautionary and defensive nature.

I observed to his Highness that I could not understand why such vehement invectives were launched against England by the Russian press, whilst during the whole course of the war our attitude had differed in no respect from that of Austria and Germany.

Prince Gortchakow replied that he could not admit that we had maintained the same attitude as Austria and Germany.

The two Imperial Governments had acted and were acting in perfect accord, and in harmony with that of Russia.

He stated that the policy of the Austrian Cabinet had been consistent throughout, and that he placed entire confidence both in Austria and Germany. As regarded France, his Highness observed, her attention has been absorbed in her internal affairs, and could not therefore be directed to external questions; but he had received very satisfactory assurances from the new French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

England, therefore, he said, was quite isolated.

I replied to his Highness that it was not the first time that England had taken her own line of policy, and that she was sufficiently great and powerful to defend her own interests alone.

His Highness then said that he had always supported a pacific solution of the Eastern Question. "I have always," said his Highness, "admired and respected England, and I have always wished to maintain amicable relations with her; but I can never prostrate myself before her ('mais me prosterner devant elle jamais!')"

I then observed that there appeared to exist a certain confidential and secret understanding between the Three Imperial Cabinets which was concealed from the other European Governments, and that this circumstance, whether correct or not, was calculated to create distrust and suspicion.

Prince Gortchakow replied with some warmth that he could not make any confidential communication to England, because he felt that it would be immediately transmitted to Constantinople. His Highness referred to the state of parties in England, and said that he did not believe that a policy of action which was apparently the object of the Prime Minister would have the general support of the nation. I endeavoured to undeceive his Highness in this belief, stating that he must not indulge in the same illusions which led to such regrettable consequences at a former period. To this his Highness replied that "he made to himself no illusions, and had no occasion for them, as the course he had to pursue was clear and perfectly defined. He had always been frank and truthful, and had never indulged in finesse, which he considered neither suitable to nor in consonance with the interests and dignity of a great Power."

This conversation (which was conducted throughout in a very friendly tone and manner) referred chiefly to generalities.

I consider the important points of it to be as follows:—

1. An anxiety on the part of Prince Gortchakow to ascertain what will be the course taken by Her Majesty's Government as regards the protection of British interests, and a certain feeling of alarm respecting it.

2. The reference to Austria and Germany seemed to confirm the existence of a secret understanding between the Three Imperial Courts in regard to the future results of the war. This understanding may probably refer to the concessions to be demanded of Turkey, and the unwillingness to communicate them may possibly arise from a fear that they would be unacceptable to England.

3. The statement of Prince Gortchakow, although vague, that the occupation of Gallipoli by England, and the entry of the English fleet into the Bosphorus, would be interpreted by Russia as affording protection to Turkey, and as a participation with Turkey in hostility to Russia.

4. My endeavours to impress on his Highness that England is bound to protect her own interests if she considers them menaced, and not to confide that protection to others, and that any action taken by England with that view did not necessarily pourtray any act inimical to Russia.

I trust that the language I have held will be approved by Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 332.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January 7, 1878.*)

(No. 495. Secret.) *Berlin, December 29, 1877.*

My Lord,

THE same person who told me, on the 26th instant, as I telegraphed to your Lordship, that Count Andrassy and Prince Bismarck were agreed to oppose mediation and promote direct negotiations between Turkey and Russia, assures me this evening that they have now again telegraphically agreed with Prince Gortchakow that his answer to the offer of mediation from Her Majesty's Government should express the readiness of the Emperor of Russia to make peace, but propose that the preliminaries should be negotiated between the Turkish and Russian military authorities in Turkey.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 333.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 3. Secret.)
Berlin, January 3, 1878.

My Lord,

A WELL-INFORMED friend tells me confidentially that he has reason to believe that Count Andrassy and Prince Bismarck have advised Prince Gortchakow, in his communications with Her Majesty's Government, to adhere to the principle of direct negotiation between Russia and Turkey, but to invite her Majesty's Government at the same time to explain frankly, and with more precision than heretofore, what the interests of England and Her Majesty's Government require Russia to respect.

He also thinks that Prince Bismarck, Count Andrassy, and Prince Gortchakow have agreed that it will be prudent so to frame the conditions of peace to be communicated to the Porte that they may not give umbrage to the Governments of France and of Italy, and afford no cause for serious objection or interference to England.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 334.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 5.)
Berlin, January 3, 1878.

My Lord,

IN obedience to your Lordship's instruction No. 454 of the 17th ultimo, inclosing copy of your Lordship's No. 562 of the same date to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, inquiring whether the Emperor of Russia would entertain overtures for peace, I addressed the note, copy of which was inclosed to your Lordship in my despatch No. 489 of the 29th ultimo, to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, expressing the hope that the initiative thus taken by Her Majesty's Government to bring the war to a close would met with the support of the German Government.

I now have the honour to transmit herewith translation of the answer I have just received from his Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 334.

M. von Bülow to Lord Odo Russell.

(Translation.)
Berlin, January 3, 1878.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's communication of the 29th ultimo, inclosing copy of an instruction given by the Earl of Derby on the 27th of the same month to Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, and I lost no time in laying the same before His Majesty the Emperor and King, my most august Sovereign,

His Majesty received the news contained in these documents with interest. He shares with the British Government the expression of a lively wish that the war now raging between Russia and Turkey may soon come to an end by the conclusion of peace.

The absolutely neutral and reserved attitude which has given the measure of German policy since the outbreak of the war—a policy not directly concerned in Eastern affairs—will, however, not even now permit the Government of His Majesty, at the instigation of one of the belligerents, to initiate a mediation with the other, or to take any part in such a step.

The Imperial Government has already expressed itself in this sense in answer to the request addressed to it by the Porte in its Circular of the 12th ultimo, respecting the entering into preliminary peace negotiations with the Russian Cabinet.

Whilst I have the honour to inform your Excellency of this perception of the situation on the part of the Imperial Government, I avail, &c.

(Signed) V. BULOW.

No. 335.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 7. Confidential.)
Berlin, January 5, 1878.

My Lord,

IN obedience to the instruction conveyed to me by your Lordship's telegram of yesterday's date, I informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs, confidentially, of the substance of the communications which have passed between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Russia, through Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, on the subject of the armistice Russia is willing to grant to Turkey.

The German Government had already been made acquainted with the nature of these communications through their Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, but Herr von Bülow was, nevertheless, much obliged to your Lordship for authorizing me to let him know the modifications Her Majesty's Government had suggested to Prince Gortchakow's views.

His Excellency said that he had no reason to doubt the sincerity of Prince Gortchakow's desire to meet the views of Her Majesty's Government, which, to judge from the Earl of Carnarvon's recent speech, were animated by a conciliatory spirit well calculated to bring about a satisfactory agreement between England and Russia. Nothing, his Excellency said, could give greater satisfaction to the German Government than the realization of such an agreement between those two great Powers.

I replied that the influence of the German Government could be beneficially exercised in bringing about the agreement they desired, for it should not be forgotten that England had interests in Turkey which Her Majesty's Government would know how to protect under all circumstances.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 336.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 8. Secret.)
Berlin, January 6, 1878.

My Lord,

AUTOGRAPH letters have recently been exchanged between the three Emperors, the contents of which are not known, but the effects of which has been to alarm the German Emperor in regard to the maintenance of the general peace of Europe.

In consequence His Majesty sent his favourite Aide-de-camp, Count Lehndorf, wh is a personal friend of Prince Bismarck, to Varzin, to talk over the situation, and ask him what he thought was likely to happen.

Count Lehndorf has now returned, and as far as I have been able to ascertain the answer he brought from the Chancellor to the Emperor was to the following effect:—

"Prince Bismarck sees no cause of alarm for Germany in the present situation, and, for his own part, is quite satisfied with the course events are taking. He is glad England has approached Russia to facilitate the negotiation of an armistice and the conclusion of peace. He feels sure that Russia will meet England in a conciliatory spirit, for it is in her own interest to do so. He hopes, therefore, that the present exchange of ideas between England and Russia will lead to a practical understanding in regard to their respective interests in Turkey.

"If it does not, and the war continues, he sees no reason why Germany sh depart from her present neutrality, since the war does not affect her interests. And if things came to the worst, and England's interests compel her to go to war with Russia, it will be best for Germany and Austria not to interfere, but to remain strictly neutral while England and Russia fight it out, as the neutral Powers have hitherto done in regard to Turkey and Russia.

"All things considered, it is best for Germany that the Powers concerned should now settle the Eastern question once for all, than put it off by compromises for the present, and live in expectation of another Eastern war in the future."

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 337.

Server Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha, January 7.)

Constantinople, le 5 Janvier, 1878.

(Télégraphique.)

JE m'empresse de compléter ma dépêche télégraphique d'hier. Ainsi que Lord Derby en a informé le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, la Sublime Porte, en s'adressant à l'Angleterre, n'avait pas proposé un armistice; sa Seigneurie nous communique par conséquent la réponse de la Russie sur ce point. En effet, nous avons demandé tout simplement la médiation de l'Angleterre, et nous avons lieu de considérer notre demande comme acceptée par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique par le fait même que Lord Derby a bien voulu transmettre à l'Ambassadeur Anglais à St. Pétersbourg notre dépêche à ce sujet en date du 26 Décembre. Ainsi qu'il résulte de mon télégramme d'hier, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a accepté en principe l'armistice proposé par la Russie; et, en attendant que les bases en soient arrêtées, nous avons exprimé le désir de voir les armées des deux parties belligérantes s'abstenir de toute opération militaire. Pour ce qui est de ces bases, il faudrait, comme Lord Derby l'a déclaré dans sa dépêche à Lord Loftus, que les deux Gouvernements de la Turquie et de la Russie s'entendent au préalable entre eux pour les déterminer afin que l'armistice fût d'une application pratique. Toutefois, la Sublime Porte, n'étant pas en communication avec la Russie, ne serait-il pas plus à propos et plus naturel que le Cabinet de St. James veuille bien arrêter avec celui de St. Pétersbourg les bases principales de l'armistice?

Une fois ces bases déterminées et acceptées par la Sublime Porte, nous donnerons immédiatement aux Commandants des armées Ottomanes en Europe et en Asie l'ordre de s'entendre avec les Commandants des armées Russes sur les détails de l'armistice. Il va sans dire que, le désir de la Russie de voir la cessation de l'effusion du sang également constaté, l'armistice ne saurait avoir pour but que le rétablissement de la paix. Il est donc évident que les conditions de l'armistice seront arrêtées en même temps que la base des négociations pour la paix, base qui est le Traité de Paris garantissant l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire. Quant à la Serbie et au Monténégro, une suspension d'hostilités pourrait être conclue avec ces Principautés.

Veuillez soumettre cette dépêche à son Excellence Lord Derby, qui voudra bien, je n'en doute pas, convenir, dans son esprit de haute équité, de la justice des considérations y contenues.

No. 338.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 29.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 7, 1878.

MUSURUS PASHA has left with me a telegram from Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that the Porte had reason to suppose that Her Majesty's Government had accepted the office of mediation, and proposing that we should settle with Russia the principal bases of the armistice which the Porte has accepted in principle.

I told his Excellency, in reply, that this was impossible, as I felt sure that no such proposal addressed to the Russian Government would meet with a favourable reply, and I pointed out that it was not the fact that England had accepted the position of a mediator; we had simply offered to inquire whether the Emperor of Russia would entertain overtures of peace.

I took occasion again to remind the Turkish Ambassador, as on a previous occasion, that we had declared at the outset our intention of maintaining neutrality, except on certain conditions which we had defined as involving British interests.

No. 339.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 30. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, January 7, 1878.

Sir,

THE Turkish Ambassador called upon me to-day for a reply to a telegram from Server Pasha of the 5th instant, which he had left in my hands yesterday, and of which a copy is inclosed herewith.

The principal object of this communication is to suggest that Her Majesty's Government should come to an understanding with that of Russia as to the principal basis of an armistice.

I told his Excellency that this was impossible, as I felt sure that no such proposal addressed to the Russian Government would meet with a favourable reply, and it was useless to take a step which we know beforehand could have no result. I pointed out further, that it was not the fact that England had accepted the position of a mediator in the quarrel. Her Majesty's Government, I said, had simply offered to inquire whether the Emperor of Russia would entertain overtures for peace.

In the course of some further conversation that passed between us, I took occasion again to remind the Turkish Ambassador that our language had never varied from the beginning of the war to the present time. Her Majesty's Government had declared their intention of maintaining neutrality except under certain conditions which we had clearly defined, and in regard to which we believed British interests to be concerned. I thought it right, I said, once more to repeat this warning, which I had given very often before, in order that no false hopes might be raised.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 340.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 7, at night.)

(No. 15 A. Most Secret.)
(Telegraphic.)

Pera, January 7, 1878, 7·30 P.M.

RUSSIANS are making the greatest efforts to advance on all sides, and information has been just received that they have turned Shipka on the left and are approaching Kyzanlik. Turkish forces are much scattered, and are withdrawing in many cases in disorder. An armistice is of the utmost urgency, even if only for twenty days or a month, in order to give time to reorganize Turkish army, otherwise serious disasters may be expected. Sultan sent to me this morning to say that he was at a loss to know what to do, as a strong party was urging him to address himself at once to Russia. He asked me my personal opinion as to whether he could expect any aid from England, and as to the probability of an armistice. I replied that the only advice I could give was that he should wait for the reply of Russia to your last communication. I held out no hope of help. I earnestly (hope?) that I shall hear from you without delay decision of Russia, as the state of affairs is very grave.

No. 341.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 4.)

Rome, January 5, 1878.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to receive yesterday your Lordship's telegram dated the 4th instant, relating to communications which had passed between your Lordship and Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh since the 27th ultimo, and in compliance with your Lordship's instructions, I communicated yesterday afternoon to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the substance of these communications in a confidential Memorandum of which I have the honour to inclose herewith a copy.

M. Depretis had already received a very accurate report of your Lordship's instructions of the 3rd instant to Lord Augustus Loftus from General Menabréa, whose telegram he was kind enough to read to me.

M. Depretis said he might possibly see the Russian Ambassador, on whom I believe he was intending to call, and that he should certainly express the hope that Prince Gortchakow would enter into the views put forward by Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. PAGET.

Inclosure in No. 341.

Substance of Telegram from the Earl of Derby, dated January 4, 1878.

(Confidential.)

IN reply to the communication from Her Majesty's Government of the 27th ultimo, inquiring if the Emperor of Russia would entertain proposals for peace, Prince Gortchakow informed Lord A. Loftus, on the 29th ultimo, that Russia desired nothing better than to arrive at peace, but that for that purpose the Porte must address itself to the Commanders-in-chief in Europe and Asia, who will state the conditions upon which an armistice can be granted.

Lord A. Loftus has been instructed (3rd January) to express the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government with Prince Gortchakow's declaration to the effect that Russia desired nothing better than to arrive at peace, and he is also to state that although the Porte has not made any application for an armistice, they would not be unwilling to convey the suggestion of the Government of Russia to Turkey, provided the communication were made in a manner which, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, might lead to a practical result.

The projected armistice must, of course, include operations in Asia as well as in Europe, and as each would not be complete without the concurrence of Servia and Montenegro, it is indispensable that the conditions on which it is granted should be discussed between the two Governments, and not merely between the Generals commanding portions of the contending forces. Her Majesty's Government invite the attention of Prince Gortchakow to this modification of his Highness' views.

Her Majesty's Government fully appreciate the distinction recognized by him between an armistice which may well be arranged between the immediate belligerents and the conditions of peace in which other Powers also are interested.

No. 342.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 8, 1878, 11·15 A.M.*

HER Majesty's Government have received and considered Prince Gortchakow's reply to their suggestion conveyed in your Excellency's telegram of the 5th instant.

They understand from it that the Russian commanders-in-chief have received from the Central Government the instructions necessary to enable them to discuss the terms on which an armistice can be concluded. Under these circumstances, the conditions which seemed to Her Majesty's Government essential are practically fulfilled, and they are ready to convey Prince Gortchakow's message to the Porte, and to advise the latter to send delegates to the Russian head quarters similarly commissioned to negotiate an armistice.

No. 343.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 8, 1878, 11·15 A.M.*

YOUR Excellency is now authorized to make the following official communication to the Porte:—

Her Majesty's Government have received from the Emperor of Russia a reply to their inquiry whether the Emperor would be willing to entertain overtures for peace.

Prince Gortchakow has stated "that Russia desired nothing better than to arrive at peace; but for that purpose the Porte must address itself to the Commanders-in-chief in Europe and Asia, who will state conditions upon which an armistice can be granted."

Her Majesty's Government thereupon suggested that the conditions for an armistice would be better discussed between the two Governments than between Generals commanding a portion of the forces, and that it would not be complete without the concurrence of Servia and Montenegro.

Prince Gortchakow has answered that he had not asked for an armistice, but had indicated this mode of arriving at peace, and that military commanders were instructed to state conditions on which an armistice could be agreed to.

Her Majesty's Government have stated that they understand the military commanders to have received from the Central Government their instructions, and that the suggestion of Her Majesty's Government is thus practically fulfilled.

Under these circumstances Her Majesty's Government would suggest to the Porte the expediency of sending delegates to the Russian head-quarters similarly commissioned to negotiate an armistice, which Musurus Pasha has already expressed the willingness of the Porte to accept in principle.

No. 344.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 8, 1878, 11·20 A.M.*

WITH reference to my other telegram of this day, Her Majesty's Government conclude that the Emperor of Russia will take the necessary measures to include Servia and Montenegro in the contemplated armistice.

No. 345.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 8, 1878.*

AM I to understand from your telegram of yesterday that Her Majesty's Government can do no more towards helping Turkey to obtain an armistice and peace, and that she must make the best conditions she can with Russia? If so, it would be better to tell her so clearly at once; at present the Sultan is still looking to England, and is unwilling to throw himself entirely into the arms of Russia. Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs told me last night that unless they learnt within a few hours that through the good offices of Her Majesty's Government at St. Petersburgh there is a prospect of an immediate armistice, Sultan will be compelled to address himself directly to Russia. In such case, Minister for Foreign Affairs said he would resign, as he had hitherto strenuously supported an alliance and friendship with England. My position here is most difficult, and I venture to ask your Lordship for instructions as to the course that I should pursue: as the question now really comes to this: is England prepared to abandon her influence and interests in the East to Russia? Unless an armistice is concluded, judging from what I learn from the Sultan, the Minister of War, Mehemet Ali Pasha, and other sources, I have little hope of Turks being able to resist for any length of time a Russian advance even upon Constantinople.

No. 346.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 8.) *Foreign Office, January 8, 1878.*

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's telegram of the 5th instant, reporting that you had informed Prince Gortchakow of the substance of my despatch No. 5 of the 4th instant on the subject of the overtures for peace made by the Porte through Her Majesty's Government.

His Highness stated to you, in reply to this communication, that he maintained the answer embodied in your Excellency's telegram of the 29th ultimo, namely, that the Turkish Government must address itself directly through some persons of note and confidence to the Commanders-in-chief of the Russian armies in Europe and Asia. Prince Gortchakow further observed to you that he had not asked for an armistice, but had merely indicated this mode of arriving at peace, and that the Russian Military Commanders had been instructed to state the conditions on which Russia could agree to an armistice.

Her Majesty's Government understand from this reply on the part of Prince Gortchakow, that the Russian Commanders-in-chief have received from the Central Government the instructions necessary to enable them to discuss the terms on which an armistice can be concluded. Under these circumstances, they consider that the conditions which appeared to them essential in order to give effect to Prince Gortchakow's suggestion for an

armistice have been practically fulfilled; and I have accordingly to instruct your Excellency to inform his Highness that Her Majesty's Government are ready to convey to the Porte his message, as reported in your telegram of the 29th ultimo, and to advise the Porte to send delegates to the Russian head-quarters, with the same powers to negotiate an armistice as have been given to the Russian Commanders-in-chief.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 347.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 10.) *Foreign Office, January 8, 1878.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 9 of this day, informing you that Her Majesty's Government are prepared to advise the Porte to send Delegates to Russian head-quarters to negotiate an armistice, I have to observe to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government conclude that the Emperor of Russia will take the necessary measures to include Servia and Montenegro in the contemplated armistice.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 248.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 32.) *Foreign Office, January 8, 1878.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 9 of the 27th ultimo, forwarding a copy of a despatch which I had addressed on the same date to Lord Augustus Loftus, instructing him to inquire of the Russian Government whether His Majesty the Emperor of Russia would entertain overtures for peace, I have to authorize your Excellency to make the following official communication to the Porte:—

Prince Gortchakow has stated, in reply to the inquiry made by Her Majesty's Government on the 27th ultimo, that Russia desired nothing better than to arrive at peace, but that for that purpose the Porte must address itself to the Commanders-in-chief in Europe and Asia, who would state the conditions upon which an armistice could be granted.

Her Majesty's Government thereupon suggested that the conditions for an armistice would be better discussed between the Governments of Turkey and Russia than between Generals commanding a portion of the forces of the two countries, and than an armistice would not be complete without the concurrence of Servia and Montenegro.

Prince Gortchakow's reply to this suggestion was, that he had not asked for an armistice, but had indicated this mode of arriving at peace, and that the Russian Military Commanders had been instructed to state the conditions on which an armistice could be agreed to.

Her Majesty's Government have now informed the Russian Government that they understand from this reply that the Military Commanders have received from the Central Government the instructions necessary to enable them to discuss the terms on which an armistice can be concluded, and that the suggestion of Her Majesty's Government is thus practically fulfilled.

Under these circumstances I have to instruct your Excellency to inform the Porte that Her Majesty's Government would suggest the expediency of their sending Delegates to the Russian head-quarters similarly commissioned to negotiate an armistice, which Mussurus Pasha has already expressed the willingness of the Porte to accept in principle.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 349.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 33.) *Foreign Office, January 8, 1878.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 32 of this day, I have to inform your Excellency that I have pointed out to Lord A. Loftus that Her Majesty's Government conclude that the Emperor of Russia will take the necessary measures to include Servia and Montenegro in the contemplated armistice.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 350.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Odo Russell.

(No. 12.) *Foreign Office, January 8, 1878.*

My Lord,

I APPROVE the language used by your Excellency to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in your despatch No. 7, Confidential, of the 5th instant, as to the beneficial influence which might be exercised by Germany in promoting an agreement between Russia and this country on the subject of the Turkish overtures for peace recently communicated by Her Majesty's Government to the Government of Russia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 351.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 5. Confidential.) *Vienna, January 5, 1878.*

My Lord,

I CALLED upon Count Andrassy this morning and communicated to his Excellency the substance of your Lordship's answer to Prince Gortchakow's suggestion that if the Porte is desirous of peace, it should apply to the Russian Commanders-in-chief in Europe and Asia for an armistice.

His Excellency seemed to appreciate the reasons why Her Majesty's Government consider that such an arrangement would be inexpedient, and that the discussion of the conditions of an armistice ought rather to take place between the two Governments. He observed, however, that if Servia and Montenegro declined to accept an armistice, the Porte could crush them with the forces which would be placed at its disposal by its armistice with Russia.

But, as I answered that the Porte could not be expected to apply to the Principalities for an armistice, and the Russian Government, therefore, could alone properly take measures for including them in any arrangement for the suspension of hostilities which might be made, he appeared to concur in this view of the case, without expressing any decided opinion upon it.

I mentioned to his Excellency that Lord Augustus Loftus had no hope of Russia accepting a mediation, and he said he did not expect her to do so, but her refusal of a mediation will not prevent the Guaranteeing Powers from taking part in a negotiation for peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 352.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 6. Very Confidential.) *Vienna, January 6, 1878.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to Mr. Layard's despatch No. 1488 of the 16th ultimo, I said to Count Andrassy yesterday that some persons believe that Russia has a scheme for seizing

the heights on the Black sea at the entrance of the Bosphorus, and fortifying them so as to render them as impregnable as Gibraltar. I observed at the same time that though it might be difficult for England to expel a Russian force from such a fortified position, it appeared to me that Austria could easily cause the garrison to be withdrawn: and he answed that as Austria, in case of being obliged to interfere, would act on the rear of the Russian army, it could hold no positions on the Bosphorus against her will.

This communication was of a strictly private character, but I have thought it expedient to report it to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 353.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January 9.*)

(No. 20. Confidential.)
Paris, January 8, 1878.

My Lord,

M. WADDINGTON told me confidentially this afternoon that he had directed General Leflô, the French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to ask Prince Gortchakow what were the Russian conditions for an armistice, but that the Prince had declined to make them known.

Prince Gortchakow had, M. Waddington went on to say, stated to General Leflô that the conditions had not been communicated to any of the Ambassadors or other Diplomatic Representatives of Russia abroad; and that they would be disclosed only to properly accredited agents sent by the Porte to the head quarters of the Grand Dukes Commanding-in-chief the Russian armies in Europe and Asia.

On the other hand, M. Waddington had, he told me, received last night telegraphic intelligence from St. Petersburgh which confirmed him in the belief that the Russian Government was really desirous of peace.

He had also been informed that the St. Petersburgh newspapers had been directed to abstain from using expressions likely to embitter the relations between England and Russia, or to give offence to English feelings.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 354.

Server Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha, January 9.*)

(Télégraphique.)
Constantinople, le 7 Janvier, 1878.

DANS le but de profiter de l'armistice, qui est en négociation, la Russie donne une grande impulse aux mouvements d'envahissement de son armée.

C'est ainsi qu'en Roumélie ses troupes cherchent plus que jamais à forcer les Balkans, et en Asie a s'emparer d'Erzéroum.

Nous remercions vivement le Gouvernement Britannique des efforts qu'il veut bien déployer avec nous pour obtenir un armistice et une paix dans des conditions satisfaisantes; mais plus cet armistice sera proche, plus il nous sera avantageux.

Je vous prie de soumettre immédiatement ces considérations à l'appréciation bienveillante de Lord Derby et de consacrer tous vos efforts dans le même sens.

No. 355.

Server Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha, January 9.*)

(Télégraphique.)
Constantinople, le 8 Janvier, 1878.

RECU télégramme No. Spécial 13.

Votre Excellence sait que, dans sa dépêche à Lord Loftus, Lord Derby avait déclaré que, pour que l'armistice fût d'une application pratique, il considérait comme indispensable que les bases en fussent arrêtées au préalable entre les deux belligérants. N'étant pas en communication avec la Russie, nous avions prié le Cabinet de St. James de déterminer ces

bases avec le Gouvernement Russe. Mais aujourd'hui Lord Derby nous conseille de donner à nos Commandants l'ordre de s'entendre avec les Commandants Russes sur la conclusion de l'armistice, et il déclare qu'il est impossible au Gouvernement Britannique de s'en charger, sachant d'avance que toute démarche de l'Angleterre dans le sens de notre demande précitée serait repoussée par la Russie. Nous trouvant ainsi seuls et isolés vis-à-vis de la Russie dans la question de l'armistice, nous avons été obligés de transmettre, conformément au conseil de Lord Derby, à nos Commandants en Asie et en Europe, les instructions nécessaires pour qu'ils s'entendent avec les Commandants Russes pour la conclusion d'un armistice purement militaire.

En faisant part de ce qui précède à Lord Derby, vous êtes autorisé à communiquer en même temps à sa Seigneurie mes deux dernières dépêches sur les mouvements des armées Russes, qui, comme je vous l'ai déjà télégraphié, ont entrepris de nouveaux envahissements, en profitant du temps malheureusement perdu à cause des négociations faites au sujet de l'armistice.

Je dois ajouter que nos autorités militaires ne peuvent pas négocier avec les Commandants Russes la suspension d'hostilités pour la Serbie et le Monténégro. Elles ne peuvent non plus prendre l'initiative d'une demande dans ce sens auprès des Commandants des armées de ces Principautés. Veuillez donc me télégraphier de quelle manière Lord Derby croit qu'il devrait être procédé à l'égard de la Serbie et du Monténégro pour amener la cessation des hostilités qui, devant avoir un caractère général, comprendra également la Moldo-Wallachie.

No. 356.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January 9.*)

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.)
Constantinople, January 9, 1878.

WITH reference to your telegram of 11·30 P.M., your telegram reached me late last night. I informed the Sultan of its substance early this morning, and it will be officially communicated as soon as possible to the Porte. Minister for Foreign Affairs appears to have received Musurus Pasha's telegram as to armistice early yesterday, and orders were at once sent to the Turkish Commanders to address themselves to Russian head-quarters.

A telegram, I understand, was sent last night to Musurus Pasha to express to you the disappointment of the Porte at being deserted by England. The feeling is very bitter.

No. 357.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January 9.*)

(No. 22. Very Secret.)
(Telegraphic.)
Constantinople, January 9, 1878.

I HAVE learnt from trustworthy source that Prince Reuss is endeavouring to frighten the Porte, and make it believe that Russia will demand exorbitant terms for an armistice.

No 358.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 9.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 9, 1878.*

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW informed me to-day that the Russian troops, having crossed the Balkans, were advancing rapidly, and were already close to Philippopolis.

Object is evidently to reach Adrianople as soon as possible, and, by military pressure, proving the futility of further resistance, to force the Porte to accept peace.

Russian conditions are kept profoundly secret.

No. 359.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 9.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 9, 1878.*

I COMMUNICATED to Prince Gortchakow this morning your Lordship's two telegrams of yesterday, and left with him a transposed copy.

His Highness expressed his satisfaction, and his hope that the instructions to the Turkish Plenipotentiaries would be such as to lead to a favourable result. He stated that instructions were sent to Russian Commanders-in-chief some days ago. He observed that there could be no doubt of armistice applying equally to Servia and Montenegro.

The Servian troops were now acting with the Russian troops, and consequently could not advance without them, and the Prince of Montenegro would undoubtedly act in unison with Russia.

He considered peace attainable on two conditions, namely, the advance of the Russian army and the certainty impressed on Turks of receiving no aid from England.

The Porte would then accept conditions on which peace could be made.

No. 360.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 9, 1878, 5·35 P.M.*

HER Majesty's Government regret to learn from your telegram of to-day that the Porte expresses disappointment. Her Majesty's Government explained clearly to you in my telegram of the and to Musurus Pasha in my letter of the 27th ultimo, the nature of the communication they were prepared to make to Russia. They have never held out any expectation that they would attempt a single-handed mediation which they had reason to be assured would be refused.

They consider that in taking the initiative for peace negotiations, and thus obtaining the consent of the Russian Government to an armistice, they have done the Porte good service.

Point out that Prince Gortchakow has informed Her Majesty's Government that the Russian Commanders have instructions from St. Petersburgh as to the terms of an armistice. Hence the objection which Her Majesty's Government stated to the arrangement of an armistice between the respective Generals no longer arises.

No. 361.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 38.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 9, 1878.*

IN your telegram of this day, reporting that on the receipt of a telegram from Musurus Pasha orders were sent to the Turkish Commanders to address themselves to Russian head-quarters in regard to the conclusion of an armistice, you state that Musurus Pasha has been instructed by telegraph to express to me the disappointment of the Porte at being deserted by England, and you add that the feeling at Constantinople is very bitter.

Her Majesty's Government have learnt with regret this expression of disappointment on the part of the Porte. A clear explanation was given to your Excellency in my telegram of the 24th ultimo, and to Musurus Pasha in my letter of the 27th ultimo, as to the nature of the communication which Her Majesty's Government were prepared to make to Russia. They have never held out any expectation that they would attempt a single-handed mediation, which they had reason to be assured would be refused; and they consider that they have done the Porte good service in taking the initiative for peace negotiations, and thus obtaining the consent of the Russian Government to an armistice.

You should point out to the Porte that Prince Gortchakow has informed Her Majesty's Government that the Russian Commanders have received instructions from St. Petersburgh as to the terms on which an armistice can be concluded, and that the objection made by Her Majesty's Government to the settlement of an armistice between the respective Generals has consequently been removed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 362.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Paget.

(No. 12.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 9, 1878.*

I HAVE received, and laid before the Queen, your Excellency's despatch No. 442 of the 30th ultimo.

In reply I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the note addressed by you to Signor Depretis, in communicating to his Excellency a copy of my despatch No. 462 of 27th ultimo, to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, as well as the language in which at a personal interview with M. Depretis, as reported in your above-named despatch, your Excellency invited the co-operation of the Italian Government with the steps which have been initiated by Her Majesty's Government with a view to bring to a close the war now being waged between the Russian and Turkish Empires.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 363.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 10, 1878.)

(No. 1534.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December 31, 1877.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of the reply addressed by Server Pasha, through the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna, to Count Andrassy's communication to the Porte, in answer to its appeal for a collective mediation of the Powers parties to the Treaty of Paris.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

Inclosure in No. 363.

Server Pasha to the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna.

(Télégraphique.)
(Confidentielle.) *Constantinople, le 31 Décembre, 1877.*

VEUILLEZ dire au Comte Andrassy que la Porte apprécie à leur juste valeur et avec reconnaissance les déclarations importantes que nous avons constatées dans la communication de son Excellence et qu'il y a d'autant plus lieu d'en être satisfait qu'elles démontrent à ses yeux la résolution du Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois d'exercer son influence pour le maintien du Traité de Paris, qui garantit l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman.

No. 364.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 10, 1878.)

(No. 1527. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December 30, 1877.*

COUNT ZICHY complained to me this morning that some personal opinions which he had expressed to me with reference to the terms of peace which the Porte should be prepared to accept from Russia had been communicated through your Lordship to Count Andrassy, who had written to him on the subject, and had begged him to be more discreet. I told my colleague that it was not from him that I had learnt that he had suggested to an influential member of the Turkish Government that there were probably "six points" (those referred to in my despatch, Secret, No. 1487 of the 16th instant) upon which Russia would insist as conditions of peace, and to which Turkey would, in his opinion, have to submit. The person to whom this communication had been made looked upon it as a serious statement of the views of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and as an attempt to sound the Porte. He had consequently repeated it to some of his colleagues. This information had come to me, I said, from a trustworthy source, and as the language which he had himself subsequently held to me appeared to confirm it, I felt it my duty to convey it to my Government, although intimating to your Lordship at the same time that it was not official. I added that I had no objection to tell him that the Minister to whom I alluded was Safvet Pasha.

Count Zichy said that it was perfectly true that he had had a conversation with Safvet Pasha, when the terms of peace to which I had referred had been discussed in a general way, and that he had afterwards spoken to me privately in the same manner as he had done to the Minister. But he could assure me that he had no authority from his Government to suggest any conditions of peace to the Porte, and that he had merely expressed his personal opinions to Safvet Pasha. He begged me so to inform your Lordship, which I of course promised to do. He then complained that the Porte had, without sufficient reason, assumed that the "six points" were such as Austria was ready to advise Turkey to accept, and had allowed them to be misrepresented and criticised in the "Stamboul," a newspaper supposed to be under official influence. He was about, he said, to address a representation on the subject to the Porte.

At the time when Count Zichy expressed what he states to be only his personal views to Safvet Pasha it was believed that Edhem Pasha was about to retire, and that Safvet was to be his successor as Grand Vizier, whilst Sadyk Pasha was to be Minister for Foreign Affairs. It is a little curious that they both called upon me and sounded me as to what I thought would be the opinion of Her Majesty's Government of the six conditions of peace suggested by Count Zichy. It was generally understood that they had been both put forward by the Austrian Embassy as the Ministers who should have the principal direction of public affairs when the terms of peace with Russia came to be discussed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 365.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 10, 1878.)

(No. 1525.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December 28, 1877.*

COUNT ZICHY delivered this morning to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs the reply of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Circular addressed by the Porte to the Powers parties to the Treaty of Paris, asking for their mediation to bring about peace. It is to the following effect:—"We earnestly desire the cessation of bloodshed and the end of the war. The Ottoman Circular does not, however, in our opinion, offer a basis for negotiations of a nature to bring about peace. The duties of neutrality do not allow us to take the initiative of mediation between the two belligerents, which would oblige us to formulate conditions of peace. On the other hand, the Imperial and Royal Cabinet reserves the right of participating in negotiations as soon as they are commenced between the belligerents. It also reserves the legitimate influence in the definitive settlement of the state of things in the East to which it is entitled as a guaranteeing and neighbouring Power."

I have the honour to inclose copy of the communication made in French by Count Zichy to Server Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

Inclosure in No. 365.

Count Andrassy to Count Zichy.

(Télégraphique.) *Le 12 Décembre, 1877.*

* * * * *

NOUS appellons de nos vœux la cessation de l'effusion de sang et la fin de la guerre. A nos yeux la Circulaire Ottomane n'offre cependant pas de base à des négociations de nature à amener le rétablissement de la paix. Les devoirs de la neutralité ne permettent pas de prendre l'initiative de médiation entre les deux belligérents, qui nous placerait dans la nécessité de formuler des propositions de paix. Par contre le Cabinet Impérial et Royal se réserve la participation une fois que des négociations seraient entamées entre les belligérents. Il se réserve également l'influence légitime qui lui revient comme Puissance garante et limitrophe au règlement définitif de l'état de choses en Orient.

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No. 366.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 12. Secret.)
My Lord, *Berlin, January 7, 1878.*

THE autograph letters recently exchanged between the three Emperors mentioned in my despatch to your Lordship No. 8 Secret of the 5th instant, are now said to relate to the conditions of peace.

The German Emperor communicated them through Count Lehndorff to Prince Bismarck at Varzin, and Prince Bismarck it is said advised His Majesty not to communicate them to anyone, not even to the members of the Royal Family.

The Chancellor himself, however, is represented as having observed in the course of conversation, that he "thought the Russian peace conditions would be acceptable to the neutral Powers, because they were based on the agreement already come to at the Constantinople Conferences, and left questions of common interest open to further consideration and agreement."

"The Russians," Prince Bismarck is reported to have said, "could well afford to be moderate; first, because they had already gained more than they had anticipated at the outset, and second, because they must now wish for guarantees to enable them to keep what they have got, and secure what they have gained."

I am unable to say what truth attaches to these utterances attributed to Prince Bismarck by his friends.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 367.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 9.)
My Lord, *Rome, January 7, 1878.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. of the , I have the honour to inclose herewith copy and translation of a note which I have received from the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in reply to that by which I communicated to his Excellency a copy of your Lordship's despatch instructing Lord Augustus Loftus to ascertain from the Russian Government if the Emperor of Russia would be willing to entertain proposals for peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. PAGET.

Inclosure in No. 367.

M. Depretis to Sir A. Paget.

(Translation.)

Rome, January 2, 1878.

Sir,

IN your note of the 30th ultimo your Excellency communicated to me a copy of a despatch which Lord Derby had addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador in St. Petersburgh, instructing him to ascertain whether His Majesty the Czar would entertain overtures for peace, your Excellency expressed, in the name of the Queen's Government, the hope that this initiative might have the support of the Italian Government, and of the other neutral Governments, all of whom should be anxious to endeavour to put an end to the war.

In the conversation which I held this day with your Excellency, I made you acquainted with my view. The Government of the King is animated by a most lively desire for the re-establishment of peace. But as on the day on which your Excellency communicated the despatch of Lord Derby there was also communicated to us, by the Russian Ambassador, the answer of Prince Gortchakow, it appeared to me, in consequence of this very fact, that we were less able to second the initiative of the British Government.

From the tenour of the Russian answer, indeed, we must conclude that the Government of the Czar would not be inclined to receive overtures aiming at the conclusion of peace unless they emanated directly from the Sublime Porte.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) DEPRETIS.

No. 368.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 23.)

(Telegraphic.) *Pera, January 9, 1878, 11·30 P.M.*

SULTAN has sent to tell me that acting upon the advice of Her Majesty's Government, who had informed the Porte that Russian military Commanders were instructed to state the conditions on which an armistice could be agreed to, a communication on the subject was addressed yesterday by the Minister of War to the Grand Dukes Nicholas and Michael, but no answer had been returned by them. Turkish Commanders have also addressed themselves to the Russian Generals in Roumelia, who have replied they know nothing of an armistice, and are still advancing on all sides. His Majesty wishes to know what he is to do under the circumstances.

Turkish Ministers were in Council all day at the Palace. I sent the substance of your Lordship's telegram to them. It has caused the greatest rage against England, who is accused by Turkey of having misled them and prevented their addressing themselves to Russia immediately after the fall of Plevna to obtain peace. They believe that Russia has deceived Her Majesty's Government in order to gain time, so as to be able to occupy Adrianople, against which they are advancing rapidly from Sofia and the Southern Balkans.

I have just received a further message from the Sultan, requesting me to ask Her Majesty's Government to get instructions given immediately to Russian General at Ichtiman to treat with parlementaire sent by Sabit Pasha.

No. 369.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Pera, January 10, 1878.*

FOLLOWING message just received from the Sultan:—"With astonishment and sorrow we hear early this morning that our army at Shipka has surrendered to Russians who came down upon them in great numbers. This is an irreparable loss to us, and should be telegraphed to British Government immediately."

There is a conviction here that Russia is deceiving Her Majesty's Government, and is pretending to negotiate for an armistice in order to seize Adrianople. The alarm is very great, and the Mussulman population of Roumelia is flying in all directions from the approach of the Russians and armed Bulgarians.

No. 370.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 25. Most Urgent.)

(Telegraphic.) *Pera, January 10, 1878*

SULTAN, in Council with his Ministers, has sent Said Pasha to inform me that the Russians are moving in immense force, it is said with 200,000 men, upon Adrianople, which it is feared cannot be defended; and that when that city is taken they will advance upon Constantinople. Should they attempt to occupy the capital, the result cannot be foreseen: the Empire would be in peril. To prevent this catastrophe, the Sultan makes a last appeal to Her Majesty's Government to obtain peace for him with Russia on the best terms that can be secured, based on the Treaty of Paris. Should Her Majesty's Government be unable, or decline, to take any further steps to secure an immediate peace, the Sultan will be compelled, for safety of his Empire, to address himself at once directly to Russia, and to accept such terms as she may impose upon Turkey. He will then consider that no responsibility rests upon him for consequences. The Sultan begs me to add that as there is no time to be lost, an immediate and final answer from Her Majesty's Government is absolutely necessary.

I telegraph this at the dictation of Said Pasha.

No. 371.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 26. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) *Pera, January 10, 1878.*

I HAVE reason to believe that the Sultan may appeal directly to the Queen. I have been asked whether I would forward His Majesty's message, but I have pointed out that if His Majesty decides upon sending it, he had better do so through Musurus Pasha.

No. 372.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Pera, January 10, 1878.*

I AM informed, confidentially, that the instructions sent to the Turkish commanders are: To apply for a suspension of hostilities or negotiations for armistice; the armistice to be on the basis of mutually excluding all conditions of a political character; if Russian commanders propose any terms of a political nature and beyond *status quo*, the Turkish delegates are to declare that they have no instructions, and to apply for an extension of time strictly necessary to communicate with Constantinople; they are not to throw any difficulties, on their part, in the way of conclusion of armistice; they are not to admit any Servian or Roumanian officer to take part in the negotiations without referring to Constantinople, as the Russians will treat for themselves and on behalf of their auxiliaries; they are to endeavour to obtain armistice for two months, but to consent to one if the Russians insist upon the shorter period; they are to stipulate that any territorial occupation by Russia during the negotiations for the armistice is to be at once restored; the armistice is to cease only after denunciation, and hostilities are not to commence within five days after it is denounced; armistice to be general. Nothing is said about Montenegro in the instructions.

No. 373.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 10.)

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 10, 1878.

ANSWER of Grand Duke Nicholas to the Turkish Minister of War, just received, is to following effect:—

"Your telegram has been forwarded to Emperor. The negotiations could only be carried on directly with me. Consequently, unless the basis of peace is determined upon, the negotiations for an armistice cannot take place."

No. 374.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 10, 1878, 4·45 P.M.

HER Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople has been informed by the Sultan that a communication was yesterday addressed by the Turkish Minister of War to the Grand Dukes Nicholas and Michael, but that no answer had been returned by them; that the Turkish Commanders had also addressed themselves to the Russian Generals in Roumelia, who have replied they know nothing of an armistice, and are still advancing on all sides.

The Sultan further requests that instructions may be given to Russian General at Ichtiman to treat with parlementaire sent by Subit Pasha.

Please inform Prince Gortchakow at once of the above. Her Majesty's Government hope that there will be no delay in commencing the negotiations for an armistice, for which they have informed the Porte, upon Prince Gortchakow's authority, that the Russian Commander-in-chief had received the necessary instructions.

No. 375.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 10, 1878.

MUSURUS PASHA communicated to me yesterday afternoon a telegram stating that the Porte has given to the Turkish Commanders in Europe and Asia the necessary instructions to settle with the Russian Commanders the terms of a purely military armistice. The telegram states that the Turkish military authorities cannot negotiate with the Russian Commanders a suspension of hostilities for Servia and Montenegro, nor can they take the initiative in a request in this sense to the Commanders of the forces of those Principalities; and Musurus Pasha is instructed to inquire what step should, in my opinion, be taken to include these Principalities and Roumania also in the general suspension of hostilities.

I replied that I presumed that, as the forces of these Principalities had been acting in concert with those of Russia, the Russian Commanders-in-chief would be able to settle the terms of an armistice for all the forces engaged.

No. 376.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 11.)

(No. 29.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 10, 1878, 3·30 P.M.

THE answer of Grand Duke Nicholas, which I have now seen, states that there can be no question ("il ne saurait toutefois être question") at this time of an armistice without the bases of peace.

No. 377.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 11.)

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 10, 1878, 4 P.M.

ANSWER from Grand Duke Michael simply acknowledges receipt of Minister of War's telegram.

No. 378.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 11.)

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 10, 1878, 6 P.M.

I AM informed that Council of War will probably decide upon not defending Adrianople. A telegram just received from Consul Blunt states that a panic is reigning there, and that non-combatant population is abandoning the place. In the present critical state of affairs would it not be desirable that Admiral Hornby, who is at Malta, should be directed to return at once to the fleet? The Russians may suddenly advance upon the Dardanelles; if Her Majesty's Government have decided upon preventing their occupation by Russia, it appears to be time to take the matter into serious consideration. If the fleet be brought nearer to Constantinople, it could only, I believe, find safe anchorage within the Straits.

No. 379.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 11.)

(No. 34. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Pera, January* 11, 1878, 3·30 P.M.

I LEARN on good authority that the Greek Minister has informed his Government that the situation of the Turkish Empire is desperate, and that it is falling to pieces; that the Russians will probably be at Constantinople in a few days; that the Turkish army is demoralised; that the Porte is in despair, since Grand Duke Nicholas refused the armistice; that England has abandoned Turkey completely, and that he expects that the communications between Adrianople and Constantinople will be interrupted very shortly. My informant fears that this report may induce the Greek Government to take action at once.

No. 380.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 11.)

(No. 35. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 11, 1878, 3·30 P.M.

IF Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that an attempt on the part of Russia to take possession of the Dardanelles should be resisted, steps to that end should be taken without delay. As far as I can learn, the Porte has not a sufficient force at its disposal at the present moment to defend the lines of Bulair. If Her Majesty's Government think that it is of essential importance that those lines should be held at all cost, I will take the strongest measures in my power to induce the Turkish Government to send troops there in sufficient numbers, if they can possibly be obtained, from Roumelia or Bulgaria.

As your Lordship is aware I attach the utmost importance to these lines, and believe that if they fall into the hands of the Russians the consequences will be most fatal to the interests of England, but I cannot act energetically in the matter without instructions from Her Majesty's Government. Should Her Majesty's Government decide upon preventing the Dardanelles falling into the hands of Russia our fleet ought to be on the spot, and the only way of having it ready would appear to be to ask the Porte to permit it to anchor within the Straits. At this most critical moment the most explicit instructions for my guidance should be sent to me.

No. 381.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 11, 1878, 4·30 P.M.

WE are informed that in answer to the communication addressed to him by the Turkish Minister for War, the Grand Duke Nicholas has replied as follows:—

"The contents of your despatch have been forwarded to the Emperor. The negotiations can only take place directly with me; there cannot, however, be any question of an armistice at this moment without bases of peace."

Her Majesty's Government are unable to reconcile this reply with the message which they have communicated to the Porte on Prince Gortchakow's authority that the Russian military Commanders had received instructions to state the conditions upon which an armistice would be agreed to.

Ask Prince Gortchakow for explanations.

No. 382.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January* 11, 1878, 5·15 P.M.

I COMMUNICATED to Prince Gortchakow to-day your Lordship's telegram of yesterday. His Highness replied the necessary instructions were sent about a week ago by the Minister of War to the Imperial Commanders-in-chief in Europe and Asia by messenger, being of too serious importance to confide to the telegraph. They may reach the former in eight or ten, the latter in twelve or fifteen days, dating from the 3rd or 4th instant.

Prince Gortchakow said that no separate instructions can be given to Russian generals to treat with Turkish delegates. Sole power to do so is vested in Commanders-in-chief. No instructions, therefore, will be sent to Russian general at Ichtiman as requested by the Sultan.

Prince Gortchakow observed that he had not stated that the instructions had been received by the Russian Commanders-in-chief, but that they had been sent to them.

No. 383.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 12.)

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) *Pera, January* 12, 1878, 11·30 A.M.

SULTAN has sent to me several times to inquire whether I have received an answer to my telegram No. 25 of the 10th instant, and is most anxious to learn the decision of Her Majesty's Government, as matters are getting worse every day. His Majesty informs me this morning that the Russians have advanced as far as Eski and Yeni-Zaghra, and are within a few hours of Philippopolis. Porte, under the misapprehension that an armistice had been agreed to through the intervention of Her Majesty's Government, had given orders to the Turkish military commanders to suspend hostilities, and now complain that the Russians continue them. No answer has been received from the Grand Duke Nicholas. Has Prince Gortchakow deliberately deceived Her Majesty's Government, or is the Russian war party so strong that the Emperor cannot fulfil his promise of granting an armistice? One or other would appear to be the case, as the steps taken by the Porte in pursuance of the advice of Her Majesty's Government to obtain the promised armistice have hitherto had no result.

No. 384.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 12.)

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 12, 1878, 5·50 P.M.

THE Imperial Decree naming new Grand Vizier attributes Turkish reverses to faults and errors of some Generals, into whose conduct inquiries will be made, and commands the Ministers to take warning of the past, to listen to the wise and amicable counsels

of the friends of the Empire, and to consider the guarantees necessary for the maintenance of its integrity and independence.

No. 385.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January* 12, 1878, 2 P.M.

EXPLANATIONS required in your telegram of the 11th were given to me by Prince Gortchakow, and reported in my telegram of yesterday, which could not have reached your Lordship when your telegram was despatched.

No. 386.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January* 12, 1878.

BARON CALICE communicated to me yesterday a telegram from Count Zichy reporting the answer of the Grand Duke Nicholas to the Turkish proposal for an armistice, and I have mentioned verbally to His Excellency this morning the instructions sent on the subject to Lord A. Loftus.

Count Andrassy returns to-day, and as I dine at the Palace on Monday, I should have an opportunity of expressing directly to the Emperor any opinions which your Lordship might wish me to convey to His Majesty.

No. 387.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, January* 12, 1878.

FOLLOWIG telegram sent to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople this morning from Semlin:—

"Probability of an armistice discussed here, and all Servians declare its inadmissibility until Russia has completed her work. Porte sent to Belgrade yesterday two telegrams, through Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, for transmission to Pashas commanding besieged fortresses, with a view to negotiations of armistice, but they cannot be forwarded, as the force before Widdin consists, not of Servians, nor even Russians, but of Roumanians; and with regard to Nisch, its Commander had capitulated on the previous night, merely stipulating freedom of garrison to depart without arms."

No. 388.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 12, 1878.

IN answer to your telegram of the 10th instant, No. 25, and to that just received, No. 40, Her Majesty's Government have already employed their good offices in placing the Porte in communication with Russia for the purpose of obtaining an armistice. They regret the delay that has occurred in connection with this negotiation, which they had no reason to expect, and for which they are not responsible. They cannot, in the present state of affairs, do more.

No. 389.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 12, 1878.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 40, it is impossible that the Porte can have supposed, from anything that I have telegraphed to you, that an armistice had been agreed to through the intervention of Her Majesty's Government.

There was no question of anything beyond the opening of negotiations, and the conditions were absolutely unknown.

The order for suspension of hostilities on the Turkish side, if given, must have been given for their own reasons, and on their own authority.

No. 390.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 12, 1878.

ASCERTAIN whether any objection would be offered by the Sultan to a direction being given to the British fleet to anchor within the Dardanelles, it being clearly understood that this step is no departure from the attitude of neutrality hitherto maintained, but merely a precaution to keep the channel from being closed.

You had better not interfere as to the lines of Boulair, or in any way with the disposition of the Turkish forces.

No. 391.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 12, 1878.

WITH reference to your telegram of the 11th instant, Her Majesty's Government will repeat Prince Gortchakow's answer respecting armistice instructions to the Porte, but they are of opinion it is to be regretted that the Prince should not have explained to you at the time the delay that would be caused by sending the instructions by special messenger instead of by the telegraph.

No. 392.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 12, 1878.

IN answer to the inquiry contained in the last paragraph of Prince Gortchakow's Memorandum of the 16th December, Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that any operations tending to place the passage of the Dardanelles under the control of Russia would be an impediment to proper consideration of terms of final settlement.

Ask Prince Gortchakow whether he is willing to give assurance to Her Majesty's Government that no Russian force shall be sent to the peninsula of Gallipoli.

No. 393.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 52.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 12, 1878.

I PERCEIVE that, in your telegram of the 12th instant, your Excellency mentions that the Porte, being under the misapprehension that an armistice had been agreed to through the intervention of Her Majesty's Government, had given orders for the suspension of hostilities. With reference to this I have to observe that it is impossible that the Porte can have supposed from anything that I have telegraphed to your Excellency that an armistice had been agreed to through the intervention of Her Majesty's Government.

There was no question of anything beyond the opening of negotiations, and the conditions were absolutely unknown.

I have to add that the order for the suspension of hostilities on the Turkish side, if given, must have been given for reasons of their own, and on their own authority.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 394.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 54. Secret.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 12, 1878.

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to ascertain whether any objection would be offered by the Sultan to a direction being given to the British fleet to anchor within the Dardanelles, it being clearly understood that this step is no departure from the attitude of neutrality hitherto maintained by Her Majesty's Government, but is simply a precaution to guard against the channel being closed.

With reference to your Excellency's telegram of yesterday's date, I have to state to you that it will be better for you not to interfere as to the lines of Boulair, or in any way with the disposition of the Turkish forces.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 395.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 56.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 12, 1878.

I HAVE received your Excellency's telegram, dated the 10th instant, in which you inform me that, in view of the present military situation, the Sultan will be compelled, for the safety of his Empire, to address himself directly to Russia and to accept such terms as she may impose upon Turkey, if Her Majesty's Government should be unable, or should decline to take further steps to secure an immediate peace.

In reply, I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government have already employed their good offices in placing the Porte in communication with Russia for the purpose of obtaining an armistice. They regret the delay that has occurred in connection with this negotiation, which they had no reason to expect, and for which they are not responsible; but in the present state of affairs they cannot do more.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 396.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 43.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 12, 1878, 11·30 P.M.

GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS has answered Turkish Minister of War that, as soon as an understanding is come to as to bases of peace, and the general principles of an armistice are agreed to with him, he will at once give the necessary orders to the Russian Commanders to come to an arrangement with the Turkish Generals in order to carry out the armistice, but that until then the military operations cannot be suspended.

I am informed secretly that, unless I receive an answer from Her Majesty's Government to my last communications by to-morrow, Porte has decided to inform Grand Duke by telegraph that it will send Plenipotentiaries to treat directly with him for peace and an armistice. The general feeling against England is very strong, and there is a conviction that we have allowed ourselves to be deceived by the Russian Government in the matter of the armistice.

No. 397.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 13, 1878, 1·20 P.M.

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW, in his answer to the Memorandum communicated to Count Schouvaloff on the 13th ultimo, having expressed a wish that Her Majesty's Government should define more clearly what interests of England they think may be affected by the eventualities of the war within the limits to which they are confined by the Imperial assurances, the following telegram has been sent to Lord A. Loftus in reply:—

[See No. 392.]

You are at liberty to communicate the substance of the above in strict confidence to Count Andrassy.

No. 398.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 13.)

(Private.) *Vienna, January* 13, 1878.

(Telegraphic.) MR. MONSON writes in a private letter that the general opinion at Pesth seems to be that the apparent apathy of Count Andrassy is exposing the country to the risk of war. A public intimation to Russia would yet bring about an acceptance of peace. He hesitates to write officially on the subject, but he fears that silence of the Government, as to humiliation policy, may lead to an explosion of public feeling in Hungary.

No. 399.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 13.)

(Most Confidential.) *Vienna, January* 13, 1878, 2·30 P.M.

(Telegraphic.) I HAVE acquainted Count Andrassy with the substance of your Lordship's recent telegraphic correspondence with Lord A. Loftus on the subject of the armistice, and his Excellency is evidently of opinion that the Russian Government have wished for delay with a view to further military successes, but he does not believe their army can reach Constantinople. He stated in strict confidence that some days ago he caused Prince Gortchakow to be informed confidentially that Austria could not assent to a separate peace between Russia and Turkey, and that peace to be concluded must be an European one.

He is anxious, therefore, that the Turks should lose no time in getting the Russians to state their conditions. If they are reasonable, the Porte might accept them, subject to the assent of Europe; but it may be presumed that they will not be acceptable, and it will then, on the application of the Porte, be for England and Austria, and Europe generally, to interfere, and state what they can assent to and what they will resist; when Austria will be found ready to maintain what she has said from the first to Russia, and what she has stated in writing to Her Majesty's Government.

His Excellency seemed to fear that public opinion in England might have an unfavourable influence on the decisions of Her Majesty's Government.

No. 400.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 13.)

St. Petersburgh, January 13, 1878, 5 P.M.

(Telegraphic.) IMMEDIATELY on the receipt of your telegram of yesterday I saw Prince Gortchakow, and made the inquiries relating to Gallipoli Peninsula as instructed by your Lordship. Prince Gortchakow said that before replying he must confer with the Emperor and Minister of War.

At his own request I have given him a written memorandum drawn up in the terms of your telegram, and I have requested him for an early answer in the same form. He will see Emperor to-morrow.

No. 401.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 13.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January* 13, 1878, 6 P.M.

ON communicating to Prince Gortchakow your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, on the delay caused by the instructions to Commanders being sent by messenger instead of by telegraph, his Highness stated that the Grand Duke Nicholas had signified to the Pasha charged to treat his readiness to negotiate, but that he must be provided with direct instructions given by the Porte.

No. 402.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 46.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 13, 1878, 10·30 P.M.

GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS has telegraphed that the bases of peace will be communicated to person sent to him furnished with full powers to accept them and to conclude thereupon the principles of an armistice, which will afterwards be carried out. He requests to be furnished with name of Plenipotentiary, and that he be sent to meet him at Kyzanlik and to be informed of time of his arrival. A prolonged Council of Ministers was held to-day, and your Lordship's communication to Musurus Pasha, as reported by him, being considered unsatisfactory, and there being nothing left for the Porte to do, it was decided to send Server Pasha and Namik Pasha to-morrow to Kyzanlik to meet Grand Duke Nicholas for the purpose of accepting bases of peace and concluding armistice.

No. 403.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 13, 1878, 6 P.M.

THE Turkish Ambassador asked me yesterday whether Her Majesty's Government could do nothing more for the Porte in its present difficulties.

I said I feared not; that we were not prepared to give military assistance to Turkey, as I had warned him from the first; and that, as the Russian Government seemed determined to reject all offers of mediation, it was useless to attempt them.

Musurus Pasha spoke of the intimation from the Grand Duke Nicholas that there could be no armistice without an understanding as to the bases of peace, and asked what I thought the Porte should do.

I said I could see no harm in the Porte endeavouring to ascertain the nature of the conditions which Russia would demand.

No. 404.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 18.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 5, 1878.

I HAD the honour to receive late in the evening your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, referring to the reply of Prince Gortchakow to my previous communication in regard to the overtures for peace, and containing the opinions of Her Majesty's Government in regard to it.

I had an interview this morning with Prince Gortchakow, when I communicated to his Highness the instruction I had received, and I left the annexed copy with his Highness as an *aide-mémoire*.

After I had read this paper to Prince Gortchakow, he stated that he had no further reply to make than that he held to the answer which he had given me on the previous occasion, namely, "that the Porte must address itself through Turkish agents of rank to the Commanders-in-chief in Europe and in Asia, who would state the conditions on which an armistice would be granted."

The Chancellor said that no change could be made in this decision, and that if the Porte was desirous of peace, it could be obtained in the manner he had stated.

His Highness observed that he had not asked for an armistice, but had merely indicated that an armistice was required to arrive at peace, and that the Imperial Commanders-in-chief were instructed as to the conditions on which it could be agreed to.

Prince Gortchakow made no allusion whatever to the nature of the instructions sent to the Imperial Commanders-in-chief, nor has any official indication in any form been given with regard to them, and without instructions I did not feel myself authorized to broach the question.

I observed to his Highness that there were two separate questions, although intimately connected with each other, to be dealt with, namely, the political question referring to the conditions of peace, and the military question referring to the armistice.

The political question was one for discussion between the Governments, while the military question came within the sphere of the Imperial Commanders-in-chief.

To this observation Prince Gortchakow replied that this was a question for Russia alone, in her character as a belligerent Power, to decide.

In regard to the concurrence of Servia and Montenegro in any armistice agreed upon between Russia and Turkey, Prince Gortchakow stated that if Russia concluded an armistice with Turkey there was no doubt that Servia and Montenegro would equally concur in it, and that it would include all military operations in Europe and in Asia; but his Highness added that he could not admit that the conditions on which it should be granted should be discussed otherwise than in the mode he had indicated.

Prince Gortchakow then repeated that the decision of the Imperial Government had been taken, and it could not undergo any modification.

In the course of our conversation Prince Gortchakow referred to the *mémoire* (an unsigned document, he observed) which your Lordship had placed in the hands of Count Schouvaloff and of which he recognized the friendly tone.

His Highness read to me his reply, observing, at the same time, that it was his earnest wish and hope that this friendly exchange of opinions would conduce to a perfect understanding between the two Governments.

After reading this paper, Prince Gortchakow expressed a wish to know what were the British interests which could be endangered by the passage of the Balkans by a Russian force, and he again referred to those already enumerated in your Lordship's letter to Count Schouvaloff of May 6, 1876, which he had hoped had been satisfactorily disposed of.

I replied to his Highness that he must be aware that in the course of a war now raging over a large portion of Europe and Asia, events might occur which could considerably alter the aspect of affairs which existed at the commencement of the war, and that dangers to separate interests might suddenly arise which could not have been foreseen and could not have been provided for.

For instance, I observed, the object of the war was stated to be for the purpose of attaining an amelioration of government for the supposed suffering Christian population of Bulgaria. Now, I could not see how the occupation of Armenia could benefit the Bulgarian Christians.

"Ah," said his Highness, "there are also Christians in Armenia, and when there is war we must attack our enemy on every frontier."

On taking leave of his Highness, he repeated to me his desire for peace, and his earnest hope for the maintenance of good relations with England, adding, however, that he would never consent to sacrifice the dignity of his country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 404.

Pro-Memorid.

THE declaration made to your Excellency by Prince Gortchakow to the effect that Russia desired nothing better than to arrive at peace has been received by Her Majesty's Government with satisfaction.

In reply to the further statement of Prince Gortchakow that to accomplish this purpose, it is desirable that there should be an armistice, and that this temporary cessation of hostilities should be effected through the instrumentality of the Commanders-in-chief in Europe and Asia, Her Majesty's Government have to remark that, although the Porte has not made any application for an armistice, they would not be unwilling to convey the suggestion of the Imperial Government to the Turkish Government, provided that the communications were framed in a manner which in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government might lead to a practical result.

It is evident that the projected armistice, if it be effectual, must include operations in Asia as well as in Europe, and would not be complete without the concurrence of Montenegro and Servia. But it is clearly indispensable in this case that the conditions on which it is to be granted should be discussed between the two Governments, and not merely between Generals commanding a portion of the contending forces. Her Majesty's Government invite the consideration of Prince Gortchakow to this modification of His Highness's views.

Her Majesty's Government fully appreciate the distinction recognized by His Highness between the conditions of a peace, in which other Powers are also interested, and an armistice, which may well be arranged between the immediate belligerents.

London, January 4, 1878.

No. 405.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January 14.*)

(No. 22. Secret.)

Berlin, January 12, 1878.

My Lord,

PRINCE BISMARCK is still absent, and Herr von Bülow is again ill, I regret to say, but I hope to be able to see his Excellency early next week. I am, however, glad to say that the success of Her Majesty's Government in bringing about an armistice has given general satisfaction, and has been most favourably received by all parties.

The semi-official papers express the belief that the course now pursued by England is calculated to bring about the re-establishment of peace. Russian military honour is satisfied. The German Emperor has telegraphed his congratulations to the Czar on the brilliant victories of Sofia and Shipka. England it has said has taken the lead, and thanks to her conciliatory policy, Europe may look forward to a sound and lasting peace, to which should be added that Prince Bismarck is generally reported to be well satisfied with the course events are taking.

From a private and confidential source I learn that Count Andrassy writes to Prince Bismarck not to fear complications, because they can rely on England not taking any warlike measures to check the policy of the Russian ally, without being previously assured of the co-operation of Austria; and as it has been settled that Russia is to respect the interests of England as well as those of Austria, the final settlement of Eastern affairs can be effected, safely and peaceably, by negotiation alone, and to everybody's satisfaction.

It is the prospect of a peaceful settlement which will equally satisfy England, Russia, and Austria, that makes Prince Bismarck declare himself officially satisfied with the course events are taking.

But it has privately come round to me that Prince Bismarck, in an after-dinner conversation, admitted that he was in truth now less satisfied than he had been before the victories of Sofia and Shipka. "Those victories were not," he said, "necessary, and might have been dispensed with, and he feared the Russians had now had more military successes than was good for them, or for Europe. Those victories could make them 'bumptious' and overbearing, and he therefore could no longer be sorry if some complications arose after all which would compel England to fight the Russians and check their aggressive pride.

"The military defeat of Russia by England would be a good thing, because it would re-establish the balance of power in Europe. England, by proving herself to be as strong and as mighty as ever would throw the rising power of Russia once more and altogether into the background. England would then again hold a commanding position, and allied with Germany would dictate peace and order to Europe by sea and by land for years to come."

Although I cannot vouch for the accuracy of his words, I have every reason to believe that Prince Bismarck really entertains these sentiments, which have long been "his dream," as he told me himself on more than one occasion.

As matters now stand, if complications arose, I believe that Prince Bismarck would adhere to his present neutral policy, even though he might look forward with secret satisfaction to the defeat of Russia by England.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 406.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 14, 1878, 12·30 P.M.*

I SAW Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning with Count Zichy, at Count Zichy's request. Count Zichy asked Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he was going to the Grand Duke Nicholas with full powers, not only to treat for peace, but to accept any terms, however onerous, that Russia might think fit to impose, without referring to Constantinople.

Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that such was the case, the Grand Duke having made it an absolute condition that bases of peace should be accepted before the armistice was discussed, and that in the present critical state of affairs the Russians might advance upon Constantinople, and the safety of the Empire was at stake. It was pointed out to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs that Prince Gortchakow had stated in the most distinct terms to your Lordship that armistice was to precede negotiations for peace, whilst instructions in a directly opposite sense had been given to the Grand Duke.

Count Zichy observed that after this grave deception practised by Russia upon Her Majesty's Government, she might put forward terms that were entirely opposed to interests of Austria and to the Treaty of Paris; and that although Austrian Government, as well as that of Her Majesty, had stated explicitly that they would have a voice in the settlement of the Eastern question, they were now evidently about to be entirely excluded from it. He asked Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to wait, before agreeing to bases of peace, until he could receive instructions from his Government. Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that this was now impossible; that Turkey had been abandoned by Parties to Treaty of Paris, which Russia was consequently justified in considering as no longer in force, and that he would have to make the best terms he could with Russia, without reference to it or to the interests of European Powers parties to it. Count Zichy will, he tells me, telegraph in this sense to his Government, and will urgently ask for instructions; he expresses great anxiety that we should be instructed to act together.

No. 407.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 48. Most Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 14, 1878.*

TURKISH Minister for Foreign Affairs authorizes me to tell your Lordship most secretly that if the Grand Duke Nicholas asks for conditions of too onerous a nature he will prolong or break off negotiations, should there be any hope of England assisting Turkey to resist terms which may be dangerous to Turkey and to the interests of England. He will leave for Russian head-quarters to-night or to-morrow morning, but I have arranged means of communicating with him if I receive immediate reply from you. Please mark answer to this telegram "private and personal."

No. 408.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 14, 1878, 1·15 P.M.*

I HAVE not yet received a positive answer as to the British fleet anchoring in the Dardanelles, but I think that Porte will, under present circumstances, object, as it fears that the presence of the British fleet in the Straits would be considered by Russia as a menace, and would make her impose still harder conditions upon Turkey; while England, having declared that the step would be no departure from her attitude of neutrality, would leave Turkey to bear the consequences of it. Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs says that otherwise the Sultan would probably have no objection. He is to speak to His Majesty again on the subject to-night.

No. 409.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 50.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 14, 1878, 2 P.M.*

REPORTS have reached me that the Russians are marching a detachment of troops directly on Gallipoli. I do not know how far they may be trustworthy; but it is my duty, after the many proofs of Russian duplicity, to put Her Majesty's Government on their guard. Emperor of Russia has said acquisition of Constantinople does not enter "into his plans," but he has said nothing of the kind as regards Gallipoli. Prince Gortchakow, in his communication to Count Schouvaloff, in answer to your Lordship's Memorandum of the 13th December, carefully avoids all mention of the Dardanelles, although your Lordship had referred to them as well as to Constantinople.

No. 410.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 14, 1878, 5 P.M.*

MINISTER of War states that Russian Colonel appeared at Turkish posts near Sarnsoufiar, in front of Osman Bazar, with flag of truce, to announce suspension of hostilities in Bulgaria.

Suleiman Pasha has fought a battle near Tatar-Bazardjik with the object of covering retreat of his troops to Philippopolis; result unknown. Minister of War still hopes that some forty battalions may be brought back to Adrianople.

No. 411.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 14.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 14, 1877, 4·15 P.M.*

COUNT ZICHY prepares his Government by a telegram received to-day for the Porte, in order to stop hostilities, accepting any terms offered to it by Russia.

No. 412.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 14.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Strictly Confidential.) *Vienna, January 14, 1878.*

DURING Palace dinner to-day, the Emperor having said to me that it would be now necessary to speak firmly at St. Petersburgh to prevent Russia going too far, I observed that I understood His Majesty had already done this, and he answered, "We are now doing so, and we stated distinctly to Russia, as we have done from the first, 'what we can tolerate, and what we cannot tolerate,' with every wish to maintain our friendship with her." After dinner, as M. Orczy, who was present, expressed an opinion that armistice will be concluded in ten days or a fortnight, and peace in six weeks, I asked whether he expected that the peace would be one which Austria-Hungary would consider satisfactory, and he replied, "There can be no peace unless it be satisfactory to Austria." I communicated to Count Andrassy last night the substance of your Lordship's telegram of yesterday respecting Gallipoli, and M. Orczy thinks that Russia will endeavour to satisfy Her Majesty's Government on that subject.

No. 413.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 14, 1878, 6·53 P.M.

IN order to avoid possible misconception, and in view of the reports which have reached Her Majesty's Government, your Excellency should state to Prince Gortchakow that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government any Treaty concluded between the Government of Russia and the Porte affecting the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 must be a European Treaty, and would not be valid without the assent of the Powers who were parties to those Treaties.

No. 414.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 14, 1878, 7·10 P.M.

HER Majesty's Government have made the following communication to the Russian Government:—

[See No. 413.]

You may inform the Porte of the opinion thus expressed.

No. 415.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 14, 1878.

IN reply to your telegram of the 12th, you may communicate to Count Andrassy the telegrams to Lord A. Loftus and Mr. Layard of to-day.*

No. 415 A.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 36.) *Foreign Office, January* 14, 1878.

My Lord,

IN view of the reports which have reached Her Majesty's Government as to the negotiations for peace which are about to be opened between the Russian Government and the Porte, and in order to avoid any possible misconception, I have to instruct your Excellency to state to Prince Gortchakow that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, any Treaty concluded between the Government of Russia and the Porte affecting the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 must be an European Treaty, and would not be valid without the assent of the Powers who were parties to those Treaties.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 416.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 61.) *Foreign Office, January* 14, 1878.

Sir,

I ENCLOSE herewith to your Excellency a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh,† instructing him to state to Prince Gortchakow that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, any Treaty concluded between Russia and Turkey affecting the Treaties of 1856 and 1871, must be an European Treaty, and would not be valid without the assent of the Powers who were parties to those Treaties.

* Nos. 413 and 414.

† No. 415 A.

Your Excellency is authorized to inform the Porte of the opinion expressed in this despatch.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 417.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 18.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 14, 1878.

WITH reference to your Excellency's telegram of the 12th instant, I transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh,* instructing his Excellency to state to Prince Gortchakow the views of Her Majesty's Government respecting any Treaty concluded between the Russian Government and the Porte affecting the Treaties of 1856 and 1871.

I have instructed Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to inform the Porte of the opinion thus expressed by Her Majesty's Government; and your Excellency may also communicate the substance of this despatch to Count Andrassy.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 418.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 56.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 15, 1878, *noon.*

COUNT ZICHY has just received instructions to state to the Porte that Austria has addressed representations at St. Petersburgh against the *modus procedendi* of Russia in making the negotiation for an armistice depend upon an agreement between Russia and Turkey as to bases of peace; that Austria adheres to her determination formulated in her answer to the Circular of the Porte of the 12th December last, to reserve her right to participate in definite settlement of Eastern question as a limitrophe and guaranteeing Power; and to warn the Porte not to enter into any arrangement contrary to the Treaty of Paris, and to remind her that even should she do so, Austria will be able to protect her own interests.

This communication has been made this morning by Count Zichy to Server Pasha, who leaves to-day for the Russian head-quarters. I have also communicated your Lordship's telegram of yesterday.

No. 419.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 57.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 15, 1878, 12·45 P.M.

I AM informed by Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Sultan has telegraphed to the Emperor of Russia to ask him to suspend hostilities for a few days, and Porte has reason to believe that this request has been complied with in one instance, at least, probably that referred to in my telegram to your Lordship No. 52 of yesterday.

No. 420.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 58.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 15, 1878, 6 P.M.

I HAVE just seen Grand Vizier. Your telegram of yesterday and Count Andrassy's, referred to in my telegram No. 56 of this morning, have produced a good impression. His Highness tells me that the instructions to Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, who left to-day as one of the Plenipotentiaries, are to propose Treaty of Paris as the basis of negotiations for peace; should Grand Duke Nicholas insist upon any terms inconsistent with

* Nos. 413 and 414.

Treaty of Paris, Plenipotentiaries are to refer at once to the Porte. They are only authorized to agree to secondary conditions. Grand Vizier assures me that every endeavour will be made to avoid coming to any arrangement without previous consultation with Her Majesty's Government, but should the Grand Duke abruptly break off negotiations and march upon Adrianople, danger to Turkey will be great.

No. 421.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 15.)

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 15, 1878, 6·20 P.M.

GRAND VIZIER is of opinion that it would be better that the fleet should not for the present come into the Dardanelles. His Highness thinks that such a step, which would be attributed to invitation of the Porte and be considered as a warlike demonstration, might throw doubts as to the sincerity of the Porte in entering upon negotiations for peace, and cause offence to Russia. Should the negotiations fail it might be of great use as a protection to the population, and in order to calm panic which now prevails. I have not thought it desirable to do more than ask question, as there is much force, I think, in the Grand Vizier's objection, and there is nothing at this moment which renders the presence of the fleet in the Dardanelles of urgent necessity.

No. 422.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 15.)

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, January* 15, 1878.

IT is believed that Russian Commanders will endeavour to delay conclusion of an armistice until their army reaches Adrianople, and that it is possible that General Ignatieff may be sent to conduct the negotiations by the Emperor Alexander.

No. 423.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 15.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January* 15, 1878, 4·45 P.M.

I PROFITED of my slight indisposition to carry out the instruction of your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, respecting the validity of future Treaty, by inclosing in a private note to Prince Gortchakow a Memorandum in the words of your Lordship's telegram.

I thought it essential that there should be a written and not a verbal record of this communication.

No. 424.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 15, 1878, 3·45 P.M.

HAVE you received any reply about Gallipoli?

No. 425.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 15.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January* 15, 1878, 4·30 P.M.

THE Emperor has received a telegram from the Sultan deploring the war and expressing a wish for its termination. The Sultan states that he has sent Server Pasha and Namik Pasha with full instructions to negotiate an armistice and the conditions of

peace, and he hopes that Emperor of Russia during negotiations will order an immediate suspension of military operations along the whole line.

Emperor of Russia has replied that he fully participates in the Sultan's regrets for the war and wishes for peace. That the Grand Duke Nicholas has full instructions to negotiate an armistice and the conditions of peace, but that His Majesty cannot agree to suspend military operations during negotiations.

The two Pashas were to leave Constantinople to-day for Kyzanlik.

No. 426.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 15.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Confidential.) *Vienna, January* 15, 1878, 7·20 P.M.

I COMMUNICATED to Count Andrassy the substance of telegrams which your Lordship sent, viz., to St. Petersburgh and Constantinople, respecting right of other Powers to be parties to any Treaty affecting those of 1856 and 1871, and he expressed satisfaction at the language of Her Majesty's Government, observing at the same time that he had been under some apprehension from the inquiry which your Lordship had made to St. Petersburgh respecting Gallipoli, that Her Majesty's Government were withdrawing from the position they had previously occupied in the question. He told me that he had yesterday desired the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to express his painful surprise at Grand Duke Nicholas insisting on preliminaries for peace taking precedence of an armistice, and he has intimated confidentially that if it is intended to shut out Austria from the negotiations, he would find means of making her right to be heard respected. I asked how he would do so, and whether he was prepared to mobilize army. He answered there are many things he can do, but as a mobilization would be expensive, it would not be resorted to as yet. To the Turks he has intimated that he has always told them that Austria intended to be a party to negotiations for peace as a guaranteeing and neighbouring Power, but that if they think fit to make peace independently of Austria, she will protect her own interests in another way.

No. 427.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 15.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January* 15, 1878, 3 30 P.M.

BEING slightly indisposed and unable to go to Prince Gortchakow at his invitation to receive verbal answer about Gallipoli, I requested his Highness, by note, to send me a written answer in the form of a Memorandum, as I had delivered to him. He sent, however, Baron Jomini as bearer of a verbal reply to the following effect:—

"Russian Government has no intention of directing their military operations on Gallipoli, unless Turkish regular troops should concentrate there. They hope further that, in putting question, Her Majesty's Government do not contemplate an occupation of Gallipoli, which would be a departure from their neutrality, and would encourage Porte to resistance."

This reply has been telegraphed to Count Schouvaloff.

I requested Baron Jomini to send me a written reply in the form of a Memorandum, which I have since received.

No. 428.

Server Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha, January* 16.)

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le 15 Janvier,* 1878.

PAR son dernier télégramme, le Grand Duc Nicolas nous a informé que les bases de paix seront communiquées par lui à la personne envoyée à Kyzanlik munie de pleins pouvoirs pour les accepter et conclure là-dessus les principes de l'armistice. A la suite de cette dépêche le Gouvernement Impérial a dû nommer Server Pacha et Namik Pacha en qualité de Plénipotentiaires chargés d'arrêter avec le Grand Duc Nicolas les bases de la paix et les principes de l'armistice. Leurs Excellences sont partis aujourd'hui pour Kyzanlik.

No. 429.

Count Andrassy to Count Beust.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Count Beust, January 16.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Private and Confidential.) *Vienna, January 15, 1878, 10·15 P.M.*

ZICHY telegraphs that Mr. Layard has communicated the following telegram to the Porte which Lord Derby has addressed to Lord A. Loftus:—

"Pour éviter tout malentendu vous déclarerez au Prince Gortchakow que tout Traité affectant le Traité de Paris de 1856, et celui de Londres, doit être Européen, et ne sera valable sans assentiment des Puissances Garantes de ces Traités."

I have received the same communication from Sir A. Buchanan. I told him that Lord Derby's standpoint seems to me perfectly correct, and in complete conformity with our exchange of declarations, and that I hail this *démarche* with vivid satisfaction.

No. 430.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 16, 1878.*

WITH reference to my telegram of the 11th instant, No. 57, Sultan received this afternoon the reply of the Emperor of Russia to His Majesty's telegram asking for suspension of hostilities. After expressing his earnest desire for the cessation of further bloodshed, said that he could not consent beforehand ("préalablement") to the suspension of hostilities unless Porte accepted the conditions on which the conclusion of armistice depended. The conditions above mentioned are considered to include the acceptance of bases of peace as already stated by the Grand Duke Nicholas to the Turkish Minister of War.

No. 431.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 16.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 16, 1878.*

YOUR Lordship's telegram of yesterday, asking what instructions have been sent to Count Zichy in consequence of Server Pasha's language on the previous day to him and Mr. Layard, appears to be answered by my telegram of the 14th and Mr. Layard's telegram of yesterday, but nevertheless, on inquiring whether Count Zichy is fully acquainted with the understanding between his Government and that of Her Majesty, I also asked what instructions will be sent to him in consequence of his wish that he and Mr. Layard should be instructed to act together.

Count Andrassy being at the palace, Baron Orczy said he must refer my questions to his Excellency, and I therefore left a memorandum with him in which they are formulated, and in which your Lordship's expression of joint mediation is quoted. M. Orczy said that Count Zichy could not have used that term in proposing that he and Mr. Layard should have common instructions; but I hope to report later in the day Count Andrassy's answer to the questions put to him.

No. 432.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 16.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 16, 1878.*

WITH reference to your telegram of this morning, Count Andrassy has desired me to be informed that Count Zichy is not acquainted with the negotiations which have taken place between the two Governments, that he has not suggested that he and Mr. Layard should be instructed to act together, and that copy of the last instructions sent to him, and on which he appears to have already acted, was transmitted to Count Beust yesterday for communication to your Lordship, and as Count Andrassy considers them sufficient under present circumstances he does not propose to add to them.

It is believed here that the Turkish Delegates, with Sultan's sanction, will ask for an armistice, and that if immoderate conditions of peace are proposed they will decline to accept them.

No. 433.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 23. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 16, 1878.*

COUNT BEUST read to me to-day a telegram from Count Andrassy, giving the substance of a report from the Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople as to the communications which have passed between the Grand Duke Nicholas and the Porte in regard to the armistice.

It appears from this report that on the 11th instant the Grand Duke sent the following telegram to the Turkish Minister of War:—

"With reference to my telegram of yesterday, as soon as an understanding is come to on the bases of peace, and the general (conditions) of the armistice are agreed upon with me, I will send authority to our Commanders to make arrangements with the Turkish Commanders for giving effect to the armistice. Before that has been done, military operations cannot be (suspended)."

On the 13th instant the Grand Duke telegraphed:—

"I have received your telegram. If you wish to know the preliminary bases of peace, come in person or send a delegate with full powers to Kyzanlik, where I now am. I await an answer."

In conformity with this communication, Server Pasha and Reouf Pasha were at once dispatched to the Grand Duke's head-quarters.

Count Zichy goes on to say that the Sultan desires peace at any price, and that if none of the Powers give any support to Turkey, the Porte will in negotiating look to its own interests exclusively, and will conclude peace with the utmost dispatch, in order to avoid having to submit to its being dictated in Constantinople.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 434.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 24.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 16, 1878.*

COUNT BEUST read to me to-day the substance of a telegram from Count Andrassy on the subject of my telegram to Lord A. Loftus of the 13th instant, an extract of which had been read to him by your Excellency, and which stated that England would look upon any military operation that would put the passage of the Dardanelles under the control of Russia as one threatening British interests; Lord A. Loftus was, in consequence, directed to ask Prince Gortchakow whether he was disposed to give an assurance to Her Majesty's Government that no Russian troops would be sent to Gallipoli.

Count Andrassy observed that it appeared from this communication that the British reservations were receding at the same rate as events proceeded, and he added that in view of the declaration of the Grand Duke Nicholas, which was equally unexpected by the Austrian Government, that the conclusion of an armistice was to be made subject to the previous acceptance of the bases of peace, it would be extremely desirable for the Austrian Government to know whether or not Her Majesty's Government maintains its standpoint that peace shall not be concluded without the participation of the Guaranteeing Powers.

Count Beust said that he was instructed to declare that the Austro-Hungarian Government decidedly maintains that stand-point and in general all its declarations, but that a clear knowledge of the intentions of England will, at the present moment, be absolutely decisive as regards the line which Austria will pursue.

I have pointed out to Count Beust, in reply, that the telegraphic instruction sent by Her Majesty's Government to Lord A. Loftus on the 14th instant, must have crossed this telegram from Count Andrassy, who could not at the time have been aware of the declaration made by Her Majesty's Government at both St. Petersburgh and Constantinople that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, any Treaty concluded between the

Government of Russia and the Porte affecting the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 must be a European Treaty, and would not be valid without the assent of the Powers who were parties to those Treaties.

Count Beust said that he had no doubt that the telegrams had crossed as I supposed.

I added that I must state, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, that they are most desirous to act in complete and cordial co-operation with the Austrian Government, and that they adhere firmly to the existing understanding with Austria, and are determined to maintain it.

Count Beust expressed his satisfaction at receiving this assurance, which he would telegraph to Count Andrassy.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 435.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 25.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 16, 1878.

COUNT BEUST has given me a translation of a telegram from Count Andrassy on the subject of a conversation reported by Count Zichy to have taken place between Server Pasha, Mr. Layard, and himself, in the course of which Server Pasha stated that the Porte was not acquainted with the Russian conditions of peace; that his colleague and he were going to the Russian head-quarters with large powers, and that they even feared that the Grand Duke Nicholas would not allow them to refer for further instructions to Constantinople; that as the intention to force the Porte to conclude a direct peace was known at Vienna as well as in London, and as the Porte received no encouragement of any sort from either of these capitals, they must doubt whether the two Cabinets have the will and the power to insist upon participating in the peace negotiations. Server Pasha asked that he might receive an answer on the subject by the following morning.

Count Andrassy's reply to Count Zichy was to the effect that the standpoint of the Austrian Government was officially and explicitly stated in the closing sentence of his answer to the Circular in which the Porte applied for the mediation of the Powers; that they maintained that standpoint, and that a doubt as to their insisting in participating in the peace negotiations was inadmissible. If the Envoys of the Porte intended not only to learn the nature of the Russian propositions, but at the same time to come to a definite agreement with Russia, that was their affair. Count Zichy was instructed, however, to point out that even in this case Austria would be in a position to provide effectually for the complete safeguarding of her own interests, as far as they might be affected by the conclusion of peace.

In communicating this telegram to me, Count Beust stated that he was instructed to inquire what answer I had sent to a communication which, it was understood, had been telegraphed home by Mr. Layard in a sense similar to that of Count Zichy.

His Excellency added that he was authorised to inform me, confidentially, that the Austrian Government have made a representation at St. Petersburgh against the proceedings of Russia in prejudging the peace negotiations by the armistice question.

I have stated to Count Beust that Her Majesty's Government had not considered it necessary to reply to the communication in question, as the inquiry seemed to have been sufficiently met by the declaration which Her Majesty's Government had instructed Lord A. Loftus to make to the Government of Russia, and of which the Porte had also been informed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 436.

Count Andrassy to Count Beust.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Count Beust, January 16.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Private and Confidential.) *Vienna, January* 15, 1878, 9·30 P.M.

COUNT ZICHY telegraphs to-day:—

"I have received your Excellency's telegram of yesterday evening, and have spoken to the two Plenipotentiaries, Namyk and Server Pashas, who were to have started in two hours.

"The firmness with which your Excellency reaffirms our stand-point, as stated in our answer to the Turkish Circular of December 12, had a very favourable and reassuring effect on both Delegates.

"They desire me to convey their best thanks thereof to your Excellency.

"They both expressed themselves identically as follows:—

"'In consequence of this important communication we start on our errand without *parti pris*. We intend, first of all, to conclude an armistice, urgently required by the interests of humanity. If the Grand Duke communicates conditions of peace to us that would compromise the independence and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and would, therefore, be in opposition to the deliberations which preceded the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris, we shall answer that this question can only be regulated by Europe, and that therefore we cannot give an assent, which, without the consent of the Guaranteeing Powers, would only be a one-sided one.

"'Should the Grand Duke, in consequence, also refuse an armistice, we shall allow the Russian armies to push forward, nor conclude anything, as long as the European Powers, and especially Austria and England, maintain their stand-point as Guaranteeing Powers.'"

No. 437.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 26.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 16, 1878.

I TRANSMIT herewith, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a telegram from Count Andrassy which the Austrian Ambassador communicated to me to-day, containing a report from Count Zichy, respecting the negotiations for peace.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 438.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 27. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 16, 1878.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 24 of this day's date, I have to inform your Excellency that Count Beust called at the Foreign Office this afternoon, and stated that he had received a telegram from Count Andrassy, from which it appeared that he had now had communicated to him by Sir A. Buchanan the instruction sent to Lord A. Loftus on the 14th instant.

Count Andrassy had requested him to tell me that the standpoint of Her Majesty's Government seemed to the Austrian Government to be perfectly correct, and in complete conformity with the exchange of declarations which had taken place between the two Governments. Count Andrassy hailed the step which had thus been taken by Her Majesty's Government with vivid satisfaction.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

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* No. 436.

No. 439.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 37.)
Foreign Office, January 16, 1878.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 742, Confidential, of the 25th ultimo, reporting a conversation which you had on that day with Prince Gortchakow; and I have to express to you my approval of the language employed by you on this occasion with regard to British policy in the East.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 440.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.)
Constantinople, January 17, 1878.

FOLLOWING received from Consul Blunt dated yesterday:—

"The Ottoman Delegates left Adrianople at 7 P.M. by special train for Mustapha Pasha Station. From there they will endeavour to get to Kormanly (?) Station, in possession of Russian outposts, in order to make arrangements to proceed to Kyzanlik, where doubtful if they can reach before Saturday evening."

No. 441.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 65.)
(Telegraphic.)
Constantinople, January 17, 1878.

WITH reference to your telegram of yesterday, statement made to Lord A. Loftus does not appear to agree with answer as communicated to Sultan here; the words of which as given to me are that Emperor could not consent beforehand to a suspension of hostilities "sans que la Porte accepte les conditions auxquelles la conclusion de l'armistice est subordonnée."

No. 442.

Consul-General White to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 17.)

(Telegraphic.)
Belgrade, January 17, 1878.

LANGUAGE of the Russian Agents here incompatible with prospect of speedy peace; at any rate betrays desire for territorial changes greater than hitherto admitted, and such as might lead to the occupation of Bosnia by Austria.

No. 443.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)
(Secret.)
Foreign Office, January 17, 1878, 5·50 P.M.

COUNT BEUST has communicated a telegram from Count Andrassy respecting the meeting between the Austrian and British Ambassadors and Server Pasha. Count Andrassy has informed Count Zichy that Austrian Government maintain the stand-point stated in their answer to the Turkish Circular, and that a doubt as to their insisting on participating in the peace negotiations was inadmissible. If the Turkish Envoys came to a definite agreement with Russia, that was their affair; but Count Zichy was to point out that in that case Austria would be in a position to provide effectually for the complete safeguarding of her own interests.

In answer to an inquiry from Count Beust, I said that Her Majesty's Government had not sent any answer to Mr. Layard's report of the meeting with Server Pasha, as they

considered it sufficiently answered by the communication to the Porte of their telegram to Lord A. Loftus of the 14th.

No. 444.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)
Foreign Office, January 17, 1878, 6·15 P.M.

WITH reference to the telegram from Count Andrassy communicated to me yesterday and repeated to you by me to-day, ask Count Andrassy whether he considers the language of the Turkish Plenipotentiaries satisfactory.

Her Majesty's Government do not think that the Porte should be encouraged to break off negotiations and allow the Russian armies to advance under the expectation that Austria and England will afford military aid to preserve the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, if by that it is meant to exclude the idea of territorial concessions of all kinds which the events of the war may have now made imperative.

Her Majesty's Government do not understand the distinction apparently drawn between "the deliberations which preceded the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris" and the Treaty itself.

No. 445.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)
(Secret.)
Foreign Office, January 17, 1878, 6·35 P.M.

IN answer to an inquiry from Count Beust, which Count Andrassy appears to have instructed him to make before you communicated my telegram to Lord A. Loftus of the 14th, I stated that Her Majesty's Government are most desirous to act in complete and cordial co-operation with the Austrian Government, and that they adhere firmly to the existing understanding with Austria, and are determined to maintain it.

No. 446.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)
(Secret.)
Foreign Office, January 17, 1878, 6·50 P.M.

COUNT BEUST has informed me that Count Andrassy is gratified at the stand-point of my telegram to Lord A. Loftus of the 14th instant, and considers it perfectly correct and in complete conformity with the exchange of declarations between the two Governments.

No. 447.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 38.)
Foreign Office, January 17, 1878.

My Lord,

I APPROVE the note addressed by your Excellency to Prince Gortchakow, copy of which was inclosed in your despatch No. 732, Confidential, of the 29th ultimo, inquiring, according to the instructions of Her Majesty's Government, whether His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia would entertain overtures for peace.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 448.

Count Andrassy to Count Beust.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Count Beust, January 17.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January* 16, 1878.

COUNT ZICHY telegraphs that the fortifications of Constantinople consist of 20 works that are finished, and of 10 positions for batteries, which are prepared. These fortifications require 250 guns and 70,000 men. At present there are only 6 battalions of recruits there. The National Guard is not to be relied upon for the defence. There are no troops at Gallipoli.

He telegraphs further that the Sultan has sent him a message to inform him that he fully approves of the language held to him (Zichy) by Namyk and Server Pasha (*vide* our telegram communicated the day before yesterday).

No. 454.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)
(Secret.) *Foreign Office, January* 17, 1878, 5·30 P.M.

ASK Count Andrassy what he proposes should be done in case of necessity to give effect to the declarations made by the English and Austrian Governments to Russia respecting the conclusion of a separate peace between Russia and the Porte.

No. 455.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)
(Most Secret.) *Foreign Office, January* 17, 1878, 8·30 P.M.

IN communicating the telegram repeated to you this evening, Count Beust said that in his personal opinion, the Turkish Plenipotentiaries, notwithstanding their assurances, would be compelled by military necessities to sue for peace, and accept whatever conditions Russia chose to impose, leaving Austria and England to give effect to their declaration as to separate Treaty in the best way they could.

He also said he was impressed with the necessity for full understanding between English and Austrian Governments, and had telegraphed and written to ask Count Andrassy what he was prepared to do "par terre?" He knew feeling in England was looking for an ally, and that if Austria had anything to propose now was the time.

He repeated declaration that there was no secret understanding with Russia, merely a point of contact between three Emperors.

No. 456.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 37. Most Secret.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 17, 1878.

THE Austrian Ambassador communicated to-day a telegram of which a copy is inclosed, containing a report from Count Zichy on the inadequacy of the Turkish forces available for the defence of Constantinople, and stating that the Sultan had signified his approval of the language held to Count Zichy by the Turkish Plenipotentiaries.

His Excellency observed that in his personal opinion the Turkish Plenipotentiaries, notwithstanding their assurances to Count Zichy, would be compelled by the necessities of the military situation to sue for peace, and to accept whatever conditions Russia chose to impose, leaving Austria and England to give effect to their declaration with regard to the validity of a separate Treaty in the best way they could.

In reply to a remark that it was very desirable that there should be a thorough understanding on all points between the English and Austrian Governments, His Excellency said that he was deeply impressed with this, and had both telegraphed and written to Count Andrassy to ask what he was prepared to do *par terre*. His Excellency added that he was quite aware of the feeling in England, and that the English people were looking for an ally, and he knew that if his Government had anything to propose now was the time, when Parliament had just re-assembled, to propose it.

He at the same time repeated that he could most formally declare that there was no secret understanding with Russia, and that there had never been anything more than a point of contact between the three Emperors.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 457.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 18.)

(No. 15. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 4, 1878.

COUNT ZICHY, when calling upon me to-day, dwelt with much earnestness on the absolute necessity of an armistice between Turkey and Russia. His Excellency said that the Russians, supported by the Servians, were now overrunning the west of Bulgaria, and were rapidly advancing to the south of the Balkans. They had probably occupied Sofia, as the town had been abandoned by the Turkish forces. In Constantinople everything was in confusion. The Chamber was showing a very hostile feeling to the Government, and its declaration of want of confidence in the Ministry in its answer to the Sultan's speech had already led to the resignation of the Grand Vizier, and of Mahmoud Damat Pasha. At the seat of war things were getting worse every day. Suleiman Pasha was on bad terms with the Minister of War, with Djemil Pasha, the Governor of Adrianople, with Ahmed Eyoub Pasha, and with other Generals. Whilst such a state of affairs lasted only disasters could be expected; and his Excellency thought that it was, consequently, equally to the interest of Europe, as of Turkey, that a suspension of hostilities should be brought about as soon as possible.

I told my colleague that I was also convinced of the urgent necessity of an armistice, that I had already so informed your Lordship, and that I was quite ready to do so again. Count Zichy said that he should also telegraph in the same sense to Count Andrassy if I were disposed to repeat my opinion to your Lordship. He expressed great satisfaction at finding that our views were the same, and his desire to act cordially with me. I could but reply that I had the same wish to act with him, and that he could not forget that I had constantly expressed my hope that his Government would support the policy pursued by that of Her Majesty in the Turkish question.

After my interview with Count Zichy, I sent my telegram No. 5 of to-day's date to your Lordship, and I presume that my colleague telegraphed to Count Andrassy in the same sense.

After I had seen Count Zichy I was informed that Suleiman Pasha would probably be deprived of his command, and that some of the Ministers wished him to be replaced by Moukhtar Pasha, an arrangement to which the Grand Vizier was, however, opposed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 458.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 18.)

(No. 16.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 4, 1878.

THE Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs called upon me this afternoon to show me a telegram from Musurus Pasha, giving an account of his interview with your Lordship to receive the answer from Prince Gortchakow to the communication, addressed by Her Majesty's Government to that of Russia, with a view to peace. Musurus Pasha, after stating what that answer had been, went on to observe that he had asked your Lordship whether or not Her Majesty's Government had offered their mediation to Russia, and that your Lordship had replied that Her Majesty's Government had not proposed to mediate between the two Powers, but had only taken steps to ascertain whether Russia was prepared to make peace. Musurus Pasha added that he had reminded your Lordship that the Porte had distinctly asked Her Majesty's Government for their mediation, and that the Queen had announced in her Speech from the Throne that England would avail herself of the first occasion to mediate between the belligerents. This occasion now presented itself.

Server Pasha said that your Lordship's answer had caused his colleagues and himself great surprise, as the Porte had formally applied to Her Majesty's Government for their mediation. It had distinctly understood that its request had been acceded to, and that Her Majesty's Government had entered into communication with the Russian Government for the purpose of proposing mediation. His Excellency expressed himself as greatly discouraged by the account that Musurus Pasha had given of his interview with your Lordship.

Server Pasha then placed before me, at some length, his views with regard to the answer that he should send to Her Majesty's Government through Musurus Pasha with respect to the armistice, consulting me on the subject. The result of our conversation, which was strictly private and confidential, was that his Excellency came to the conclusion that it would be desirable to ask for an armistice as the Porte was disposed to accept one, and that Musurus Pasha should be at once instructed by telegraph to beg your Lordship to ascertain from Prince Gortchakow the basis upon which Russia was prepared to accede to a suspension of hostilities, leaving the details to be settled by the Commanders of the respective armies. As regards the conditions of peace which, his Excellency observed, were quite distinct from the terms of an armistice, the Porte would still require that the Treaty of Paris, which guaranteed the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, should be accepted as the basis.

His Excellency observed, however, that before sending instructions to Musurus Pasha to this effect it would be necessary for him to consult the Grand Vizier, who might think fit to alter or modify them.

I reminded Server Pasha, in the course of our conversation, that when he consulted me with reference to the draft of his circular to the Powers, informing them of the appeal that Turkey had made to Her Majesty's Government, I pointed out that the statement it contained that Her Majesty's Government had agreed to offer their "mediation" was inaccurate, as no such promise or undertaking had been given, and I suggested that some such words as "had consented to use their good offices at St. Petersburgh to ascertain whether Russia would be disposed to make peace" should be substituted. This, however, had not been done. I observed that although the step taken by your Lordship could not be termed an "offer of mediation," it was to be hoped that it might lead to mediation.

Shortly after Server Pasha had left me Count Zichy called. He said that there was a general rumour that an armistice was about to be concluded between the belligerents, probably founded upon the answer which Prince Gortchakow had given to your Lordship. He had reason to believe, his Excellency said, that Russia was prepared to agree to one on very moderate and acceptable terms, such, for instance, that a line of demarcation should be drawn between the places occupied by the respective armies.

I endeavoured to ascertain from his Excellency whether he expressed a personal opinion, or whether he spoke from information received from a trustworthy, if not official, source. But his Excellency evaded my questions, simply saying that he was not in any way authorized to make this statement.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 459.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 18.)

(No. 18. Confidential.) *Constantinople, January* 5, 1878.

My Lord,

I RECEIVED late last night a letter from Said Pasha, stating that he had been directed by the Sultan to inform me that, according to a telegram received that night from Suleiman Pasha, the situation on this side the Balkans was becoming more and more serious; that "the long-wished-for peace had become an absolute necessity now." His Majesty therefore desired to know privately whether any favourable result had been obtained through the mediation of Her Majesty's Government.

I had received in the evening your Lordship's telegram of yesterday morning relating to the communication made by your Lordship to Prince Gortchakow respecting peace and an armistice, of which your Lordship authorized me to inform the Porte confidentially and unofficially.

I accordingly requested Said Pasha to acquaint His Majesty with the substance of your Lordship's telegram.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 460.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 18.)

(No. 47.) *Paris, January* 17, 1878.

My Lord,

M. CALLIMAKI CATARGI asked me yesterday to inquire of your Lordship whether, if he should present himself in London, he would be well received there, and be placed on the same footing as that which he occupies here.

M. Callimaki Catargi and his predecessors seem to have been always received by the French Government as virtually representing the Roumanian Government, and no difficulty appears to have been made by the French Foreign Office in transacting business with them. They have not, however, been treated as belonging either *de jure* or *de facto* to the Diplomatic Body.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 461.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 18.)

(No. 69. Secret.) *Constantinople, January* 17, 1878.
(Telegraphic.)

COUNT ZICHY informs me that he has telegraphed to Count Andrassy that preparations are already being made by the Sultan to leave for Brussa if Russians advance on Constantinople, and has suggested that in this event he should go to Mondania, from whence he would be in constant relation with His Majesty. He authorized me to tell you this, but begged that you would not mention it to Count Beust. He tells me also that he is going to telegraph to Count Andrassy that the presence of some English ships-of-war might be of the greatest use here to prevent a panic and the consequences that might ensue to life and property, and to ask for authority to support me should Her Majesty's Government think it desirable to ask Porte to consent to presence of our ships here.

German Ambassador is, I am assured, endeavouring to prevail upon the Porte not to listen to the communications from England and Austria, but to make peace without reference to them. Count Zichy tells me that he has represented very strongly at Vienna the language and proceedings of German Ambassador.

No. 462.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 18.)

(No. 70.) *Constantinople, January* 17, 1878.
(Telegraphic.)

FOLLOWING received from Consul Blunt dated to-day, 6·10 P.M.:—

"Authorities have received telegram from station Mustapha Pasha that Ottoman Delegates were met at Gesmanli by General Strogonoff, and had left with him for the Russian head-quarters.

"Please telegraph to Lord Derby that the weather is mild and threatening rain, but snow still on ground."

No. 463.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 18.)

(No. 72.) *Constantinople, January* 18, 1878.
(Telegraphic.)

SAFVET PASHA, who is charged with the Department of Foreign Affairs, assures me that the Turkish Plenipotentiaries have precise instructions not to accept any conditions contrary to the Treaty of Paris, but to refer at once to Constantinople if such be demanded.

No. 464.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 18.)

(No. 74.) *Constantinople, January* 18, 1878.
(Telegraphic.)

WITH reference to your telegram of yesterday, meeting between myself and Count Zichy at Server Pasha's was only casual. Count Zichy was calling on Minister for Foreign Affairs, and during his interview sent to ask me to join them. There was no joint or collective official action or representation on our part. I should not have taken any such step, nor shall I do so, without instructions from your Lordship.

Count Zichy is very pressing that I should act cordially with him, which I have done as far as I can properly; but I have not in any way alluded, in my communications with him, to negotiations that have taken place between your Lordship and Count Andrassy.

No. 465.

Lieutenant-Colonel Mansfield to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 18.)

(Confidential.) *Bucharest, January* 15, 1878.
(Telegraphic.)

ROUMANIAN GOVERNMENT has sent a delegation to the head-quarters of the Grand Duke to take part in the negotiations.

No. 466.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 18.)

St. Petersburgh, January 18, 1878.
(Telegraphic.)

IN official telegram published this morning, dated Kyzanlik, Tuesday, January 15, Grand Duke Nicholas states as follows:—"I received to-day a despatch from Reouf Pasha announcing that Server and Namyk Pashas are coming to me as delegates to negotiate an armistice. I expect them on the 17th or 18th January."

No. 467.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 19.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Secret.)

Vienna, January 18, 1878.

IN reply to your telegram of yesterday, 6·15 P.M., Count Andrassy states that he considers language of Turkish Plenipotentiaries to Count Zichy satisfactory, which I understand, though Count Andrassy's telegram to Count Beust, referred to by your Lordship, was not repeated to me identic with that of Grand Vizier, as reported in Mr. Layard's telegram of the 16th instant.

With respect to wish of Her Majesty's Government that the Porte should not be encouraged to break off negotiations by an expectation that the absolute territorial integrity of Turkish Empire may be maintained through assistance from England and Austria, he says that no ground has been given to the Porte for entertaining such hope; but while agreeing with you that the Porte should not be encouraged to decline all territorial concession, he thinks it would be dangerous, in the present state of panic at Constantinople, to discourage Turkish Ministers from expecting any material aid whatever.

Therefore, and with a view also to convince Russia that England will seriously resist her pretensions, he is strongly of opinion that the Porte should be induced to allow Her Majesty's fleet to proceed to Constantinople. He has not the slightest apprehension that Russia will resent the measure as an act of war, as, under the circumstances, Her Majesty's Government would be perfectly justified in adopting it as a mere precaution for the protection of British interests; and he hoped that Her Majesty's Government will decide on action; that they will not limit it to the occupation of Gallipoli, which would not prevent a Russian occupation of Constantinople. With respect to that eventuality, he said that, without having come to a final decision, he was now more inclined to oppose it, as the danger of its occurring increased, and that, if he consented to it at all, he would insist on an army merely entering by one of the gates and leaving by another. He said that he had just received a telegram from Count Zichy reporting that occupation of Bulgaria for two or three years by Russian force will be proposed, and I said that I had reason to believe such measure is contemplated. He answered that it could not take place without Russia remaining also in Roumania, to which he could not consent; and as the measure would most certainly eventually lead to war, he would prefer accepting war at once. Feeling confident, however, that the pretensions the two Governments resist will be abandoned by Russia, as she cannot meet an attack on her rear by Austria, combined with English naval and military action on her front.

He says that any movement on the part of Austria would be war, as her first step would bring her into collision with Russian troops in Roumania, and she must therefore, on that account, delay action as long as possible, and also on account of great expense of mobilization of the army; but Russia knows, and Her Majesty's Government may rest assured, that what he has declared he will do under certain circumstances will be done should the time for action come. His Excellency believes that his late declaration at Petersburgh has already produced a favourable influence on the policy of Russia, without, however, bringing her pretentions within reasonable limits, and he is convinced that peace will be preserved if Her Majesty's Government, by sending the fleet to Constantinople, should prove that the Russian party in England cannot prevent their action; and he believes, if Her Majesty's Government adopt this course, that the other Powers will join them and Austria in resisting the ambitious views of Russia. As I asked what Prince Bismarck would do, his Excellency said that his Highness has been in favour of a separate peace, probably in order not to have to decide between supporting Russian or Austrian interests, but that he has no fear of his giving active support to Russia, as he could not do so without endangering the maintenance of the newly-formed German Empire.

Count Andrassy is not aware to what your Lordship alluded in referring to "a distinction apparently drawn between deliberations which preceded the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris and the Treaty itself," as he has not spoken of such a basis himself, nor read anything respecting it, and I could not give him any information on the subject.

No. 468.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 39. Secret.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, January 18, 1878.

I HAVE to request your Excellency to ask Count Andrassy what he proposes should be done in case of necessity in order to give effect to the declarations made by the Governments of Austria and England to Russia respecting the conclusion of a separate peace between Russia and the Porte.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 469.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 41. Secret.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, January 18, 1878.

COUNT BEUST informed me to-day that he had received a telegram from Count Andrassy stating that, in consequence of the step which the Austrian Government had taken at St. Petersburgh, Prince Gortchakow has given them the solemn assurance that only the fixing of the general bases of peace was contemplated. These would in no way prejudge the final decisions, and the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh had never had the intention to trick the Austrian Government out of influencing the conditions of peace. Count Andrassy took this answer for what it meant, that is to say, for an apology. The Austrian Government would wait its results and act in consequence.

Count Andrassy added that Count Zichy had telegraphed that the Emperor Alexander had returned the following answer to the Sultan's direct appeal for an armistice: "Je ne saurais consentir préalablement à la suspension des hostilités sans que la Porte accepte les conditions auxquelles la conclusion de l'armistice est subordonnée."

Count Andrassy thought he could discern in the fact that less stress was laid in this answer on the peace conditions the effect of the steps taken by the Austrian and English Governments.

In reply to an inquiry, Count Beust said that he had not yet received any answer to the question which he had put to Count Andrassy mentioned in my despatch to your Excellency No. 37, Most Secret, of the 17th instant.

I informed him that your Excellency had been instructed to put a similar question, and to ask Count Andrassy what he proposed should be done in case of necessity to give effect to the declarations made by the English and Austrian Governments to Russia respecting the conclusion of a separate peace between Russia and the Porte.

Count Beust further said that he was confident that his Government were not yet acquainted with the Russian conditions of peace. He thought it possible that Prince Bismarck might have some notion of them, but if so, he had certainly not told Count Andrassy.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 470.

Server Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha, January 18.)

(Télégraphique.)

Constantinople, le 17 *Janvier*, 1878.

VOTRE Excellence connaît déjà la réponse de l'Empereur Alexandre au télégramme de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan. L'Empereur ne consent pas à la suspension d'hostilités en attendant la conclusion de l'armistice. L'armée Russe marche sur Andrinople à grands pas; elle est sur le point d'y entrer ci, d'après son plan, elle va menacer la capitale de l'Empire. Veuillez signaler immédiatement à Lord Derby la gravité de la situation.

No. 471.

Server Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha, January* 18.)

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le 17 Janvier*, 1878.

SA Majesté Impériale a adressé à l'Empereur de Russie un télégramme pour lui annoncer la nomination des Plénipotentiaires et pour demander la suspension des hostilités en attendant la conclusion de l'armistice.

Voici la réponse de l'Empereur Alexandre à ce télégramme de notre auguste Maître :—

"Comme votre Majesté, je désire la paix et le rétablissement de bonnes relations, mais je ne saurais consentir à une suspension d'hostilités que si la Sublime Porte accepte préalablement les conditions auxquelles les Commandants-en-chef, d'après les ordres dont ils sont munis, doivent subordonner la conclusion d'un armistice."

No. 472.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 19.)

(No. 17.)

My Lord, *Rome, January* 15, 1878.

IN the midst of the occupations by which the President of the Council has been absorbed during the past week, I have naturally had very little opportunity of conversing with his Excellency on public affairs.

I may mention, however, that, in a short interview I had with him on Saturday, M. Depretis spoke with much anxiety respecting the evasive replies returned by the Grand Dukes in command of the Russian armies in Bulgaria to the overtures for an armistice which had been addressed to them on the part of Turkey, which his Excellency considered a very grave symptom, after the assurances which had been given at St. Petersburgh that the Commanders-in-chief of the Russian armies in Europe and Asia had received instructions in regard to the conditions of the armistice.

I have not been able to see M. Depretis to-day, or I should have informed his Excellency that your Lordship had directed Her Majesty's Ambassador to acquaint Prince Gortchakow that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government any Treaty concluded between Russia and the Porte affecting the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 must be an European Treaty, and would not be valid without the consent of the Powers who were parties to those Treaties,—a principle which I cannot doubt would have the concurrence of the Italian Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 473.

Lieutenant-Colonel Mansfield to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

(Confidential.) *Bucharest, January* 19, 1878.

IT is believed that Russian Government is exercising peremptory pressure to induce Roumanian Government to voluntarily cede portion of Bessarabia taken from Russia in 1856.

This Government, in consequence, finds itself in the greatest difficulty. Minister of Finance is going to plead their cause at Berlin, as a last hope.

No. 474.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 19.)

(No. 79. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 19, 1878.

PORTE most urgently requests Her Majesty's Government to order Her Majesty's fleet immediately to Besika Bay or to Macri, to be in time to enter Dardanelles and to

anchor at Gallipoli the moment Russians make any movement towards that place or Bulair. Russians expected to enter Adrianople to-day. No news of Plenipotentiaries.

No. 475.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 19, 1878.

COUNT BEUST informed me that he had received the following telegram from Count Andrassy, to the effect that, in consequence of the step which Austria had taken at St. Petersburgh, Prince Gortchakow has given Austria a solemn assurance that only the fixing of the general bases of peace was contemplated. These would in no way prejudge the final decisions, and the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh had never had the intention to trick Austria out of influencing the conditions of peace.

The Austrian Government take this answer for what it means, that is to say, for an apology, and will await its results and act in consequence.

Count Zichy has telegraphed that the Czar has returned the following answer to the Sultan's direct appeal for an armistice :—

"Je ne saurais consentir préalablement à la suspension des hostilités, sans que la Porte accepte les conditions auxquelles la conclusion de l'armistice est subordonnée."

Count Andrassy thought he could discern in the fact that less stress was laid in this answer on the peace conditions, the effect of the steps taken by the English and Austrian Governments.

In reply to an inquiry, Count Beust said that he had not received any answer to the question which he had put to Count Andrassy, mentioned in my telegram of the 17th instant. I told Count Beust that you had been instructed by telegraph yesterday to put a similar question.

Count Beust said Austrian Government were not yet acquainted with Russian conditions of peace, and he thought that Prince Bismarck might possibly have some notion of them; but, if so, he had not informed Count Andrassy.

No. 476.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 42. Most Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 19, 1878.

THE Austrian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon and read to me a telegram which he had received from Count Andrassy in reply to the assurances conveyed by your Excellency in pursuance of my telegraphic instruction to you of the 17th instant.

Count Andrassy expresses his sincere satisfaction at the determination of Her Majesty's Government to adhere to the understanding come to with Austria, and authorizes Count Beust to affirm that the same course may be expected from Austria. Count Beust is further instructed to state that when the moment really comes, the Austrian Government will endeavour to arrive at the conclusion of definite arrangements of a practical and comprehensive nature.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 477.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Lyons.

(No. 40. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 19, 1878.

THE Marquis d'Harcourt having called at this Office to-day, I informed his Excellency of the substance of the instructions sent to Lord A. Loftus on the 14th instant, of which a copy was inclosed in my despatch No. 31, Secret, of the 16th instant, and inquired whether the French Government had made any similar communication to the Russian Government respecting the conclusion of a separate Treaty between Russia and the Porte.

His Excellency replied that his Government had not made any specific mention of the Treaties of 1856 and 1871, but had intimated to the Russian Government that they considered that the regulation of the Danube and Dardanelles should be matters of European concert.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 478.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 20.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January* 19, 1878.

WITH reference to my telegram of yesterday, I have received by messenger to-day copy of Count Andrassy's despatch to Count Beust of the 15th instant, reporting the language of Turkish Plenipotentiaries to Count Zichy, and I have (called) Count Andrassy's attention to their observations respecting the deliberation which preceded the Treaty of Paris. His Excellency said that he had not noticed them when he read the telegram, and he was, equally with your Lordship, unable to understand them.

No. 479.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 20.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Secret.) *Vienna, January* 20, 1878.

I HAVE asked Count Andrassy, as instructed by your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, what he proposes should be done to give effect to the declarations of the two Governments respecting a separate peace, and he answered that he could add nothing at present to what he had stated to me yesterday, when he had expressed his opinions fully and frankly. I said to him that as I thought it not improbable that he would refer me to these opinions, I had brought my telegram reporting them, and would read it to him, in order that I might be certain neither to misrepresent his language nor to mislead Her Majesty's Government. He concurred generally in the accuracy of my report. With respect, however, to the fleet coming to Constantinople, he said that he did not advise or invite such a measure, but merely spoke of it as one which appeared to him likely to promote English interests, and if Her Majesty's Government adopted it, they must do so entirely from an English point of view, and not as concerted with or advised by Austria. He objected also to what I said of Gallipoli, as it appeared to represent him as an advocate for the occupation of the Peninsula by an English force; with respect to Bulgaria he said he considered the maintenance of Turkish Empire in Europe to depend upon it, and that unless Her Majesty's Government are prepared to resist a proposal for its occupation by a Russian force, it is not to be expected that Constantinople can remain in possession of the Turks. He said that by the expression "Russia knows his declarations will be maintained," it might appear that he had already threatened to enforce them by war, which he has not done; and as he objected to his appearing to have designated as Russian the party of absolute neutrality in England, I explained that I had used the term as the shortest which occurred to me. His Excellency did not in reality modify his opinions, but he is nervously anxious to avoid appearing to have agreed to or advised joint action on the part of the two Governments, or to have concerted measures beforehand with England to meet eventualities which may not occur; and while he considers that the future action of the two Governments must be guided by the course of negotiations now pending and the Russian conditions of peace, he appears to fear, from the questions addressed to him, that the opinions of Her Majesty's Government on the subject are still undecided.

No. 480.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 20, 2·45 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January* 20, 1878, 1 P.M.

FROM Count Andrassy's language yesterday he evidently intends, in the event of any arrangement being necessary between England and Austria for imposing their views

on Russia, to include the withdrawal of Russian troops on the conclusion of peace from Bulgaria among the conditions of their co-operation with respect to that province, as he considers it would be useless to make sacrifices for defence of Constantinople if a Russian force is allowed to remain in Bulgaria.

No. 481.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 20, 6 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Secret.) *Vienna, January* 20, 1878, 3·5 P.M.

WITH reference to Mr. Layard's Secret telegram of 6th instant, of which a copy is included in your Lordship's despatch No. 12, I have no doubt myself that Count Zichy is acquainted with the understanding existing between Her Majesty's Government and that of Austria, although no official communication may have been made to him on the subject, otherwise M. Orczy would have answered at once the question your Lordship instructed me to address to Austrian Government on the subject.

No. 482.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 21.)

(No. 35.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January* 9, 1878.

I HAD an interview with Prince Gortchakow this morning, when I communicated to his Highness your Lordship's two telegrams of yesterday in the form herewith inclosed, of which I left a copy in his hands.

His Highness expressed his satisfaction in the following words: "C'est bien;" adding that he hoped that the instructions with which the Turkish Plenipotentiaries would be provided would be such as to lead to a favourable result.

He stated that the necessary instructions to the Imperial Commanders-in-chief were forwarded some days ago.

With reference to the participation of Servia and Montenegro in the contemplated armistice, Prince Gortchakow observed that there could be no doubt of their concurrence. The Servian troops, he said, were now acting with the Russian forces, and consequently could not advance without them. Nor, added his Highness, could there be any doubt that the Prince of Montenegro would act in unison with Russia.

In the course of further conversation Prince Gortchakow observed that he considered that peace was attainable on two conditions, namely, if the Russian army advanced so as to prove the futility of further resistance on the part of Turkey; and, secondly, if the Porte were fully impressed with the certainty that there was no hope of receiving aid from England. The Porte, he said, would then accept the conditions on which peace could be made. "Voila la paix," said Prince Gortchakow, with some emphasis.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 482.

Substance of Telegrams from the Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus, dated January 8, 1878.

THE reply of Prince Gortchakow, conveyed in your Excellency's telegram of the 5th instant, to the suggestion of Her Majesty's Government, has been received and considered by them. They understand from it that the Russian Commanders-in-chief have received from the Central Government the instructions necessary to enable them to discuss the terms on which an armistice can be concluded.

Under these circumstances, the conditions which seemed to Her Majesty's Government essential are practically fulfilled, and they are ready to convey his Highness' message to the Porte, and to advise the latter to send delegates similarly commissioned to the Russian head-quarters for the purpose of negotiating an armistice.

Her Majesty's Government further conclude that the Emperor of Russia will take the necessary measures to include Servia and Montenegro in the contemplated armistice.

No. 483.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 44.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 9, 1878.*

IN the course of conversation to-day Prince Gortchakow informed me that the Russian forces had crossed the Balkans, that they were advancing rapidly, and that they were already near Philippopolis.

It is evidently the object of the military Commanders to reach Adrianople as soon as possible, and by military pressure, proving the futility of further resistance, to force the Porte to accept the Russian conditions for peace.

These conditions are kept profoundly secret.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 484.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 46.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 11, 1878.*

I CALLED on Prince Gortchakow this morning and communicated to him your Lordship's telegram of yesterday stating that no answer had been returned by the Grand Dukes Nicholas and Michael to a communication of the Turkish Minister of War, and that the Russian Generals in Roumelia had answered the Turkish Generals that they knew nothing of an armistice. I expressed the hope of Her Majesty's Government that there would be no delay in commencing the negotiations for an armistice, for which they had informed the Porte on the authority of his Highness that the Russian Commanders-in-chief had received the necessary instructions.

Prince Gortchakow replied that the necessary instructions were sent about a week ago by the Minister of War to the Imperial Commanders-in-chief in Europe and Asia by special messenger, as they were of too grave importance to confide to the telegraph.

In reply to my inquiry, his Highness said that they may reach the former in eight or ten days, the latter in twelve or fifteen days, dating from the 3rd or 4th instant.

With respect to the request of the Sultan that instructions might be given to the Russian Generals at Ichtiman to treat with a "parlementaire" sent by Salih Pasha, his Highness stated very decisively that no separate instructions could be given to Russian Generals to treat with Turkish delegates, as the sole power to negotiate was vested in the Commanders-in-chief. No instructions will be sent to the Russian General at Ichtiman as requested by the Sultan in your Lordship's telegram.

In regard to the delay in the receipt of the instructions, Prince Gortchakow explained that he had not stated that the instructions had been received by the Russian Commanders-in-chief, but that they had been sent to them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 485.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 47.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 12, 1878.*

ON the receipt of your Lordship's telegram of yesterday I immediately informed your Lordship by telegraph that the explanations in regard to the delay in the negotiations for the armistice—caused by the instructions to the Imperial Commanders-in-chief having been sent by special messenger instead of by telegraph—were given to me by Prince Gortchakow, and reported in my telegram of yesterday, which could not have reached your Lordship when the telegram of yesterday referring to them was dispatched.

There can be no doubt that if Prince Gortchakow and the Minister of War had wished

to hasten the suspension of hostilities, they would have utilized the telegraph as easily as they have done on occasions of equal importance. As a striking instance of the readiness of Prince Gortchakow to transmit important information by the telegraph, I may recall to your Lordship the circumstance of his Highness specially requesting that the terms of the London Protocol should be forwarded to Constantinople by telegraph, which was assented to, and is a proof that Prince Gortchakow was less scrupulous of trusting the telegraph on the occasion of commencing the war than he now is when the urgency of bringing it to a close is so notorious.

I am therefore led to believe that the wish and object of the Imperial Government is for the Russian army to advance as rapidly and as far as possible before the possible conclusion of an armistice, both with a view to force the Porte to submission, and to render, by occupying as much Turkish territory as possible, the position of Russia more dominant in the negotiations for peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 486.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 50.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 13, 1878.*

ON the receipt of your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, I had an interview with Prince Gortchakow.

I stated to his Highness, in referring to the concluding paragraph of his Memorandum of December 16, that Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that any operations tending to place the passage of the Dardanelles under the control of Russia would be an impediment to the proper consideration of the terms of a final settlement.

I was consequently instructed by your Lordship to ask his Highness whether he is willing to give assurances to Her Majesty's Government that no Russian forces shall be sent to the Peninsula of Gallipoli.

Prince Gortchakow observed that this question, as he presumed, was "un intérêt Anglais," and if so, it should certainly have due consideration.

His Highness then said that he could give me no reply without submitting the question to the Emperor and taking His Majesty's orders, and conferring with the Minister of War.

Prince Gortchakow asked me to leave with him, as an *aide mémoire*, the memorandum which I had read to him. I replied that on returning home I would send to his Highness a Memorandum of the inquiry I had addressed.

I accordingly inclosed to his Highness a Memorandum reproducing the substance of your Lordship's telegram with a private note, copies of which I have the honour to annex.

Prince Gortchakow informed me that he should see the Emperor to-morrow.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 486.

Memorandum sent by Lord A. Loftus to Prince Gortchakow, January 13, 1878.

WITH reference to the inquiry contained in the last paragraph of Prince Gortchakow's Memorandum of the 16th December, Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that any operations tending to place the passage of the Dardanelles under the control of Russia would be an impediment to the proper consideration of the terms of a final settlement.

Her Majesty's Ambassador is consequently instructed to ask Prince Gortchakow whether he is willing to give assurances to Her Majesty's Government that no Russian forces shall be sent to the Peninsula of Gallipoli.

St. Petersburgh, January 13, 1878.

Inclosure 2 in No. 486.

Lord A. Loftus to Prince Gortchakow.

(Particulière.)
Mon Prince,

St. Pétersbourg, le $\frac{1}{13}$ *Janvier*, 1878.

JE vous envoie ci-joint, selon votre désir, en forme de memorandum, l'instruction que j'ai reçus de Lord Derby, et que j'ai communiqué ce matin à votre Altesse, en la priant de me faire parvenir le plutôt possible la réponse dans la même forme.

Je suis, &c.
(Signé) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 487.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 21.)

(No. 52.)
My Lord,

St. Petersburgh, January 15, 1878.

I INFORMED Prince Gortchakow this morning, in the terms of your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, that Her Majesty's Government will repeat to the Porte his answer respecting the transmission of the instructions to the Imperial Commanders-in-chief for the negotiation of an armistice, but they were of opinion that it was to be regretted that his Highness should not have explained at the time the delay that would be caused in sending these instructions by special messenger instead of by telegraph.

His Highness stated that the Grand Duke Nicholas had signified to the Pasha (he could not recollect the name, but thought it was Mehemet Ali Pasha) his readiness to negotiate with him. It was probable, his Highness added, that the Grand Duke had by this time received his instructions and that the negotiations had commenced.

Prince Gortchakow observed that the Turkish negotiator must be provided with direct instructions from the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 488.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 21.)

(No. 57.)
My Lord,

St. Petersburgh, January 15, 1878.

I RECEIVED a note from Prince Gortchakow this morning, requesting me to call on him for the purpose of receiving an answer to the inquiry of Her Majesty's Government as to whether his Highness would be willing to give assurances that the Russian forces would not occupy the Peninsula of Gallipoli.

I expressed to His Highness in a note, of which I annex a copy, my regrets that, in consequence of a slight indisposition, I was unable to leave the house; and I requested him to send me the answer to the Memorandum I had given him in the same form as I had submitted the inquiry to his Highness.

On receiving my note, Prince Gortchakow deputed Baron Jomini to call on me as the bearer of a verbal reply, which was to the following effect:—

"The Russian Government have no intention of directing their military operations on Gallipoli, unless Turkish regular troops should concentrate there.

"They further hope that, in putting the question, Her Majesty's Government do not contemplate an occupation of Gallipoli, which would be a departure from their neutrality, and would encourage the Porte to resistance."

Baron Jomini informed me that this reply had been telegraphed to Count Schouvaloff.

I stated to Baron Jomini that as I had made the inquiry in the form of a Memorandum, it would be agreeable to me to receive the answer in the same form. I made this request as, in matters of such importance, I felt a great responsibility in receiving and transmitting verbal communications.

Baron Jomini perfectly understood the motive for my request, and immediately forwarded the Memorandum which he was authorized by the Prince Chancellor to deliver

to me, and of which, together with his Excellency's note, I have the honour to inclose copies.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 488.

Prince Gortchakow to Lord A. Loftus.

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

Mardi.

JE voulais passer chez vous pour vous porter la réponse que vous attendez, mais je suis tellement occupé que je ne puis pas bouger. Si vous voulez bien prendre la peine de passer chez moi, je vous attendrai jusqu'à deux heures.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) GORTCHAKOW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 488.

Lord A. Loftus to Prince Gortchakow.

Mon cher Prince,

St. Pétersbourg, le $\frac{3}{15}$ *Janvier*, 1878.

JE me serais rendu chez votre Altesse immédiatement à la réception de votre aimable billet, mais je suis malheureusement empêché de sortir par suite d'un leger refroidissement.

Je prie donc votre Altesse de me faire parvenir la réponse au "Memorandum" par écrit, et dans la même forme dans laquelle je l'ai soumis à votre Altesse.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 488.

Baron Jomini to Lord A. Loftus.

Le 3 *Janvier*, 1878.

VOICI, M. l'Ambassadeur, l'aide-mémoire que, conformément à votre désir, le Prince Chancellier m'autorise à remettre à votre Excellence.

Je la prie, &c.
(Signé) N. JOMINI.

Inclosure 4 in No. 488.

Memorandum.

LE Cabinet Impérial n'a pas l'intention de diriger les opérations militaires sur Gallipoli, à moins que les forces régulières Turques ne s'y concentrent.

Il suppose que de son côté, en lui adressant cette question, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique n'a pas l'intention d'occuper cette presqu'île, ce qui ne serait guère conforme à sa neutralité, et ferait naître à Constantinople des illusions peu favorables à la paix.

No. 489.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 21.)

(No. 59.)
My Lord,

St. Petersburgh, January 15, 1878.

BARON JOMINI was instructed by Prince Gortchakow to inform me that the Emperor had received a telegram from the Sultan deploring the miseries of the war, and expressing an earnest desire for its termination.

The Sultan stated that he had sent Server and Namyk Pashas with full instructions to the Imperial head-quarters to negotiate an armistice and the conditions of peace, and he

hoped that the Emperor of Russia during the negotiations will order an immediate suspension of military operations along the whole line.

The Emperor of Russia replied that he fully participated in the Sultan's regrets for the war, and in the wishes for its termination. His Majesty stated that the Grand Duke Nicholas had full instructions to negotiate an armistice and the conditions of peace, but that His Majesty could not consent to a suspension of military operations during the negotiations.

Baron Jomini stated that Server and Namyk Pashas were to leave Constantinople as to-day for Kyzanlik.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 490.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 61.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 15, 1878.*

BEING prevented by a slight indisposition from leaving the house, and considering it of importance to communicate without delay to Prince Gortchakow the instruction contained in your Lordship's telegram of yesterday respecting the validity of any future Treaty between Russia and Turkey, I thought it advisable to record, in the form of a Memorandum, the communication I was instructed to make to his Highness.

I accordingly forwarded to his Highness, with a private note, copy of which I have the honour to annex, the inclosed Memorandum expressed in the words of your Lordship's telegram.

I have taken this course because I thought it essential that there should be a written and not a mere verbal record of this communication.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 490.

Lord A. Loftus to Prince Gortchakow.

St. Pétersbourg, le 15 Janvier, 1878.

Mon Prince,

ETANT retenu à la maison par une légère indisposition et ne voulant pas retarder à faire part à votre Altesse d'une communication dont je suis chargé par le Comte de Derby je m'empresse de la faire parvenir à votre Altesse dans la forme du Memorandum ci-joint, que j'ai l'honneur de placer ainsi dans la main de votre Altesse.

Vouillez, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 490.

Memorandum.

HER Majesty's Ambassador has been instructed to state to Prince Gortchakow that in order to avoid possible misconception, and in view of reports which have reached Her Majesty's Government, they are of opinion that any Treaty concluded between the Governments of Russia and the Porte, affecting Treaties of 1856 and 1871, must be an European Treaty, and would not be valid without the assent of the Powers who were parties to those Treaties.

St. Petersburgh, January 15, 1878.

No. 491.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 33. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, January 18, 1878.*

HERR VON BULOW'S being unfortunately ill when your Lordship's telegram of the 14th instant reached me, I wrote his Excellency a private note, giving him the substance of your Lordship's communication to the Russian and Turkish Governments, to the effect that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, any Treaty concluded between the Government of Russia and the Porte affecting the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 must be a European Treaty, and would not be valid without the assent of the Powers who were parties to those Treaties.

Herr von Bülow sent me his thanks for this communication, which he would submit to the Emperor and to the Chancellor, adding that he hoped to be well enough to receive me in a day or two.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 492.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 39.)
My Lord, *Berlin, January 19, 1878.*

THE Queen's Speech and the opening debates of the British Parliament have never been looked forward to with deeper interest in Berlin than has now been the case; and the first impression produced by the telegraphic summary received on Thursday night has been favourable to both as tending to maintain the peace of Europe.

Some anxiety had been lately felt lest complications should arise, if England, departing from the policy of conditional neutrality, took part with or encouraged the Sultan to further resistance, as the friends of Turkey seemed to anticipate, since Parliament had been summoned to assemble before the usual period. These apprehensions entertained by the friends of peace have now been relieved by the declaration of Her Majesty's Government that measures of precaution will only be adopted if either of the belligerents infringe on the conditions upon which the neutrality of England is founded.

It is namely believed in Berlin that, so long as England does not go to war for Turkish interests, the interests of England can be made to harmonize with those of Russia and Austria, and form the basis of a practical and friendly understanding between them.

But of course this solution to the Oriental question can only be achieved if the neutral Powers are prepared to sacrifice the interests of the Ottoman Empire to a new order of things.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 493.

Server Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha, January 21.)

(Télégraphique.)
(Confidentielle.) *Constantinople, le 20 Janvier, 1878.*

NOUS n'avons pas reçu jusqu'à ce moment la nouvelle de l'arrivée de nos Plénipotentiaires au quartier-général Russe. D'après les assertions de certains journaux d'Europe, ils seraient déjà arrivés auprès du Grand Duc. Nous ne savons comment expliquer ce manque de nouvelles directes de la part de nos Plénipotentiaires; les moyens de communication télégraphique se trouvent entre les mains des Russes, et toutes ces circonstances nous inspirent des inquiétudes à l'égard des vues de la Russie; est-elle décidée à occuper Constantinople, en traînant les négociations de paix et d'armistice? De l'autre côté, d'après certains indices et quelques informations dignes de foi, l'Autriche prépare une armée; la Grèce est sur le point d'envahir nos frontières; la Roumanie, la Servie, et le Monténégro continuent leurs envahissements. Je n'ai pas besoin de vous faire observer que tous ces petits Etats agissent sur un mot d'ordre. Veuillez entretenir

Lord Derby de nos appréhensions, et nous faire connaître la manière de voir de sa Seigneurie sur ce sujet.

No. 494.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 21.)

(No. 86.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 20, 1878.

IZZET BEY, an Aide-de-camp of the Sultan, was sent two nights ago to join the Plenipotentiaries, it is believed with instructions to them to accept any terms Russia may demand without referring to Constantinople.

Count Zichy (?) has so telegraphed to his (Government ?).

I cannot, however, obtain any positive confirmation of rumour. No news has yet been received at the Porte of the Turkish Plenipotentiaries, and there is much anxiety in consequence.

It is feared that Russians are either endeavouring to gain time, or that they refuse to allow Plenipotentiaries to communicate with Constantinople.

No. 495.

Consul-General Stanley to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 21.)

(Telegraphic.) *Odessa, January* 20, 1878.
(Confidential.)

RUSSIAN Staff Colonel, Aide-de-camp of the Commander-in-chief of Southern Russia, told me to-day it was his belief, and one generally shared, that such terms were intentionally put forward for an armistice as it was known Turkey could not accept, so that the war might continue.

No. 496.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

Foreign Office, January 21, 1878.
(Telegraphic.)

INFORM Prince Gortchakow that Her Majesty's Government are glad to have received the pledge of the Russian Government that they have no intention of directing their military operations on Gallipoli, unless Turkish regular troops should concentrate there.

Her Majesty's Government contemplate no occupation of that position under present circumstances.

No. 497.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 21, 1878, 6·30 P.M.
(Secret.)

WOULD the Austrian Government be willing to join in an identic note to the Russian Government to the following effect:—

The continued occupation by foreign troops of Bulgaria, or of any part of the shores of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, and Dardanelles, or any alteration of the rules affecting the navigation thereof, to be declared inadmissible without the consent of Austria and England.

Ascertain whether the above is likely to be agreed to, and, if not, whether the Austrian Government is waiting for or expecting anything further from Her Majesty's Government to induce it to join cordially with England. In that case, endeavour to find out what is expected from Her Majesty's Government.

An immediate answer to this telegram would be very desirable.

No. 498.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)
(Secret.) *Foreign Office, January* 21, 1878, 7 P.M.

COUNT BEUST told me to-day, in strict confidence, that Count Andrassy had telegraphed to him that the suspicion which Count Beust attributed to Her Majesty's Government, that Russia was trying to divide England and Austria, was not without foundation. At the present moment Russia wishes to induce the Austrian Government to agree with her in principle about the conditions of peace, probably with the idea of representing these conditions to the Porte as having been accepted by Austria. Under present circumstances the Austrian Government will decidedly not entertain these proposals. It is possible that the Russian Government, not having succeeded at Vienna, may make a similar proposal to England. Count Andrassy expected the English Government to act in the same way as the Austrian had done. The manœuvre to divide the two will not succeed, as they both maintain the standpoint that every alteration of the Treaties will only be valid with the sanction of the Treaty Powers.

I stated to Count Beust at once, in reply, that Her Majesty's Government would communicate unreservedly with that of Austria on the conditions of peace as soon as they were informed of them.

No. 499.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 21, 1878, 7·25 P.M.

WITH reference to my other telegram of to-day, the expression "continued occupation," as applied to the Bosphorus, &c., must not be taken to imply any concurrence in the entry of Russian troops into Constantinople, which would, in our opinion, have most disastrous results.

No. 500.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Telegraphic.)
(Secret.) *Foreign Office, January* 21, 1878, 7·30 P.M.

COUNT BEUST has communicated a telegram from Count Andrassy to the following effect:—

"With reference to your recent conversations with Lord Beaconsfield, I agree with his Lordship that it is high time to arrive at a clear understanding, and that the greatest openness is necessary. Therefore we must say candidly that the position taken up by England in the Queen's Speech, without at the same time asking Parliament for a money vote, has made an impression detrimental to the weight of England's voice not only in Austria but throughout Europe. Austria being still a member of the alliance of the Three Emperors, and considering her geographical and military position, the fact of our having declared that we would look upon any alteration of the Treaties without the agreement of the Signatory Powers as not valid, and of our having communicated this declaration at St. Petersburgh and Constantinople, constitute in themselves a far more active step than all the queries and reserves which England has made and which she could still make. Under these circumstances we could not make an ostensible political alliance acceptable to public opinion in Austria, and a policy which should take such an alliance for its basis would be condemned beforehand.

"The Austrian Government have no doubt that if they eventually take independent action, the Legislatures would grant them the necessary funds for mobilization, but they would not find any support in making a demonstration of going diplomatically hand in hand with England so long as the British Government have not given a visible sign of their determination to protect at least their maritime interests, and so long as they have not by so doing created confidence in their being able to act.

"Your Excellency will communicate the above confidentially, but with perfect openness, to Lord Beaconsfield.

"I do not agree with his Lordship that it would be too late for military action, and I

do not think Lord Derby's fear of a mousetrap for the British fleet at all founded in fact. I will send you my reasons in a subsequent telegram."

No. 501.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 43.)
Foreign Office, January 21, 1878.

My Lord,

I APPROVE the terms in which your Excellency communicated to Prince Gortchakow the views of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the overtures for peace, as reported in your despatch No. 18 of the 5th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 502.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 45.)
Foreign Office, January 21, 1878.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's telegram of the 15th instant, reporting the answer of the Russian Government, as communicated to you by Baron Jomini, to the inquiry which you were instructed to make as to their willingness to give an assurance that no Russian force would be sent to the Peninsula of Gallipoli.

Her Majesty's Government are glad to receive the pledge thus given by the Russian Government that they have no intention of directing their military operations on Gallipoli unless Turkish regular troops should concentrate there.

You are authorized to inform Prince Gortchakow that Her Majesty's Government do not, under present circumstances, contemplate any occupation of the position in question.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 503.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 49. Secret.)
Foreign Office, January 21, 1878.

My Lord,

IN a private communication made to me by the Russian Ambassador to-day, his Excellency told me that as he saw false reports propagated by certain journals as to supposed Russian demands for Russian vessels of war in the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, he thought it right to inform me that in the bases of peace sent to the Grand Duke Nicholas, no mention was made of either of those Straits.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 504.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 44. Secret.)
Foreign Office, January 21, 1878.

Sir,

I HAVE to request your Excellency to ask Count Andrassy if the Austrian Government would be willing to join in an identic note to the Russian Government to the following effect:—

"The continued occupation by foreign troops of Bulgaria, or of any part of the shores of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, and Dardanelles, or any alteration of the rules affecting the navigation thereof, to be declared inadmissible without the consent of Austria and England."

I have to request your Excellency to ascertain whether the above is likely to be agreed to, and, if not, whether the Austrian Government is waiting for or expecting anything

further from Her Majesty's Government to induce it to join cordially with England. In that case, your Excellency should endeavour to find out what is expected from Her Majesty's Government.

An immediate answer to this question would be very desirable.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 505.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 46. Secret.)
Foreign Office, January 21, 1878.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 44 of this day's date, the expression "continued occupation," as applied to the Bosphorus and mentioned in that despatch, must not be taken to imply any concurrence in the entry of Russian troops into Constantinople, which would, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, have most disastrous results.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 506.

Musurus Pasha to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 22.)

Ambassade Impériale Ottomane, Londres, le 17 *Janvier*, 1878.

My Lord,

JE m'empresse de transmettre à votre Excellence la copie ci-jointe d'une dépêche télégraphique que je reçois à l'instant du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte, et qui contient le texte d'une nouvelle dépêche télégraphique adressée par mon auguste Maître à Sa Majesté la Reine; et je prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien faire parvenir immédiatement ce message de Sa Majesté Impériale à sa haute destination.

J'ai, &c.
(Signé) MUSURUS.

Inclosure in No. 506.

Server Pasha to Musurus Pasha.

Constantinople, le 17 *Janvier*, 1878.

(Télégraphique.)

VEUILLEZ faire parvenir immédiatement à Sa Majesté la Reine le télégramme suivant de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan:—

"Je me fais un devoir empressé d'exprimer à votre Majesté mes remercîments les plus sincères et les plus vifs pour la réponse, pleine d'amitié, qu'elle a bien voulue adresser à mon télégramme du 10 Janvier. En s'adressant personnellement, et en particulier à l'Empereur de Russie, pour l'engager à faciliter la conclusion d'une prompte et honorable paix, votre Majesté m'a donné, je suis heureux de la constater, une nouvelle preuve de sa haute sollicitude pour mon Empire. J'espère que cette démarche de votre Majesté produira sans retard un résultat satisfaisant, et arrêtera la marche envahissante des Russes, qui sont déjà tout près d'Andrinople, et menacent la capitale de mon Empire. Dans ce moment suprême je compte, avant tout, avec confiance sur mon auguste, ancienne et constante amie.

No. 507.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 42. Secret.)
Berlin, January 20, 1878.

My Lord,

MY confidential informant tells me that Count Andrassy and Prince Bismarck have agreed to Prince Gortchakow's wish for a European Conference after the signature of the preliminaries, if a satisfactory agreement cannot be arrived at between the Powers by any other means.

Being at peace Austria has no excuse for wresting any portion of territory from Turkey. At the same time a rectification of frontier may become desirable for the greater safety of Austrian interests, according to the nature and extent of the Russian peace conditions.

If Austria attempted to obtain that rectification of frontier by force, it is not impossible that Italy might follow her example and equally claim some increase of territory, whilst by submitting the question to a Conference, as suggested by Prince Gortchakow, the sanction of Europe may possibly be obtained to a new state of things in Turkey without further bloodshed.

Count Andrassy has therefore undertaken to promote the idea of a Conference later on.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 508.

Server Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha, January 22.)

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le 21 Janvier*, 1878.

SUITE à mon télégramme d'hier soir.

Une dépêche reçue aujourd'hui de nos Plénipotentiaires annonce leur arrivée à Kyzanlik.

No. 509.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 92. Most Urgent.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 21, 1878.*

PORTE is most anxious for a reply from Her Majesty's Government as to the approach of Her Majesty's fleet to the Dardanelles. From information received from various quarters, there appears to be little doubt that the Russians are marching on Gallipoli. No news whatever from the Plenipotentiaries, and great fears entertained here that the Russians are playing a double game.

Is Her Majesty's Government prepared for the consequence to England after seizure by Russia of the Dardanelles? I trust that I have not been deficient in giving warning. I feel the leaviest responsibility in the matter, as after your Lordship's instructions of the 12th instant not to interfere as to lines of Boulair, my hands have been tied.

No. 510.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 95.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 21, 1878.*

PORTE has received a telegram from the Plenipotentiaries only stating that they are at Russian head-quarters, and that they have been unable to decipher a telegram sent from Constantinople.

This curt message has increased suspicions of Porte.

News has been received that Suleiman Pasha has reached Drainn with large force. He has telegraphed for transports to be sent to embark his troops at Cavalla. A considerable force might perhaps still therefore be landed at Gallipoli for defence of Bulair lines.

No. 511.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 22.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Very Confidential.) *Vienna, January 22, 1878.*

I HAVE just seen Count Andrassy. He does not believe in the report of the Russians being on the way to Constantinople or Gallipoli, as he says that they have only 5,000 men before Adrianople.

He gives himself credit for steadily maintaining his standpoint in having just declined a Russian proposal that he should agree in principle with Russia respecting conditions of peace. He expressed surprise at learning from Count Beust that Her Majesty's Government have abandoned all idea of occupying Gallipoli or sending the fleet to Constantinople, as the latter measure would have been justified by necessity of the protection of British subjects and the population generally against massacre and pillage, and it could not therefore have been treated as an act of war, as the smallest maritime Power having interests at Constantinople would have a right to show her flag there in the present state of things. He said that it was not for him to urge Her Majesty's Government to adopt such a measure, but, from the opinions he has hitherto believed them to entertain as to its expediency, he was certainly not prepared for nothing being done.

Since the foregoing was written I have received your telegram of this afternoon, and I have little hope of Count Andrassy accepting the proposal of Her Majesty's Government or making one himself. He appears to think that he would be acting dishonourably, as the negotiations have shown from the first, if he adopted a menacing attitude towards Russia in concert with England before Russia has violated her engagements to Austria by the conditions of peace which she may attempt to impose on Turkey.

No. 512.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 22.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 22, 1878.*

I HAVE communicated to Prince Gortchakow this day, in the form of a Memorandum, the substance of your Lordship's telegram of yesterday referring to Gallipoli.

No. 513.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 38.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 9, 1878.*

I RECEIVED late last night your Lordship's telegram of yesterday morning, authorizing me to suggest to the Porte, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, the expediency of sending delegates to the Russian head-quarters, furnished with instructions to negotiate an armistice with the Russian Commanders. I communicated its substance to the Sultan through Said Pasha early this morning, and sent Mr. Sandison with a translation of it into French to Server Pasha. His Excellency had, however, already left his house for the palace, where the Council of Ministers had assembled, and remained sitting during the greater part of the day. Mr. Sandison was consequently unable to deliver my communication to his Excellency personally, but sent it to him through Serkis Effendi, the Under-Secretary, who had been summoned by the Grand Vizier.

The answer of Russia had already been made known to the Porte on Monday afternoon (7th), from the Turkish Ambassador at Paris, who had learnt it through Lord Lyons. It was told me by Server Pasha in the evening, but as I had not then heard from your Lordship on the subject, I was unable to confirm the information received by his Excellency. In the course of the night the Porte was apprised by the Turkish Ambassador in London of the Russian reply communicated to him by your Lordship. In the evening of yesterday, as I was informed at the time from a trustworthy confidential source, Server Pasha sent Musurus Pasha a telegram instructing him to state to your Lordship that the Porte, finding itself isolated to the face of Russia and following the advice of your Lordship, had directed its Commanders to conclude a purely military armistice with the Russian Generals. Musurus Pasha was to add that the Russian armies were continuing their invasion of Rumelia, profiting by the time unhappily lost in consequence of the negotiations set on foot for an armistice, and that as the Turkish Com-

manders could not treat with Servia and Montenegro, the Porte desired to know from your Lordship what course it should pursue with regard to them and the Principalities, in order to include them in the armistice. I enclose copy of Server Pasha's telegram, in case Musurus Pasha should not have given one to your Lordship.

Telegrams were at the same time sent by the Minister of War, Raouf Pasha, to the Grand Dukes Nicholas and Michael informing them that the Turkish Commanders in Europe and Asia had received instructions from the Porte to negotiate and conclude an armistice with the Russian Generals who might be empowered to treat with them. Instructions to this effect were also telegraphed to the Turkish Commanders.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

Inclosure in No. 513.

Substance of Telegram from Server Pasha to Musurus Pasha.

8 *Janvier*, 1878.

CE soir Server Pacha a adressé à Musurus Pacha une dépêche dont voici la substance :

"Vous savez que Lord Derby avait déclaré au Prince Gortchakow, par l'entremise de Lord Loftus, qu'il pensait que pour que l'armistice eut un résultat pratique, il serait nécessaire que les bases en fussent préalablement arrêtées entre les deux belligérents, et que nous avions en conséquence prié Lord Derby de demander au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg de lui faire connaître ces bases.

"Aujourd'hui Lord Derby nous conseille de nous adresser directement à la Russie pour faire conclure un armistice entre les Commandants des armées belligérantes, attendu que toute démarche dans ce sens que pourrait faire l'Angleterre serait rejetée par la Russie.

"Nous trouvant ainsi isolés en face de la Russie et suivant les conseils de Lord Derby, nous chargeons nos Commandants de conclure avec les Commandants Russes un armistice purement militaire.

"En portant ce fait à la connaissance de Lord Derby vous lui direz que les armées Russes ont continué leur invasion en Roumélie en profitant du temps malheureusement perdu par suite des négociations entamées en vue d'un armistice.

"Vous ajouterez que nos Commandants ne pourront pas traiter avec la Serbie et le Monténégro, et que nous désirons savoir comment Lord Derby entend que l'on devrait procéder à leur égard aussi bien que l'égard des Principautés pour les faire participer à un armistice qui doit être général."

No. 514.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 41.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 10, 1878.

THE Porte so fully relied upon the understanding come to between Prince Gortchakow and your Lordship with reference to the armistice, that, being under the impression that nothing remained to be done but for the Commanders of the opposing forces to communicate with each other on the subject, it telegraphed to the Turkish Generals in Europe and Asia to suspend hostilities. It was on this account that they addressed themselves to the Russian Commanders as if an armistice were actually concluded, and that there was a general conviction amongst the Turks that such was the case. Ahmed Kaiserli Pasha informed the Minister of War that he had not returned the Russian fire at Rustchuk, and the authorities at Adrianople and elsewhere were able to calm and keep back the crowds of wretched fugitives by assuring them that the Russians were not advancing, as an armistice had been agreed to. When the truth was discovered, the disappointment was very great, as your Lordship may suppose.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 515.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 42.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 10, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of the reply of the Grand Duke Nicholas to the telegram of the Turkish Minister of War, proposing negotiations for an armistice, according to the suggestion made by Prince Gortchakow to your Lordship, and communicated by me to the Porte in pursuance of your Lordship's instructions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

Inclosure in No. 515.

The Grand Duke Nicholas to Raouf Pasha.

(Télégraphique.) *Pera-Lowtcha, le 9 Janvier*, 1878.

CONTENU de votre télégramme a été transmis à l'Empereur. Les négociations ne peuvent avoir lieu qu'avec moi directement. Il ne saurait toutefois être question en ce moment d'armistice sans bases de paix.

(Signé) NICOLAS.

No. 516.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 43.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 10, 1878.

THE Sultan, who had assembled his Ministers early this morning at the Palace, sent Saïd Pasha to me with a communication from himself, which had been agreed to in Council. As the matter was of so grave a nature, and it was of the utmost importance that I should be able to report to your Lordship with the greatest accuracy His Majesty's very words, I begged Saïd Pasha to dictate them to me, and after I had taken them down I read over to his Excellency what I had written. Saïd Pasha having approved of it, I telegraphed it to your Lordship. It was to this effect: that the Russian forces on this side of the Balkans, said to amount to nearly 200,000 men, were advancing upon Adrianople, and that it was feared that the city could not be defended against such overwhelming numbers. If it fell into the hands of the Russians they would at once advance upon Constantinople. Should they attempt to take possession of the capital, the Turkish Empire itself would be in peril, and the consequences could not be foreseen. To prevent the catastrophe which would probably be the result, the Sultan appeals for the last time to Her Majesty's Government to obtain peace for him from Russia on the most favourable terms that she can be induced to give, accepting for basis the Treaty of Paris. Should Her Majesty's Government find themselves unable to take any further steps to secure an immediate peace, or should they be under the necessity of declining to do so, the Sultan will, in such case, be under the absolute necessity, as the safety of his Empire is at stake, to address himself at once directly to the Emperor of Russia, and will be compelled to accept such terms as he may think fit to impose upon Turkey. No responsibility will then rest upon His Majesty for the consequences of this direct understanding with Russia. I was further requested by the Sultan to represent to Her Majesty's Government that it was absolutely necessary that an immediate and final answer should be returned by them to this communication, as there was no time to be lost.

I gave Saïd Pasha, at his Excellency's request, a memorandum of what I had telegraphed to your Lordship to be shown to the Sultan and his Ministers. Server Pasha, whom I saw later in the day, stated that it was in strict conformity with the message which His Majesty, with the concurrence of the Council, had sent to me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 517.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 56.)
My Lord, *Paris, January 21, 1878.*

PRINCE ORLOFF, the Russian Ambassador at Paris, came to me this morning, and showed me copies which he had, he told me, just received of telegrams which had passed between the Emperor his master and the Sultan.

The Sultan's telegram was dated the 1st January, no doubt the 1st January old style, which corresponds to the 13th January new style. It expressed the desire of His Majesty to put an end to the horrors of war, announced that Server Pasha and Namik Pasha had been sent to the head-quarters of the Grand Duke Nicholas, and begged the Emperor to give orders at once for the cessation of hostilities in Europe and Asia.

The Emperor's answer bore the date of the 3rd January, which corresponds to the 15th, new style. It was somewhat curt, and stated that the Emperor was as desirous of peace as the Sultan could be, but that he could not order any cessation of hostilities until Turkey had agreed to the conditions for an armistice which would be laid down by the Russian Commanders-in-chief.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 518.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 23.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Secret.) *Vienna, January 22, 1878.*

COUNT ANDRASSY is unwilling to address to Russia the identic note proposed by Her Majesty's Government, but not on the grounds on which I believed last night he would object to it. He declines to adopt it, as it would, in his opinion, weaken position which the two Governments have already taken by their declarations at St. Petersburgh and Constantinople, and as it would not only separate England and Austria from the other Guaranteeing Powers, but would admit that the occupation by Russian troops of Bulgaria, which he considers to be absolutely inadmissible, might be permitted with consent of England and Austria. He says that the difference between him and Her Majesty's Government is that he has declared clearly what interests he intends to protect, and if a mobilization is necessary the order will be given for it before the Legislature is asked to sanction the expenditure to be incurred; but Her Majesty's Government appear unwilling to take any responsibility on themselves, and the action of England may depend on an adverse vote of the House of Commons: and, therefore, until Her Majesty's Government (have I) taken some active and material measure proving that the country will support them in protecting momentous interests against pretensions of Russia, he cannot commit himself before his country to the adoption of any course in concert with England for the support of their common interests, though he has no intention of abandoning those of Austria. But, as he has already said, he can take no middle course, and he cannot menace Russia without mobilizing, and mobilization will not only mean war, but put the country from the first day to enormous expenses. When it is necessary, however, he will easily find the financial means required for it, and Austria has no idea of accepting foreign subsidies.

He repeated, on my endeavours to ascertain what he expected England to do, that she should, for the protection of her own interests in Constantinople, send her fleet there, and she should ask a credit for the expenses of the measures she may have to adopt to cause her voice to be heard by Russia.

If she does this, he said, it will be seen that she is in earnest, and those who are disposed to act with her for the protection of their own interests or of the interests which they may have in common, will know that they will find in her an ally to be depended on, and whose voice will be respected by Russia.

I said that he seemed to doubt that Her Majesty's Government were in earnest, and that they had finally decided on supporting English interests by material measures (?); but if Her Majesty's Government were influenced by what ill-disposed persons said, they might equally doubt that Austria had taken an irrevocable decision on the subject, and, indeed, the public generally in England believed that the three Emperors were in one camp. To this he answered that from the mission of General Somoroukoff to the present day, he had shown that he had the courage of his own opinions (?), and was well-prepared

to act upon them. He did not, however, wish war, or that the action of England should lead to it, and he considered that the day on which Her Majesty's Government ordered the fleet to Constantinople, the peace of the East of Europe would be decided, as Russia would never accept war in which she would have to meet Austria and England. He took great exception to the epithet (of anxious ?) applied to him by the Prime Minister.

No. 519.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 98. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 23, 1878.*

PORTE received a telegram late last night, dated Sunday, from Server Pasha, stating that he had had an unofficial conversation with the Grand Duke Nicholas, and that, judging from what fell from his Imperial Highness, he thinks that the terms demanded by Russia will be very hard. They were to have been communicated to him officially yesterday.

No. 520.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 99.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 23, 1878.*

I COMMUNICATED to the Porte the substance of your telegram of the 21st instant* with reference to Gallipoli. In reply I am informed that there are now only three battalions at that place to maintain order and to prevent Mussulman population from taking flight, and that more troops will not be sent there if I am authorized by Her Majesty's Government to communicate officially to Porte in their name the pledge given by Prince Gortchakow referred to in your Lordship's telegram.

No. 521.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 23, 1878.*

WHAT answer have you received to the communication made by you to the Russian Government on the instructions telegraphed to you on the 14th instant ?†

No. 522.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 23, 1878.*

RUSSIAN Ambassador informed me privately on the 21st instant that no mention is made of the Dardanelles or Bosphorus in the bases of peace sent to the Grand Duke Nicholas.

No. 523.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 23.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 23, 1878.*

WITH reference to my telegram of yesterday Count Andrassy seems to consider that when the English fleet is at Constantinople the two Powers will only then be in equally favourable positions to force Russia to respect their opinions; and should Russia meanwhile have been allowed to occupy Gallipoli, her troops there would necessarily be

* Repeating telegram to Lord A. Loftus of January 21, in answer to Russian assurances respecting Gallipoli.
† As to separate peace between Russia and Turkey.

recalled in event of war ensuing, which he does not think probable, the day on which an Austrian force entered Roumania and threatened the rear of Russian army.

No. 524.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 58.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 23, 1878.

I HAVE to request your Excellency to inform me what answer you have received to the communication made by you to the Russian Government in pursuance of the instructions contained in my despatch No. 36 of the 14th instant, relative to the views of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the validity of any Treaty concluded between Russia and Turkey, without the consent of the Guaranteeing Powers.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 525.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 60. Most Confidential.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 23, 1878.

THE Russian Ambassador told me this afternoon that he had yesterday telegraphed to his Government to obtain from them a statement of the Russian conditions of peace, as he saw that there was much anxiety on the subject in this country.

I confirmed what his Excellency said on this point, and impressed upon him the growing feeling of uneasiness and impatience, especially in the House of Commons, and I urged the great importance of letting us know at once what was proposed on the side of Russia.

Count Schouvaloff said he was quite aware of the state of public feeling here. He believed the reason which had influenced his Government in keeping secret the terms of peace, was the possible necessity of making some modifications in them to satisfy the requirements of a friendly Power (I understand his Excellency to refer to Austria), and the greater difficulty of making such changes after the conditions had once been announced to Europe.

His Excellency told me further confidentially, and for my private guidance only, that he understood the delay that had taken place to have been due in great measure to the fear of producing an unfavourable effect in the English Parliament at the opening of the Session.

I told Count Schouvaloff that I thought this was a miscalculation, as whatever the terms were, the knowledge of them would probably have caused less irritation than the long suspense to which the Government and Parliament had been kept, which naturally led people to anticipate the worst.

Count Schouvaloff did not dissent from this expression of opinion, but said that it was not easy for a Russian Minister at St. Petersburgh to judge of the effect which would be produced on opinion here.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 526.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 48.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 9, 1878.

I MET Server Pasha this morning at a reception at the German Embassy. Whilst engaged in a confidential conversation with me, his Excellency received a communication from the Sultan directing him to tell me that, acting upon the advice of Her Majesty's Government, who had informed the Porte that the Russian Commanders had been instructed to state to the Turkish Generals who might be authorized to negotiate an armistice the conditions on which it would be concluded, His Majesty had caused a communication on the subject to be made yesterday by his Minister of War to the Grand Dukes Nicholas and Michael,

but that up to that time no answer had been returned by them. The Turkish Commanders in Roumelia had also addressed themselves to the Russian Generals at the head of the invading armies; but the latter had professed to know nothing about an armistice, and had refused to treat for one. The Russians were still advancing in large force towards Adrianople. His Majesty wished to know my opinion as to what he should do under the circumstances.

I begged Server Pasha to inform his Majesty, in reply, that I could not venture to give advice on so grave a subject, and could only undertake to telegraph His Majesty's message to your Lordship at once. I accordingly immediately returned to the Embassy, and sent my telegram No. 23 to your Lordship.

Server Pasha informed me that the Ministers in Council had received the translation which I had sent him in the morning of your Lordship's telegram, suggesting that the Turkish Delegates should put themselves into direct communication with the Russian Commanders to negotiate an armistice, with profound surprise and disappointment.

They had fully understood, his Excellency said, from Musurus Pasha's reports of his interviews with your Lordship, that the British Government had undertaken to settle, on behalf of the Porte, the basis of the armistice at St. Petersburgh, and that Russia had asked for or proposed it. They could not reconcile your Lordship's telegram with Musurus Pasha's statements. It now appeared that Her Majesty's Government had confined themselves to informing the Russian Government that Turkey was ready to make peace, and were not prepared to go further. Prince Gortchakow even declared that he had not proposed an armistice at all. Most valuable time had been lost in fruitless negotiations, of which the Russians had availed themselves to push forward their forces with the greatest vigour and activity, and to overrun the greater part of Roumelia. It would have been better, his Excellency observed, had Her Majesty's Government said at once that they could do nothing, and had left the Sultan to address himself directly to the Emperor of Russia.

Had His Majesty done so immediately after the fall of Plevna, the advance of the Russians on this side of the Balkans might have been stopped. He added that great irritation was felt against England, who was accused by the Turks of having misled them, and then deserted them. They were convinced, he maintained, that the Russian Government had purposely drawn England into negotiations about the armistice in order to deceive her, so as to be able to occupy Adrianople, upon which city they were rapidly advancing, before a suspension of arms was agreed to.

His Excellency declared that his position was most seriously compromised, as he had strongly advised the Sultan to adhere to the "English policy," and he was mainly responsible for the course that the Porte had taken.

I remarked to his Excellency that his charge against Her Majesty's Government was unjust and unfounded. I reminded him that I had, over and over again, informed him officially, in the most distinct terms, that Her Majesty's Government declined to offer their sole mediation to Russia, being convinced that such an offer would not be accepted, and that it would not be to the advantage of Turkey that it should be made. They had simply, at the request of the Porte, endeavoured to ascertain from Prince Gortchakow whether Russia would be disposed to put an end to the effusion of blood, and to conclude peace. The Russian Chancellor, in reply, had expressed the desire of the Emperor to bring the war to an end, and suggested an armistice as the first step towards obtaining peace.

The answer of Russia had been communicated to the Porte, and Musurus Pasha had informed your Lordship that the Turkish Government agreed in principle to an armistice.

Her Majesty's Government had then taken a further step on behalf of Turkey in suggesting to the Russian Government that conditions for an armistice would be better discussed between the two Governments than between Generals, and that Servia and Montenegro should be included in it. Prince Gortchakow had, thereupon, stated that the Russian Military Commanders were instructed as to the conditions to which Russia would agree. Her Majesty's Government had consequently suggested to the Porte the expediency of sending delegates to the Russian head-quarters to negotiate the armistice. Surely, I said, Her Majesty's Government had done all in their power to assist Turkey in obtaining peace consistently with their often-declared intention not to depart from the position of conditional neutrality which they had deliberately assumed at the outbreak of the war. The Porte, so far from having grounds of complaint against Her Majesty's Government, had every reason, I maintained, to be grateful for what they had done on its behalf.

I had occasion during the evening to speak to several Turks of high station, and to some of the leading Mussulman and Christian functionaries at the Porte, who were

assembled at Princess Reuss' reception. I found the most bitter feelings prevailing against England, and a general conviction that she had allowed herself to be deceived by Russia, who had no real intention of concluding an armistice, but was only seeking to gain time to complete her military arrangements to march upon Constantinople. The language held by Prince Reuss and the members of his Embassy was not calculated to remove that conviction from their minds.

On my return home I received another message from the Sultan, informing me that the Russian General at Ichtiman, to whom Sabit Pasha had sent a "parlementaire" to treat for an armistice, had declared that he had no instructions whatever on the subject, and had refused to enter into any communications with the Turkish delegate.

His Majesty begged me to ask Her Majesty's Government to request the Russian Government to give the necessary instructions without delay to the Russian Commander in question.

I accordingly telegraphed in this sense to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 527.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 57.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 13, 1878.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of two telegrams sent by the Grand Duke Nicholas to the Turkish Minister of War, informing his Excellency that bases of peace must be settled with Turkish delegates before the principles of an armistice can be agreed to by him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 527.

The Grand Duke Nicholas to Raouf Pasha.

(Télégraphique. *Le 11 Janvier*, 1878.

ME référant à mon télégramme d'hier, aussitôt qu'entente sera établie sur les bases de paix et principes généraux d'armistice seront convenus avec moi, je donnerai sans retard ordres nécessaires aux Commandants. La cause pour arrangement prendre conjointement avec Commandants Turcs, vue d'appliquer l'armistice. Jusque là opérations entreprises ne sauraient être arrêtées.

Inclosure 2 in No. 527.

The Grand Duke Nicholas to Raouf Pasha.

(Télégraphique.) *Gabrova, le 12 Janvier*, 1878.

LES bases de paix seront communiquées par moi à la personne qui me sera envoyée munie de pleins pouvoirs pour les accepter et conclure là-dessus les principes d'armistice qui seront aussitôt appliqués. Je prie de me faire connaître le nom du Plénipotentiaire choisi, et de me l'envoyer à Ryzanlik, et de m'avertir de l'époque de son arrivée.

No. 528.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 60.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 14*, 1878.

I INFORMED your Lordship by telegraph on the 12th instant that the Sultan had sent to me repeatedly to inquire whether I had received any answer to the telegram that, at His Majesty's request, I had addressed to your Lordship on the 10th instant, placing before Her Majesty's Government the peril of his Empire, making a last appeal to Her Majesty's Government to obtain peace for him on the most favourable terms, based on the

Treaty of Paris, and adding that if Her Majesty's Government were unable or declined to do so, there would be nothing left for him but to address himself directly to the Emperor of Russia, and to accede to such terms as he might think fit to impose upon Turkey. I further informed your Lordship that His Majesty was most anxious to learn the decision of Her Majesty's Government, as the state of affairs was daily getting worse, the Russians having advanced as far as Eski and Yeni-Zagra, and being within a few hours of Philippopolis.

The Turkish Minister of War, acting under a misapprehension that an armistice had been actually concluded through the intervention of Her Majesty's Government (which it is not easy to explain, as there were, as far as I am aware, no grounds whatever for the supposition), had sent orders to the Turkish Commanders to suspend hostilities, and the Porte complained that the Russians continued them. No answer had been at that time received from the Grand Dukes Nicholas and Michael, to whom the Porte had addressed itself, in accordance with the suggestion of Her Majesty's Government, with a view to procuring an armistice.

Later on the same day (12th) I telegraphed to your Lordship that the reply of the Grand Duke Nicholas had reached the Turkish Minister of War. It was to the effect that as soon as an understanding had been come to as to the bases of peace, the general principles of an armistice could be settled with him, and he would then give the necessary orders at once to the Russian Commanders to arrange with the Turkish Generals for carrying it out, but that until such an arrangement was arrived at military operations must continue. I informed your Lordship, at the same time, that I had learnt from a secret source that unless I received an answer from your Lordship to my telegram of the 10th instant the Porte would decide upon sending Plenipotentiaries to the Grand Duke Nicholas to treat directly with him, both for the bases of peace and for an armistice.

I also informed your Lordship by telegraph that the only answer sent to the Turkish Minister of War by the Grand Duke Michael was a simple acknowledgment of the receipt of his Excellency's telegram.

On the morning of the 13th I received your Lordship's answers to my communications. They were to the effect that Prince Gortchakow had replied to the representations of Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, with reference to the answers received by the Porte from the Grand Dukes Nicholas and Michael, that the instructions as to the armistice had been sent to their Imperial Highnesses about a week before by messenger, as they were of too serious importance to be confided to the telegraph; they would therefore reach the Grand Duke Nicholas in eight days and the Grand Duke Michael in about fifteen. His Highness observed that he had not stated to Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh that instructions had been received by the Russian Commanders, but that they had been sent to them.

Your Lordship subsequently informed Lord Augustus Loftus that you would repeat Prince Gortchakow's answer to the Porte, but that Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that it was to be regretted that the Prince should not have explained at the time that delay would be caused by the employment of special messengers, instead of the telegraph, in sending the instructions to the Russian Commanders-in-chief.

In answer to the final appeal of the Sultan to England, your Lordship stated to me that Her Majesty's Government had already employed their good offices in placing the Porte in communication with Russia for the purpose of obtaining an armistice, and regretted the delay which had occurred in connection with the negotiations. They had, however, no reason to believe that such delay would have occurred, and they did not hold themselves responsible for it. In the present state of affairs, your Lordship informed me, they could not do more.

The Ministers had met in Council at the Palace very early on Sunday morning, and it was not until late in the afternoon that Mr. Sandison was able to communicate to them at the Porte, as I had instructed him to do, the substance of your Lordship's telegrams. In the meanwhile, Server Pasha had received from Musurus Pasha by telegraph a report of his conversation with your Lordship on the subject of the final appeal of Turkey to England for help. It was to the effect that your Lordship had transmitted to the Queen a telegram from the Sultan, and was expecting Her Majesty's answer, which could only, however, be in conformity with the policy of Her Majesty's Government; and that he (Musurus Pasha) had asked your Lordship's opinion of the answer of the Grand Duke Nicholas, which insisted upon negotiations for the bases of peace being concluded before the principles of an armistice could be agreed to. Your Lordship's reply was not, Musurus Pasha stated, conclusive; on one hand your Lordship saying that the conditions of peace, and especially those which concerned English interests, required the participation and assent of England; on the other, that England, being resolved to maintain her policy of

neutrality, could not undertake to mediate between the belligerents. For two years, your Lordship had added, you had declared to the Porte that it could expect no material assistance from England. You expressed your opinion that the Porte should enter into "pourparlers" with the Russian Commanders-in-chiefs, in order to ascertain provisionally the conditions of peace that Russia proposed, and should communicate them to Her Majesty's Government, who would then see what there was to be done.

Musurus Pasha ended by saying that your Lordship had told him that you had directed me to ask the Porte whether it wished the English fleet to enter the Dardanelles and English troops to debark at and occupy Gallipoli. If they did so, it would be on the express understanding that these measures would not in any way affect the neutrality of England.

This telegram from Musurus Pasha appears to have made a most unfavourable impression upon the Ministers. It was not removed or diminished by the communication to them of your Lordship's answer by Mr. Sandison. A prolonged discussion took place with regard to the course to be pursued. Some of the Ministers—amongst them, I understand, Server, Said (the General), and Namyk Pashas—spoke strongly in favour of still looking to England, and against treating directly with Russia, and accepting such terms of peace as the Grand Duke Nicholas might think fit to impose upon Turkey before discussing the conditions of an armistice. However, the majority were of opinion that there was nothing left for the Porte to do but to come to an immediate and direct arrangement with Russia without reference to any other Power, in order to check the further advance of Russia upon Constantinople. They maintained that there was nothing to hope from England, who would not venture to oppose Russia even to protect her own interests, much less those of Turkey. It was, therefore, determined to name two Plenipotentiaries to proceed at once to Kyzanlik, where the Grand Duke Nicholas had notified his intention of receiving them if the Porte wished to negotiate the bases of a peace, and subsequently the principles of an armistice. Server Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Namyk Pasha, the Minister of the Civil List, were chosen for this important and responsible duty.

The decision of the Council was communicated by me to your Lordship immediately I received it.

I understand that one of the strongest arguments used by those who advocated a direct understanding with Russia was founded upon the manner in which, they maintained, England had allowed herself to be deceived by Prince Gortchakow in the matter of the armistice. They pointed out that whilst Her Majesty's Government had been informed at St. Petersburgh that the conclusion of an armistice would precede the negotiations for peace, the instructions given to the Russian Commanders-in-chief were to insist upon an agreement for the bases of peace before consenting to discuss the principles of an armistice. Her Majesty's Government, it was contended, having apparently submitted to this deception, had placed the Porte entirely at the mercy of Russia, and no other course was open to it but to accept the best terms of peace that it could obtain by direct negotiation with the Russian Commanders-in-chief, and thus to put a stop to military operations which were devastating the country, bringing dreadful sufferings upon the Mussulman population, and threatening the capital itself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 529.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 61.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 14, 1878.*

IN pursuance of the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram of the 12th instant, I have endeavoured to ascertain whether any objection would be offered by the Sultan to the British fleet anchoring within the Dardanelles, it being clearly understood that this step would not be considered by Her Majesty's Government a departure from their attitude of neutrality, but merely as a precaution to prevent the closing of the Straits. I directed Mr. Sandison to speak on the subject yesterday to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, being unable to see his Excellency myself, as he was in Council at the Palace, and afterwards at the Porte with his colleagues. Server Pasha submitted the question to His Majesty and to the Ministers, but being unable to give me an answer at the breaking up of the Council last night, begged me to see him on the subject early this morning.

His Excellency said, when I called upon him, that the Sultan could have no objection under ordinary circumstances to seeing the fleet of so old and friendly an ally as England in any of his waters; but as negotiations were now about to commence for peace it would scarcely be prudent for His Majesty to consent to a step which might be looked upon by Russia as an act of war and as a menace, and might induce her to impose even harder conditions upon Turkey than those which she was now prepared to demand. On the other hand, Her Majesty's Government having renewed their declaration to maintain a strict neutrality, would not interfere to protect Turkey from the consequences. However, his Excellency said, he was to see the Sultan in the evening and would speak to His Majesty again on the matter; but it appeared to me that there was little prospect of the Porte agreeing to a measure which would only lead to fresh difficulties with Russia without bringing it any compensating advantages.

Mr. Sandison informs me that one of the objections raised by Server Pasha was, that if permission was given to the English fleet to enter the Dardanelles, the same privilege would probably be demanded by Austria and other Powers, and the Sultan could not run the risk of offending them by refusing to grant it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 530.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 63.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 14, 1878.*

SERVER PASHA sent last night to ask me to call upon him early this morning, in order that he might speak with me before his departure for the head-quarters of the Grand Duke Nicholas. I arrived at his Excellency's private house at the same time as my Austrian colleague, who had received a similar invitation.

Count Zichy, after being a short time alone with his Excellency, sent out to beg me to join them. He observed, when I entered the room, that he was anxious that I should be present at his interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as it related to matters of very grave importance both to the interests of England and of Austria, in which it was desirable that we should understand one another and act together as far as possible. I assured him of my readiness to do so as far as I properly could. He then asked Server Pasha whether he was going to meet the Grand Duke Nicholas, not only with a view to negotiating for an armistice, but furnished with full powers to conclude the bases of a peace without further reference to Constantinople. Server Pasha replied that he possessed such powers, as the Grand Duke had made it an absolute condition that, before discussing an armistice, the bases of peace should be settled with him by the Turkish Plenipotentiaries. As in the present critical state of affairs an armistice was absolutely necessary to prevent the Russians advancing upon Constantinople and endangering the safety of the Empire, the Porte, helpless and deprived of the support of the other Powers, could not do otherwise than conclude a peace as soon as possible, and on the most favourable conditions she could obtain, without considering their interests and objections.

"Then," said Count Zichy, "I am to understand that you and your colleague are empowered to make a peace with Russia upon such terms as you may think advisable, without accepting them *ad referendum*, and submitting them previously to the Porte?" Server Pasha answered again that he was.

I pointed out to his Excellency that Prince Gortchakow had stated to your Lordship, in the most distinct terms, that an armistice was to precede negotiations for peace, which was a matter which concerned all the Powers parties to the Treaty of Paris. I observed that in agreeing to a peace directly with Russia, without consulting the Great Powers, or communicating its terms to them, the Porte itself might be running the risk of throwing over a Treaty to which it had always professed to cling as a guarantee for the integrity, independence, and safety of the Empire.

Server Pasha replied that the European Powers had permitted Russia to violate that Treaty with impunity, and had refused to acknowledge the obligations that were imposed upon them by it. Such being the case, Turkey, finding herself abandoned, could no longer be expected to be bound by the Treaty to her own disadvantage. Her only consideration must now be how to obtain peace.

Server Pasha then referred to the official communication I had been authorized by your Lordship to make to the Porte on the 8th instant as to what had passed with Prince Gortchakow with regard to the armistice, asking how, after the deception practised upon

England, to which she had submitted, Turkey could look to her, or any other Power, for help to resist any pretensions that Russia might put forward. I read it to his Excellency and to Count Zichy at their request. In it, as your Lordship will remember, it is said that Prince Gortchakow had stated to Lord A. Loftus "that Russia desired nothing better than to arrive at peace, but that for that purpose the Porte must address itself to the Commanders-in-chief in Europe and Asia, who will state the conditions upon which an armistice can be granted;" and further, his Highness declared "that he had not asked for an armistice, but had indicated the mode of arriving at peace, and that the Russian Military Commanders were instructed to state the conditions on which an armistice could be agreed to." Her Majesty's Government consequently suggested to the Porte the expediency of sending Delegates to the Russian head-quarters to negotiate an armistice.

There was nothing, therefore, said at St. Petersburgh, as Server Pasha pointed out, about the Turkish Delegates negotiating for peace. Whilst Prince Gortchakow had thus informed Her Majesty's Government, through Lord A. Loftus, that such negotiations were to be preceded by the armistice, his Highness had apparently given instructions in a completely opposite sense to the Russian Commanders-in-chief, and the Grand Duke Nicholas had absolutely refused to consider the question of the armistice until the bases of peace had been settled between himself and the Turkish Plenipotentiaries.

The discrepancy thus shown by Server Pasha to exist between the language held by Prince Gortchakow to your Lordship and the communications received by the Turkish Minister of War from the Grand Duke, made, apparently, a deep impression upon my Austrian colleague. He seemed to think that the Prince had purposely deceived your Lordship by discussing the question of an armistice at St. Petersburgh, in order to gain time to enable the Russian armies to overrun Roumelia and to occupy Adrianople, when Turkey would be compelled to accept any terms of peace in order to arrest their further progress. His Excellency observed that, after this grave deception practised upon Her Majesty's Government, Russia could no longer be depended upon, and might impose conditions upon Turkey which would be contrary to the interests of Austria and to the Treaty of Paris, which she still held to be in full force. Although, Count Zichy said, the Austro-Hungarian Government had declared explicitly, and Her Majesty's Government had made a similar declaration, that a settlement of the Turkish question could not take place without their having a voice in it, and their interests being consulted, it was now evident that an attempt was about to be made to exclude both England and Austria altogether from it. He, therefore, called upon the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs not to agree to any bases of peace until they could be made known to his Government, and he had received instructions on the subject.

Server Pasha replied that this was now impossible. Austria, he said, should have thought of this before it was too late. His Excellency repeated that as the European Powers had abandoned Turkey, setting aside the Treaty of Paris, Russia probably considered that that Treaty was no longer in force. It would consequently be his duty to obtain the best term he could from Russia without reference to it, or to the interests of Austria, or any other Power. The interests of Turkey alone had to be considered in the mission which had been confided to him.

Count Zichy seemed disconcerted at this declaration. He said that he would telegraph to his Government at once what Server Pasha had stated, and would ask urgently for their instructions. He begged me to do the same, expressing an anxious hope that we should be directed to act together, as the time for a frank and cordial understanding between our two Governments appeared now to have arrived. I replied that I should certainly inform your Lordship without delay of what had passed between us and the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 531.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 64.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 15, 1878.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copy of a cypher telegram I have received from Mr. Consul Green, respecting the correspondence which has passed between the Turkish and Montenegrin Commanders on the subject of an armistice.

I also inclose my reply to Mr. Green.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 531.

Consul Kirby Green to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.) *Scutari, January 14, 1878.*

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF has just shown me a letter from one of his Generals who has been sent to communicate conclusion of armistice to the Montenegrins at Antivari, announcing that the Prince declines to acknowledge its existence as he has received no official communication on the subject. In a letter from Montenegrin Commander of Antivari on the subject, it does not appear (that) the official communication is expected to come.

I have advised his Excellency to send immediately to Antivari by his aide-de-camp repeating announcement of armistice, and asking for arrangements to be made for its strict observation.

Last night, without my knowledge, Commander-in-chief wrote to Antivari saying that he considers null and void all operations effected after conclusion of armistice.

Prince is said to be preparing attack against Dulcigno.

Inclosure 2 in No. 531.

Mr. Layard to Consul Kirby Green.

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 15, 1878, 11 A.M.*

NO armistice has yet been concluded between the belligerents, and the Turkish Commanders appear to be acting under a misapprehension in consequence of information received from Constantinople. You had consequently better not interfere in the matter.

No. 532.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 65. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 15, 1878.*

COUNT ZICHY sent the Secretary of the Austro-Hungarian Embassy to me early this morning to inform me of the substance of a telegram which he had just received from Count Andrassy in answer to the one he had forwarded to the Count after our interview of yesterday with Server Pasha, described in my despatch No. 63 of yesterday. His Excellency had gone to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to communicate to him Count Andrassy's telegram, which stated that representations ("démarches") had been made at St. Petersburgh against the *modus procedendi* of Russia in insisting that negotiations for an armistice should depend upon a previous agreement as to the bases of peace; and that Austria maintained the decision ("point de vue") that she had formulated in her answer to the Circular of the Porte of the 12th ultimo, namely, that she reserved to herself the right to participate in the definitive arrangement of the Eastern question as a limitrophe and guaranteeing Power. Count Zichy is instructed to warn the Porte not to enter into any arrangement with Russia contrary to the Treaty of Paris, and to remind it that even should it do so Austria would be able to protect her own interests.

In return for this communication I informed Baron Herbert of the substance of your Lordship's telegram of yesterday.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 533.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January 24.*)

(No. 66. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 15, 1878.*

I PAID to-day my official visit to the Grand Vizier.

His Highness was good enough to say that he was well acquainted with my feelings towards his country, and with the services that I had already rendered to her. He expressed a hope that I would have the same friendly and intimate personal relations with him as I had maintained with his predecessor.

He observed that no sane man would wish to undertake the direction of public affairs at a moment like the present. He would have declined the responsible task that had been confided to him had he not felt that it was his duty to obey the commands of his Sovereign, and to place his services at His Majesty's disposal.

His Highness gave a brief sketch of the events which had led to the critical state in which the Turkish Empire was now placed. He observed that Turkey had admirable soldiers, but incompetent Generals. To the latter he attributed the disasters that had befallen her. She still had the materials for a powerful army, but it would require time to organize one. The troops now in the field were demoralized on account of their repeated defeats, brought about by bad generalship and their constant retreat before the Russians, who were elated by their successes. It was now absolutely necessary that Turkey should obtain peace, and to that end he would direct all his efforts. Had proposals for peace been made to Russia before the fall of Plevna, better terms would, no doubt, have been obtained than at the present moment, when the enemy had crossed the Balkans. But he was prepared to take his stand upon the Treaty of Paris, which he considered the only safeguard for Turkey, as the basis of a peace with Russia.

After I had thanked his Highness for his friendly feelings towards me, and had exchanged with him the usual compliments, I informed him of the substance of your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, which he had already learnt from Server Pasha, who had also communicated to him the telegram from Count Andrassy to Count Zichy, referred to in my despatch No. 65, Confidential, of to-day. I pointed out to his Highness that both England and Austria had now, and on other occasions, declared that they must be consulted in any settlement of the Eastern question, that their interests must be considered, and that no Treaty could be concluded between Turkey and Russia affecting the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 without the assent and concurrence of the Powers who were parties to those Treaties. It was, therefore, of essential importance that it should be clearly understood that the Plenipotentiaries who had been sent to treat with the Grand Duke Nicholas for peace were not empowered to consent to terms which might be at variance with the Treaties to which I had alluded, but should receive them *ad referendum*.

His Highness replied that the communications which the Porte had received that morning from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador and myself had afforded much satisfaction, as they proved that England and Austria still adhered to the Treaty of Paris. The instructions now given, his Highness said, to the Turkish Plenipotentiaries were to propose that Treaty as the basis of negotiations for peace. If the Grand Duke Nicholas demanded any concessions from Turkey that were inconsistent with it, they were to refer at once to Constantinople. They were only authorized to consent to secondary matters, and his Highness assured me every endeavour would be made to avoid coming to any arrangement without previous consultation with Her Majesty's Government. But, his Highness added, the Porte would find itself in a very critical position should the Grand Duke Nicholas peremptorily break off the negotiations, and march upon Adrianople, if the terms he demanded as the bases of peace were not at once acceded to. In that case could Turkey look to either England or Austria for assistance? His Highness expressed a hope that the communications which had been addressed by your Lordship and Count Andrassy to Prince Gortchakow would, however, have the effect of inducing the Russian Government to agree in the first place to an armistice, without first compelling the Porte to discuss bases of peace which might be opposed to the Treaty of Paris. In such case

fresh instructions might be sent to the Grand Duke and serious difficulties might be avoided.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 534.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January 24.*)

(No. 67. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 15, 1878.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 61 of the 14th instant, I asked the Grand Vizier to-day whether any decision had been come to as to the answer I was to give to Her Majesty's Government with respect to the suggestion that Her Majesty's fleet should anchor within the Dardanelles. His Highness replied that, in his opinion, it would be better that, for the present, this step should not be taken. It would, of course, be supposed that the Porte had invited it, and it would be looked upon in the light of a warlike demonstration. It would scarcely, his Highness thought, be prudent or desirable to make such a demonstration at the moment when the Turkish Plenipotentiaries had gone to the Grand Duke Nicholas to enter upon negotiations for peace. Doubts would be thrown upon the sincerity of the Porte, and offence might be caused to Russia. Should, however, the negotiations fail, and the advance of the Russians in Roumelia continue, the presence of the British fleet in the Dardanelles might be of great use as a protection to the populations, and might calm the panic which was now leading to so much suffering and misery.

I have not thought it desirable to do more than ask the question as to the willingness of the Sultan to allow the fleet to anchor in the Dardanelles under the conditions mentioned in your Lordship's telegram of the 12th instant. There is, no doubt, much force in the Grand Vizier's objection to its presence there at the present time, and there does not appear to me to be anything which renders it absolutely necessary that the fleet should be in the Straits at this moment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 535.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January 24.*)

(No. 68.) Confidential.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 15, 1878.*

THE Grand Vizier asked me to-day whether I thought that any steps could be taken for the protection of Constantinople should the Russians advance upon the city. He said that the Turkish capital was different from that of any other in Europe. It was inhabited by a mixed population of different races and creeds. In the event of an attack, or a siege, most serious disorders might take place which the authorities might be unable to repress, and great loss of life and property might ensue.

I inquired of his Highness what kind of protection he referred to. Did he mean that the European Powers should be invited to take steps to afford military assistance for the defence of the city? His Highness said that he had not quite made up his mind as to the nature of the protection; but he thought that the Ambassadors, and other foreign Representatives, might take the matter into consideration, and devise some means of saving the city from the dangers with which it would be threatened should the Russians advance upon it.

I told the Grand Vizier that if the time came when measures were necessary for the protection of the lives and property of the European inhabitants of the city, I should be quite ready to concert with my colleagues with regard to them; but that I thought that it would be unwise to take any steps at the present moment that might raise a panic. I observed that Djemil Pasha had, I was informed, done great mischief at Adrianople by inviting the foreign inhabitants and others to leave the city, and to take precautions for the protection of their property. This led to unnecessary alarm, and to the flight of a great part of the population of the city. A similar result, with even more serious consequences,

might be apprehended in Constantinople if the Government, or the foreign Embassies, were to take any steps which might induce the inhabitants to believe that they were in danger.

His Highness agreed with me, and said that for the present it was not necessary to do anything in the matter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 536.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 69. Secret.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 16, 1878.

I TRUST that your Lordship will forgive me if I importune you with despatches upon the policy pursued by the German Embassy here. The matter appears to me to be of such grave importance at the present moment that, unwilling as I am to listen to the reports that reach me on the subject (some of them, perhaps, unfounded or exaggerated), I cannot refrain from bringing them to the notice of your Lordship, leaving your Lordship, who has the means of testing their truth by information received from Berlin, to decide whether they are worthy of consideration or not.

It is, I believe, generally understood that German diplomatists are kept under strict control by Prince Bismarck, and that they do not venture to express opinions, give advice, or pursue a course which are not in accordance with the views and policy of his Highness. If such be the case, the hostility to England, which Prince Reuss does not conceal, his urgent counsels to the Porte to come to a direct understanding with Russia and to accept any terms which she may demand for the conclusion of peace, and his persistent representations that Her Majesty's Government, whatever may be their declarations to the contrary, will not interfere in any arrangement agreed to between Russia and Turkey, however injurious it may be to British interests, have a very serious significance. That such is the language held, without reserve, by the German Ambassador and by the members of his Embassy, there is not a shadow of doubt. I have abundant proofs of it. I have learnt, moreover, that his Highness has indirectly addressed similar language to the Sultan himself, who has not been a little perplexed and alarmed by it.

The policy pursued by Prince Reuss, from the time of his arrival here (as I have had frequently occasion to inform your Lordship), has been to endeavour to induce the Porte to come to a direct and separate understanding with Russia without reference to any other Power. For a long time he was unsuccessful; but now that Turkey finds herself in the greatest difficulties, and knows not where to turn for advice or help, his counsels have prevailed.

Such being (as I have reason to think) the case, it may be of the utmost importance to ascertain whether Prince Bismarck has the deliberate intention of excluding England, if possible, from all share in the settlement of the Eastern question, and of supporting Russia in exacting from Turkey such terms as may be in accordance with her present objects and necessary for the furtherance of ambitious designs to be carried out hereafter with regard to this Empire. Is there any foundation for the theories put forward by Russian and other publicists as to the division of Europe between Panslavism and Pangermanism? Is there any ground for the suspicion that whilst Russia is intent upon absorbing all the Slav races into her already vast territories, Prince Bismarck has schemes for annexing to the German Empire those States and peoples that may have any affinity to the German race? Is Europe to be hereafter at the mercy of two great military Empires?

When I see what is passing around me I cannot help putting to myself these questions, which, however, your Lordship is better able to answer than I am.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

No. 537.

Consul Kirby Green to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 5. Political.)
My Lord, *Scutari, January* 13, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, copies of two despatches addressed by me to Mr. Layard on the subject of the surrender of Antivari to the Montenegrins.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. KIRBY GREEN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 537.

Consul Kirby Green to Mr. Layard.

Sir, *Scutari, January* 12, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that the Turkish authorities were completely taken by surprise this morning when a number of men, recently forming part of the besieged garrison of Antivari, arrived here and stated that the town had surrendered on Thursday last, the 10th.

The announcement of an armistice having been concluded between Russia and Turkey was received by the authorities here on the 9th, and on the next day a second telegram stated that the arrangement included the whole of the belligerents.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. KIRBY GREEN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 537.

Consul Kirby Green to Mr. Layard.

Sir, *Scutari, January* 13, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that Ali Saib Pasha has allowed me to read a letter received by him this morning from M. Macho Verbitza, the Montenegrin officer in command at Antivari, and informing his Excellency, under date of December 29, 1877 / January 10, 1878, that Antivari had capitulated.

The Pasha is under the impression that this letter has been addressed to him for the purpose of letting him infer that the suspension of hostilities was not known in the Montenegrin camp at the time of its date.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. KIRBY GREEN.

No. 538.

Consul Kirby Green to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 7. Political.)
My Lord, *Scutari, January* 14, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, the copy of a despatch addressed this day by me to Mr. Layard on the subject of the refusal of the Montenegrins to acknowledge the existence of an armistice.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. KIRBY GREEN.

Inclosure in No. 538.

Consul Kirby Green to Mr. Layard.

Scutari, January 14, 1878.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that Ali Saib Pasha has this moment read to me a letter received by him from Rizah Pasha, who had been ordered to inform the Commander of the Montenegrin forces around Antivari that an armistice had been concluded between Russia and her allies and Turkey.

Rizah Pasha was informed by Prince Nicholas that His Highness could not admit the existence of the armistice, as no official notification on the subject had yet reached him. A letter was also addressed to Rizah Pasha by the Voïvoda Verbitza in the sense of the Prince's reply, but indicating in no way what further communication was required by the Montenegrin Government.

Ali Saib Pasha, on my suggestion, has addressed a letter to the Commander of the Montenegrin forces at Antivari, which he has dispatched by his Aide-de-camp, repeating the information concerning the armistice, and calling upon the Montenegrin General to enter into arrangements with him for its observance without further delay.

The Pasha, unknown to me, last night wrote to the Montenegrin Commandant at Antivari, telling him that he claims that all military operations which may have occurred since the conclusion of the armistice are null and void.

Dulcigno, it is believed here, is about to be invested by the Montenegrins.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. KIRBY GREEN.

No. 539.

Colonel Siborne to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 24.)

(No. 5. Confidential.)

Thames Ditton, January 23, 1878.

My Lord,

THE future position of the European Commission of the Danube must be more or less affected by the results of the war; and as my French colleague, M. Kerbette, has forwarded to his Government his ideas on some points which he thinks ought to be considered in the negotiations for peace, I have obtained his permission to submit them confidentially to your Lordship, and I have the honour to supplement them by some observations of my own.

He proposes:—

1. "That Russia should not recover her former territory on the Danube beyond the Kilia Branch."

That is, that she should not obtain possession, in addition to the strip of Bessarabia she lost in 1856, of the Delta, so as to have, as formerly, the St. George's branch for her frontier.

I have not understood that Russia has any such design, but that she merely wishes to regain the whole of Bessarabia down to the main Danube, and the Kilia or northern branch of the Delta; in fact, to the present Roumanian frontier.

Even this territory she consented to surrender, according to the XXth Article of the Treaty of Paris, "in order more fully to secure the freedom of the navigation of the Danube." This principle would evidently be entirely set at naught by her acquisition of the whole Delta.

But even her obtaining the Kilia branch as frontier would affect the Commission very considerably, as Turkey would then cease to be the sole territorial Power on the Lower Danube.

It is true that such a Russian frontier would only adjoin the main navigable route of the river under our jurisdiction for a distance of about twelve miles, from Isaktcha to the head of the Delta, but it is probable that the presence of Russia on the Danube would induce her to demand the alteration of certain clauses in the Public Act, which she would consider as affecting her territorial rights.

2. "The Delta should be politically and administratively attached to the State to which the right bank should belong, and be neutralised under the guarantee of the Great Powers."

He explains this to mean that a country so neutralised or guaranteed by the Powers from the effects of war must nevertheless be governed by some constituted authority which

could not be the Commission, but which, in order to save absorption by Russia, should be the State established on the right bank or in the Dobrudscha. By these means he thinks the Commission would share the benefits of neutralization, a point on which he lays great stress.

From the Commission point of view, this neutralization of the Delta, and consequently of its navigable waters, would no doubt be very desirable, if it could be accomplished, but in any case it seems to be essential that the governing power on land should not be handed over to Russia. She has already a voice in the governing power of the river, or in the European Commission, and, in the event of her regaining the strip of Bessarabia above alluded to, would be equally represented on the Riverain Commission which is to succeed it.

3. "That the existence of the European Commission shall be prolonged beyond the present fixed date of expiry on April 24, 1883, for twice the length of time during which the navigation has been interrupted by the war."

He justifies this on the grounds that we have suffered a double loss in having, on the one hand, received no revenue from the navigation since April last; and, on the other, been obliged to defray our current expenses as usual.

Seeing, however, the objections that would probably be raised by Russia against a prolongation of the existence of the Commission, it would perhaps be more expedient to suggest only that it should be compensated by the revenue of another season's navigation, and that it should terminate on December 31, instead of April 24, 1883.

4. "Revision of the Public Act as regards the police sentences being enforced in the name of the territorial Power, and that they should run in the name of the Commission."

This and the general question of the so-called "Ottoman employés" are very essential points.

The anomalous position of these officials has been the source of many difficulties, and it is manifest that, when it becomes practicable to effect it, all the employés of the Commission should be placed under its sole authority, and be treated in other respects on an equal footing.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. C. SIBORNE, *Colonel, R.E.*,
British Commissioner on the Danube.

No. 540.

Count Andrassy to Count Beust.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Count Beust, January* 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

(Particularly Confidential.) *Vienna, January* 23, 1878; 7 P.M.

THERE is a discrepancy between your Excellency's telegrams No. 23 and 26 in answer to my telegram No. 21.

From the former, I gathered that the British Government would meet Russian endeavours to decide as in the same way as we have done; in the latter, you inform me that "meanwhile Lord Derby counts upon the Russian conditions being jointly deliberated upon by Austria and England, and that a joint answer to these conditions shall be sent."

As Sir A. Buchanan has not made a communication on the subject to me, I do not know which of the two lines the British Government really intends to take. There is, however, a very important discrepancy between the two.

We have not spoken about jointly deliberating on the Russian preliminaries; we have, on the contrary, said that we will not entertain the idea to deliberate at all on them now, and thereby to allow of their being imposed on the Porte as having been sanctioned by us. We shall not at all accept the communication of the peace preliminaries, and we have told Russia that she had better communicate them strait off to the Porte, as we must decline the responsibility of giving Russia an excuse for not concluding an armistice. Let the belligerents come to a preliminary understanding; we must reserve to ourselves to pronounce, as Signatory Power, with full weight on all those points which affect European Treaties. This is what we have done and maintain. If Lord Derby does not simply reject the preliminary negotiation with Russia, and if, on the contrary, it were his intention to communicate the Russian overtures to us, then our lines of policy would diverge, and Russia achieves one of two things: either she succeeds in bringing forward as sanctioned by

England and Austria the conditions she wishes to impose on the Porte, or she succeeds in separating us from England.

Your Excellency will be pleased to clear up this point thoroughly, and to telegraph the answer immediately.

No. 541.

Consul-General Stanley to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Odessa, January 23, 1878.*

I AM led to believe that possibly one of the conditions of peace may be to march through Constantinople and embark Russian troops there.

No. 542.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 101.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 24, 1878.*

BAKER PASHA telegraphs from Kumanitza, on the 22nd instant, that the Russians are rapidly advancing on Gallipoli, and that unless a sufficient military force is sent to defend position it will be lost. Except mere rumours, I have not heard anything during the last twenty-four hours to confirm this. It is possible that the Russians may be following railway line to Dedeagatch, so as to cut off Macedonia from Thrace. According to statement furnished to me by General Klapka, Porte will have 155 battalions ready soon for the defence of Constantinople, Gallipoli Peninsula; but I cannot vouch for its accuracy. The terms of peace are, I believe, known at the Porte, but have not yet been communicated to me or to my colleagues, as far as I can learn.

No. 543.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 102.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 24, 1878.*

I HAVE just heard the Russian conditions from the Palace, as follows:—

1. A pecuniary indemnity to be determined, and east of Armenia, including Bayazid, Kars, Ardahan, and Batoum, to be held by Russia as a guarantee for payment; the fortifications of Erzeroum to be destroyed.
2. Roumania to be declared independent.
3. Servia to become a Kingdom, with augmentation of territory.
4. Bulgaria to be formed into a State similar to Servia before the war.
5. Additional territory to be given to Montenegro.
6. The question of Bosphorus and Dardanelles to be settled between the Sultan and the Emperor of Russia.

Such are conditions as stated by the Sultan. He wished to submit them to the Parliament, but was dissuaded by his Ministers from doing so, and I am informed that the Plenipotentiaries will be instructed to accept them this afternoon.

No. 544.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 24, 1878.*

BEING confined to the house by indisposition I have not seen Prince Gortchakow since I made a written communication to him in pursuance of your Lordship's instruction of the 14th instant.

If an answer was to be given it would probably be made through Count Schouvaloff, but I presume Prince Gortchakow regarded the communication as a statement to record opinion of Her Majesty's Government which required no answer.

No. 545.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 24, 1878.*

RUSSIAN press this morning mentions that Suleiman Pasha has arrived at Kavalla on the Ægean Sea; hints that portion of his force may be sent to Gallipoli. This may give excuse to the Russians to move in that direction; and it is reported that Russian corps d'armée is advancing on Gallipoli. Procrastination evinced by Grand Duke Nicholas in opening negotiations for armistice is interpreted by public opinion here as indicative of pushing on to Constantinople.

"Agence Russe" yesterday published a violent semi-official article against the pretensions of England, which I have sent by post. General tone of public opinion here is hostile to England; desire for her humiliation is generally expressed; mystery preserved in regard to Russian conditions for peace give grounds for suspicion.

It is my duty to warn Her Majesty's Government against the danger of an occupation of Dardanelles by a Russian force.

No. 546.

*The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.**

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 24, 1878.*

LORD ODO RUSSELL writes on 20th instant that he has heard from a confidential informant that Count Andrassy and Prince Bismarck have agreed to Prince Gortchakow's wish for a European Conference after the signature of the preliminaries if a satisfactory agreement cannot be arrived at between the Powers by any other means.

Count Andrassy has, according to Lord Odo Russell's informant, undertaken to promote the idea of a Conference later on, in view of the possibility that the peace conditions may be such as to make a rectification of the Austrian frontier desirable in Austrian interests, and that in that case Italy might also claim an increase of territory, whilst, by submitting the question to a Conference, as suggested by Prince Gortchakow, the sanction of Europe may possibly be obtained to a new state of things in Turkey without bloodshed.

No. 547.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 24, 4 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Confidential.) *Rome, January 24, 1878, 2·40 P.M.*

M. DEPRETIS being ill, I have seen Count Tornielli this morning. He seems to be but moderately reassured by the Bosphorus and Dardanelles not being mentioned in the conditions of the peace sent to the Grand Duke Nicholas, and fears that, unless the Turks are able to accept terms to be dictated at Adrianople, the Russians will push on to Constantinople or Gallipoli, which, it is thought here, will practically amount to the same thing.

No. 548.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 24, 1878, 7·20 P.M.*

THE Russian Ambassador communicated to me to-day a telegram from Prince Gortchakow to the following effect:—

"The Turkish Plenipotentiaries, after having objected to some of the Russian conditions of peace, have taken the whole *ad referendum*.

"According to the reports received by the Russian Government, Turkish troops were being directed on Gallipoli. Nevertheless the Emperor had ordered the Grand Duke

* Similar telegrams were sent to Sir A. Buchanan, Sir A. Paget, and Mr. Layard.

Nicholas to send in that direction a corps of observation, but not to push forward as far as the town of Gallipoli.

"The Russian Government, Prince Gortchakow added, thus remained faithful to their intentions, as announced to Her Majesty's Government, and were even going beyond them if the Turkish regular forces were, in effect, concentrated at Gallipoli."

No. 549.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 24, 1878, 8·25 P.M.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 102 of this day, it is to be presumed that, as the Turkish Plenipotentiaries are to accept conditions of peace, hostilities will forthwith cease, and there will be no further advance of Russian troops on Gallipoli Peninsula or Constantinople.

Is this so?

No. 550.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 51. Secret.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 24, 1878.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith, for your information, the accompanying copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin,* reporting that he has been confidentially informed that Count Andrassy and Prince Bismarck have agreed to Prince Gortchakow's wish for a European Conference if a satisfactory agreement cannot be arrived at between the Powers by any other means.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 551.

The Earl of Derby to Sir A. Buchanan.

(No. 52. Most Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 24, 1878.*

THE Austrian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon and read to me confidentially the telegram of which I inclose herewith a Memorandum, commenting upon an observation which Count Beust had reported me to have made as to a joint discussion by Austria and England of the Russian conditions of peace.

I told Count Beust that I had never intended to suggest a discussion or formal expression of opinion by Austria and England on the terms of peace before they had been communicated to the Porte, because I understood that they had in fact already been or were at least on the point of being so communicated to the Turkish Plenipotentiaries. They would, however, I apprehended, come before us eventually in one of three ways:—

Either the Porte would reject the terms offered, and would appeal to the Powers in justification of that course;

Or the terms would be accepted, and brought to our knowledge in that shape;

Or, thirdly, the Porte might, on learning their nature, address itself to the other Powers for their opinion.

I asked Count Beust to give this explanation to Count Andrassy, and I remarked that his Excellency had not expressed any opinion as to the course which it would be desirable for Austria and England to follow in the event of our receiving a request from the Porte for advice on the conditions offered by Russia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

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* No. 507.

No. 552.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 62.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 24, 1878.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a copy of a telegram from Prince Gortchakow to Count Schouvaloff,* which the Russian Ambassador communicated to me to-day, with reference to the movements of Russian troops in the direction of Gallipoli.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 553.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 97.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 24, 1878.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's telegram No. 112 of this day's date, and I have to observe that it is to be presumed that, as the Turkish Plenipotentiaries are to accept the conditions of peace, hostilities will cease forthwith, and there will be no further advance of the Russian forces on the peninsula of Gallipoli or on Constantinople.

Your Excellency will report to me if this is the case.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 553 A.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.)

(Confidential.) *Foreign Office, January 24, 1878, 4·50 P.M.*

FLEET has been ordered to come inside the Dardanelles and will probably be there on Friday morning. The Sultan should be informed, and orders should be sent to the forts not to fire upon the ships. The Admiral has orders to go through, whether he is fired upon or not. You must clearly understand that this measure involves no departure whatever from the neutral attitude of Her Majesty's Government, and frame your language accordingly.

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* See No. 548.

No. 553 B.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 24, 1878, 7·15 P M.

DO not act on the telegram sent to you this afternoon as to fleet. Further telegram being cyphered to you.

No. 553 C.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

[Approved by the Earl of Beaconsfield, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and First Lord of the Admiralty.]

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 24, 1878.

ON the receipt of your telegram No. 102, stating that the Porte had accepted the Russian conditions of peace, Her Majesty's Government have telegraphed to the Admiral not to enter the Straits, but to anchor at Besika Bay.

A telegram has also been sent to the Admiral, through Vice-Consul at Chanak, to stop the fleet there in case it may have reached so far.

You should also telegraph to Admiral in cypher to direct the fleet to stay at Besika Bay.

You should likewise inform the Porte in case you have already acted on previous instruction.

No. 554.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Lord Tenterden.—(*Received January* 25.)

Sir, *Admiralty, January* 25, 1878.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Earl of Derby, that the following telegram was received by them this morning from the Senior Naval Officer at Malta, viz. :—

"Italian squadron composed of 'San Martino,' 'Affondatore,' 'Terribile,' and despatch boat 'Authion,' sailed this morning (24th) at 10 for eastward, it is supposed (for) Salonica. Foregoing telegram, dated to-day, has been received this evening from Consul at Naples."

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROBERT HALL.

No. 555.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 25.)

(No. 103.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 24, 1878.

I AM informed that, while accepting the terms demanded by Russia, Porte has made appeal to the Emperor to modify condition as regards Bulgaria, and to accept for that province the autonomy proposed at the Conference. It appears that, in addition to the conditions mentioned in my telegram of this morning, Bulgaria is to (have a*) Prince to be named by Russia.

The terms of peace are kept exceedingly secret, and have not been communicated by the Porte to any of the foreign Representatives.

The information about them came to me secretly.

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* Group unintelligible. By altering one figure I can make sense, but whether this is accurate or not I cannot say.—G. D.

No. 556.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 103.) *Constantinople, January 24, 1878.*
(Telegraphic.)

I AM informed that the Grand Duke Nicholas insists that peace shall be signed at Constantinople, and that he will be accompanied by General Gourko and probably by General Ignatiew. The Sultan will have to submit to this last humiliation, and the effect of his doing so upon the Mussulman world may be serious. The exasperation against England is very great.

No. 557.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 105.) *Constantinople, January 24, 1878.*
(Telegraphic.)

INFORMATION contained in my telegram of this afternoon as to conclusion of peace at Constantinople was given to me by Count Zichy, who now tells me that he believes that he was misinformed. He says that Safvet Pasha has just told him that "we shall soon have peace, and with it the end of the Empire."

No. 558.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 25.)

Berlin, January 24, 1878.

(Telegraphic.)

THE "Official Provincial Correspondence," in an article on the armistice, says that the questions at issue cannot be definitively settled by the belligerents alone without the sanction and co-operation of the European Powers. The wisdom and moderation of the Emperor Alexander, his intimate relations with the neighbouring Powers, and the peaceful tendencies lately manifested in England, appear to be guarantees of an early and peaceful solution.

No. 559.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 25.)

St. Petersburgh, January 24, 1878.

(Telegraphic.)

GENERAL IGNATIEW left St. Petersburgh this morning for the head-quarters of the Grand Duke Nicholas. This would seem to portend serious peace negotiations. Grand Duke Nicholas, in a telegram published this morning, dated Kyzanlik, Tuesday, January 22, expects to be at Adrianople on the 27th instant.

No. 560.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 109 T.) *Constantinople, January 25, 1878.*
(Telegraphic.)

WITH reference to your telegram of yesterday, orders will be sent for the passage of the fleet through the Dardanelles. Porte says that it is placed in most critical position, as Russia may look upon this step as a menace on the part of Turkey, and break off negotiations and march at once upon Constantinople. I entreat Her Majesty's Government to make Russia clearly understand without delay that it is taken by the British Government solely for the protection of British interests and not at the request or with the connivance of the Porte, who cannot but hold Her Majesty's Government responsible for the consequences which may ensue.

No. 561.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 111.) *Constantinople, January 25, 1878.*
(Telegraphic.)

WITH reference to your telegram of 8·4 p.m. yesterday, received this morning at 8 a.m., I have telegraphed to Vice-Consul at Dardanelles to stop Admiral if possible before entering Straits, and to direct him to remain in Beika Bay. Admiral telegraphed to me yesterday that he was to leave Vourla at 5 p.m.

I shall inform Porte at once of change. Instructions were sent yesterday to Plenipotentiaries to accept conditions of peace. I understand that, in addition to those I have already telegraphed to you, are two more: the demolition of all fortresses in Bulgaria, which are never to be rebuilt; and the cession of part of the Dobrutscha to Roumania as compensation for restoring Bessarabia to Russia.

No. 562.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 112.) *Constantinople, January 25, 1878.*
(Telegraphic.)

TURKISH Ministers keep conditions of peace very secret; have not, as far as I know, yet communicated them to the foreign Representatives, so that I may not be fully acquainted with them. I understand that Council of Ministers were (?) yesterday discussing the expediency of not accepting the terms unconditionally, when a telegram arrived from Musurus, stating that you had informed him that Her Majesty's Government could not oppose the occupation of Constantinople by the Russians. This communication was received with despair, and with expressions of utmost indignation against England, and it was at once decided to accept everything to save the fragments of the Empire.

This I learn from leading Minister. I have been informed on the same authority the Grand Duke Nicholas refused to listen to mention of Treaty of Paris of 1856, which he declared to Plenipotentiaries Russia does not consider in force or compulsory (?). I also hear that the Sultan has stated that it has been arranged secretly that he is to assist (?) Emperor of Russia, and that on that account he will open Dardanelles to Russian fleet. This comes to me very secretly.

No. 563.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 113.) *Constantinople, January 25, 1878.*
(Telegraphic.)

WITH reference to your telegram of yesterday with regard to Gallipoli, it would appear from the reports received here that the Russians are still advancing on that town. I will ascertain, if possible, the exact number of the Turkish troops there. Grand Duke Nicholas, according to your telegram of 7·30 yesterday, has been ordered not to push forward to the town of Gallipoli. It must be remembered that lines of Bulair which defend the peninsula and the Dardanelles are about eight miles in front of the town, and might thus be occupied by Russians without apparent violation of pledge given.

This is very important.

No. 564.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 25, 1878.*
(Secret.)

I HAVE communicated Count Andrassy secretly with the orders which were sent to the fleet on Wednesday, and with those by which they have been superseded; but although he was pleased to find Her Majesty's Government determined to take active measures to protect English interests, he was much dissatisfied with the conditions of peace which I communicated to him, as reported by Mr. Layard, that he spoke only of them. He said that they differed in several respects from what he had heard on the subject, and as he

could hardly believe them to be correct, he asked me to give him a copy of them to compare with the report which he had (? received). He said that the Russian Ambassador, on arriving some days ago from St. Petersburgh, wished to communicate them to him, but he had declined receiving any information respecting them till they were officially presented to the Porte. According to his information, the question of the Dardanelles was to be settled between the belligerents, and nothing was said of Servia becoming a kingdom. He must reflect on them before expressing any decided opinion respecting them, but he said enough to convince me that he will neither accept a Servian kingdom, nor such a Bulgaria as Russia wishes to create.

He said that the best policy at present is not to interfere with what may be taking place between belligerent Powers, but to maintain steadfastly the English and Austrian declaration that no Treaty which Europe has not been a party to can be valid.

There ought not to be any precipitate action, he said, but Russia should be left to disclose fully her intentions, and then she should be told what can be permitted and what will be resented; adding that the two Governments will have time during interval to arrange as to military and naval means which may be necessary to cause their wishes to be attended to.

With reference to British Ambassador at Berlin's information, I asked him whether he had not consented to the alleged wish of Russia that a Conference should be held; and he answered, not such a Conference as Russia wants, but one which I may call myself after we had protested against Russian conditions.

No. 565.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 25.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Secret and Very Confidential.)

Vienna, January 25, 1878.

THE Emperor having granted me an audience to-day to receive my letters of recall, I mentioned verbally to him the Russian conditions of peace, and they evidently made as painful an impression on His Majesty as I have in another telegram reported them to have done on Count Andrassy. He said that Russia appeared to have entirely forgotten her promises, and he could not understand how the Emperor, of whose personal loyalty he was convinced, could be induced by those around him to believe that he was not violating his engagements. His Majesty said that the two Governments must now take the state of the question into serious consideration, and he trusted to Great Britain in co-operating with Austria-Hungary in maintaining their mutual interests and those of Europe.

No. 566.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 25.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Confidential.)

Berlin, January 25, 1878.

I HAD some conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the peace negotiations telegraphed from Constantinople.

His Excellency said that as far as he could judge they appeared moderate and calculated to facilitate a peaceful understanding between the Powers interested.

Germany, his Excellency said, would under all circumstances continue to adhere conscientiously to her policy of neutrality and reserve.

No. 567.

The Earl of Derby to Her Majesty's Embassies.

Foreign Office, January 25, 1878.

(Telegraphic.)

COUNT SCHOUVALOFF has communicated to me, in strict confidence, the following bases of peace as proposed by Russia:—

"Bulgaria, within the limits of the Bulgarian nationality, not less than that of the Conference, to be an autonomous tributary Principality, with a national Christian Government, a native militia, and no Turkish troops, except at some points to be determined.

"Independence of Montenegro, with increase (of territory) equivalent to the military *status quo*; the frontier to be decided hereafter.

"Independence of Roumania, with sufficient territorial indemnity.

"Independence of Servia, with rectification of frontiers.

"Autonomous administration, sufficiently guaranteed, to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

"Similar reforms for the other Christian provinces of Turkey in Europe.

"Indemnity to Russia for the expenses of the war, in a pecuniary, territorial, or other form to be decided hereafter.

"Ulterior understanding for safeguarding the rights and interests of Russia in the Straits.

"These bases being accepted, a Convention, an Armistice, and the despatch of Plenipotentiaries to develop them into preliminaries of peace."

No. 568.

The Earl of Derby to Her Majesty's Embassies.

(Translation.)

Foreign Office, January 25, 1877.

IN communicating the bases of peace stated in my previous telegram of to-day Count Schouvaloff read to me the following extract of a telegram from Prince Gortchakow:—

"We repeat the assurance that we do not intend to settle by ourselves European questions having reference to the peace which is to be made."

No. 569.

*The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.**

(No. 66. Confidential.)
My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 25, 1878.

I INCLOSE herewith, for your information, a copy of a Memorandum of the bases of peace, as proposed by Russia, which has been given to me to-day in strict confidence by Count Schouvaloff, who at the same time read to me the following extract of a telegram from Prince Gortchakow:—

"We repeat the assurance that we do not intend to settle by ourselves ('isolément') European questions having reference to the peace which is to be made ('se rattachant à la paix future')."

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 570.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 65. Most Confidential.)
My Lord,

Paris, January 25, 1878.

IN my despatch No. 884 of the 2nd November last, and in several subsequent despatches, I have had the honour to direct your Lordship's attention to the sort of coquetry, so to speak, which is believed to have been going on between Prince Bismarck and the advanced Liberal party in France.

That some communications took place after the 16th May between the leaders of that party and persons more or less authorized to speak in the name of Prince Bismarck seems certain. It is hardly less certain that the leaders in question in some measure responded to the overtures made to them; and that even M. Thiers himself, in familiar conversation, sometimes talked of a possible understanding between France and Germany, and of an acquisition of territory by France, as the consequence of it.

These overtures appear to have given rise to much wild talk and to still wilder rumours, in which M. Gambetta's name has been especially prominent.

Prince Bismarck has been represented as intending to annex Holland to Germany, and as bidding for the assent of France to this arrangement, by offering her all or part of

* Identic despatches to other Embassies.

Belgium for herself, and even by holding out to her hopes of obtaining the restoration of Alsace and Lorraine. On the other hand, France was to propitiate Italy by giving Nice back to her, and the prospect of acquiring additional territory at the expense of Austria was to be held out to that Power.

M. Gambetta's recent journey to Italy naturally gave strength to these rumours. They have revived with still greater force since his return, and it has even been confidently asserted that he was charged with a Special Mission from the present Government, and that he, in fact, entered into negotiations at Rome with a view to an understanding between France, Germany, and Italy.

M. Waddington has more than once assured me that there was no sort of foundation for these rumours; and, in particular this afternoon, he told me that the assertion that M. Gambetta had any sort of mission from the Government was an absolute fiction. It was equally untrue, he added, that M. Gambetta had entered into any kind of negotiation on behalf of the French Government, or had brought back any communication to that Government from the Government of Italy. The principal incident of M. Gambetta's journey had been his audience of the late King Victor Emmanuel. He appeared to have been beyond measure gratified by the reception he had met with from His Majesty, but, so far as M. Waddington knew, nothing as to territorial arrangements or any other practical political question had passed between them. In short, the most important thing which had been said appeared to have been an earnest affirmation by the King that, so long as he lived, France should never find an enemy in Italy.

M. Waddington observed, that undoubtedly, after the dismissal of the Liberal Cabinet on the 16th May, communications had taken place between M. Gambetta and the German Chancellor, but that he believed these referred only to the religious question, respecting which Prince Bismarck appeared to be always anxious and uneasy.

M. Waddington, speaking most confidentially, proceeded to say that, for his own part, he did not believe that Prince Bismarck was specially occupied at the present time with any such combinations respecting territorial changes as were attributed to him. M. Waddington's own opinion was that Prince Bismarck's energies were directed at this moment to two main objects:—the one being to complete the unity of Germany by centralizing the administration; the other to involve England in war with Russia. Territorial acquisitions were very probably among the ultimate objects the Prince had in view; but his Highness was, M. Waddington believed, actually intent upon paralyzing the action of England, and of Austria also, in the West, in order that there might be no check to any course which he might hereafter think fit to pursue.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 571.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 114.) *Constantinople, January 25, 1878.*
(Telegraphic.)

SAFVET PASHA says that, as the Russians have carefully avoided giving any assurances with regard to lines of Bulaïr, he strongly suspects that they will take possession of them, so as to be full masters of the situation in view of any objection being made by England to the terms of peace forced upon Turkey. I am assured that there are only 7 battalions, or about 3,000 men, in the peninsula, and that the reports spread to the contrary are unfounded.

Prince Reuss stated to me last night that there are 10,000 or 12,000 men there, and he may have so telegraphed to Russia.

No. 572.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 115.) *Constantinople, January 25, 1878.*
(Telegraphic.)

I THINK that the following are authentic heads of bases of peace proposed by Russia, and accepted by the Porte:—

1. Bulgaria to be an autonomous national Principality, under a Christian Prince, its militia to be composed of Bulgarians, to the exclusion of all Turkish troops: its limits

nearly those proposed at the Conference, which would include the greater part of Roumelia.

2. Independence of Servia, with extension of territory by way of compensation.

3. Independence and aggrandisement of Montenegro.

4. Independence of Roumania, with increased territory as compensation for surrender to Russia of the part of Bessarabia taken from Russia after the Crimean war.

5. Application of administrative autonomy to Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and to the other provinces of European Turkey, including Epirus and Thessaly.

6. Complete evacuation of Quadrilateral.

7. War indemnity in money or its equivalent, the nature and amount of which is to be settled.

8. Military occupation of certain portion of Empire not yet defined, by way of guarantee.

9. Turkey and Russia to come to a separate understanding as to Dardanelles and Bosphorus.

It is scarcely necessary to say that this amounts to destruction of Turkish Empire in Europe.

I hope to obtain a full text of the conditions to-morrow.

No. 573.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 116.) *Constantinople, January 25, 1878.*
(Telegraphic.)

IN consequence of an interruption in the telegraphic lines with Gallipoli and the Dardanelles, the telegrams to Admiral, instructing him to (stop at?)* Besica did not leave Constantinople until 4·30 P.M. I do not (know?) whether they reached in time to stop him.

No. 574.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 25, 1878.*

"AGENCE RUSSE" of this morning gives formal denial of reported march of a Russian corps on Gallipoli. It states that Russian Government, aware of importance attached by Her Majesty's Government to Gallipoli, have no intention of touching that point; that it will be neither attacked nor occupied unless Turkish regular troops should concentrate there.

No. 575.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, January 25, 1878.*

I HAVE informed Minister for Foreign Affairs of the conditions of peace, as stated by Mr. Layard, and repeated in your Lordship's telegram of yesterday.

His Excellency considers them less bad than he feared they would be, and is relieved to find that the question of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, in which Italy is the most interested, is reserved for settlement at Congress.

No. 576.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 25, 1878.*

THE Emperor has accepted the resignations of the Cis-Leithanian Ministers.

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* Group unintelligible.

No. 577.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 118. Most Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 26, 1878.*

BASES of peace communicated to you by Russian Ambassador agree generally with those specified in my telegram of yesterday No. 115, but they differ in some important points, and I think I have been accurately informed. Moreover, I have good grounds for believing that there are other conditions which are kept back. The greatest secrecy is maintained with regard to them, the Plenipotentiaries having, I am assured, been warned that if they are divulged negotiations will be at once broken off, and the Russian army will march on Constantinople. I am doing my utmost to ascertain what they are. The conditions with which we are acquainted break up, in my opinion, the Ottoman Empire in Europe, and contain seeds of gravest difficulty and dissensions and of future wars, which will probably end in the partition of Turkey. Upon this subject I will write fully. Your Lordship authorized me some time ago to inform Sultan that, when time came for negotiating a peace, you would obtain for him the most favourable terms possible. Does your Lordship's promise still hold good, and may I repeat it? I understand that, as the Plenipotentiaries have only full powers from the Porte, any terms they accept will require to be confirmed by an Imperial Iradé, and to be sanctioned by Turkish Parliament. Consequently they might be yet rejected. This fact should be kept most secret, as it may have escaped the notice of Russia; but it may yet give us a chance of modifying conditions so disastrous to Turkey, and, I am persuaded, to the interests of England.

No. 578.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, January 26, 1878.*

THE conditions of peace communicated by Count Corti agree with those communicated to your Lordship by the Russian Ambassador.

In my interview yesterday with M. Depretis his Excellency expressed anxiety at no mention being made of Herzegovina and Bosnia in conditions telegraphed by Mr. Layard, fearing that lot of these provinces had been reserved for some arrangement with Austria. He is, however, now reassured on this subject, the more so as an interview, appointed by Count Andrassy with Count de Robilant, was at the last moment postponed by the former on learning, as M. Depretis presumes, the stipulations respecting Bosnia and the Herzegovina. His Excellency again assures me most emphatically that Italy has no ambitious views; that he believes it is the interest of both Italy and Austria to maintain best relations and their present frontier.

A division of the Italian fleet, to be followed by another, has been ordered to Salonica and other ports on the coast, but solely with the view, M. Depretis says, of protecting interests of Italian subjects, of which there are a large number in those districts, which are reported as being overrun by Greek marauders and disbanded Turkish soldiers.

When I saw M. Depretis information (since contradicted) had reached Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs from Italian Consul at Dardanelles that English fleet had entered Straits.

His Excellency, speaking under this impression, said that this action on the part of England was fully explained to him by the stipulation in the conditions of peace reserving question of Straits for direct understanding between Emperor of Russia and Sultan, to which he thought it difficult for England to consent.

No. 579.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.[a]

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 26, 1878, 3·25 P.M.*

COUNT SCHOUVALOFF has informed me, confidentially, that the Turkish delegates objected to the 1st Article of the bases of peace, relating to Bulgaria, and to the

[a] Repeated to Embassies.

second part of the 4th Article, respecting reforms in the Christian provinces. They had taken the whole *ad referendum*.

No. 580.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 26, 1878, 6·15 P.M.*

DO the limits of the proposed Bulgarian Principality include Salonica or Cavalla, or any of the seabord of the Ægean?

No. 581.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 68. Most Confidential.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 26, 1878.*

THE Russian Ambassador informed me in confidence yesterday evening that the Turkish delegates had objected to the 1st Article of the bases of peace, which he had communicated to me—that which relates to Bulgaria; and also to the second part of the 4th Article, relating to the reforms to be introduced into the other Christian provinces of the Empire.

They had, however, taken the whole *ad referendum*.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 582.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 69. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 26, 1878.*

THE Russian Ambassador informs me that Prince Gortchakow has expressed his regret that an article recently published in the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg," commenting on the policy of England, should have been supposed to be inspired. Such, his Excellency stated, was not the case. The newspaper in question is entirely independent, but, as it is the only French journal which appears at St. Petersburgh, the Government occasionally communicate to it documents which they wish to be reproduced in that language.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 583.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 76.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 22, 1878.*

BEING indisposed and unable to leave the house, I communicated to-day to Prince Gortchakow the substance of your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, referring to Gallipoli, in the form of a Memorandum, copy of which, together with my private note to his Highness, I have the honour to annex.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 583.

Lord A. Loftus to Prince Gortchakow.

St. Pétersbourg, le $\frac{17}{29}$ Janvier, 1878.

Mon Prince,

NE pouvant pas sortir aujourd'hui, je m'empresse de faire par écrit, dans la forme du Memorandum ci-joint, la communication dont je suis chargé par le Comte de Derby.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 583.

Memorandum.

HER Majesty's Government are glad to have received the pledge of the Russian Government that they have no intention of directing their military operations on Gallipoli unless the Turkish regular troops should concentrate there.

Her Majesty's Government contemplate no occupation of that position under present circumstances.

January $\frac{18}{30}$, 1878.

No. 584.

Russian Peace Conditions, communicated by Count Beust, January 27, 1878.

THE following is the *verbatim* text of the conditions:—

"Si les Turcs demandaient aux avant-postes la paix ou un armistice Son Altesse Impériale le Commandant-en-chef devra leur notifier que les hostilités ne sauraient être suspendues que si les bases suivantes étaient préalablement adoptées:

"1. La Bulgarie, dans les limites déterminées par la majorité de la population Bulgare, et qui en aucun cas ne sauraient être moindre que celles indiquées par la Conférence de Constantinople, serait érigée en Principauté autonome, tributaire, sous un Gouvernement national Chrétien et une milice indigène. L'armée Ottomane n'y séjournerait plus (sauf quelques garnisons à déterminer d'un commun accord).

"2. L'indépendance du Monténégro serait reconnue. Un accroissement de territoire équivalent à celui que le sort des armes a fait tomber entre ses mains lui serait assuré. La frontière serait fixée ultérieurement.

"3. L'indépendance de la Roumanie et de la Servie serait reconnue. Un dédommagement territorial serait assuré à la première et une rectification de la frontière à la seconde.

"4. La Bosnie et l'Herzégovine seraient dotées d'une administration autonome, avec des garanties suffisantes. Des réformes analogues seraient introduites dans les autres provinces Chrétiennes de la Turquie d'Europe.

"5. La Porte s'engagerait à dédommager la Russie des frais de la guerre et des pertes qu'elle a dû s'imposer. Le mode, soit pécuniaire, soit territoriale ou autre, de cette indemnité, serait réglée ultérieurement. Sa Majesté le Sultan conviendrait de s'entendre avec Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie pour sauvegarder les droits et les intérêts de la Russie dans les Détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles.

"En témoignage de l'acceptation de ces bases essentielles des Plénipotentiaires Ottomans devront immédiatement se rendre à Odessa ou Sebastopol pour y négocier avec les Plénipotentiaires Russes des préliminaires de paix.

"Aussitôt que l'acceptation de ces conditions préalables aura été officiellement notifié aux Commandants-en-chef des armées Impériales, une Convention d'Armistice devra être négociée sur les deux théâtres de la guerre et les hostilités devront être provisoirement suspendues.

"Les deux Commandants-en-chef auront la faculté de compléter les conditions ci-dessus, en désignant certaines points stratégiques et certaines forteresses qui devront être évacués, comme garantie matérielle de l'acceptation par la Sublime Porte de nos conditions d'armistice et de son entrée dans la voie des négociations de paix."

No. 585.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 120.)
(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, January 26, 1878.

SAFVET PASHA informs me confidentially that the threat held out by Russia against the Porte in case it divulges textually the terms of peace is so strong that he does not dare give them to me; but I am promised a copy of them as soon as the Porte is informed that preliminaries of peace and the armistice have been signed.

No. 586.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 122.)
(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, January 27, 1878.

WITH reference to your telegram of yesterday, I understand limits proposed for new Bulgarian Principality are those mentioned at page 153 of Correspondence respecting Conference No. 2 of last year. They do not include Salonica and Cavalla, but can scarcely be doubted that Principality will ultimately find means to extend itself to the Ægean seaboard.

No. 587.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, January 27, 1878.

THE impression here is that Turks are procrastinating with the lingering hope of English intervention, and that Russians are seeking to gain time with a view to extend their occupation of Roumelia.

No. 588.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 27.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Secret.)

Vienna, January 27, 1878.

I ARRIVED yesterday and saw Count Andrassy last night. He had only just received from M. Novikow the Russian conditions, which he telegraphed *in extenso* to Count Beust. The principal difference between them and those communicated to your Lordship by Count Schouvaloff consists in a statement that the arrangement respecting the passage of the Straits is to be come to between the Emperor and the Sultan directly, and in a declaration that when the conditions are accepted Turkish Plenipotentiaries should be sent to Odessa or Sebastopol to convert them into preliminaries of peace, General Ignatiew having already proceeded there.

He appears perfectly resolved to refuse to recognize any terms of peace arranged without the participation of the Powers, and declares that Powers must not be simply invited to endorse what had been settled between the Porte and Russia, but must be *bonâ fide* consulted upon every question affecting European Treaties, which cannot be altered without their consent.

I pressed him very hard to enable Her Majesty's Government to inform Parliament in asking for vote of credit that they were acting in concert with Austria, and he said he would tell me to-day how far he would consent to their going in intimating that an understanding or agreement existed between the two Governments.

He considers that in asking for vote of credit it should be made clear that it was not an (?) actual hostility to Russia, but only a means of taking precautionary measures at a moment's notice, if the protection of British interests makes it necessary; but he is most anxious to know whether, if Russia afterwards persists in acting independently of the European Powers, he can count upon the active assistance of England to enforce our mutual rights. He is convinced that this necessity will not arise, but says it is indispensable that Austria and England should be agreed as to what they will do in case it should arise.

As far as it is possible to judge from a first interview, I should say that Count Andrassy is perfectly resolved, if supported by Her Majesty's Government, to stand up for the rights of Europe to be consulted in all matters affecting the Treaties, first by protest and afterwards by arms, if (which he does not believe) this should become necessary.

Count Andrassy informed M. de Novikow two days ago that he is determined, even if standing alone, not to tolerate a Russian occupation south of the Danube after peace is signed.

No. 589.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 27.)

Vienna, January 27, 1878.

(Telegraphic.)

COUNT ANDRASSY considers that in asking Parliament for the vote Her Majesty's Government could make a statement somewhat to the following effect:—

"With reference to the arrangements made by the Russian and Turkish Delegates at Kyzanlik, Her Majesty's Government declare that, while recognizing their validity as between Russia and Turkey, in so far as they are calculated to modify European Treaties and to affect general and British interests they are unable to recognize in them any validity unless they are made the subject of a formal agreement among Parties to the Treaty of Paris.

"Her Majesty's Government hope that this view of the case, which is entirely based upon the Treaties, and especially upon the Treaty of London of 1871, will receive assent of the other Powers.

"As regards Austria, the repeated declarations of that Power give us the conviction that she entirely shares the views of Her Majesty's Government."

No. 590.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 27.)

Vienna, January 27, 1878.

(Telegraphic.)

REVERTING to first Russian conditions respecting limits to be assigned to Bulgaria, Count Andrassy asked me whether the preliminary Conferences at Constantinople were correctly represented as having advocated the formation of a Bulgaria extending south of the Balkans.

I said that it was altogether incorrect (?). General Ignatieff had at first strongly advocated the erection of a large Bulgarian province, which had been firmly resisted by Lord Salisbury, and the preliminary Conference adopted the principle of dividing the districts in which the reforms were to be introduced into two separate provinces.

This, Count Andrassy said, was a totally different thing, and he seemed to attach much importance to what he regards as an attempt on the part of Russia to make it appear that the creation of a Bulgarian province extending beyond the Balkans had already been approved by Europe.

No. 591.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 28.)

St. Petersburgh, January 23, 1878.

(No. 79.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship, in translation by Mr. Michell, an article from the "Novoe Vremia" on the question of the Dardanelles, in which it is urged that, with a complete neutralization of the Black Sea, Russia should occupy a strategical point at the mouth of the Bosphorus, in order effectually to prevent at a critical moment the passage through the Dardanelles of foreign ships-of-war.

I also inclose an article from the "Russki Mir" to which special attention is called by the "Agence Russe," a semi-official organ, on the freedom of the Straits.

This article is of opinion that the Black Sea, in lieu of being opened, should be closed to foreign ships-of-war which might enter it with a hostile purpose. It suggests, rather, that Russia should possess, on the shores of the Bosphorus, at the entry of the Black Sea,

a naval station, and it affirms that on this condition Russia will find that security of which she is now deprived.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 591.

Extract from the "Novoe Vremia."

(Translation.)

THE DARDANELLES.—The Slavophil "Novoe Vremia" of the 13th January, 1878, expresses the following opinion on this subject:—

"Rumours are in circulation in regard to peace and war. The English want a speedy peace. The Russian army, which may justly be said to be the soul of all Russia, aspires to reach Adrianople and Constantinople. . . . . .

"The dispute between England and Russia refers solely to the Turkish Straits, and in regard to those, not the English, but we Russians are the most competent judges. We do not at all wish to rule over the whole world, or to enslave international commerce dictating to it our laws and views. In these efforts England, so far, stands alone. She took Heligoland, and may threaten Germany at will; she occupied the Channel Islands, and from this position threatens France; by her possession of Gibraltar she holds Spain and Portugal in terror and submission; she stationed her troops and military stores on the island of Malta, and presses heavily on Italy and Greece; she stationed her fleet off the Turkish coast, and forced the submission of Turkey and Egypt; she took up a position at the outlet of the Suez Canal, and commands its navigation; she annexed the southern extremity of Africa, and from these two latter stations she commands the trade of the whole world. We say nothing of other appropriations of England in Africa, Asia, America, and Australia; the facts stated are sufficient to prove that there is not a more rapacious nation existing than England. England now wishes to prescribe impotency for Russia in the Black Sea, and not because we have been vanquished, but because we have been victorious in our campaign against Turkey.

"But this is not a serious political idea, it is merely a calculation on our good-nature; and this wily intrigue will be crushed by the firmness of Russian policy.

"No, we do not wish to open the Black Sea to the English fleet. If Nature herself has created such a condition of things that by defending those narrow straits we can maintain the inviolability of our southern coasts, the mistress of this position must be Russia."

Other Slavophil organs published at St. Petersburgh, such as the "Pétersbourg Gazette" and the "Russki Mir," strongly urge, together with a complete neutralization of the Black Sea, the occupation by Russia of a strategical point at the mouth of the Bosphorus, in order that Russia might effectually prevent, at a critical moment, the passage through these straits of ships-of-war of foreign nations.

Inclosure 2 in No. 591.

Extract from the "Agence Russe."

AU milieu des opinions encore vacillantes en Russie sur la question de savoir ce qui est le plus favorable aux intérêts Russes de l'ouverture ou de la fermeture des Détroits, nous croyons devoir signaler à nos lecteurs un article qu'on trouvera plus bas, de M. Jélovitsky, qui a paru dans le "Monde Russe" et où le savant historien motive son opinion par des considérations qui nous paraissent de nature à être prises en considération.

Nous appelons également leur attention sur les télégrammes privés des journaux Russes que nous reproduisons ci-contre.

LA LIBERTÉ DES DÉTROITS.—Voici l'article dont nous parlons plus haut et que nous empruntons au "Monde Russe":

"Maintenant que le moment décisif de la guerre est arrivé, il me semble opportun que la presse Russe se livre à l'examen des conditions de paix qui seraient désirables dans l'intérêt du pays. La première question qui se présente est celle dite de la liberté des Détroits. Je me trompe peut-être, mais j'avoue que j'entends cette question dans un sens tout opposé à celui qu'on lui prête aujourd'hui. D'après moi, il importe non pas que les Détroits soient ouverts à nos navires de guerre, mais plutôt que la Mer Noire soit fermée à

toute flotte qui y voudrait pénétrer dans un but hostile. Admettons que la Turquie accède au passage libre de nos navires dans le Bosphore et les Dardanelles. Où est la garantie qu'au moment le plus grave elle ne nous fermera pas l'entrée? Ce n'est certes pas l'Angleterre qui la contraindra à l'observation de son engagement. Ce serait différent si, sur les rives du Bosphore, à l'entrée même de la Mer Noire, nous possédions une station navale. Nous exercerions alors avec la Turquie une influence commune, ce qui serait juste, puisque, par le fait, la Mer Noire est bien un lac Russe auquel donne accès un passage étroit. Et quoi de plus naturel que de demander de surveiller ce passage? Suppose-t-on que nos provinces du Sud puissent se développer, privées de toute sécurité? Le pillage de Soukhoum, le bombardement d'Eupatoria, de Théodosie, et d'Anapa sont des événements qui répondent à cette question. On dira que nous pouvons créer dans la Mer Noire une flotte qui tienne en échec la flotte Ottomane. C'est vrai, mais dans ce cas, il peut se faire que les vaisseaux d'une autre Puissance se réunissent à la flotte Turque comme il est arrivé lors de la Guerre de Crimée. Ce n'est donc qu'à la condition de posséder une station navale sur les rives du Bosphore que la Russie trouvera la sécurité qui lui manque aujourd'hui. A défaut de cette garantie, je ne vois vraiment pas à quoi nous servirait la liberté des Détroits; je n'aperçois pas non plus la raison pour laquelle notre flotte de la Mer Noire voudrait naviguer sur la Méditerranée. Non-seulement l'Angleterre, mais tout autre Puissance maritime est en état d'empêcher, en cas d'hostilités, la jonction de notre flotte de la Baltique avec celle du Sud. La nature des choses nous force à avoir deux escadres distinctes, qui resteront toujours distinctes. En conséquence, ne nous laissons prendre à aucun mirage et tâchons que la paix soit basée sur une base solide, sur des garanties sérieuses."

No. 592.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 83.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 22, 1878.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship a leading article published in yesterday's "Agence Russe," and which bears the stamp of emanating from the pen of Baron Jomini, on the question of the opposition of the British Cabinet to the negotiation direct with Turkey of the preliminaries of peace.

Also two articles entitled "the English pretensions."

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 592.

Extract from the "Agence Russe."

St. Petersburg, Mardi soir, le 15/3 Janvier, 1878.

UNE IMPASSE.—Nous avons déjà relevé la contradiction flagrante qui résulte du point de vue auquel paraît s'être placé le Cabinet de Londres en n'admettant pas que la Russie traitât directement des conditions préliminaires de la paix avec la Turquie et de sa décision d'attendre pourtant ces mêmes conditions pour déterminer les crédits qu'il se propose de demander au Parlement.

Ces réserves contradictoires aboutissent forcément à la regrettable impasse suivante: D'une part, elles rendent l'armistice impossible en annulant d'avance toutes bases de paix; d'autre part, elles éloignent toute possibilité de paix en empêchant la conclusion d'un armistice.

D'où il résulte que la politique du Cabinet de Londres, à laquelle l'opinion avait déjà attribué l'échec des négociations qui eurent naguère pour objet de conjurer l'éventualité de la guerre, se rend aujourd'hui responsable de l'échec éventuel de la tentative actuelle de pacification.

LES PRÉTENTIONS ANGLAISES.—L'impartialité et la justice ne sont pas précisément les principes dont, en réalité, s'inspire la politique des Etats. Prétendre qu'elle y conforme toujours ses pratiques et ses vues, c'est peut-être lui demander plus qu'elle ne peut donner. Il est cependant des limites au delà desquelles elle cesse d'être celle du bon sens et contre laquelle proteste l'opinion même du pays qu'elle est censée protéger parcequ'elle ne représente plus alors ni ses idées, ni ses intérêts.

C'est ce qui arrive aujourd'hui avec la politique pratiquée depuis quelques années, et surtout dans les derniers temps, par le Cabinet de Londres.

Si l'on en croit ses organes, ce Cabinet est froissé de voir la direction des affaires Européennes lui échapper. Il n'est d'expressions assez vives dont ils ne se servent pour attaquer l'entente qui s'est établie entre les trois grandes Empires du Nord, sans laquelle pourtant le maintien de la paix générale aurait plus d'une fois déjà été rendu impossible. Ils oublient ces organes toutes les démarches qui ont été faites pour convier l'Angleterre à faire partie de cette entente commune et tous les refus que le Gouvernement Anglais y a chaque fois opposés, ainsi que tout le mal qu'il s'est donné pour la détruire.

La Turquie en serait-elle où elle en est aujourd'hui si en Décembre 1875, et en Mai 1876, l'Angleterre ne s'était pas volontairement et de parti-pris retirée du concert qui s'était établi alors entre toutes les Puissances pour empêcher la guerre? C'est encore en s'en isolant, après que le sort des armes a prononcé, qu'elle empêche aujourd'hui la conclusion de la paix. Le mot si terrible de son premier Ministre, "il faut une saignée," ne serait-il pas, par hasard, suffisamment accompli à l'heure qu'il est?

Que veut au fond le Cabinet de Londres? Il ne veut pas que la Russie et la Turquie, les deux belligérants en présence, s'entendent sur les bases préliminaires de la paix. A l'en croire, ce n'est pas leur affaire, mais celle de l'Europe.

Dans quel but élève-t-il cette prétention? Est-ce dans un intérêt Anglais? Non pas, puisqu'il a déclaré officiellement, solennellement par la bouche de la Reine, que les deux belligérants ont respecté et continuent à respecter les intérêts Anglais. C'est donc dans un intérêt Européen? Mais est-ce que l'Angleterre est seule à représenter cet intérêt? Et au moment que la Russie reconnaît que la sanction de l'Europe est nécessaire aux bases préliminaires de paix intervenues entre elle et la Turquie et que les autres Puissances admettent la conclusion, sous cette réserve, de la paix entre les deux belligérants, de quel droit, se demande-t-on, le Gouvernement Anglais s'y opposerait-il?

Et du reste, nous le répétons, cette entente préalable n'est-elle pas nécessaire pour servir de bases aux discussions Européennes?

La prétention du Cabinet de Londres n'est donc soutenable à aucun titre et à aucun point de vue. Il y a plus: elle est impraticable et ne saurait aboutir, si elle était admise, qu'à la rupture de l'entente si heureusement établie entre les trois grands Empires du Nord et, par suite, à la guerre générale. C'est là même ce qui la rend à bon droit particulièrement suspecte.

L'idée seule de faire discuter des bases préliminaires en vue d'un armistice devant aboutir à la paix, par cinq Puissances ayant toutes des intérêts divergents, alors que deux armées belligérantes sont en présence, démontre toute l'impossibilité pratique et le danger d'une pareille prétention. N'est-il pas en effet évident que dans des conditions ainsi exceptionnelles une pareille discussion risquerait fort ou de s'éterniser ou de n'aboutir qu'à une mésintelligence générale?

Pour ne citer qu'un exemple, l'Angleterre ne trouverait sans doute rien à dire à une complète indépendance de toutes les populations Chrétiennes de la Turquie de la détestable administration Ottomane; mais il est probable que cette manière de voir ne serait pas tout-à-fait agréée par l'Autriche, laquelle, par contre, se montrerait vraisemblablement beaucoup plus indifférente sur le terrain Asiatique, où l'Angleterre ferait, à son tour, de l'opposition. Il en serait ainsi de tous les autres points à résoudre.

Pendant ce temps, qui peut durer des mois, la Russie, dont les armées triomphantes auraient suspendu leur marche en avant pour assister à un pareil spectacle, aurait à supporter les mêmes lourdes charges sans aucun espoir dans l'issue satisfaisante de ces débats prolongés et avec la perspective presque certaine d'avoir à recommencer de nouveau les hostilités, mais dans toutes autres conditions, parce qu'en admettant même que la Turquie n'ait pas alors à côté d'elle de nouveaux alliés, elle aura en tout le temps de se refaire, d'opposer à la Russie de nouvelles forces, de nouveaux obstacles pour prolonger la lutte et l'effusion de sang.

Ainsi la prétention du Cabinet de Londres n'est pas seulement injuste, impraticable et dangereuse pour la paix générale, elle est encore offensante au bon sens, puisque pour y adhérer il faudrait que la Russie eût perdu tout souci de ses droits d'Etat belligérant, de sa dignité de grande Puissance, et jusqu'à la notion de la plus vulgaire prudence.

Aussi, sommes-nous convaincu qu'elle ne saurait être appuyée par la nation Anglaise, connue pour son esprit pratique et droit.

Inclosure 2 in No. 592.

Extract from the "Agence Russe."

LES PRÉTENTIONS DE L'ANGLETERRE.—LE "Journal (Français) de St. Pétersbourg" caractérise, comme nous le faisons nous-mêmes, ces prétentions:—

"Le Cabinet de Londres s'est fait le porte-voix du Gouvernement Ottoman pour demander des négociations de paix et d'armistice. La Russie y a aussitôt consenti, pourvu que la Turquie envoyât ses Plénipotentiaires aux deux quartiers-généraux, qui lui feraient connaître les conditions auxquelles une suspension d'hostilités pouvait avoir lieu. La première condition devait naturellement être l'acceptation des bases préliminaires de la paix. Nous avons déjà exposé à satiété qu'un armistice sans bases de paix ne pouvait être qu'un moyen d'augmenter les forces de l'ennemi et de prolonger la guerre.

"On a vu, en d'autres temps, des suspensions d'hostilités stipulées entre les armées qui, se sentant l'une et l'autre épuisées par les efforts déjà faits ou arrêtées par les rigueurs de la saison, prenait ce qu'on appelait les quartiers d'hiver, sauf à recourir de nouveau à la fortune des armes dès que les circonstances le permettaient. De nos jours, et surtout dans une guerre comme celle-ci, pareil arrangement n'est plus concevable, alors surtout que l'une des deux armées, bravant tous les obstacles, est en pleine marche victorieuse sur la capitale de l'ennemi, et que celui-ci n'a presque plus rien à lui opposer. Il est encore impossible dans une guerre qui n'a point pour but une conquête, mais la cessation d'un état de choses auquel on ne saurait laisser le temps de raffermir sans manquer à la mission essentielle qui domine l'entreprise humanitaire de la Russie. Même en laissant à l'écart les considérations militaires qui n'admettent pas qu'on donne à l'ennemi le temps de se réconforter pour une nouvelle lutte, un armistice sans bases de paix arrêtées serait injustifiable, parce qu'il laisserait à la merci des troupes Turques des contrées et des populations dont le sort, déjà si déplorable en temps de paix, avait précisément motivé la guerre.

"On comprend donc qu'à tous ces points de vue—sans parler de ceux parfaitement légitimes de l'armée et des finances Russes—l'armistice ne pouvait être que la conséquence d'une entente entre les belligérants sur les conditions de la paix. Or, actuellement, le Cabinet de Londres déclare ne vouloir admettre qu'une paix négociée avec la participation de l'Europe.

"Qu'en résulte-t-il? C'est que même si la Porte souscrivait aujourd'hui aux conditions qui pourraient aboutir à l'armistice en acceptant les bases de la paix, la Russie se trouverait devant la conviction que ces bases n'auraient aucune valeur, l'assentiment de la Turquie n'engageant à rien, puisque l'Europe pourrait le réduire à néant. Cette situation a encore été accentuée par la déclaration du Gouvernement Britannique, qu'il attendait seulement de connaître les conditions de la Russie pour formuler sa demande de subsides en vue des armements. Ainsi donc, si la tentative actuelle devait échouer, ce serait encore une fois l'attitude de l'Angleterre qui aurait rendu l'armistice et la paix impossibles et précipité l'Orient vers une crise fatale. Loin de nous la pensée que ce soit là ce qu'on aura voulu à Londres. Mais l'incontestable logique de notre raisonnement n'échappera à aucun homme sincère et impartial. C'est à l'Europe de juger, et il est nécessaire que devant la conscience publique et le tribunal d'histoire chacun porte les responsabilités qui lui incombent."

No. 593.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 19. Very Confidential.)
My Lord, *Vienna, January 13, 1878.*

I HAVE had an interview to-day with Count Andrassy, at which I acquainted his Excellency with the substance of your Lordship's recent telegraphic correspondence with Lord Augustus Loftus on the subject of the armistice.

His Excellency appeared to think that the Russian Government have wished to delay the commencement of the negotiations, with a view to their obtaining meanwhile further military successes, but he does not believe that their army will be able to reach Constantinople before a settlement is effected.

He stated to me, in strict confidence, that some days previously he had caused an intimation to be made confidentially to Prince Gortchakow that the Austro-Hungarian Government would not agree to the conclusion of a separate peace between Russia and Turkey, and that they must insist upon the peace being a European one. He said he was anxious, therefore, that the Porte should lose no time in inducing the Russians to state the conditions on which they are willing to make peace, and that if they are reasonable he has no objection to its accepting them, subject to the assent of Europe.

It may be presumed, however, that they will not be such as the Porte will be disposed to accept; and on its then applying for the interference of England and Austria and the other European Powers, they will be in a position to state what they can assent to and what they will resist; and, he added, Austria will then be found ready to maintain what she has said from the first to Russia, and what she has stated in writing to Her Majesty's Government.

His Excellency seemed to be under some apprehension lest public opinion in England, as exhibited at meetings in favour of the maintenance of peace, might not have an unfavourable influence on the eventual decision of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 594.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 21.)
My Lord, *Vienna, January 14, 1878.*

I UNDERSTAND that a telegram was received this morning from Count Zichy, in which he expresses to his Government the opinion that the Porte, with a view to prevent the advance of the Russian armies, is prepared to accept any terms of peace which Russia may offer to it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 595.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 23. Strictly Confidential.)
My Lord, *Vienna, January 14, 1878.*

I HAD the honour to sit next to the Emperor at a dinner at the Palace yesterday, and on my referring to the negotiations for an armistice between Russia and the Porte, His Majesty said that it would now be necessary to speak firmly at St. Petersburgh in order to prevent the Russian Government going too far in its demands upon Turkey; and he spoke with some asperity of what he called the new tactics of combining preliminaries for peace with the arrangements for an armistice.

I observed in reply that I understood His Majesty had already caused firm language to be used to Russia, and he answered, "We are now doing so, and we have stated at St. Petersburgh distinctly, as we have done from the first, what we can tolerate and what we cannot tolerate, at the same time that we wish to maintain our friendship with Russia."

On our retiring to the drawing-room, I had some conversation with Baron Orczy, who was present, and as he expressed an opinion that an armistice would be concluded in ten days or a fortnight, and peace in six weeks, I inquired whether he expected that the peace would be one which Austria-Hungary would consider satisfactory; and he answered that there can be no peace unless it be one satisfactory to Austria-Hungary.

On receiving your Lordship's telegram of yesterday respecting Gallipoli, I immediately communicated its substance to Count Andrassy; and Baron Orczy, who spoke to me of it this evening, expressed an opinion that the Russian Government will endeavour to come to a satisfactory arrangement with Her Majesty's Government upon the subject to which it relates.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 596.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 25.)
My Lord, *Vienna, January 15, 1878.*

AT an interview which I had to-day with Count Andrassy, I communicated to his Excellency the substance of the telegrams which your Lordship sent yesterday to St. Petersburgh and Constantinople, asserting the right of the other Powers who were parties to the Treaties of 1856 and 1871 to be parties to any Treaties affecting them; and he expressed satisfaction at the language which Her Majesty's Government had held on this subject, more especially as he had been under an apprehension, from the inquiry which your Lordship had addressed to Prince Gortchakow respecting Gallipoli, that they were withdrawing from the position which they had previously occupied in the question.

His Excellency said he was pleased to find, however, that the two Governments were taking the same standpoint, as he had yesterday desired the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to express his painful surprise that the Grand Duke Nicholas should have insisted on the preliminaries of peace taking precedence of an armistice; and that he had intimated confidentially to Prince Gortchakow that if it was intended to shut out Austria from the negotiations, he would find means of making her right to be heard respected.

I asked how he proposed to do so, and whether he was prepared to mobilize the army, and he answered there were many things he could do, but mobilization would not be resorted to as yet, as it would be extremely expensive. He has also reminded the Porte that he has always informed it that Austria intended, as a guaranteeing and neighbouring Power, to be a party to the negotiations for peace; but that she can protect her own interest in another way if it thinks fit to make peace independently of her.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 597.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 28.)
My Lord, *Vienna, January 16, 1878.*

I RECEIVED this morning your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, requesting me to ascertain what instructions will be sent to Count Zichy in consequence of the language held to him and to Mr. Layard on the previous day by Server Pasha as to the acceptance by the Porte of any conditions of peace which may be proposed by Russia, and it appeared to me that your Lordship's inquiry on this subject has been already answered by my telegram of the 14th instant and by Mr. Layard's telegram of yesterday, which has been repeated to me.

On my calling, however, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to inquire whether Count Zichy is fully acquainted with the understanding existing between his Government and that of Her Majesty, I also asked Baron Orczy, by whom I was received, as Count Andrassy had gone to the Emperor, what instructions will be sent to Count Zichy in consequence of his wish that he and Mr. Layard should be instructed to act together.

Baron Orczy said he would refer my questions on both points to Count Andrassy and give me an answer to them if I would call later in the day.

I therefore left with him a memorandum, of which I inclose a copy, in which they are formulated, and in which I quoted your Lordship's expression of a joint mediation, observing, however, that though I did not feel justified in suppressing words used by your Lordship, they did not appear to me to represent correctly the wishes expressed by Count Zichy to Mr. Layard.

His Excellency said, in reply, that there was apparently some misunderstanding on the subject, as he could not believe that Count Zichy had spoken of a joint mediation; and on my calling at the Ministry in the afternoon, he stated that Count Zichy had not even suggested to Count Andrassy that he and Mr. Layard should be instructed to act together.

He informed me also, in conformity with instructions from Count Andrassy, that, in answer to your Lordship's inquiry, Count Zichy is not acquainted with the negotiations which have taken place between the two Governments, and that a copy of the last instructions given to him, and on which, from Mr. Layard's telegram of yesterday, he appears to

have already acted, was sent yesterday to Count Beust for communication to your Lordship, and that Count Andrassy does not intend, under present circumstances, to add to them or to modify them.

Baron Orczy told me at the same time that, according to the last information received from Constantinople, the Turkish delegates to the Russian head-quarters intend, with the sanction of the Sultan, to ask for an armistice; and if the Grand Duke Nicholas makes it dependent on unreasonable conditions of peace, they will decline to accept them and refer them to the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 597.

Memorandum left with Baron Orczy of substance of Lord Derby's Telegrams of 15th January.

IN a telegram received from Mr. Layard on the 14th instant, he reports his having accompanied Count Zichy, at his Excellency's request, to see Server Pasha, and after relating what passed at the meeting, he states that Count Zichy intended to ask for instructions, and expressed great anxiety that he and Mr. Layard should be instructed to act together.

With reference to what Count Zichy appears to have said in the telegram "on the subject of joint mediation with Austria," Sir Andrew Buchanan has been requested by Lord Derby to inquire of the Imperial Government whether Count Zichy is fully informed respecting the negotiations which have taken place between Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor, and to ask what instructions it is now proposed to send to Count Zichy.

No. 598.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 31. Secret.)
My Lord, *Vienna, January 18, 1878.*

IN conformity with the instructions conveyed to me in your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, I have asked Count Andrassy his opinion on the points to which it refers.

His Excellency considers the language of the Turkish Plenipotentiaries to Count Zichy to be satisfactory, and I understand that it was identic with that of the Grand Vizier to Mr. Layard as reported in his telegram of the 16th instant, but Count Andrassy's telegram to Count Beust referred to by your Lordship as having been reported to me has not yet reached me.

With respect to the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that the Porte should not be encouraged to break off negotiations by an expectation that it will receive material assistance from England and Austria which will enable it to maintain the absolute territorial integrity of the Turkish Empire, he said no ground has been given to the Porte for entertaining such a hope; but while agreeing with your Lordship that the Turkish Government should not be encouraged to refuse all territorial concessions, he thinks it would be dangerous, in the present state of panic at Constantinople, to discourage them from expecting any material aid whatever. To prevent them, therefore, from acting without consulting the Guaranteeing Powers, and with a view also to convince Russia that Great Britain will offer a serious resistance to her pretensions, he is strongly of opinion that the Porte should be induced to allow Her Majesty's fleet to proceed to Constantinople, and he has not the slightest apprehension that Russia would resent such a measure as an act of war, as, under the circumstances, Her Majesty's Government would be perfectly justified in adopting it as a mere precaution for the protection of British interests.

His Excellency expressed a hope at the same time that if Her Majesty's Government should decide on taking active measures, they would not limit them to defending Gallipoli, as a Russian occupation of Constantinople would not thus be prevented; and with respect to that eventuality, he said that, without having taken a final decision upon the subject, he was himself more inclined to oppose it as the danger of its occurring increased, and that if he consented to it all, he would insist on the Russian army merely entering by one gate and leaving by another.

He then mentioned that he had just received a telegram from Count Zichy reporting the probability of its being proposed that a Russian force should occupy Bulgaria for two or three years; and on my observing that I had also reason to believe that such a measure is in contemplation, he answered that as it could not take place without Russian troops also remaining in Roumania, he would not consent to it, and besides, as it would most certainly lead eventually to war, he would prefer accepting war at once; but he feels confident that whatever pretensions the two Governments resist will be abandoned by Russia, as she could not meet an attack on her rear from Austria, combined with English naval and military action on her front.

In speaking of the fleet's presence at Constantinople not being an act of war, his Excellency said that Austria could not make a similar demonstration, for any movement on her part would be war, as her first step would bring her into immediate collision with Russian troops in Roumania. She must, therefore, on that account, and also in consequence of the great expense of mobilizing the army, defer any action until it becomes actually indispensable. Russia knows, however, and Her Majesty's Government may rest assured, that what he has declared himself prepared to do under certain circumstances will be done, should the time for action come.

He believes that his recent declaration at St. Petersburgh has already had a favourable influence on the policy of Russia, though it may not have brought her pretensions within reasonable limits, and he is convinced that peace will be preserved if Her Majesty's Government clearly show that the Russian party in England cannot prevent their action, which would be at once proved if the fleet were sent to Constantinople; and he believes that if Her Majesty's Government adopt this course, the other Powers will join them and Austria in resisting the ambitious views of Russia.

I asked what course he thought Prince Bismarck would adopt, and he answered that if his Highness has encouraged a separate peace between Russia and the Porte, it may have been to avoid the necessity of deciding between giving his support to Russian or to Austrian interests, but there is no probability of his affording material aid to Russia, as he could not do so without endangering the maintenance of the German Empire as at present constituted.

Count Andrassy did not understand to what your Lordship alluded by your reference to a distinction which has been apparently drawn between the deliberations which preceded the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris and the Treaty itself, as he has not himself spoken of such a distinction, and did not recollect its having been referred to by anyone else. I was not able to offer any explanation on the subject to his Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 599.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 38. Secret.)
Vienna, January 19, 1878.

My Lord,

IN conformity with the instructions conveyed to me in your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, I have asked Count Andrassy what he proposes should be done to give effect to the declaration of the English and Austrian Governments respecting the validity of a separate peace, and he answered that he could add nothing at present to what he had stated to me yesterday, when he had expressed to me fully and frankly his opinion on the subject.

I said in reply, that as I thought he might probably refer me to those opinions for an answer to the question I had put to him, I had brought a copy of the telegram in which I had reported them to your Lordship, and I would read it, in order to satisfy myself that I had neither misrepresented his language nor said anything that could mislead Her Majesty's Government.

His Excellency concurred generally in the correctness of my report, but seemed to object to some of his observations having been recorded in a telegram.

With respect to the fleet being sent to Constantinople, he said he had neither advised nor invited such a measure, though he had spoken of it as one which appeared to him of a nature to promote the interests of England; but if Her Majesty's Government adopted it, they must do so entirely from an English point of view, and not as if it had been concerted with or advised by Austria. He objected also to what I said of his language respecting

Gallipoli, as it appeared to represent him to have been advocating the occupation of the Peninsula by English troops.

With respect to the withdrawal, on the conclusion of peace, of the Russian troops from Bulgaria, he said he considered the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in Europe to depend upon it, and unless Her Majesty's Government were prepared to resist the occupation of the province by a Russian force, it is not to be expected that Constantinople will long remain in possession of the Turks.

He observed, also, that by the expression "Russia knows" his declarations will be maintained, he may appear to have stated that he had already threatened to enforce these declarations by war, which he had not done; and he took objection to my having designated as "Russian" the party of absolute neutrality in England, as it might appear that he had done so; and I explained to him that I had used the term in ciphering my telegram as the shortest which occurred to me.

His Excellency did not, in reality, modify his opinions, but he seems to be nervously anxious to prevent any possibility of his being represented hereafter to have agreed to or advised joint action on the part of the two Governments, or to have concerted measures beforehand with England to meet eventualities which may never occur.

He appears also, while considering that the future action of the two Governments must be guided by the course of the negotiations now pending and the Russian conditions of peace, to be under some apprehension, from the questions I have been instructed to put to him, that Her Majesty's Government still entertain undecided opinions on the subject to which they refer.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 600.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 37.)
Vienna, January 21, 1878.

My Lord,

THE reports which have reached Vienna, as far as I can learn, from the seat of war seem to indicate the probability of a Russian force advancing in a southerly direction towards Gallipoli or Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 601.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 39. Very Confidential.)
Vienna, January 22, 1878.

My Lord,

COUNT ANDRASSY, whom I have just seen, does not believe the report that the Russians are on the way to Constantinople or Gallipoli, as he says they have not more than 5,000 men before Adrianople.

He takes credit to himself for steadfastly maintaining his standpoint, saying that he has just declined a proposal of Russia that he should agree with her in principle, without the other Powers, respecting the conditions of peace.

He said he was surprised to learn from Count Beust that Her Majesty's Government had abandoned all idea of occupying Gallipoli or of sending the fleet to Constantinople, as the latter measure could not have been treated as an act of war, as it would have been justified by the necessity of protecting British subjects and the population generally against massacre and pillage.

Besides, he said, the smallest maritime State, having interests at Constantinople, would have a right to show its flag there in the present state of things.

It was not, however, for him to invite or to urge Her Majesty's Government to adopt such a measure, but he was certainly not prepared, from the opinions he has hitherto believed them to entertain as to its expediency, for their doing nothing.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 602.

Sir A. Buchanan to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 43. Secret.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January 22, 1878.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that, on my requesting an interview with Count Andrassy, in order to execute the instructions it conveyed to me, his Excellency came to the Embassy; and, on my reading to him a copy of the identic note which Her Majesty's Government propose should be addressed to Russia, he at once declared that he could not be a party to such a measure.

His objections to it, however, were not those which I had anticipated, but, while expressing his unwillingness to join at present in any identic communication to Russia, he said he could not be a party to the present note on other grounds, as it would, in his opinion, weaken the position which the two Governments have already taken as parties to the Treaty of Paris, by their declarations at St. Petersburgh and Constantinople; and also because it would separate England and Austria from the other Powers, who would have just cause to complain of their being set aside as if they had not an equal right with England and Austria to be consulted with respect to the conditions of peace. He said that the concluding phrase was also, in his opinion, extremely objectionable, as it appeared to admit that the continued occupation of Bulgaria by Russian troops, which he considers to be absolutely inadmissible, might be permitted with the consent of England and Austria.

He says that the difference between his own position and that of Her Majesty's Government is, that he has declared clearly what interests he intends to protect, and if a mobilization is necessary for doing so, orders will be given for it before the Legislature is asked to sanction the expenditure which would be incurred; but Her Majesty's Government appear to him to be unwilling to take any responsibility upon themselves, and the action of England may depend on an adverse vote of the House of Commons. He cannot, therefore, he said, commit himself before the country to the adoption of any course in concert with England for the support of their common interests, though he has no intention of abandoning those of Austria, until Her Majesty's Government have taken some active and material measures proving that they can trust to Parliament supporting them in protecting English interests against the pretensions of Russia.

Besides, as he has already said, he can take no middle course, and he cannot menace Russia without mobilizing the army, and mobilization will not only mean war, but put the country from the first day to enormous expenses.

If the measure, however, becomes necessary, it will be adopted, and, as he will easily find the financial means required for it, Austria has no idea of accepting foreign subsidies.

On my endeavouring further to ascertain what he expected England to do, he repeated that, for the protection of her own interests at Constantinople, she should send her fleet there, and she should ask a credit from Parliament for the expenses of the measures she may find it necessary to adopt to cause her voice to be heard by Russia. "If she does this," he said, "it will be seen that she is in earnest; and those who are disposed to act with her for the protection of their own interests, or of interests that they may have in common, will know that they will find in her an ally upon whom they can depend."

I answered that he seemed to doubt that Her Majesty's Government were in earnest, and that they had finally decided on supporting English interests by material means. But if Her Majesty's Government were also influenced by what ill-informed persons said, they might equally doubt that Austria had taken an irrevocable decision on the subject; and, indeed, the public generally in England believed that the three Emperors were in the same camp.

He replied, with some warmth, that from the mission of General Soumaroukoff, when he had acted on his sole responsibility, to the present day, he had shown that he had the courage of his opinions, and he was still prepared and determined to act upon them. He did not, however, wish for war, nor that any action on the part of England should lead to it; and, on the contrary, he was of opinion that the day on which Her Majesty's Government ordered the British fleet to Constantinople the peace of the East and of Europe would be secured, as there was no probability of Russia accepting a war in which she would find herself opposed to England and to Austria.

I may mention that his Excellency took great exception to the epithet "anxious" which the Prime Minister applied to Austria in the debate upon the Address.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 603.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 76.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 18, 1878.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose in article from the semi-official paper the "Turquie," with reference to the declarations made by the Government of Her Majesty and that of Austro-Hungary to Russia.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. H. LAYARD.

Inclosure in No. 603.

Extract from "La Turquie" of January 17, 1878.

LES DÉCLARATIONS AUSTRO-ANGLAISES.—Les Cabinets Signataires du Traité de Paris, impuissants à empêcher la guerre qui a éclaté l'année dernière entre la Turquie et la Russie, s'étaient réservé cependant le droit de discuter en commun les conditions de la paix à intervenir entre les belligérants.

Le Gouvernement de la Grande Bretagne est allé plus loin dans cette voie. Par une note du 1er Mai de l'année dernière, Lord Derby, en réponse à la Circulaire du Prince Gortchacow annonçant l'ordre donné par l'Empereur de Russie de franchir les frontières de Turquie, chargeait Lord Loftus de déclarer au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg que la mesure prise par le Gouvernement Russe ne pouvait avoir ni le concours ni l'approbation du Cabinet de St. James.

Le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de la Reine pour les Affaires Etrangères rappelait, dans la même note, la teneur du Traité de 1856 et de celui surtout de 1871, par lequel les Puissances Signataires affirmaient "le principe essentiel de droit international d'après lequel aucune Puissance ne peut se libérer des engagements d'un Traité ni en modifier les stipulations qu'avec le consentement des Parties Contractantes, au moyen d'un arrangement amical."

La note de Lord Derby ajoutait :—

"En prenant position, pour sa part, contre la Turquie et en ayant recours aux armes sans consulter d'avance ses alliés, l'Empereur de Russie s'est séparé du concert Européen maintenu jusqu'ici et s'est départi à la fois de la règle à laquelle il avait donné son assentiment général."

Bien que les autres Puissances Signataires du Traité de Paris n'aient pas cru devoir s'associer d'une manière formelle à la démarche de la Grande Bretagne, elles approuvaient cependant par leur silence la manière de voir du Cabinet de St. James. C'était là un avertissement assez significatif pour la Russie.

Il paraît que le Gouvernement de l'Empereur Alexandre n'en a voulu tenir aucun compte. Il veut, malgré l'engagement formel pris par les Traités de 1856 et 1871, négocier la paix directement avec la Turquie sans se soucier autrement des stipulations de ces actes internationaux.

Abandonnée comme elle l'était depuis le commencement de la guerre par ses alliés naturels, la Turquie ne pouvait faire autrement que de se rendre aux exigences de son ennemie. Elle s'est donc décidée à envoyer au quartier-général Russe deux Plénipotentiaires chargés de négocier les préliminaires de la paix et la conclusion d'un armistice. Namik Pacha et Server Pacha sont déjà partis hier pour leur destination.

Quel sera l'effet de cette démarche? Là est toute la question.

La Russie respectera-t-elle les engagements qu'elle a pris envers les autres Puissances co-signataires des Traités de 1856 et de 1871, ou bien passera-t-elle outre, comme elle l'a déjà fait, en déclarant la guerre à la Turquie?

Dans le premier cas, les belligérants conclurent un armistice et les Puissances se réuniront en Congrès pour discuter les conditions de la paix et décider, s'il y a lieu, d'apporter ou non des modifications aux anciens Traités.

Dans le second cas, c'est à la Grande Bretagne et à l'Autriche-Hongrie d'examiner si leur dignité nationale est compromise par suite de ce nouvel affront, et si leurs intérêts sont sauvegardés par un tel procédé de la part de la Russie.

La Turquie, qui a été correcte jusqu'au bout et qui s'en est constamment tenue à l'observation rigoureuse des Traités, ne saurait être accusée ni d'avoir provoqué la guerre, ni d'avoir apporté la moindre entrave à la conclusion de la paix. Elle a fait tout ce que son honneur et sa dignité lui commandaient. Sa conscience est en repos.

No. 605.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 28.)

(No. 64.)
Rome, January 25, 1878.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to receive this morning your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, repeating the conditions of peace as stated by Mr. Layard; and M. Depretis being still too unwell to attend at the Ministry, I called at his Excellency's private residence, and finding that he had not yet received any further information beyond the fact that the Porte had accepted these conditions, I read them to him.

In expressing his thanks for the communication, M. Depretis observed that they appeared to him less unfavourable than he had feared they might be. His Excellency was struck by there being no mention made of either Bosnia or Herzegovina—the original source of all that had since taken place, and he evinced some anxiety to know what extension might be assigned to the limits of Bulgaria.

He, at the same time, expressed a sense of relief at finding that the question of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, which was the one in which Italy was the most interested, was reserved for the consideration of a Congress.

In regard to the payment of the indemnity, M. Depretis stated his opinion that if the resources of Turkey were properly administered they would prove sufficient to pay the interest of any sum which could reasonably be demanded by Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 606.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 28.)

(No. 48.)
Berlin, January 24, 1878.

My Lord,

THE official "Provincial Correspondence" of this day's date, in an article on the armistice, says: "That the questions at issue cannot be definitely settled by the belligerents alone without the sanction and co-operation of the European Powers. The relations hitherto existing among the Powers appear to give rise to the assurance that the final settlement of the Eastern complication will be arrived at whilst peace is maintained.

"The wisdom and moderation of the Emperor Alexander, his intimate and confidential relations with the neighbouring Powers, and the peaceful tendencies lately manifested in England, appear to guarantee an early and peaceful solution of the Oriental crisis."

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 607.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 28.)

(No. 52. Confidential.)
Berlin, January 25, 1878.

My Lord,

I HAD some conversation to-day with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the peace conditions telegraphed from Constantinople, and which Prince Reuss thinks will be accepted by the Sultan.

Herr von Bülow said he had not received them from Russia, but that if the version received from Constantinople was correct, the conditions at first sight appeared moderate and calculated to facilitate a peaceful understanding between the Powers interested.

In reply to a question of mine, Herr von Bülow said that under all circumstances Germany would continue to adhere conscientiously to her policy of neutrality and reserve, having the maintenance of general peace as earnestly at heart as England.

I said that moderate as the conditions telegraphed by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople appeared at first sight, the protection of British interests in the East might yet at any moment necessitate a policy of action.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 608.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Lord Tenterden.—(*Received January* 28.)

(Secret.)
Admiralty, January 26, 1878.

My Lord,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Earl of Derby, the accompanying copies of secret telegrams sent to and received from Vice-Admiral Hornby.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ROBERT HALL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 608.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Vice-Admiral Hornby.

(Telegraphic.)
(Most Secret.)
Admiralty, January 23, 1878, 7 P.M.

SAIL at once for the Dardanelles, and proceed with the fleet now with you to Constantinople.

Abstain from taking any part in the contest between Russia and Turkey, but the water-way of the Straits is to be kept open, and, in the event of tumult at Constantinople, you are to protect life and property of British subjects.

Use your judgment in detaching such vessels as you may think necessary to preserve the water-way of the Dardanelles, but do not go above Constantinople.

Report your departure, and communicate with Besika Bay for possible further orders, but do not wait if none are there. Keep your destination absolutely secret. Acknowledge.

Inclosure 2 in No. 608.

Vice-Admiral Hornby to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)
Vourla, January 24, 1878, 6·10 P.M.

ORDERS received. Sail at 6 P.M. to-day for Dardanelles and Constantinople. Orders left for "Alexandra" and colliers to follow. Have not sent orders for ships at present at Malta.

Am very short of small vessels. Unless Foreign Office object, strongly request "Condor" may be ordered by telegraph to join from coast of Syria. She was last at Alexandretta.

Inclosure 3 in No. 608.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Vice-Admiral Hornby.

(Sent to Vourla, Koumkaleh, and Chanak.)
(Telegraphic.)
Admiralty, January 24, 1878, 7·25 P.M.

ANNUL former orders. Anchor at Besika Bay and wait further orders. Report arrival there.

Inclosure 4 in No. 608.

Vice-Admiral Hornby to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Dardanelles, January 26, 1878, 5·45 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

RECEIVED your telegraphic communication to anchor at Besika Bay when abreast Dardanelles forts.

Firman received there for passage of Straits.

I returned to Besika Bay immediately as ordered.

No. 609.

Server Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha, January* 28.)

Constantinople, le 27 Janvier, 1878.

(Télégraphique.)

LA flotte Anglaise est entrée avant-hier dans les Dardanelles. Cette mesure n'a pas été provoqué par la Sublime Porte. Elle a été prise par le Gouvernement Anglais de sa propre initiative; mais, à la suite des démarches pressantes de l'Ambassadeur Britannique à Constantinople, nous avons dû y donner notre consentement. Vous voudrez bien relever ce dernier point au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, que le passage de la flotte Anglaise par le Détroit des Dardanelles ne soit pas considéré comme une violation du Traité de Paris. J'ajoute que le Gouvernement Britannique, ayant appris dans l'intervalle l'acceptation par la Sublime Porte des conditions de paix proposées par la Russie, a immédiatement donné à sa flotte l'ordre de retourner à Bésika.

No. 610.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 28.)

(No. 123.)

Constantinople, January 27, 1878.

(Telegraphic.)

COUNT ZICHY has this morning made communication to the Porte, in pursuance of instructions from Vienna to the effect that Count Andrassy had not been informed of conditions prepared by Russia, nor wished to be so, in order to avoid alternative of delaying armistice by objecting to them, or of implying approbation by silence. But, on conclusion of armistice, Porte should lose no time, from regard to legitimate claims of other Powers, and in her own interest, in communicating them to signatory Powers, in order that they may at least be placed as far as possible in a position to meet stipulations modifying Treaties. This would suit interests of Turkey all the more if the conditions are as hard as they are understood to be.

Count Zichy informs me that Safvet Pasha stated to him this morning that condition regarding Straits is purposely vague; it only states that a direct understanding shall be come to on the subject between the Sultan and the Emperor.

No news of an armistice from the Plenipotentiaries, which gives rise to much anxiety and leads to fear that the terms of armistice are such as to make it difficult to accept them and that further time will be gained for advance of Russians and their auxiliaries.

No. 611.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 28.)

(No. 124.)

Constantinople, January 27, 1878.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE been officially requested by the Porte that, in event of Her Majesty's Government deciding again upon bringing the fleet into the Dardanelles, sufficient notice may be given to the Porte, in order that it may have time to send the necessary orders.

No. 612.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 28.)

(No. 125.)

Constantinople, January 27, 1878.

(Telegraphic.)

WITH reference to your telegram of yesterday, I learn from the Porte confidentially that although Plenipotentiaries did make resistance to 1st Article of Bases of Peace relating to Bulgaria, and to the second part of the 4th Article respecting Christian provinces, none of the Articles whatever were taken *ad referendum*, but the whole were accepted under the last instructions sent by the Porte.

No. 613.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 28.)

Vienna, January 27, 1878.

(Telegraphic.)

WITH reference to my previous telegram, Count Andrassy considers it very desirable to recognize the arrangements already made as binding upon Turks as regards Russia, in order to deprive latter of all pretext for repudiating them, and commencing march on Constantinople. Count Andrassy telegraphs this evening in terms similar to those suggested, and he considers that all the other Governments should be informed of views of England and Austria in order to obtain their assent to a principle which he thinks they cannot repudiate, and to avoid a possible impression that the two Governments were arranging between themselves a matter of general interest.

No. 614.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 28.)

St. Petersburgh, January 27, 1878.

(Telegraphic.)

I FEEL it my duty to submit to Her Majesty's Government following considerations in regard to importance of occupation of the Dardanelles without delay, as a precautionary measure:—

First, Russian forces within few hours of Gallipoli now consist only of cavalry; when reinforced by infantry and artillery, Gallipoli and Dardanelles will be virtually in their hands, as it will be too late for any protective action on our part. 2ndly, if the Dardanelles should be held by Russia, our communication with Constantinople will be at their mercy, and our fleet prevented giving protection to our subjects there. 3rd, from a Russian occupation of the Dardanelles, which, to judge by the language here, appears imminent, whole of Turkish fleet must eventually fall into hands of Russia.

No. 615.

Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 28.)

Berlin, January 28, 1878.

(Telegraphic.)

IT is reported in Berlin that Russians are availing themselves of the procrastination of Turkey to push on their forces as far as Katardji, near Constantinople.

No. 616.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January* 28.)

(No. 127.)

Constantinople, January 28, 1878.

(Telegraphic.)

PRINCE REUSS (?) informs me that the Russians have appeared at Rodosto and Tchorlu, half way between this and Adrianople. No information has been yet received of signature of the armistice, and the greatest anxiety is felt at the Porte, which fears some design on the part of Russia to gain time, now that she has secured acceptance by Turkey of bases of peace. It is possible that as the *uti possidetis* is to be applied to Montenegro

and Servia, Russia may wish for them to occupy as much Turkish territory as possible before a suspension of arms. I am secretly informed that Russians now insist on the armistice being signed at Odessa, but I cannot answer for the accuracy of my information.

No. 617.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 129. Most Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 28, 1878.*

SULTAN has sent to tell me that the Russians have now appeared at Bourgas, and seem determined to advance upon Constantinople in two, or perhaps three, columns in great force. As His Majesty has accepted all the demands made by Russia, he cannot understand why she should now advance upon his capital, bringing infinite suffering and misery unnecessarily upon his people. His Majesty implores Her Majesty's Government to stop, if possible, an attack upon Constantinople, which would produce the greatest disasters, and even endanger his throne and life. He begs that should Her Majesty's Government make any endeavour to stop advance of Russia she should not be led to suspect that it was founded upon anything coming from him, as he dreads her vengeance after the warnings he has received from Russia not to enter into any communication whatever with any other Power with reference to peace or war.

Alarm felt by the Sultan is not unfounded, and if the Russians advance upon Constantinople consequences will be most serious.

May I give pledge in the name of Her Majesty's Government that Russians will not occupy Boulair lines if the Porte does not concentrate troops there? In that case all available troops would be brought here at once.

No. 618.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 28, 1878.*

I AM informed that answer to the Austrian verbal communication to Prince Gortchakow, stating that the Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey, affecting Treaty of 1856 and that of 1871, would require assent of signatory Powers, was made in the form of an autograph letter from Emperor of Russia to Emperor of Austria, of which M. de Novikow was the bearer. Since its receipt, I am told, all distrust between two Governments has been allayed.

No. 619.

Mr. Wyndham to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 28.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, January 28, 1878.*

THE following figures have been sent to Constantinople:—

"Minister for Foreign Affairs told me this morning that he had received a telegram from Greek Minister at Berlin, stating that difficulties had arisen as to the conclusion of peace.

"This news may have the effect of inciting the Government to war."

No. 620.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 28, 1878, 5·10 P.M.*

COUNT SCHOUVALOFF has read to me, this afternoon, the following extract of a telegram from Prince Gortchakow:—

"You may affirm, categorically, that we consider the passage of ships of war through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles as an European question, which we do not intend to 'résoudre isolément.'"

No. 621.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 28, 1878, 6·15 P.M.*

IN reply to your telegram No. 118, Secret, of the 26th instant, it would be useless for Her Majesty's Government to attempt to obtain for the Sultan the most favourable terms possible.

The circumstances have entirely altered since that intimation was made to His Majesty.

No. 622.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 28, 1878, 6·30 P.M.*

ENDEAVOUR to ascertain what is to be the nature of the "ulterior understanding for safe-guarding the rights and interests of Russia in the Straits," mentioned in the bases of peace communicated by Count Schouvaloff.

No. 623.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

(No. 61. Most Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 28, 1878.*

THE Austrian Ambassador called upon me yesterday afternoon, and left with me a copy of the Russian conditions of peace,* which he stated to be textually accurate, and of which I inclose a copy for your Excellency's information.

Count Beust said that his Government had, in the first instance, refused to receive them, but were assured that they had been "accepted by England."

I said, in reply, that this was not the case; that no question of acceptance or refusal had arisen. A summary of the conditions, less detailed than the document which he had placed in my hands, had been communicated to me by Count Schouvaloff for information, but no opinion had been asked from or expressed by me upon them.

Count Beust further stated, as your Excellency has done in your telegram, that several of the conditions are highly unacceptible to Austria. Count Andrassy, he said, had declared that many pledges and assurances had been given him by the Russian Government, but that he was now convinced of their falsity.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 624.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 73.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 28, 1878.*

THE Russian Ambassador called upon me late this afternoon and read to me an extract of a telegram from Prince Gortchakow, authorizing him to affirm categorically that the Russian Government considered the passage of ships of war through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles as a European question, which they did not intend to settle by themselves ("résoudre isolément").

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

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* No. 584.

No. 625.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Lyons.

(No. 60.) *Foreign Office, January 28, 1878.*

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 47 of the 17th instant, reporting an inquiry made of you by M. Callimaki Catargi as to whether, supposing he should present himself in London, he would be well received here and be placed on the same footing as that which he occupies at Paris.

I have to state to your Excellency, in reply, that the Roumanian Delegate will, in the event of his coming to this capital, be received in the same manner as Prince Ghika was on the occasion of his visiting this country in 1876, charged on behalf of the Roumanian Government with certain commercial negotiations; but M. Catargi will understand that Her Majesty's Government cannot accord him any diplomatic position.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 626.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 105. Secret.) *Foreign Office, January 26, 1878.*

Sir,

WITH reference to your telegram No. 118 of the 26th instant, in which your Excellency inquires whether you may repeat to the Sultan the promise of Her Majesty's Government, that when the time came for negotiating a peace they would obtain for him the most favourable terms possible, I have to inform your Excellency that it would now be useless for Her Majesty's Government to attempt to obtain for the Sultan the most favourable terms possible.

The circumstances have entirely altered since that intimation was made to His Majesty.

I am, &c.

(Signed) DERBY.

No. 627.

Server Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha, January 29.*)

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le 23 Janvier, 1878.*

NOS Plénipotentiaires ont des instructions formelles pour arrêter avec le Grand Duc Nicolas les bases générales de la paix, et conclure l'armistice. Nos dispositions conciliantes nécessitent nullement l'occupation de la capitale de l'Empire. Il est donc de la plus haute importance de prévenir par tous les moyens cette éventualité. Veuillez voir immédiatement Lord Derby, et lui exposer la situation. Sa Seigneurie nous rendra un immense service en empêchant la marche des Russes sur la capitale, marche qui, je le répète, ne saurait être justifiée d'aucune manière en présence de nos dispositions conciliantes. La déclaration que le Prince Gortchakow a fait parvenir au Cabinet de St. James à propos de Gallipoli faciliters, nous espérons, le succès des nouvelles démarches du Gouvernement Anglais pour obtenir également du Gouvernement Russe des assurances formelles au sujet de Constantinople. Je vous prie de me télégraphier le plus tôt possible le résultat de vos démarches.

No. 628.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January 29.*)

(No. 70.) *Rome, January 26, 1878.*

My Lord,

I HAD a further interview with M. Depretis this morning at his private residence.

His Excellency said he had received a report of the conditions of peace from Count Corti, and they differed in some degree from those with which I had acquainted him yesterday. On comparing notes, the account of them telegraphed by Count Corti appeared to tally with those communicated to your Lordship by Count Schouvaloff.

When I saw his Excellency information had been received at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (from which I had just come) by a telegram dated 1 A.M. to-day from the Italian Consul at the Dardanelles, that the English fleet had entered the Straits. M. Depretis was not aware of this, but when I announced it to him, his Excellency said the action taken by England was fully explained to him by the stipulation in the conditions of peace which reserves the question of the Straits for a direct understanding between the Emperor of Russia and the Sultan—a mode of settlement which M. Depretis said it appeared to him difficult for England to consent to.

Since leaving M. Depretis I have received a note from Count Tornielli stating that a second telegram from Constantinople announced that the fleet had not actually entered the Straits, apparently having received a counter-order at the moment of doing so.

In my interview with M. Depretis yesterday his Excellency appeared struck, as I reported in my despatch No. 64 of yesterday's date, at there being no mention of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the conditions reported by Mr. Layard. He was under some anxiety lest the lot of these provinces had been reserved for some arrangement with Austria. It now appearing, however, that Bosnia and Herzegovina are to have an autonomy guaranteed to them, his Excellency's mind is relieved on this subject, the more so as an interview which was appointed to take place, at Count Andrassy's request, between him and Count Robilant was, at the last moment, postponed at the request of the former, on learning, as M. Depretis presumes, the arrangement proposed for the provinces in question.

M. Depretis again assured me, in the strongest terms, that Italy had no ambitious views, and that the Italian Government had nothing more at heart than to remain on the most cordial terms with Austria. He did not believe that either Austria or Italy had anything to gain by extending their frontiers, but, on the contrary, that it was in the interest of all Powers that the existing territorial arrangements should be preserved.

With regard to the territorial changes, and the other conditions in the Russian terms, M. Depretis said he considered them very hard, but that Turkey, if she retained Roumelia, would gain as a homogeneous Mahomedan State, not subjected at every moment to disturbance arising out of foreign intrigue.

I replied, that if the proposed amputation of her limbs were really carried out, I did not see what of Turkey in Europe would be left.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 629.

Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby.—(*Received January 29.*)

(No. 132.) *Constantinople, January 29, 1878.*

(Telegraphic.)

GRAND VIZIER states distinctly and categorically that orders and full powers were sent to Turkish Plenipotentiaries by telegraph, about 2 P.M. on the 23rd instant, to accept bases of peace as submitted to them in writing by the Grand Duke Nicholas. Since that time the Porte has thrice telegraphed to Plenipotentiaries to ask them to inform it of the result, but have received no answer whatever. His Highness cannot admit the possibility of any delay or procrastination on the part of Turkish Plenipotentiaries in the matter. It is evident that telegraphic communication with Kyzanlik is still open, as one member of the mission has telegraphed to his family here, and messages have been received thence in twelve hours.

No. 630.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 29, 1878.*

YOUR Excellency should state to the Russian Government that Her Majesty's Government, while recognizing any arrangements made by the Russian and Turkish delegates at Kyzanlik for the conclusion of an armistice and settlement of bases of peace as binding between the two belligerents, declare that, in so far as those arrangements are calculated to modify European Treaties and to affect general and British interests, they are unable to recognize in them any validity unless they are made the subject of a formal agreement among the Parties to the Treaty of Paris.

No. 631.

*The Earl of Derby to Lord Lyons.**

Foreign Office, January 29, 1878.

(Telegraphic.)
STATE to the Government to which you are accredited that Her Majesty's Government, while recognizing any arrangements made by the Russian and Turkish delegates at Kyzanlik for the conclusion of an armistice and settlement of bases of peace as binding between the two belligerents, declare that, in so far as those arrangements are calculated to modify European Treaties and to affect general and British interests, they are unable to recognize in them any validity unless they are made the subject of a formal agreement among the Parties to the Treaty of Paris.

Her Majesty's Government hope that this view of the case, which is entirely based upon the Treaties, and especially upon the Treaty of London of 1871, will receive the assent of the other Powers.

No. 632.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

Foreign Office, January 29, 1878.

(Telegraphic.)
INFORM Count Andrassy that the following telegram has been sent to St. Petersburgh, after having been shown to Count Beust for his concurrence:—

"Her Majesty's Government, while recognizing any arrangements made by the Russian and Turkish delgates at Kyzanlik for the conclusion of an armistice and settlement of bases of peace as binding between the two belligerents, declare that, in so far as those arrangements are calculated to modify European Treaties and to affect general and British interests, they are unable to recognize in them any validity unless they are made the subject of a formal agreement among the Parties to the Treaty of Paris."

The same telegram has been addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Rome, and Berlin, with the following addition:—

"Her Majesty's Government hope that this view of the case, which is entirely based upon the Treaties, and especially upon the Treaty of London of 1871, will receive the assent of the other Powers."

No. 633.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

Foreign Office, January 29, 1878, 7·25 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)
WITH reference to Mr. Layard's telegram No. 132, repeated to you thisday, stating that no answer has been received from Turkish Plenipotentiaries, can you ascertain cause of delay?

No. 634.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

Foreign Office, January 29, 1878.

(No. 107.)
Sir,
I ENTIRELY approve the language employed by your Excellency in your conversation with Server Pasha, as reported in your despatch No. 48 of the 9th instant, relative to the attitude of Her Majesty's Government in their late endeavours to procure the restoration of peace.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

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* Repeated to Berlin and Rome.

No. 635.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

Foreign Office, January 29, 1878.

(No. 108.)
Sir,
I APPROVE the telegraphic instructions sent by your Excellency to Mr. Consul Green, copy of which is inclosed in your despatch No. 64 of the 15th instant, informing him that it would be better for him not to interfere between the Turkish Commanders and Montenegro with regard to the conclusion of an armistice.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 636.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

Foreign Office, January 29, 1878.

(No. 109.)
Sir,
I HAVE to express to your Excellency my approval of the language employed by you at your interview with the Grand Vizier, as reported in your despatch No. 66, Confidential, of the 15th instant, relative to the instructions given to the Turkish Plenipotentiaries for the conclusion of peace.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY

No. 637.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

Foreign Office, January 29, 1878.

(No. 110.)
Sir,
I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch No. 67, Confidential, of the 15th instant, reporting that at an interview with the Grand Vizier on that day you had asked his Highness whether any decision had been come to with respect to with respect to the suggestion that Her Majesty's fleet should anchor within the Dardanelles; and I have to express to you my approval of your proceedings on that occasion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 638.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

Foreign Office, January 29, 1878.

(No. 111.)
Sir,
I APPROVE your language to the Grand Vizier as reported in your Excellency's despatch No. 68, Confidential, of the 15th instant, respecting the protection of the inhabitants of Constantinople in the event of a Russian advance upon the capital.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 639.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

Foreign Office, January 29, 1878.

(No. 112.)
Sir,
I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 63 of the 14th instant, reporting the interview which you had with Server Pasha and Count Zichy, previous to the departure of the former on his mission to the Grand Duke Nicholas; and I have to express to your Excellency my approval of your language therein reported with reference to the negotiations for peace.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 640.

*The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.**

(No. 80.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 29, 1878.*

WITH reference to Mr. Layard's telegram of to-day's date,† which was repeated to your Excellency this day, stating that no answer had been received from the Turkish Plenipotentiaries respecting the result of the negotiations as to the bases of peace, I have to instruct you to ascertain if possible the cause of the delay.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 641.

*The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.**

(No. 82.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 29, 1878.*

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to state to the Russian Government that Her Majesty's Government, while recognizing any arrangements made by the Russian and Turkish Delegates at Kyzanlik for the conclusion of an armistice and for the settlement of bases of peace, as binding between the two belligerents, declare that in so far as those arrangements are calculated to modify European Treaties and to affect general and British interests, they are unable to recognize in them any validity unless they are made the subject of a formal agreement among the parties to the Treaty of Paris.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 642.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 84.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 29, 1878.*

THE Russian Ambassador informs me that, according to the telegraphic reports he has received, no news of the conclusion of the armistice has yet reached St. Petersburgh. Prince Gortchakow, his Excellency states, is surprised at this, and attributes it either to the distance or to an interruption of the field telegraph.

Prince Gortchakow also denies the rumour that the preliminaries of peace are to be signed at Sebastopol, and affirms that they will be concluded at Adrianople.

Count Schouvaloff adds that, in speaking of the Straits, Prince Gortchakow has repeated his instruction to affirm positively that the passage of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles is a question reserved for agreement among the Powers.

In Count Schouvaloff's personal opinion, the *status quo*, that is to say, the *mare clausum*, forbidding the passage to vessels of war of all nationalities will be maintained.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 643.

The Earl of Derby to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Vienna, Berlin, and Rome.‡

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 29, 1878.*

I HAVE to request that your Excellency will inform the French Government that Her Majesty's Government, whilst they are prepared to recognize any arrangements which may be made by the Russian Delegates and those of Turkey at Kyzanlik, with a view to the conclusion of an armistice and the settlement of bases of peace as binding between the two belligerents, declare, nevertheless, that in so far as such arrangements may be found calculated to modify European Treaties, or to affect general interests or those of Great Britain, they are unable to recognize in them any validity unless they shall be made the subject of a formal agreement by the Powers parties to the Treaty of Paris.

* Substance telegraphed. † "Turkey No. 4 (1878)"

Her Majesty's Government entertain the hope that the view of the case above stated, which is entirely based upon the Treaties, and more especially upon the Treaty of London of 1871, will receive the assent of the other Powers who were parties to those Treaties.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 644.

Count Andrassy to Count Beust.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Count Beust, January 29.)

(Telegraphic.)
(Private and Confidential.) *Vienna, January 28, 1878.*

I DRAW your attention to a point in my conversation with Sir H. Elliot which I particularly wish to have put before the British Government in the light in which I look upon it. I told Sir Henry that we would declare in St. Petersburgh that the Kyzanlik Convention would—in as far as our interests as a neighbouring State and our right as a Signatory Power are concerned—*for us* be null and void, but that we would not question the fact of those stipulations (Kyzanlik) being binding upon the Porte. This seems to me of importance, because otherwise Russia might make our declaration the pretext for refusing the armistice to the Porte. By Elliot's desire, and in order that the British Government may in some form or the other publicly refer to the fact that we are in agreement with them, I have myself submitted a formula to him, in which such reference might be made. I wish that some mention should also be made to the effect that the other Signatory Powers are also counted upon. I do not think that we should preclude the action of the other Signatory Powers by identical action of England and Austria, as such identical action at this moment would denote a separate Anglo-Austrian alliance, which might induce the other Powers to stand aloof. If, on the contrary, we act separately, though to the same effect, our common standpoint assumes an European aspect, and the other Signatory Powers cannot very well reject it. To be able to do so they would require a *fait accompli* denoting a separate alliance, but not only a silent assumption thereof.

Elliot personally assented to my views, and I hope they will be satisfactory in England.

No. 645.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 91.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 25, 1878.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship, from the semi-official "Agence Russe," a formal denial of the report of the march of a Russian corps against Gallipoli, and a statement that the Russian Government, being fully aware of the importance which Her Majesty's Government attach to Gallipoli, has no intention of touching that point which does not enter into its sphere of military operations, consequently that Gallipoli will neither be attacked nor occupied, unless the Turkish regular forces should concentrate there, in which case it would be impossible to leave them on the Russian flank.

The "Agence Russe" also alludes with indignation to the telegram of the 14th instant from Constantinople published with the papers lately presented to Parliament, and which reported the notification of the armistice by a Russian parlementaire, as an instance of the false news constantly invented at Constantinople with a view of creating a rupture between England and Russia.

The "Agence Russe" terminates by saying that everything now points to a collapse (in Turkey) which will require the agreement and intervention of Europe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE LONDON

Inclosure in No. 645.

Extract from the "Agence Russe."

UN télégramme de Constantinople annonce qu'un corps Russe marcherait contre Gallipoli. Une interpellation a eu lieu à la Chambre des Communes au sujet de cette nouvelle, qui n'est qu'une manœuvre Turcophile.

Nous sommes à même de démentir ce télégramme de la manière la plus formelle.

Le Gouvernement Impérial n'ignore pas l'importance que le Cabinet Anglais attache à Gallipoli. Il n'a aucun intérêt à toucher à ce point, qui ne rentre pas dans la sphère de ses opérations militaires. Conséquemment Gallipoli ne sera pas occupé, ni attaqué, à moins que des armées régulières Turques ne s'y concentrent, auquel cas il serait impossible de les laisser sur notre flanc.

Nous ne ferons pas, par rapport à certains personnages officiels, de rapprochement entre le télégramme de Constantinople, démenti plus haut, qui a été porté avant hier à la tribune de la Chambre des Communes, et ce autre télégramme du 14 Janvier annonçant la notification par un parlementaire Russe de l'armistice, qui a été déposé au Parlement parmi les documents du Blue Book, et auquel nous avons eu le regret de devoir opposer un démenti non moins catégorique.

Il est impossible pourtant de ne pas voir dans cette répétition de nouvelles fausses et on ne peut plus insidieuses, adressées de Constantinople et arrivant directement au Parlement, la preuve matérielle d'une machination Turcophile ayant pour objet de brouiller l'Angleterre et la Russie, et qui pour être le fait du désespoir n'en constitue pas moins un faux.

En dehors du précédent démenti que nous avons télégraphié dès cette nuit à l'étranger, et qui a dû paraître dans les feuilles de Londres de ce matin, nous n'avons rien de particulièrement nouveau à signaler dans la situation politique, si ce n'est que les événements vont plus vite que toutes les combinaisons vers un effondrement qui exigera sans doute l'entente et l'intervention de toute l'Europe.

No. 646.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 29, 1877.*

COUNT ANDRASSY is much disturbed by a report from Count Beust of a conversation with your Lordship, which he considers to indicate a repudiation of the understanding come to by his note of July 30 and your Lordship's despatch to Sir A. Buchanan of August 14.

Count Beust understands your Lordship to say that Her Majesty's Government had nothing to object to the autonomy proposed by Russia for Bulgaria, and that their only anxiety related to the question of the Straits.

Count Andrassy says that the agreement between the two Governments must be taken as a whole, and he cannot consent to the question of the Straits being separated from the rest.

It was not the point of great interest to Austria, but he had declared his readiness to support English views upon it; while your Lordship had promised that if occasion should arise, Great Britain would join with Austria in opposing the other points on which she was more immediately interested.

The seventh of the points declared incompatible with Austrian interests was the establishment of a great Slav State, to the [detriment] of the Balkan Peninsula, and the Russian project of a new Bulgaria would create such a State.

Count Andrassy begged that he may be informed as soon as possible whether Her Majesty's Government adhere to the declarations of 14th August in their full integrity.

He was aware of Russian Government having given assurances that questions of the Straits would be referred to the Powers; but if a Conference was to be called to deliberate on that point alone, he, for one, would refuse to take part in it.

He had received information of the rapid advance of the Russians towards Constantinople, which was stated to be in no position to make a defence, and massacre and destruction of Turkish property were imminent.

He had formerly objected to agreeing with Her Majesty's Government to oppose a Russian entrance into Constantinople, because it might encourage Turks to prolonged resistance, and because it might be for the Russians a military necessity.

These reasons no longer exist. The Turks have accepted the preliminaries, and the Russians have no excuse for advancing.

No time is to be lost if frightful calamities are to be prevented, and Count Andrassy begs that he may as soon as possible be made acquainted with the manner in which Her Majesty's Government would regard an evident design upon the capital, and if they come to a decision he will be ready in twenty-four hours to state measures that Austria will be prepared to take.

He stated that application had been made to St. Petersburgh for the immediate dispatch of the reserve forces, but the Emperor had refused to send them till he was informed of the object for which they were wanted.

This showed the designs of Russian Military Commanders.

Count Andrassy intimated in no ambiguous terms that if he is now abandoned by England nothing will be left for him but to come to an immediate understanding with Russia, and to obtain in Bosnia some compensation for Austria.

No. 647.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 30, 1878.*

I HAVE communicated to M. Orczy substance of your Lordship's telegram to Lord A. Loftus, saying that I hoped it would convince Count Andrassy there was no ground for the impression he had derived from Count Beust's report of his conversation with your Lordship.

He said that the telegram appeared to give quite accurately the substance of the declaration Count Andrassy had wished Her Majesty's Government to make.

The Austrian communication to St. Petersburgh had been made in very similar terms, and the Russian Government had, in reply, given assurances that all questions affecting the Treaties shall be referred to the decision of a Conference of the Powers.

No. 648.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 30, 1878.*

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW told me this morning that no intelligence had reached Emperor or Russian Government from head-quarters since 26th instant. He could not explain cause, except that portions of telegraph were defective. Negotiations may have been delayed by movements of Grand Duke Nicholas, who was to arrive at Adrianople on the 26th at the earliest.

No. 649.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 30, 1878.*

I COMMUNICATED this morning substance of your Lordship's telegram of yesterday to Prince Gortchakow. His Highness replied that to effect an armistice certain bases of peace were necessary, but they are only to be considered as preliminaries, and not definitive as regarded Europe. His Highness stated categorically that questions bearing on European interests will be concerted with European Powers, and he had given clear and positive assurances to Her Majesty's Government to this effect.

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No. 650.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 30, 1878.*

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW, in reply to my inquiry this morning, stated that last Article of peace conditions communicated by Count Schouvaloff, referring to ulterior understanding in regard to Russian interests in Straits, was vague and unnecessary. He had no objection to suppress it altogether. He denied that it referred to an understanding between Russia and Turkey alone, and authorized me to state to your Lordship most categorically that Russia considered the question of Straits as a European question, which could only be settled in concert with European Powers.

No. 651.

Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, January 30, 1878.*

I HAVE given French Minister for Foreign Affairs a written memorandum containing your telegram of 9·30 P.M. He requires time to consult his colleagues about it.

With regard to a Conference, his information is that Russia and Germany are entirely opposed to one, and that Austria desires to attain her own objects by separate negotiation with Russia before resorting to one.

He has no information whatever about the armistice.

No. 652.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 30.)

(Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, January 30, 1878.*

HAVING read to M. Depretis Mr. Layard's telegram No. 132, relating to absence of all communication from Turkish Plenipotentiaries, and having stated that it looked to me as if the Russian object was to gain time so as to seize Constantinople, his Excellency replied that this could never be permitted. I asked him if Italy would join England in employing force to prevent her keeping it. He replied that he hoped the case would not arise, that the Emperor had given his word, that he could not answer so serious a question off-hand; but he did not give negative reply, again repeating that Russia must not be allowed to keep Constantinople, and admitted that, if England and Austria were to act together to prevent it, Italy would be in good company.

Your Lordship will please understand this conversation was quite unofficial; that the question I put was suggested by M. Depretis' own observation, which seemed to afford a favourable opportunity for endeavouring to ascertain what was to be expected from Italy in an extreme case.

No. 653.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 30, 5 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, January 30, 1878, 3·30 P.M.*

I HAVE embodied in a note your Lordship's instructions of yesterday evening relative to the non-recognition of the arrangements between Russia and Turkey, calculated to modify European Treaties so far as they are made subject of formal agreement among Parties to the Treaty of Paris, &c., and have delivered the same to M. Depretis.

His Excellency at first would only promise to give me a written answer to-morrow, but after some conversation he added that he would endeavour that the answer should be favourable, though he took no engagement.

No. 654.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 30, 1878.*

WITH reference to the Memorandum sent to you by Prince Gortchakow on the 15th instant, ask his Excellency if His Majesty's Government are authorized to give a pledge to the Turkish Government that the Russian forces will not occupy the Bulair lines if Turkish regular troops are not concentrated there.

No. 655.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 30, 1878, 4·20 P.M.*

COUNT SCHOUVALOFF states that no news of armistice being concluded has yet reached St. Petersburgh, and that Prince Gortchakow is surprised at the delay, and attributes it either to the distance or to an interruption of the field telegraph. The Prince says that the preliminaries of peace are not to be signed at Sebastopol, but at Adrianople. He repeats that the question of the passage of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus is reserved for agreement among the Powers

Count Schouvaloff's personal opinion is that the existing arrangement forbidding the passage to the vessels of war of all nationalities will be maintained.

No. 656.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 30, 1878, 6·5 P.M.*

A MEMORANDUM has been sent to Count Schouvaloff to-day stating that the Cabinet have seen with great anxiety and apprehension the near approach of the Russian forces to Constantinople, and that the Porte having accepted the bases of peace, whatever military necessity might formerly have existed for an occupation of the city has now ceased. Her Majesty's Government desired to repeat the friendly but earnest warning which they have more than once offered against a step which may have the most serious consequences.

No. 657.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 30, 1878, 4·45 P.M.*

WITH reference to your telegram of yesterday, I have never stated that Her Majesty's Government had no objection to the autonomy proposed by Russia for Bulgaria. What I said to Count Beust must have been completely misunderstood. Details can be sent later.

We are prepared to adhere to our Declaration of the 14th August and to all the assurances given by us.

No. 658.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 30, 1878, 5·30 P.M.*

WITH reference to latter part of your telegram of yesterday, Her Majesty's Government agree with that of Austria that there can now be no military reason for a Russian occupation of Constantinople, the bases of peace having been accepted by the Porte. Her Majesty's Government entertain the gravest objection to such an occupation, and are ready to join in an identic note expressing such objection. They would be glad to know what

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measures Austria would be prepared to take in the event of such a representation not being listened to.

No. 658*.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

(Telegraphic.)
(Secret.) *Foreign Office, January* 30, 6·30 P.M.

COMMUNICATE to Count Andrassy the following telegram sent to Lord A. Loftus to-day:—

"A Memorandum has been sent to Count Schouvaloff to-day stating that the Cabinet have seen with great anxiety and apprehension the near approach of the Russian forces to Constantinople, and that the Porte, having accepted the bases of peace, whatever military necessity might formerly have existed for an occupation of the city has now ceased.

"Her Majesty's Government desired to repeat the friendly but earnest warning which they have more than once offered against a step which may have the most serious consequences."

No. 659.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 30, 1878, 7·30 P.M.

COUNT BEUST informs me that in answer to an inquiry from Count Andrassy, the Italian Minister at Vienna stated that in the opinion of his Government the questions of territorial modifications and of the Straits ought to be settled with the concurrence of the Signatory Powers.

Count Andrassy explained to him the Austrian standpoint, and has no doubt that the Cabinet of Rome will accept it.

No. 660.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

(No. 66.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 30, 1878.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency, with reference to your telegram of yesterday's date, that I never stated to Count Beust that Her Majesty's Government had no objection to the autonomy proposed by Russia for Bulgaria. What I said must have been completely misunderstood by his Excellency.

I have to request your Excellency to inform Count Andrassy that Her Majesty's Government are prepared to adhere to their declaration of the 14th August, and to all the assurances that they have given.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 661.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

(No. 68.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 30, 1878.

WITH reference to the latter part of your Excellency's telegram of yesterday's date, I have to request your Excellency to inform Count Andrassy that Her Majesty's Government agree with the Austrian Government that there can now be no military reason for a Russian occupation of Constantinople, the bases of peace having been accepted by the Porte. Her Majesty's Government entertain the gravest objection to such an occupation, and are ready to join in an identic note to the Russian Government expressing such objection. Her Majesty's Government would be glad to know what measures the Austrian

Government would be prepared to take in the event of such a representation not being listened to by Russia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 662.

The Earl of Derby to Sir H. Elliot.

(No. 76.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 30, 1878.

I HAVE to state to your Excellency that Count Beust has informed me that in answer to an inquiry from Count Andrassy, the Italian Minister at Vienna stated that in the opinion of his Government the questions of territorial modifications and of the Straits ought to be settled with the concurrence of the Signatory Powers.

I have to add that Count Beust has further informed me that Count Andrassy explained to the Italian Minister the Austrian standpoint, and his Excellency has no doubt that the Cabinet of Rome will accept it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 663.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 116. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 30, 1878.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 26, Secret, of the 7th instant, reporting that Saïd Pasha had conveyed to you a message from the Sultan asking for your advice as to whether it was probable that the Porte might expect any assistance from England; and I have to express to your Excellency my approval of the reply which you requested Saïd Pasha to make to His Majesty as reported in your despatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 664.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 117.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 30, 1878.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 30 of the 8th instant reporting the manner in which you have explained to the Grand Vizier and to Server Pacha the policy of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the negotiations for peace, and I have to express to you my approval of the course taken by your Excellency in the difficult circumstances in which you were placed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 665.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 118.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 30, 1878.

I APPROVE the language employed by your Excellency on the occasion of your interview with Server Pasha, as reported in your despatch No. 16 of the 4th instant, relative to the nature of the good offices of Her Majesty's Government between Russia and Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

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No. 666.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 119.)
Foreign Office, January 30, 1878.

Sir,

I APPROVE the language employed by your Excellency in your conversation with Count Zichy, as reported in your despatch No. 15 of the 4th instant, relative to the urgent necessity for an armistice between Russia and Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 667.

The Earl of Derby to Mr. Layard.

(No. 133.)
Foreign Office, January 30, 1878.

Sir,

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to ascertain and report to me where the Turkish fleet is at present stationed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 668.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 88.)
Foreign Office, January 30, 1878.

My Lord,

I APPROVE the Memorandum communicated by you to Prince Gortchakow, copy of which is inclosed in your Excellency's despatch No. 50 of the 18th instant, conveying the inquiry whether his Excellency was willing to give an assurance to Her Majesty's Government that no Russian forces shall be sent to the peninsula of Gallipoli.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 669.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 90.)
Foreign Office, January 30, 1878.

My Lord,

I DELIVERED to the Russian Ambassador to-day the memorandum of which I inclose a copy,* reiterating the warning already given by Her Majesty's Government against the occupation of Constantinople by a Russian force.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

No. 670.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 92.)
Foreign Office, January 30, 1878.

My Lord,

WITH reference to the Memorandum communicated to you by Prince Gortchakow on the 15th instant, copy of which is inclosed in your Excellency's despatch No. 57 of the same day, I have to instruct you to inquire of his Excellency whether Her Majesty's Government are authorized to give a pledge to the Turkish Government that the Russian forces will not occupy the lines of Bulair if the Turkish regular troops are not concentrated there.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

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* No. 671.

No. 671.

Memorandum for Count Schouvaloff.

THE Cabinet have seen with great anxiety and apprehension the near approach of the Russian forces to Constantinople.

Whatever military necessity might formerly have existed for an occupation of that city has now ceased, the Porte having accepted the bases of peace.

Her Majesty's Government desire to repeat the friendly but earnest warning which they have more than once offered against a step which may have the most serious consequences.

Foreign Office, January 30, 1878.

No. 672.

Server Pasha to Musurus Pasha.—(Communicated to the Earl of Derby by Musurus Pasha, January 31.)

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le* 30 *Janvier*, 1878.

LA Sublime Porte a dû autoriser ses Plénipotentiaires à adhérer aux bases générales de la paix et de l'armistice, telles qu'elles ont été proposées par Son Altesse Impériale le Grand Duc Nicholas. Bien que cette autorisation ait été télégraphiée le 24 de ce mois, nous n'avons reçu jusqu'aujourd'hui aucune réponse de nos Plénipotentiaires. Ce délai apporté dans la conclusion de l'armistice, et qu'une rumeur publique attribue injustement au Gouvernement Impérial, a pour résultat la continuation des opérations militaires de la Russie qui n'ont plus, d'après nous, de raison d'être; et, en tout cas, elles ne peuvent avoir d'autre conséquence que d'augmenter les souffrances et l'émigration en masse de nos populations déjà si éprouvées. Veuillez vous énoncer officieusement dans ce sens auprès du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

No. 673.

Musurus Pasha to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 31.)

My Lord, *Ambassade Impériale Ottomane, Londres, le* 31 *Janvier*, 1878.

JE m'empresse de transmettre ci-joint à votre Excellence copie d'une dépêche télégraphique que je reçois à l'instant de mon Gouvernement, et par laquelle je suis invité à ne faire aucun usage de la dépêche précédente, datée d'hier, et dont j'ai donné communication à votre Excellence dans mon entrevue d'aujourd'hui, vu que, d'après une récente dépêche de nos Plénipotentiaires, les bases générales de l'armistice et de la paix seront signées aujourd'hui à Andrinople.

Votre très dévoué,
(Signé) MUSURUS.

Inclosure in No. 673.

Server Pasha to Musurus Pasha.

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le* 31 *Janvier*, 1878.

COMME d'après un récent télégramme de nos Plénipotentiaires les bases générales de l'armistice et de la paix seront signées aujourd'hui à Andrinople, je vous prie de ne faire aucun usage de mon télégramme d'hier et de la considérer comme nul et non avenu.

No. 674.

Sir A. Paget to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 31, 3·45 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Rome, January* 31, 1878, 1·20 P.M.

FROM a conversation with Count Tornielli yesterday afternoon, it was unlikely that an answer to my note asking Italian Government to join the declaration respecting the European Treaty rights will be answered to-day. The line of Italy on this, as well as on

every other important question of foreign policy, will be probably chiefly guided by what is said at Berlin.

No. 675.

The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 31, 1878, 4·15 P.M.

HER Majesty's Government have received with satisfaction the statement telegraphed by you yesterday that Prince Gortchakow had no objection to suppressing altogether the Article of the Peace Conditions referring to an understanding between Russia and Turkey in regard to the Straits. They would be glad to learn that the Russian Government had suppressed it accordingly.

No. 676.

Sir H. Elliot to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January* 31, 1878.

I COMMUNICATED to Count Andrassy your Lordship's Memorandum to Count Schouvaloff respecting advance of Russian troops towards Constantinople, and asked him what measures the Austrian Government would be prepared to adopt if an attack upon the capital seemed imminent.

He said that a Russian entry into Constantinople was not one of the points on which the two Governments had agreed to support each other, and that although he shared the objections to it of Her Majesty's Government, it would be necessary for England to be "one length" in advance of Austria in any steps to be taken.

The case would be reversed in regard to a proposed Russian occupation of Bulgaria after peace, about which also there is no agreement between our two Governments, but which Austria must oppose even if not supported by us.

My impression is that, if it suited Her Majesty's Government to add these two points to others already agreed upon, Count Andrassy would probably be ready to do so, and the support of Austria would thus be secured for any measures we might adopt in regard to Constantinople.

No. 677.

Mr. Scott to the Earl of Derby.—(Received January 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Darmstadt, January* 31, 1878.

EMPEROR of Russia informed Prince Alexander of Hesse by telegraph to-day that he had received telegram from the Sultan accepting peace.

No. 678.

*The Earl of Derby to Lord A. Loftus.**

(No. 88.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 31, 1878.

I HAVE received your Excellency's telegram of yesterday relative to the last Article of the conditions of peace communicated by Count Schouvaloff on the 25th instant, referring to an understanding between Russia and Turkey in regard to the Straits; and I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government have received with satisfaction the statement that Prince Gortchakow had no objection to suppressing altogether the Article in question, and that they would be glad to learn that the Russian Government had suppressed it accordingly.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.

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* Substance telegraphed.

END

No. 679.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Lyons.

(No. 71. Secret.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 31, 1878.

WITH reference to that part of your Excellency's telegram of the 30th instant which refers to the information which had reached the French Government that Russia and Germany are opposed to a Conference, I have to state to your Excellency that Sir H. Elliot reports by telegram, under the same date, that the Austrian communication to St. Petersburgh respecting the ultimate arrangement of certain matters by a Conference had been made in very similar terms to that of Her Majesty's Government, and that the Russian Government, in reply thereto, had given assurances that all questions respecting the Treaties shall be referred to the decision of a Conference of the Powers.

I am, &c.
(Signed) DERBY.